Daily patriot and union. (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1858-1868, April 07, 1863, Image 1

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American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of
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Cite atria it anion+
GENERAL : I have the honor to submit a
preliminary report of the military operations
under my charge since the evacuation of Har
rison's Landing.
The measure directed by the General-in-
Chief was executed successfully, with entire
safety to my command end its material, be
tween the 14th and 19th of August. The line
of withdrawal selected was that of the mouth
of the Chiokahominy, Williamsburg and York
town. Upon this line the main body of the
army, with all its train, was moved, Reintzle
man's seeps crossing the Chiokahominy at
Jones' bridge, and covering by its march the
movement of the main column. The passage
of the Lower Chiokahominy was effected by
means of a batteau bridge two thousand feet
in length.• The transfer of the army to York
town was completed by the 19th of August.
The embarkati .n of the troops and material at
Yorktown and Fortress Monroe was at once
commenced, and as rapidly as the means of
transportation admitted everything was sent
forward to Acquia creek and Alexandria No
mere sketch of an undertaking of such mag
nitude, and yet of so delicate a military char
acter will suffice to do justice. I must now,
however, content myself with a simple notice
of it ; deferring a full description for my offi
cial report of the campaign before Richmond—
a labor which I propose to undertake as soon
as events will aff..rd me the necessary time.
Justice to the achievements of the Army of
the Potomac and the brave men who composed
it requires that the official record of that cam
paign should be prepared with more care than
cireunistaneea have hitherto permitted me to
bestow upon it. The delay will not have been
felt as injurious to the' public interest, inas
much se by frequent reports from time to time
I have kept the department advised of events
as they occurred.
T reached Acquia creek with my staff on the
24th of August, reported my arrival, and asked
for orders. On the 27th of August. I received,
from the General-in-Chief, peratission to pro
' teed to Alexandria, where I'at once fixed my
headquarters: The troops composing the
Army of the Potomac were meanwhile ordered
torward to reinforce the army under General
Pope. So complete was this order carried out
that on the 30th of August I had remaining
under my command only a camp guard of about
one hundred men Everything else bad been
sent to reinforce Generat Pope. In addition, I
exhausted all the means at my disposal to for
ward supplies to that officer, my own•head
querters teams even being used for that pur
Upon the unfortunate issue of that campaign
I received an intimation from the GAnerat in.
Chief that my services were desired for the
pnrposif of arranging for the defence of the
capital. They were at once cheerfully given,
although, while awaiting definite instrueliotis
at Alexandria, I had endeavored, as just seen,
to promote a favorable result in the operations
then pending, and had•thus coptrilbuted, t hough
indirectly, yet as far as I could, to the defen , e
of Washington. On the 2d of September the .
formal order of the War Department placed
me in command of the fortifications of Wash
ington "and of all the troops for the defence
of the capital" On the let of September I.
had been instructed that I had nothing to do
with the troops engaged in active operations
wider General Pope, but th'►t my command
was limited to the immediate garrison of Wash
ington. On the next day, however, I was ver
bally instructed by the President, and the
General in Chief to asettme command of Gen.
Pope's troops (including my own Army of the
Potomac) as soon as they approached the vi
cinity of Washington, to go out and meet them,
and to post them as Ideemed best to repulse
the enemy and insure the safety of the city.
At this time the task imposed upon me was
limited to the dispositions necessary to resist
a direct attack of the enemy upon the capital.
Such. indeed, was the danger naturally it di
cued by the defeat of our forces in front. The
various garrisons were at once strengthened
and put in order, and the troops were disposed
to cover all the approaches to the city, aud so
as to be readily thrbwn upon threatened points.
New d •fences were thrown up where deemed
necessary. A few di) s only had elapsed he
fore a comparative security was felt 'with re
gard to our ability to resist any attack upon
the city. The disappearance of the enen.y
from the front of Washington, and thier passage
into Maryland, enlarged the ephere ot opera
tions. and made an active campaign necessary
to cover Baltimore, prevint the invasion ot
Pennsylvania and drive them out. of Mar)land.
