

NATIONAL UNION TICKET.

FOR PRESIDENT, Abraham Lincoln, OF ILLINOIS. FOR VICE PRESIDENT, Andrew Johnson, OF TENNESSEE.

Meeting of the Legislature—Organization of the State Militia.

The proclamation of Gov. Curtin, convening the Legislature several weeks in advance of the time fixed for its meeting, is in response to an urgent necessity created by the late rebel raid. But it will be regarded as a remarkable fact, when the history of the effort to crush rebellion is written, that a great State like Pennsylvania, only discovered the necessity of a thorough military organization after three years of war had flashed its terrors and danger along her border; and that only now, in sight of the ashes of ruined and desolated Chambersburg, we suddenly find ourselves deficient in military discipline, and, as it were, at the mercy of the foe. These facts are humiliating—because no State in the Union abounds more in military genius and material than our own. Our troops, going hence, many of them, almost as raw militia, have carried themselves as bravely and fought as effectively as veterans. This fact alone, should have given us a local military organization in six months after the inauguration of the war, such as would have impelled every man to familiarize himself with the use of arms. Had this been done, every house in the Commonwealth would have been made an arsenal and every citizen become a soldier. And with such a discipline and organization among the people, no possible danger could have arisen, no emergency occurred, for which the authorities and the people would not have been prepared.

Henceforth a knowledge of the use of arms, a practical acquaintance with a soldier's full duty, will become as essential to the safety of the State, as industry, thrift and affection are necessary for the peace and comfort of a family. For the next quarter of a century, the peace and unity of the nation will rest entirely on the military skill, force and energy of the people. The strength and endurance of the Union will be lodged in the military power of the States thereof—a power to be organized and disciplined by the States, alone for the use and benefit of the nation. While this fact is kept in view, the strength of the nation is maintained—and while that is well established, the interests and the existence of the States are secure.

We trust that when the Legislature again meets, all other business will be made to subordinate the great object of securing this proper organization and discipline of the militia. There is no exaggeration to assert that Pennsylvania should at all times be able to put into the field a hundred thousand disciplined troops. There are that many active, able-bodied men in the Commonwealth now, who need but the legal force to compel this organization, and whose service for any period of three, six or even twelve months, would not be seriously felt to the manufacturing or mercantile interests of the people at large. With such a force constantly in readiness—with each man properly drilled and imbued with a correct idea of discipline, we would not only be safe from invasion, but the Commonwealth would become a power in the Union potent for its peace, its prosperity and its glory. We earnestly hope and pray, then, that wise councils will prevail at the coming session of the Legislature. With the organization of that session, the very life of the State is placed at the disposal of our legislators. Time must prove their regard for its safety and preservation.

A Word to Horace Greeley.

The New York Tribune and Horace Greeley are synonymous in reputation. Whatever appears in the columns of that sheet, out of which good can be manufactured, is claimed by the friends of Mr. Greeley as his own; and whatever the man does which can be rendered as so much capital towards the support of a journal, is at once appropriated to the Tribune's account. Such at least is the impression of a large number of people who patronize the Tribune. They support it not because they believe it to be more reliable as a newspaper than any of its contemporaries; but because they have a notion that Mr. Greeley is a just and a pure man, in whose utterance they can look for a degree of justice and fairness which many other men fail to exhibit. But we submit it to the most ardent friend of Mr. Greeley, whether the Tribune did not overstep the bounds of decency, truth and humanity, in its coarse allusions to the calamity that has overtaken our fellow citizens of Chambersburg? We submit it in all candor, whether the reference made by Mr. Greeley, to the burning of Chambersburg, is not in all respects the exhibition of a brutality equalled in its atrocity only by that of the deeds of the actors in that hellish transaction. The invader came inspired with hatred and crazed with rum—he came trained for the brutish work—but Mr. Greeley, deliberately and coolly, in the quiet retreat of his sanctum, grasps his pen, to ridicule, to contemn and to scold the suffering of the people of Chambersburg. It is absolutely mocking the calamities of the old and helpless, to feed the pedantic vanity of a journalist who exhibits in his criticism of the action of a foe, a baseness himself, sufficient to dam him in the estimation of all true men. Mr. Greeley, by his coarse allusion to the suffering of the people of Chambersburg, forfeits the respect of the people not only of Pennsylvania, but of good men

everywhere who are animated by the common sympathies necessary for the preservation of order and decency.

