

THE DAILY PATRIOT AND UNION will be served to subscribers... The Weekly Patriot and Union is published at two dollars per annum in advance.

Patriot Union

HARRISBURG, PA., WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1863. PRICE TWO CENTS.

RATES OF ADVERTISING. Four lines or less constitute half a square. Ten lines or more than four, constitute a square.

Miscellaneous. PENSIONS, BOUNTIES, BACK PAY, War Claims and Claims for Indemnity.

STEWART, STEVENS, CLARK & CO., Attorneys and Counsellors-at-Law, and Solicitors for all kinds of Military Claims.

JACKSON & CO.'S SHOESTORE, No. 90 1/2 MARKET STREET, HARRISBURG, PA.

BOOTS AND SHOES. All kinds of articles, in the newest and most fashionable styles, and at satisfactory prices.

MURINGER'S PATENT BEEF TEA, A solid, concentrated, and nutritious article.

BEANS AND VEGETABLES. Convertible immediately into a nourishing and delicious soup.

FOR TRAVELERS, by land or sea, who can thus avoid those accidental deprivations of a comfortable meal.

CHAR OAK FAMILY FLOUR! UNEXCELLED IN ANY OF THE STATES!

FANCY BRANDS OFFERED IN PENNSYLVANIA! IT IS MADE OF CHOICE MISSOURI WHITE WHEAT.

SOLDIER'S CAMP COMPANION. A very convenient Writing Desk; also, Portfolios, Memorandum Books, Portmanteaus, &c.

CHEESE!—100 Boxes Prime Cheese (on consignment) for sale at less than market rate.

NOTIONS. Quite a variety of useful and entertaining articles—cheap—at SOEPPERS' BOOKSTORE.

WANTED—A GOOD COOK at the BOMGARDNER HOTEL. Apply immediately.

CLARET WINE!!!—We are closing out a very superior lot of claret wine.

PRIME POTATOES—A LARGE LOT just received and for sale low.

MINCE MEAT—Very superior, just received and for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

CONDENSED MILK—Just received and for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

HERMETICALLY SEALED Peaches, Tomatoes, Apples, Quinces, Spiced Oysters, for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

SMOKED HALIBUT!—A very choice article, just received and for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

FRENCH MUSTARD, ENGLISH and Superior Sals Oils, Ketchup, Sauces and condiments of every description, for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

LAKE TROUT!—A small invoice of LAKE TROUT, (Macdonald's), trimmed, and the quality "A. N. O. 1." just received and for sale very low.

WAR! WAR!—BRADY, No. 62 Market street, below Third, has received a large assortment of Swords, Sabres and Belts, which will sell very low.

SELF SEALING FRUIT JARS!—Best and Cheapest in the market! Gall and Quarts.

Business Cards. DR. C. WEICHEL, SURGEON AND OCULIST, RESIDENCE THIRD NEAR NORTH STREET.

W. M. H. MILLER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, OFFICE IN SHOEMAKER'S BUILDING, SECOND STREET.

THOS. C. MACDOWELL, ATTORNEY AT LAW, MILITARY CLAIM AND PATENT AGENT, Office in Burke's Row, Third street, (Up Stairs).

CHARLES F. VOLLMER, UPHOLSTERER, Chestnut street, four doors above Second, (Opposite Washington Horse House).

SILAS WARD, No. 11, NORTH THIRD ST., HARRISBURG.

STEINWAY'S PIANOS, MELODIONS, VIOLINS, GUITARS, Banjos, Flutes, Fifes, Drums, Accordions.

PHOTOGRAPH FRAMES, ALBUMS, Large Photo and Mantle Mirrors, Square and Oval Frames of every description made to order.

JOHN W. GLOVER, MERCHANT TAILOR! Has just received from New York, an assortment of SEASONABLE GOODS, which he offers to his customers and the public at MODERATE PRICES.

SMITH & EWING, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, THIRD STREET, Harrisburg, Practice in the several Courts of Dauphin county.

J. COOK, Merchant Tailor, 27 CHESTNUT ST., between Second and Front, Has just returned from the city with an assortment of CLOTHS, CASSIMERES AND VESTINGS.

DENTISTRY. B. M. GLIDE, D. D. S., No. 119 MARKET STREET, RBY & KUNKEL'S BUILDING, UP STAIRS.

RELIGIOUS BOOK STORE, TRACT AND SUNDAY SCHOOL DEPOSITORY, E. S. GERMAN, 27 SOUTH SECOND STREET, ABOVE CHESTNUT, HARRISBURG, PA.

JOHN G. W. MARTIN, FASHIONABLE CARD WRITER, HERRN HOTEL, HARRISBURG, PA.

FRANKLIN HOUSE, BALTIMORE, MD. This pleasant and commodious Hotel has been thoroughly re-fitted and re-furnished.