Being honored wi , h the charge of the cam
paign, I entered at once upon the additional
duties imposed upon me with cheerfulness and
trust, yet not without feeling the weight. of the
responsibilities thus assumed. aud being deep
ly impressed with the magnitude of the isines
11 tving made the necessary arrangements
for the defence of the city in the new eondi
tion of things, I pushed forward the First an
Ninth corps, under Gene. Reno and Hooker,
forming the right wing. under General Burn
side, to Leesburg, on the tith instant ; thence
the First corps. by Brookville, C. okesville and
Rideevllle, to Frederick ; and the Ninth corp.,
by Damascus, on New Market aud Fredet ice.
The Second and Eleventh corps, tinder G,fis.
Sumer and Williams, on the 6 , h were moved
from Tenallytown to Rockville; thence by
Middleburg and Urbana, on Frederick, the
Eleventh corps, moving by a lateral road be
tween 'Urbana mid New Market, thus maintain
ing the cetomunication between the centre and
right wing as atll as covering the direct, route
from Frederick to Washington. The Shutt
corps, under General Frank in, was moved to
Darnestown on the 6th intottot, thence by Dew
annville and Burnsville on Buckey to own, cover
ing the road from the mouth of the nonocacy
to Rockville, and being in potation to connect
with and support the centre, should it hive
been necessary (as was euppoaed) to force the
line of the Mononacy. C uch's division was
thrown forward to. Oliut's Cress Roads and
Ponlesville by the river road. thus' covering
that approach, watching the fords of the it
mae ; and ultimitely fellowitig and supporting
the Sixth corps. no objects of thee move
ments was to feel the enemy—to compel him
to develop hie intentions—at the same time
that the troops were in email mt.:evilly to cover
Baltimore er Washin gton , to attack him should
he hold the line of the Mittonacy. or to follow
him into Pennsylvania if necessary. On the
12 it a portion of the right wing entered Fred
erick, after a brisk skirmish at the on - skirts
agile city and in its streets. On the nil the
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October 15. 1862. 5
FisßutlG, TUFSDAY, APRIL 7. 1863.
main bodies of the right wing and centre pas
sed through Frederick, in this city the mani
festations of Union feeling were abundant and
gratifying. The troops received the most
enthusiastic welcome at the bands of the in
habitants. Oa the 18th the advance, consisting
of Pleasanton's cavalry and horse artillery,
after some skirmishing, cleared the main pas
sage over the Catoctin hills, leaving no serious
obstruction to the movement of the main body
until the base of the South Mountain range
was reached.
While at Frederick, on the 13th, I obtained
reliable information of the movement and In
tentions of the enemy, which made it clear that
it was neocessary to force the passage of the
South Mountain range, and gain possession of
Boonsboro and Rohrersville before any relief
could be afforded to Harper's Ferry.
On the morning of the 131 k I received a
verbal message from Col. Miles, commanding
at Harper's Ferry, informing me that on the
preceding afternoon the Maryland Heights had
been abandoned, after repelling an attack by
the rebels, and that the whole force was con
centrated at Harper's Ferry, the Maryland,
Loudon and Bolivar Heights being all in pos
session of the enemy. The messenger stated
that there was no apparent reason for the
abandonment of the Maryland Heights, and
that, though Colonel Miles asked for assistance,
he said he could hold out certainly two days.
I directed him to make his way bank, if pos
sible, with the information that I was rapidly
approaching, and would undoubtedly relieve
the place. By three other couriers I sent the
same message, with the order to hold out to the
I do not learn that any of these messengers
succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. I
should here state that on the 12th 1 was direeted to
assume command of the garrison at Harper's Ferry,
but this order reached me after all communication
with the garrison was cut of.. Before I lett Wash
ington, and while it was yet time,l reocommend
ed to the proper authoriVes that the garrison
of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawal, via
Hagerstown, to aid in Covering the Cumber
land valley or that, taking up the pontoon
bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it
should tall back to the Maryland Heights, and
there hold its own to the last. In this position
it could have maintained itself for weeks. It
was not deemed proper to adopt either of these sug
gestions. and when the subject wus left to rny dis•
cretion it was to late to do anything except to try
to relieve the garrison.