This is not the first time that the people of Pennsylvania have been insulted by the misrepresentations and the outrage of the press and the people of New York. At present there is no way to resent these taunts and gibes but to avoid and refuse to patronize those who exhibit this disregard for truth and justice. We wish it was possible for Mr. Greeley to carry the Tribune, and read his article in yesterday's issue on the subject of the burning of Chambersburg, to the people of the Cumberland Valley. While thus engaged, he could learn the story of many an outrage, the fact of the most heinous insults to weak women, perpetrated by his own immediate friends and neighbors, while they professed to be here a year ago for the defence of the border. But we do not wish to indulge in crimination. We only desire to assure Mr. Greeley, that the people of Pennsylvania seek no aid from such as he, to relieve the homeless and starving citizens of Chambersburg. There are humane men in the land who will gladly extend this succor. But let Horace Greeley remember hereafter, that with all his professions of humanity and regard for the suffering, his philanthropy is but a veil of flimsy profession, through which can be seen the foul hideousness of the hypocrite and the liar.

What the Sympathizers with Rebellion May Expect from the Rebels.

There has been a class of men and women in the loyal States, who have actively, ably and earnestly sympathized with the rebel efforts to destroy the present National Administration. These poor, ignorant dupes of a clique of base politicians have been taught to believe that the triumph of Jeff Davis and his armies implied merely the overthrow of "Lincoln and the nigger worshippers." Hundreds and thousands of strong men and gossipping women in the loyal States have been laboring under the delusion that the conspiracy of the slave-holders was merely an organization to secure the extermination of the "abolitionists." When that object was achieved, peace and the lash of the slave-breeder would again rule, guarded by the beautiful influences of that Democracy which trained the upholders of negro slavery until their arrogance showed itself in treason, and their treason filled the land with woe and deluged it with blood. But this delusion is fast being dispelled, by the practical and indiscriminate brutality of the rebels whenever they can make a successful incursion into free territory. The people of Chambersburg are being mournful witnesses of the impartiality with which the slave-breeding agitators carry on this war against a free Government. It is not against a party that these men war—it is not against individuals that they battle—if it against the idea, the principle, the hope and the glory of a great and free Government. Hence, those who represent that Government in any particular—who represent it in its present administration, and who aspire to represent it under any administration, are regarded as enemies by the traitors. Look at Chambersburg. Was there any discrimination made by the invaders when they seized that ill-fated borough? Did the ruffians as they traversed the streets with their blazing torches and consuming turpentine balls, enquire for the residences of Democrats who believe in the rights of slavery, that they might save their dwellings? No! All homes were alike fired, because all, in the estimation of the traitor foe, represent the idea of northern freedom, of equality and of prosperity; and until these are destroyed, until our organization of society is broken up, and the labor which is now free enslaved, the conspiracy of the south will not have achieved its objects. The fate of Chambersburg would be that of Harrisburg, were the rebels to gain possession of the city. They have decreed the desolation of the entire free North. They have sworn to apply the torch to every free home in the free States. The man who does not believe this to be so, is but a miserable dreamer, wasting his time in listless indifference, while all that he holds dear of wife and home, are constantly in danger of destruction. We must all then arm! We must discipline ourselves for the roughest dangers of war. We must be watchful and vigilant, calculating and prepared as we lay down each night, to be aroused to meet the traitor foe. Our duty is plain. If we fail in it now, our disgrace and destruction become inevitable.

PENNSYLVANIA, SS.

IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, ANDREW G. CURTIN, Governor of the said Commonwealth.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, An extraordinary occasion requires that prompt legislative action be had, to make the military power of the Commonwealth immediately available for State and National defence. Therefore I, ANDREW G. CURTIN, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby convene the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, and require the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, to meet in their respective houses in the Capitol, at Harrisburg, on TUESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF AUGUST, 1864, at twelve o'clock noon, of that day, then and there to deliberate upon, and adopt such measures as may, in their wisdom, be demanded by the exigencies of the occasion. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the Commonwealth to be affixed at Harrisburg, this first day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States, the eighty-ninth.

A. G. CURTIN, Governor.

Secretary of the Commonwealth.

By the Governor, Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Government Securities as an Investment.

There is one view of investments in Government securities which has generally taken. It is taken by shrewd capitalists and speculators. It has not been generally considered by the people. It is this: When, after a long suspension, specie payments are resumed, all stocks and all prices immediately and largely decline; but Government stocks do not materially decline. This fact we assert on the ground of historical experience. It is true that in the W. of 1812-15 Government stocks fell, at one time, to 70; but most of the banks were then suspended or bankrupt, and there was comparatively little currency in the country to buy stocks with. But suppose the gold value of Government stocks were this day 70, (the lowest they were ever till now sold at) the market value at the present rate of gold would be 135, while if the stocks are selling below 105. Supposing, then, that the market price of Government securities were, by the resumption of specie payments, to go down to 70 in July, the decline would be 35 on 105, equivalent to 33 1/3 per cent., while the decline on a railroad stock would be nearly or quite equal to the whole present difference between gold and paper. A common railroad stock, selling now at 105, would decline to 65, or in the best supposable case, to 60. This is illustrated by the history of every suspension of specie payments we have had, and there are many business men who will recollect that the prices of produce, stocks and all saleable commodities were after the commercial revulsions of 1837 and 1839-40. In 1841, '42 and '43, prices were reduced to a degree now scarcely credible. But Government stocks did not fall materially. On the contrary, it is a settled principle, deduced from all experience in England and this country, that Government funds do not fluctuate to the same extent as other kinds of property. The same extent as other kinds of property, interest and security are all fixed and permanent. There may be some variations in the market price, owing to the greater or less bulk of the entire currency, but there can be none in the intrinsic value; and hence it is, that historically the fluctuations in the value of Government stock have been comparatively small. In all the recent commercial fluctuations of England (in some of which there has been a complete prostration of all other property), the variation in British consols has not been over five or six per cent. This cannot be said of any other kind of property. Of railroad and bank stocks the great variations and at times wonderful depression are notorious. Sudden commercial revulsions have reduced these stocks to one half their price. Suppose, then, that with gold say at 90 now, and Government stocks at 105, there should be a resumption of gold payments in one year, (and this is a supposition which may become a fact,) what would be the relative effect on three kinds of stock—say Government at 105, bank at 118, and railroad at 120? In all human probability the resumption of gold payments in a year would bring them to their relative prices, viz: Government, 90; bank, 85; railroad, 70. Judged by historical experience, this would be nearly the actual result. The consequence, then, is, that the Government funds depreciate 15 per cent., the banks 25, and the railroads 50. It is most probable, if this statement be considered erroneous, that the actual results would be much more in favor of Government. But we merely give this as an illustration of a general historical truth, that on the resumption of specie payments, or on the occurrence of a great commercial convulsion, the fall in the value of Government stocks will be less, relatively, than the fall in any other kind of stock. The practical inference from this is plain. The purchase of Government stocks being made for investment, it is a far safer and more profitable investment, than any other. Now nobody can doubt that the War (that is, the great bulk and expense of the War,) will be over in a year or so; and when that occurs, there will be a gold standard; and then, when others are lamenting over the fall of stocks, the holder of Government loans will have no fall to lament. He will, in fact, profit by that change which injures the holders of other property.

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By Telegraph.

From Grant's Army.

Our Loss in the Lato Engagement. It is Estimated at 2,500.

The Rebels Refuse to Receive Flags of Truce.

THE SUPPOSED CAUSE OF THE REFUSAL.