THEO. F. SCHEFFER, BOOK, CARD AND JOB PRINTER, No. 18 MARKET STREET, HARRISBURG.

DIYOTTVILLE GLASS WORKS, PHILADELPHIA, MANUFACTURER OF GARBOYS, DEMIJOHNS, WINE, PORTER, MINERAL WATER, PICKLES AND PRESERVE BOTTLES.

MUSIC STORE! No. 92 MARKET STREET, HARRISBURG, PA. SHEET MUSIC, PIANOS, MELODIONS, GUITARS, VIOLINS, BANJO STRINGS, DRUMS, VIOLAS, FLUTES, ACCORDIONS, etc.

A BOOK FOR THE TIMES! American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events for the Year 1861. In 1 vol. 8vo. over 750 pages. Cloth, \$3. Leather \$5.00.

W. M. DOCK, Jr. & Co. PRIME POTATOES—A LARGE LOT just received and for sale low.

MINCE MEAT—Very superior, just received and for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

CONDENSED MILK—Just received and for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

HERMETICALLY SEALED Peaches, Tomatoes, Apples, Quinces, Spiced Oysters, for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

SMOKED HALIBUT!—A very choice article, just received and for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

FRENCH MUSTARD, ENGLISH and Superior Sals Oils, Ketchup, Sauces and condiments of every description, for sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

LAKE TROUT!—A small invoice of LAKE TROUT, (Macdonald's), trimmed, and the quality "A. N. O. 1." just received and for sale very low.

WAR! WAR!—BRADY, No. 62 Market street, below Third, has received a large assortment of Swords, Sabres and Belts, which will sell very low.

SELF SEALING FRUIT JARS!—Best and Cheapest in the market! Gall and Quarts.

FOR RENT—Two desirable OFFICE ROOMS, second story front of Wyeth's Building, corner of Market Square and Market street, apply to Wm. Doak, Jr. & Co.

MAKEREILL! No. 1, 2 and 3, in all sized packages, at a each package warranted. Just received, and on sale by WM. DOCK, Jr. & Co.

The Patriot & Union.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, APRIL 8 1863

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

The report of Messrs. Wade, Chandler, &c., is at length given. Instead of being on the conduct of the war, it is an inquisition into the conduct of President, Secretaries and Generals. We can only make extracts.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. On the 24th and 25th of June Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he is informed by deserters and contrabands that Jackson is contemplating an attack upon his right and rear.

"Received 8.50, p. m. 'McClellan's, June 25, 6 15, p. m. 'I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson. Say what you please, but I do not believe in the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reinforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of man to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements to that point, the decision point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command; and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

"Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for reinforcements.

"Gen. B. McClellan, Major Gen'l. 'Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.' The answer of the President is as follows: 'WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862. 'Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

"The latter of 6.15 p. m., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, talking of whom the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, I shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can. 'A. LINCOLN.

"On the afternoon of the 24th of June, between 2 and 3 o'clock, the enemy in considerable force, made a vigorous attack upon the troops of Gen. McClellan's division, stationed at Mechanicsville, consisting of the two brigades of Seymour and Reynolds. The action lasted until midnight, when the enemy were repulsed. Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to the assistance of those engaged; but they were not in the battle, though some of them were in position to support the right of the line.

"About 12 o'clock that night the troops were ordered to fall back to Gaines's Mill, which was accomplished without loss.

"On the 27th the battle of Groves Mill was fought principally by the troops under Gen. Porter. Our forces there engaged were from 27,000 to 30,000; the force of the enemy being from two to three times that number. The enemy were in such superior force that, although our troops fought with exceeding bravery, they were driven back with a loss of about 9,000, in killed, wounded and missing.

"General McClellan was questioned as to the policy of leaving the right wing, consisting of only about 30,000 men, to meet the attack of the superior force of the enemy, instead of withdrawing it to the right bank of the Chickahominy before the battle of Gaines's Mill. His testimony on that point is as follows: 'Question. Whatever might have been the intention of the enemy, as the attack was to be made by him, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on the same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaines's Mill? 'Answer. I do not think they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were.

"Question. What advantage was gained by leaving the right wing of our army to be attacked by a greatly superior force? 'Answer. It prevented the enemy from getting on our flank and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its material.

"Question. Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our army at or about the time the left was engaged which saved our flank from attack and enabled the army and its material to be withdrawn? 'Answer. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great a loss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the way.

"During the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill all our forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, at the next day's movement to the James river was determined upon. General Heintzelman testified that the night after that battle he was sent for by General McClellan; that he found everything packed, ready to leave; that General McClellan said there were two things to be done—to concentrate his forces and to get on a battle, or to withdraw to the James river; that he risked a battle here, and was driven back by the army of the enemy. General Heintzelman advised him not to risk a battle under such circumstances, for if that army was lost the cause would be lost; that it were better to go to the James river and await reinforcements.