I directed artillery to be frequently fired by
our advanced guards as a signal to the garri
son that relief was at hand.. This was done,
and I learn that. our firing was distinctly heard
at Harper's Ferry, and that they were thus
mode aware that we were approaching rapidly.
It was confidently expected that. this place
could hold out until we had carried the moun
tains and were in a position to make a detach
meat for its lend. The left, therefote, was
ordered to move through Jefferson to the South
Mountain. at Cramptun'e Pass, in front of
Burket. stride, while the centre or right moved
upon the main or Turner's Pass, in front of
Middletown. Du ing these movements I had
not impoeed long marches on the columns:—
The ansolute necessity of refitting and giving
some little rest to troops worn down by pre
vious long continued marching and severe
fighting, together with the uncertainty as to
the actual po.irion, strengta and intentions of
the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon me to
move slowly an I cautiously until the head
quarters real. hed Urbana, where I first obtained
reltoble information that
.the enemy's object
was to move upon Harper's Ferry and the
Cumberland volley, and not upon Baltimore,
Wa h ngi on or Ge.tysburg.
In the abscenee of the full reports of corps
command -re, a simple outline of the brilliant
operations which resulted in the carrying of
the two passes through the South Mouniein is
all that can at this time, with justice to the
troops and commanders engaged, be furnished.
The South Mountain range, near Turner's
Nei,' averages perhaps a housand feet. in
height, told forms a strong natural military
barrier. The practicable passes are not nu
merous, and are readily defensible. the gaps
aboundiog in fine positions. Turner's Pass .is
the wore promineut., being that by which the
national road eremites the mountain. It was
necessarily indicated at'.the route of advance
of OUT wall army.
The earryii.g of Crampton's Pass. five or six
miles below, was also ireport••nt to furnish the
means of teaching the flank of the enemy, and
having, as a lateral movemen . , direct relaiims
the attack on the principal pass, while it' at
the same time presented the most. direct. prac
ticable route fur the relief of Harper's Ferry.
s•sly in the morning of September 14, Gen.
Pleasanton. with a cavalry force, reconnoitered
the position qt the emeiny, when he discovered
them to occupy the crests or commanding hills
in the gap on either elide of the natioual road,
and up•ta advantageous ground in the centre
upon and near the road, with artillery bearing
upon the approaches to their position, whether
that by the Maio road or those by the country
roads, which led around up to the crest upon
the right and left. At about 8 o'clock, A. M.,
Cue's diel,ton of Reno's corps, e• portion of
Burnt.ide's column, in co operation with the
reconnoissance, whirl' by this time had become
an attack, moved up the mountain by the old
Snarpeburg road to the left of the main road,
d viding as they ativanoed into two columns.
These columns (Seanimon's and Cook's bri
gade-) baildsoniely carrier the enemy's posi
tion ou the crest in their front, which gave us
possesion of an important point f..r further
operations. Fresh tiudiee of the enemy now
appearing, Cux's position, though held stub•
bornly, bectme critical. and between 12 and 1
o'clock. r. u , Wileox'e division of Riwo's
corps was emit forward hy Gen Burnside to
support Cux, and between 2 and 8 r. it., Stur
gis' division was sent. up.
.The (-tiniest was maintained with perseve
rance until dark, the enemy having she adean
tags as to pi-itton, end figoting with obstinacy;
hut the ground won was fully maintained The
loss in kilett and wouu•ted here was cons,d-r
a •le on both tides, and it was h. ro that elslir
General Reno, who had gone forward to'ob
serve the operations of his corpa and to give
such direntions as were necessary, feu pierced
wit h a musket hall. The loss of this hr &w and
distinguished otHrer tempered with sadness the
exit' silting of triumph A gallant soldier, an
able gen. ral, endeared to his troops atol as
sociates, his death is lelt as an Irreparable
About. three o'clock P. M. Hooker's corpe, of
Burnside's column, moved up to the right of
the main road by a country road, which, ben
ding to the Heir, then tur,.iug up to the left,
circuitously wound its way hry•tnd the crest
of the pass to the Mountain House, oa the
main read Getieral Hooker sent Meade, with
the divisten of Pennsylvania Reserves, to at
tack the eminence to the right of this e ntrance
to the asp. which was done most handsomely
and suee.soully.