Escape of Some of Hunter's Officers from the Rebels.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2. Dispatches from Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac of July 31st, 9 P. M., say that the exact losses in the battle of yesterday have not been officially ascertained, but as near as can be judged will foot up about 2,500, not including the missing, and many believe the figures will turn out to be larger.

In the hospital of the Ninth Corps, the 1st division has 208; the 2d division, 307; the 3d division, 341; the 4th division, (colored,) 626, besides a large number lying on the field between the lines, who have got out of camp.

The Eighteenth Corps lost nearly 800 men, while Turner's division of the Tenth Corps had nearly 400 killed and wounded.

A flag of truce was sent out by the enemy to day for the purpose of getting the remainder of the field, but it was refused, the reason not being given.

Gen. Butler also sent out a flag of truce from his lines to-day, which was likewise refused, the officer giving no reason except his orders, which were peremptory not to accept a flag of truce under any circumstances.

They also refuse to exchange papers, and the men are so closely watched by their officers that they have no chance of exchanging them, though they are always willing to do so. There must be some good reason for this, and many believe their line is very weak, while others think they have some extensive move on foot and are afraid of its becoming known to us. The raid into Pennsylvania may be the reason and they wish to keep it as quiet as possible.

All the wounded that have been brought in are being well cared for, the medical arrangements being ample.

The lines of the two armies are about the same as before the battle, and picket firing has been constantly kept up since its termination.

The number of prisoners captured and brought in was 253, the highest rank among them being a captain. They are a healthy looking set of men, but their dress presents the usual dirty and ragged appearance.

The report sent yesterday morning that the colored troops had captured an entire brigade, had no foundation, and only a few prisoners taken having been brought in by the rebels.

The following officers, mostly captured from Gen. Hunter's command in the Shenandoah Valley on May 30th, came into our lines

yesterday, having escaped from Lynchburg on the 2d and made their way here: M. V. Cavaly; 1st N. Y. Cavaly; J. H. Anderson, 1st N. Y. Cavaly; F. S. Reader, 5th Va. Union Cavaly; H. Penman, 1st Maryland Infantry.

L A T E R.

A Flag of Truce Successful.

Suffering Among Union Prisoners at Lynchburg.

Later advices from headquarters up to 7 o'clock, A. M., of August 1st, say a flag of truce is now prevailing and a party have gone out to bury the dead, and bring off the wounded. The number is represented as being quite large.

The following, with a large number of others, still remain confined at Lynchburg, and are suffering much from want of proper food: Col. Miller, 14th New Jersey volunteers, slightly wounded; Capt. R. G. Hutchison, 8th Mass. Volunteer Infantry, wounded; Capt. A. Heere, 28th U. S. Inf., wounded; Capt. S. D. Ladin, 8th N. Y. Heavy artillery; Lieut. Sears, 12th Pa. Cavaly; Lieut. J. H. Kidd, 1st Md. artillery; Lieut. H. G. Hamilton, 14th N. Y.; Lieut. A. C. Beckenough, 6th W. Va. Cavaly; Lieut. Emery, 2d Massachusetts; wounded; Lieut. Burns, 13th N. Y. Cavaly; Chaplain Humphreys, 2d Mass., cavaly; Lieut. G. W. Crout, 108th Pa. Infantry; Lieut. A. S. Harrington, 18th Pa. Infantry, very sick; Adjutant A. C. Hastings, 7th Pa. Reserves; Lieut. J. W. Core, 6th W. Va., Cavaly; Lieut. C. H. Long, 1st P. H. B.; Lieut. W. C. Mathers, 1st P. H. B. They were nearly all captured on the 20th of June, in the Shenandoah Valley.

Bogus Rumors of Guerrilla Movements in Maryland.

WASHINGTON, August 2. The Star says that last night rebel guerrillas, supposed to be of Moseby's command, made their appearance at a point three miles above Rockville, having crossed the river at Nolan's Ferry.

Parties living in the vicinity imagine that these guerrillas were the advance guard of a large invading force, and immediately "skedaddled," which occasioned some excitement in this direction, for a short time.

Troops were sent from here to intercept the rebels, but they were nowhere to be found, having gone back to the Virginia side of the river.