"General McClellan replied that he was of opinion himself, and that was determined upon. That night, at 12 30 a. m. General McClellan telegraphed the Secretary of War that he (G. W. McClellan) is not responsible for the result, but feels that the government has not sustained his army.

"T. is the President's reply, on the 29th:— 'If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in

Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you.

"I will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day."

"The retreat to the James river having been decided upon, the army took up its march, being attacked by the enemy in the daytime, and however successful in repelling those attacks, evacuating their positions during the night. The actions of Savage's Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought during the movement of the army to the James, the enemy being repulsed in each day's fighting, and our army falling back, under orders, during the night.

"On the 2d of July the President telegraphs to General McClellan: 'Your despatch of yesterday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. It is this hope which I wish to reason with you for a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you must surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you made papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defence of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now, please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of General Fremont's in the valley; all of General Banks'; all of General McDowell's not with you; and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. Gen. Wool and Gen. Dix added to those mentioned. I have not outside of your army 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you had the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me.

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can."

"On the 3d of July after the army had reached Harrison's Bar, General McClellan writes to the Secretary of War: 'I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely worn out as we are; he was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. * * * It is, of course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I doubt whether they are to-day more than 50,000 men with their colors.

"To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond, and putting an end to this rebellion, reinforcements should be sent to me rather much over than less than 100,000 men. I can report that the reinforcement of the army while at Harrison's Landing, the testimony of General McClellan is as follows: 'Question. How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Bar, and how many more would you have required in order to undertake a movement successfully upon Richmond? 'Answer. I think I had about 85,000 or 90,000 men at Harrison's Bar, and would have undertaken another movement in advance with about 20,000 more reinforcements. My view was, that pretty much everything that the government could have controlled ought to have been massed on the James river. I did not believe that the enemy would trouble Washington so long as we had a powerful army in the vicinity of Richmond, and did not share the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that was entertained by a great many.

"I asked for 50,000 men at first, on the ground that I thought the army should be made as strong as possible, and as little as possible left to chance. When Gen. Halleck came down to Harrison's Bar, my recollection is that he said that 20,000 men, or something like that number, was all that could be had, and I said that I would try it again with that number. I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period for a greater number than 20,000 as a necessary preliminary to a movement.

"Question. About how many men had been lost from the 25th of June until you reached Harrison's Bar, in killed, wounded, and missing? 'Answer. I think the loss was about 14,000; but I could not tell positively without looking at the returns.

"Question. Will you state in what you think your chances for success would have been greater, with the addition of 20,000 men to the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than they were in front of Richmond, and be fore Jackson had formed a junction with the rest of the enemy's forces? 'Answer. I should have counted upon the effect of the battles, which had just taken place, upon the enemy. We had then strong reasons to believe that the enemy's losses had been very much heavier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern Hill.

"(In closing his report upon the campaign of the Peninsula, the committee would refer to the report of Gen. John G. Barnard, chief of engineers of the Army of the Potomac during that campaign, a report of which seems to have been got up to order for the committee, and in which Gen. Barnard takes back his former opinions.)

COOPERATION WITH GEN. POPE. [Note. This is the Committee's own heading. They evidently are investigating the conduct of McClellan, not of the war. They say nothing about the conduct of Pope.]

"At 10 a. m., August 27, General Halleck telegraphs General McClellan that Franklin's corps should march in that direction [Manassas] as soon as possible." At 10.40, a. m. General McClellan replies: "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here (Alexandria) corps at once, and to repair here (Alexandria) corps at once, and to repair here (Alexandria) corps at once."

"At 12 m. on the same day Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: 'Telegram from Gen. Porter to Gen. Burnside, just received, says that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, and Kiecker, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton to reinforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions by railroad.'

"At 12 m. on the same day Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: 'Telegram from Gen. Porter to Gen. Burnside, just received, says that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, and Kiecker, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton to reinforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions by railroad.'

"From Gen. McClellan to General Halleck, August 27, 12.5 p. m., received 1.40 p. m.: 'McClellan has just returned from General Franklin's camp. Reports that Generals Franklin, Smith and Reno, are all in Washington. He goes to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once.' From same to same, sent 1.15 p. m., received 1.10 p. m.: 'Franklin's artillery has no horses except four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be

well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense. I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough on hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?'

"At 1.50 p. m. Gen. Halleck replies: 'Yes; I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding officer at Edwards Ferry asks for cavalry. Have you any to spare him? The enemy seems to be trying to turn Pope's right. Is there no way of communicating with him?'