Petri k's t nizade , of Hatch's division, was
sent—one portion up around the road, to turn
the hill on the left, while the remainder ad
vanced as skirmishers—up the hill, and °eau
.pied the ereet, supported by Doubleday's and
Phelp's hrigsdes The movement, after a Sharp
cent est.ou the crest and in the fields in the de-
pression between the crest and the adjoining
hill, was fully successful.
Ricketts' division pressed up the mountain
about 6 P. M., arriving at the crest with, the
left of his command in time to participate in
the closing,scene of the engagement. Re
lieving Hatch's division, Ricketts remained on
the ground, holding the battle field during the
night. Me mountain aides thus gallantly
passed oder by Hooker on the right.of the gap
and Reno on the left were steep and difficult
in the extreme. We could make but little use
of our artillery, while our troops were subject
to a warm artillery fire, as well as to that of
infantry in the woods and under cover. By
order of General Burnside, Gibbon's brigade
of Hatch's division, late in the afternoon, ad
vanced upon the centre of the enemy's position
on the main road. Deploying his brigade,
Gibbon actively engaged a superior force of
the enemy, which, though stubbornly resisting,
was steadily pressed batik until some hours
after dark, when Gibbon remained in undis
turbed possession of the field. He was then
relieved by a brigade of Sedgwick's division.
Finding themselves outflanked both on the
right and left, the enemy abandoned their po
sition during the night, leaving their dead and
wounded on the field, and hastily retreated
down the mountain.
In the engagement at Turner's Pass our loss
was three hundred and twenty-eight killed, and
one thousand four hundrefl and sixty-three
wounded and missing; that of the enemy is
estimated to be in all about three thousand.
Among our wounded, I regret to say, were Bri
gadier General J. P. Hatch and other valuable
The carrying of Crampton's Pass by Frank
lin was executed rapidly and decisively.—
Slocum's division was formed upon the right
of the road leading through the right of the
gap, Smith's upon the left. A line, formed of
Bartlett's and Torbitt's brigades, supported by
Newton, whose activity was conspicuous (all
of Slocum's division,) advanced steadily upon
the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy
were driven from their position at the base of
the mountain. where they were protected by a
stone wall, and steadily forced back up the
mountain until they reached / the position of
their battery near the road, well up the moun
tain. Here they made a stand. They were,
however, driven back, retiring their artillery
in echelon until, after an action of three hours,
the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily
fled sown the mountain on the other side. On
the left of the road Biooks' and Irvin's brig
ades, of Smith's division, formed for the pro
tection of Sloeum's talk, charged up the
mountain in the same steady manner, driving
the enemy before them until the crest was car
ried. The loss in Franklin's corps was one
hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and
sixteen wounded and two missing. The enemy's
loss was about the same. One piece of artillery
and four colors were captured, and knapsacks,
and even haversacks, were abandoned as the
enemy were driven up the bill.
On the morning of the 15th I was informed
by Union civilians living on the side of the
mountains that the enemy were retreating in
the greatest haste and in disordered masses to
the river. There was such a concurrence of
testimony on this point that there seemed no
doubt as to the fact. The hasty retreat of the
enemy's forces from the mountain, and the
withdraal of the remaining troops from be
tween 80-nt„boro and Hagerstown to a posi
tion where they oould resist attack and cover
the Shepherdetown ford, and receive the rein
forcements expected from Harper's Ferry, were
for a time interpreted as evidence of the ene
my's disorganization and demoralization.