A party stricken orderly came hurrying into headquarters at a late hour last night from Fort Reno, and reported that the rebels in large force were advancing in the direction of Tenallytown. Due investigation showed that the report had no foundation whatever.

Re-Enlistments for One, Two and Three Years.

WAR DEPARTMENT. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE. WASHINGTON, D. C., July 26.

General Orders, No. 235.—I. On and after this date, volunteers serving in three (3) years' organizations, who may have, at the date of re-enlistment, less than sixty (60) days to serve, may re-enlist in the regiments or companies to which they belong, for one, two or three years, as they may in each case elect.

The new term will commence from the date of re-enlistment. II. All men re-enlisting will be entitled to the bounty provided by the act of Congress, approved July 4, 1864, and promulgated in General Orders, No. 224, current series, from this office, as follows: for one year, \$100; for two years, \$200; for three years, \$300. The law provides that one-third of the bounty shall be paid to the soldier at the time of his being mustered (re-mustered) into the service, one-third at the expiration of one-half his term of service, and one-third at the expiration of his term of service.

Under the foregoing the first installment of bounty will be paid when the men are re-mustered, and as follows: For re-enlistments for one year, \$33.33; for re-enlistments for two years, \$66.66; for re-enlistments for three years, \$100.

III. The musters-out of service, re-enlistments, re-musters, and payments, under this authority, will be regulated by the general provisions of General Orders, No. 359, series of 1863, from this office.

The following remark will be made on the muster-out roll: "Discharged by re-enlistment for one year, (or two, or three years, as case may be,) under the provisions of General Orders, No. 235, series of 1864, from War Department."

The following remarks will be made on the muster-in roll: "Re-mustered for one year (or two, or three years, as case may be,) under the provisions of General Orders, No. 235, War Department, series of 1864."

IV. Reports of Credits (see Circular No. 52, current series, from this office,) under the foregoing, must be made and kept separate from those for other troops.

V. To men re-enlisting, as herein provided, no furloughs will be promised. Commissioners of Musters and their assistants, will be held responsible that this condition is distinctly understood by all parties concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War, E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass't Adj. Gen.

NEWS FROM ARKANSAS.

THE LOSSES IN THE LATE FIGHT NEAR HELENA. CAMMO, Ill., July 31.

The Memphis Bulletin contains further particulars of the late fight near Helena. Our total loss was sixty-two, including four officers. The rebel loss was two hundred and fifty.

Rebel prisoners say that had Colonel Brook's expedition been sent out from Helena a few days since the rebel General Robbins would have attacked the plantations below that place the next day, and drawn all the Union force he could out of Helena, while the rebel General Shelby, with some four thousand men, was to make an attack on the place from the northwest and overpower the small force left in the fortifications.

The steamer Graham, from Memphis on the 29th inst., brings the body of Major Rawson, of the Seventy-second Ohio, who died from wounds received near Tapelo.

From Washington.

WASHINGTON, August 1. ARRIVAL OF WOUNDED.

The steamer Harlow arrived to-day with 540 sick and wounded soldiers from City Point. The hospital steamer Connecticut also arrived with 432 sick and wounded men.

Colonel Gurth, of the 45th Pennsylvania regiment, is reported to have been killed on Saturday.

THE STRAMER HERMUDA. The United States supply steamer Bermuda will sail from Philadelphia on the 11th of August, with the mails for the West Gulf Blockading Squadron. All letters for that squadron will go by her.

DEATH OF BRIGADIER. The father of Major General Sherman died in this city last week.

THE NEW 7-30 LOAN. The receipts for the 7-30 loan to-day were \$1,500,000, making a total for four days of \$4,875,000, or over \$1,000,000 per day.

General Sherman's Army.

INTERESTING CIRCULAR OF GENERAL THOMAS—HEROISM OF OUR TROOPS. NASHVILLE, July 31.

Major-General Thomas, commanding the army of the Cumberland, has issued the following interesting circular to the army near Atlanta: HEADQUARTERS, July 28.

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