"On the morning of the 28th of August Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Franklin: 'On paring with Gen. McClellan, about two o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day, toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this.'

"At 1.05 p. m. of the same day, the 28th, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck: 'Your despatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go. Please see Barnard, and be sure the works toward Chain Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon those works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance.'

"At 3.30 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: 'Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reinforced.'

"At 4.45 p. m. Gen. McClellan replies: 'Your despatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aides to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler, but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent. I repeat, that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out.'

"At 8.40 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: 'There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief.'

"At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 'Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at six (6) o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery here.'

"At 10.30 a. m., of the 29th, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck: 'Franklin's corps is in motion; started about six (6) a. m. I am giving him two squadrons of cavalry. If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much alone. What shall be done? Have but three squadrons belonging to Army of Potomac? Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders last night.'

"At 12 m. General McClellan telegraphs: 'Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? If so, I will send some ammunition and without transportation.'

"In another dispatch of same date he telegraphs: 'Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?'

"At 3 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan: 'I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get some information at Anandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.'

"At 2.40 p. m. the President asks of General McClellan: 'What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What, generally?'

"At 2.45 p. m., received 3.30 p. m., General McClellan replies: 'The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centerville and retreating towards Warrenton. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing but what obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.'

"At 4.10 p. m., the President replies: 'Years of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to-wit: to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope, is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsel.'

"At 7.50 p. m., Gen. Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan: 'You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all the news I have. Investigate and report the fact of this disobe- dience, that corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communication with Manassas.'

"To this General McClellan replies at 8 p. m., received 8.50 p. m.: 'It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, and the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions,

as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion committed to me.'

"At 10 p. m., General McClellan telegraphs: 'Not having from you, I have sent word to General Franklin to place himself in communication with General Pope, by advancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies.'

"At 10 p. m., General McClellan forwards to General Halleck a dispatch received from Gen. Franklin, at Anandale, dated 7.15 p. m., in which General Franklin gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, closing thus: 'Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country will not support him.'

"At 5 a. m., of the 30th of August, General Pope sent a dispatch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3.20 p. m., from the battle-field near Groveton, Va., containing an account of the battle of that day before, and closing as follows: 'I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's and Sturgis's regiments to Centerville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from Gen. Franklin, written by order of Gen. McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centerville?'

"At 9.40, a. m., August 30, Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: 'I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march on to Centerville, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department could have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly.'

"At 11 a. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 'Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court House, if this is the route you wish them to take. I have sent word to Gen. Halleck to instruct to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?'

"At 12.20 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: 'I think Couch should lead at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. * * * Send transports to Aquia to bring up Burnside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am awaiting his answer.'

"At 2.15 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: 'Franklin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible despatch. I must see their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything.'

"At 5 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck: 'Major Hammerstein, of my staff, reports, from two miles this side of Centerville, at 1.30 p. m., that Franklin's corps was then advancing rapidly. Sumner's corps moved at 1.45 p. m. The orderly who brought the dispatch from Hammerstein states that he learned that the fighting commenced five miles beyond Centerville, and that our people had been driving them back. Hammerstein says all he learned was favorable.'

"At 10 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: 'All of Sumner's corps on the south side of the river, not actually required in the fortis, should march to Pope's relief. Replace them with new regiments. Franklin should also be hurried on to reinforce Pope.'

"On the same day—August 30, hour not given—Gen. McClellan sent the following to General Halleck: 'Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uniformly told by the quartermasters here that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured twenty wagons to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of General Banks' supply train for that purpose.

"General Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, by application upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it.

"I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency.

"Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermaster last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under an escort at one a. m. via Alexandria.

"Every effort has been made to carry out your instructions promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermaster, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you.'

[CONCLUDED TO-MORROW.] Does it not look remarkably noble and dignified to see the President of the United States come down from his high office to the level of black Republican street and rag-shop loafers, and brand a great party of his fellow citizens as "Copperheads" and "rebels," as is done in the order, which we published last week, discharging Lieut. A. J. Edgerly from service for "circulating Copperhead tickets" at our last election? Does not every true American citizen feel humiliated almost beyond endurance, that the Presidential office should be so degraded? It is unparalleled in our history.

We hope the administration will not have the unblushing impudence and audacity to call upon any of those who have voted or "circulated" what is called "Copperhead tickets," to do any more fighting in this war. If they are unfit to act in the capacity of lieutenants, they certainly are not fit for private soldiers in the ranks.—States and Union.

The Providence Post says Democracy found just one enemy in Rhode Island, namely—money. A single corporation promised fifty thousand dollars to secure a Republican triumph in the Eastern Congressional District, and the Post believes the money was given and used.

The Republicans are very jubilant over the election of their candidate for Governor in Rhode Island, but as their late Governor fired a salute