As soon as it' as definitely known that the
enemy had abandoned the mountains, the cav
alry and .the corps of Sumner, Hooker and
Mansfield were ordered to pursue them, via
the turnpike and Booneboro', as promptly as
possible. The corps of Burnside and Porter
(the latter having but one weak division pre
sent) were ordered to move by the Sharpsburg
road, and Franklin to advance into Pleasant
valley, occupy Rohrersville, and to endeavor
to relieve Harper's Ferry. Burnside and Por
ter, upon reaching the road from Booneboro'
to Robreraville, were to reinforce Franklin or
to move on Sharpsburg, according to circum
stances. Franklin moved towards Brownsville,
and found there a force largely superior to his
own, drawn up in a strong position to receive
him. Here the total cessation of 'firing in the
direction of Harper's Ferry indicated but too
clearly the shameful and premature surrender
of that post.
The cavalry advance overtook a body of the
enemy's cavalry at Booneboro', which it dis
pers,ed, after a brief skirmish, killing and
wounding many, taking some two hundred and
fifty prisoners and two guns.
Richardson's division of Sumner's corps,
passing Booneboro' to Kedysville, found a few
miles beyond the town the enemy's force's dis
played in line of battle, strong both in respect
to tturnbers and position, and awaiting attack.
Upon receiving reports of the disposition of
the enemy, I directed all the corps, except
Franklin's, upon Sharpsburg, leaving Frank
lin to observe, and check the enemy in his front,
and avail himself of any chance that might
offer. I had hoped to come up with the enemy
during the 15tb, in sufficient force to beat them
again and drive them into the river. My in
structions were that if the enemy were not on
the march they were to be at once attacked;
if they were found in force and position the
corps were to be placed in position for attack ;
but no attack was to be made until I reached
the front.
On arriving at the front in the afternoon, I
found but two divisions (Riohardson's and
Sykes') in position. The rest were halted in
the road, the head of the column some dis
t once in the rear of Richardson. After a rapid
examination of the position I found that it was
too late to attack that day, and at once directed
locations to be selected for our batteries of
position, and indicated the bivouacs for the
t-ifferent corps, massing them near and on
both sides of the Sharpsbarg pike. The corps
were not all in their places until the next
morning, some time after satirise.
On the 16th the enemy had slightly changed
their lin% and were posted upon the he'ghts in
the rear of the Antietam creek, their left and
centre bearing upon and in front of the road
trom Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and protected
by woods and other irregularities of the ground.
Their extreme left rested upon a wooden emi
nence near the cross roads to the north of J.
firm, the distance at this point be
tween the road anti the Potomac, which makes
here a great bend to the east, being about
three-fourths of a mile. Their right rested on
the hills to the right of Sharpsburg, near
Suavely's farm, covering the crossing of the
Actietam and the approaches to the town from
the soul heist. The ground between their im
mediate front and the Antietam creek is undu
lating. Hills intervene whose crests in gen
eral are commanded by the crests of others in
their rear. On all favorable points their artil
lery was posted. It became evident, from th'e
force of the enemy and the strength of their
position, that desperate fighting alone could
drive them from the field, and all felt that a
great. and terrible battle was at hand.
In proceeding to a narrative of the events of
this and the succeeding day, I must here ro-
peat what I have observed in reporting upon
the other subjects of this communication, that
I attempt in this preliminary report nothing
more than a sketch of the main features of this
great engagement, reserving for my official re
port, based upon the reports of the corps com
manders, that full description of details which
shall place upon record the achievements of
individuals and particular bodies of troops.—
The design was to make the attack upon the
enemy's left—at least to create a diversion in
favor of the main attack, with the hope of
something more—by assailing the enemy's
right, and, as soon as one or both of the flank
movements were fully successful, to attack
their centre with any reserve I might then have
on hand.
The morning of the 16th (during which there
was considerable artillery firing) was spent in
obtaining information as to the ground, recti
fying the position of the troops, and perfecting
the arrangements for the attack.
On the afternoon of the 16th Hooker's corps,
consisting of Rickett's and Doubleday's divi
sions, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under
Meade, was sent across the Antietam creek by
a ford and bridge to the right of Kedysville,
with orders to attack and, if possible, turn the
enemy's left. Mansfield, with his corps, was
sent in the evening to.support Hooker. Ar
rived in position, Meade's division of the Penn
sylvania Reserves, which was at the head of
Hooker's corps, became engaged in a sharp
contest with the enemy, which lasted until
after dark, when it had succeeded in driving
in a portion of the opposing line, and held the
At daylight the contest was renewed between
Hooker and the enemy in his front. Hooker's
attack was successful for a time, but masses of
the enemy, thrown upon his corps, checked it.
Mansfield brought up his corps to Hooker's
support, when the two corps drove the enemy
back—the gallant and distinguished veteran
Mansfield lo3ing his life in the effort. General
Hooker was, unhappily, about this time, woun
ded, and compelled to leave the field, where
his services had been conspicuous and impor
tant. About an hour after this time Sumner's
corps, consisting of Sedgwick's, Richardson's
and French's divisions, arrived on the field—
Richardson some time after the other two, as
he was unable to start as soon as them. Sedg
wick, on the right, penetrated the woods' in
front of Hooker'S and Mansfield's troops.
French and Richardson were placed to the
left of Sedgwick; thus attacking the enemy
towards their left centre. • Crawford's and
Sedgwick's lines, however, yielded to a de
structive fire of masses of the enemy in the
woods, and suffering greatly, (Generals Sedg
wick and Crawford being among the wounded,)
the troops fell back in disorder. They never
theless rallied in the woods. The enemy's ad
vance was, however, entirely checked by the
destructive fire of our artillery. Franklin,
who had been directed the day before to join
the main army with two divisions, arrived on
the field from Brownsville about an hour after,
and Smith's division replaced Sedgwick's and
Crawford's line. Advancing steadily, it swept
over the ground just lost, but now permanently
retaken. The divisions of French and Rich
ardson maintained with considerable lose the
exposed positions weich they had so gallantly
gained, among the wounded being General
The condition of things on the right towards
the middle of the afternoon, notwithstanding
the success wrested from the enemy by the
stubborn bravery of the troops, was at this
time unpromising. Sumner's, Hooker's and
Mansfield's corps had lost heavily, several gen
eral officers having been carried from the field.
I was at one time compelled to draw two brig
ades from Porter's corps, (the reserve) to
strengthen the right. This left for the reserve
the small division of regulars who had been
engaged in supporting during the day the bat
teries in the centre and a single brigade of
Morell's division. Before I left the right to
return to the centre, I became satisfied that the
line would be held without these two brigades,
and countermanded the order, which was in
course of execution. The effect of Ournside's
movement on the enemy's right was to prevent
the further massing of their troops on the left,
and we held what we had gained.
Burnside's corps, consisting of Wilcox's,
Sturgis' and Rodman's divisions, and Cox's
Kanawha division, was entrusted with the diffi
cult task of carrying the bridge across the
Antietam, near Rohrback's farm, and assault
ing the enemy's right, the order having been
communicated to him at 10 o'clock A. M_
The valley of the Antietam, at and near the
bridge, is narrow, with high banks. On the
right of the stream the bank is - wooded and
commands the approaches both to the bridge
and the ford. Tnc steep slopes of the bank
were lined with rifle pits, and breastworks of
rails and stones. These, together with the
woods, were filled with the enemy's infantry,
while their batteries commanded and enfiladed
the bridge and ford and their approaches.
The advance of the troops brought on an ob
stinate and sanguinary contest, and from the
great natural advantages of the position it was
near one o'clock before the heights on the
right bank were carried. At about 3 o'clock
r. at. the corps again advanced with success,
the right driving the enemy before it, and
pushing on nearly to Saarpshurg, while the
left, after a hard encounter, also compelled the
enemy to retire before it. The enemy here,
however, were speedily reinforced, and with
overwhelming masses. New batteries of their
artillery, also, were brought up and opened.
It became evident that our force was not suffi
cient to enable the advance to reach the town,
and the order was given to retire to the cover
of the bill, which was taken from the enemy
earlier in the afternoon. This movement was
effected without confusion, and the position
maintained until the enemy retreated. Gen.
Burnside bad sent to me for reinforcements
late in the afternoon ; but the condition of
things on the right was not such as to enable
me to afford them.
During the whole day our artillery was ev
erywhere bravely and ably handled.. Indeed,
I cannot speak too highly of the efficiency of
our batteries, and the great service they ren
dered. On more than one occasion, when our
infantry was broken, they covered its.re. forma
tion and drove back the enemy.
The cavalry had little field for operations
during the engagement, but was employed in
supporting the horse artillery batteries in the
centre, and in driving up stragglers, while
awaiting opportunity for other service.
The signal corps, under Major Myer, ren
dered during the operations at Antietam, as at
South Mountain, and during the whole move
ments of the army, efficient and valuable ser
vice. Indeed, by its services here, aeon other
fields elsewhere, this corps has gallantly earn e d
its title to an independent and permanent Or _
ganizat ion.
The duties devolving upon my staff during
the action were most important, and the per
formance of them able and untiring. At a
later 9 d9y I propane to bring to the notice of
the department their individual services.
With the day closed this memorable battle.
i n w hich, perhaps, nearly two hundred thousand
men were for fourteen hours engaged is combat.—
We had attacked the enemy in position, driven
them from their line on one flank, and secured
Tax DAILY PATRIOT AND UNION will be eereeif to cub.
scribers residing in thoßeronghfor ealionaes
payable to the Ourier. Mail enbeeribere, VIII DOLLAR(
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to one address., jinn% dollars:
Connected with this establishment is an fastens:lra
JOB 01110I0E,, containing it variety. of plain and fancy
type,, unequalled by any establishment in the interior o f
the State, for which the patrozuge of the public is so •
a footing within it on the other.. Under- the
depression of previous reverses, we had
achieved a victory over an adversary invested
with the prestige of former successes and in
flated with a recent triumph. Our 'forces slept
that night conquerors on a field won by their
valor, and covered with the dead and wounded
of the enemy.
The night, however, presented serious ques
tions; morning brought with it grave responsi
bilities. Te renew the attack again on the 18111,
or defer it, with the chance of the enemy's re
tirement after a day of suspense, were the
questions before me. A careful and anxious
survey of the condition of my command, and
my knowledge of the eneaty'e force tied po
sition, failed to impress we with iukrreasoneble
certainty of success if T renewed the attack
without reiuforoing columns. 'A view of the
shattered state of some of the corps sufficed to
deter me from pressing them into. immediate
action, and I felt that mx,,duty to the army
and the country forbade die' risks involved in
a hasty movement, which might result in the
lose of what had been gained the previous day.
Impelled by this consideration, L awaited the
arrival duly reinforcements, taking advantage
of the occasion to collect together the disper
sed, give rest to the fatigued, and remove the
wounded. Of the reinforcements, Conch's
division, although marching with commendable
rapidity, was not in position until a late hour
in the morning; and Humphrey's division of
new troops, fatigued wish forced marches, were
Arriving throughout the day, but were not
available until near its close. Large reinforce
ments from Pennsylvania, which.were expected
during the day, did not arrive at all.
During the 18th orders were given for a re
newal of the attack at daylight on the 191. h. On
the night of the 18th the enemy, after- having
been passed troops in the latter part ofthe day
from the Virginia shore to their position ['Wad
Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly
formed the design of abandoning their line,
This movement they executed before daylight.
Being but a short distance from the river, the
evacuation presented but little difficulty. It was
however, rapidly followed up. The detatoh
ment withdrew with slight loss.
A reconnoissance was made across the river
on the evening of the 19th, which. resulted in
ascertaining the near presence of. the enemy
in some force, and in our capturing six guns.
A second reconnoissance, the next morning,
which, with the first, was made by a small de
tachment from Porter's crops, resulted in ob
serving a heavy force of the enemy there.
I submit herewith a list of the killed, wound
ed and missing in the engagements of the 15th,
and of the 16th and 17th. The enemy's loss
is believed, from the beet sources• of informa
tion, to be nearly thirty thousand. Their dead
were mostly left on the field, and.a large num
ber of wounded were left behind.
While it gives me pleasure to speak of the
gallantry and devotion the officers and men
generally displayed through this conflict, I feel
it necessary to mention that some of the offi
cers and men skulked from their places until
the battle was over. Death on the spot must
hereafter be the fate of all such cowards, and
the hands of the military commanders must be
strengthened with all the power of . the Gov
ernment to inflict it summarily.. The ealry
and . disgraceful surrender of Harper ' k Ferry
deprived my operations of result s what' would
have formed a brilliant sequel to the substan
tial and gratifying success already related.
Had the garrison held out 24 hours longer,
I should, in all probability, have captured that
part of the enemy's force engaged in the attack
on Maryland Heights ; while the whole. garri
son—some 12,000 strong—could have been
drawn to reinforce me on the day of the deci
sive battle. Certainly, on the morning of the
18th. I would thus have been in a position to
have destroyed the rebel army.
Under the same circumstances, had the be
sieging force on the Virginia side at Harper's
Ferry not been withdrawn, I would have had
35,000 or 40,000 less men to encounter at. An
tietam, and must have destroyed or captured
all opposed to me. As it was, Ik bad to engage
an army fresh from a recent sad, to, them,
great victory, and to reap the disadvantage of
their being freshly and plentifully supplied
with ammunition and supplies.
The objects and results of this brief cam
paign may be summed up as. follows In the
beginning of the month of September, the
safety of the National Capitol was seriously
endangered by the presence of a victorious
enemy, who soon, after crossed into blarjland,
and then directly threatened Washington and
Baltimore, while they occupied the soil of a
loyal State, and threatened as invasion of
The Army of thelJnion,inferior in numbers,
wearied by brig mambo, deficient •in various
supplies, worn out by numerous battles, the last
of which had not been successful, first covered
by its movemdnts the important cities of Wash
ington and Baltibtore, then boldly attacked the
victorious enemy in their t chosen strong posi
tion, and drove them back, with all their supe
riority of nutebers, into the State of Virginia,
thus saving the loyal St ites from invasion, and
rudely dispelingthe rebel dreams of carrying
the war into our country, and subsisting upon
our resources.
Thirteen guns and 39 colors, more than
15.000 stand of small arms, and more than
6,000 prisoners, were the trophies which attest
the success of our arms. Rendering thanks to
Divine Providence for Ms blessing upon our
exertions, I close this brief report. I beg only
to add the hope that the army's efforts for the
cause in which we are engaged will he 'deemed
worthy to receive the commendation of the
government and the country.
Maj. Gen. United States Army.
Brigadier General L. Thomas, Adjutant Ge
neral United Stale. , Army
COMPARISONS.—It 1S useledA EJ deny that the
masses of the peoqle have a deep seated and
settled confidence in "Sarsaparilla," as an- al
terative remedy. Notwithstanding this confi
dence has of late years been ahuaed by many
preparations claiming to possess its virtue but
really with none at all, still the people believe
in its intrinsic value as a remedy, because they
have known of its cures. The rage for large
bottles at low prices, has called into market
many compounds of Sarsaparilla which con
tain scarcely any of it, or even any medical
virtues whatever. Yet everybody knows that
Sarsaparilla is the great stable antidote for
Scrofula, Eruptions and cutaneous diseases,
and fur the purification of the blood,when they
can get the real article, or an actual extract of
it. Such we are now able to inform them they
can obtain. Dr. J. C. Ayer & Co, the celebra
ted chemists of the East, whose reputation as
sures us they do well whatever they undertake,
are selling a Campound Extract of Sarsaparilla,
which, although the bottles do not contain
quarts, fer a dollar, do contain more of actual
curative power than whole gallons of the stuffs
which have been in use. It is &tattered that
one bottle of Ayer' e Sarsaparilla contains morn
than double the amoebic of titteditad virtue,
which is afforded by any oilier. This fa't is
not only apparent to the taste, but its effects
and cures afford incontestable proof that it is
true. Such a remedy has been long rough'
for, and is everywhere needed by all classes
of our oonsaillniey. ("Age," Cynthlana, Ky