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THE BULL RUN BATTLE.

GENERAL McDOWELL'S OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE ENGAGEMENT.

HARRISBURG, DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN (VIENNA, August 4, 1861.)
Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

General, I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle on the 21st of July, near Manassas, Virginia. It has been delayed until this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.

In my communication to you of the 20th ult., I stated that I had intended to move that morning from Fairfax Court House to Centerville, and that I had intended to send you a true and correct account of the battle on the 21st. It has been delayed until this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.

On the evening of the 20th ult., my command was mostly at near Centerville. The enemy was about seven miles to the southwest. Centerville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centerville to Manassas runs from this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles above the village. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs easterly and west, goes over this ridge, about half a mile from the village, and crosses Bull Run about a mile from it. Bull Run having a course from the crossing from north-west to south-west. The First division (Tyler's) was stationed on the northern slope of the Centerville ridge, on the same road, and a mile and a half in advance, to the west of the ridge, and the 2nd division was on the road from Centerville to Manassas, where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's ford, where General Tyler had the command of the 18th ult. The Second division (Miles') was on a road known as the Middlebrook road, which comes into Centerville from the southeast, about a mile and a half from the village. The Fifth division (Hays') was on the same road with the Third division, and between it and Centerville. A road which is herewith marked A, will show positions better than I can describe.

At daylight a train of subsistence articles on Saturday night's contents order of Tyler, was sent to the rear, and the men were to have three days' rations in their luggage. On Sunday the 19th ult., my personal reconnaissance of the route to the South had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th ult., at Blackburn's ford showed me too strongly at that point for me to force a passage there without great loss, and it was decided that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired. Our information was that the stone bridge, over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the west of Centerville, was defended by a battery in position, and the road on this side of the stream impeded by a heavy abutment. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position. Reliable information was obtained of a meadowed ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major General Patterson.

General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence manœuvring the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called the Bull Run, turn to the right and north, and move around to the upper ford, and there turn southward to the enemy. Colonel Heintzelman's division was to follow Hunter's as far as he was to cross at the lower ford, where he was driven out by Hunter's division, the Fifth division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centerville ridge.

I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's ford to Centerville, and in force to the front, and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the base of the square of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irrevocably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to build some field works to strengthen the position.

The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the imminent approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aid-de-camp was sent to Brigadier General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of the attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley's Spring south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the road the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile further large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the middle of a small water course, a tributary of Bull Run.

Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached this open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery, and following it up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades, of Tyler's division, to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road, down which our troops had marched from Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the most of the enemy's batteries were planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill, with a house on it. The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the right supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklyn's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the centre and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left.

The fire from the north of the turnpike, which was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston, Rickett's battery, which did such effective service, and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded—our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it—in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession, from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abutts across the road, to allow our reinforcement (Schnock's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.

The enemy were evidently disheartened and broken. But we had been fighting since half past ten o'clock in the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than nine and a half miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.

At this time that the enemy's reinforcements came to his aid from the railroad train, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army. They threw themselves in the words on our right, and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house on it, and there had a long march before coming into action, and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.

Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what was no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, as protected by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without organization, they became intermingled, and all orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Benker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go

as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.

By referring to the general order it will be seen that, while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's ford by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.

At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed. After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Benker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas by Blackburn's ford to Centerville, on the march, under the orders from the Division Commander, for Centerville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defence across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in person the command of this part of the army, I caused such disposition of the forces which had been added to by the First and Second New Jersey and the Kalb regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve, before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centerville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub run, and owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered.

Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded. By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centerville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted—division and brigade commanders and staff—to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left. On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.

At—o'clock the rear guard (Benker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, while the troops at Fairfax station leaving by the cars took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aid-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, stayed at Fairfax Court House till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers were ready and worn out soldiers were not left behind.

I transmit herewith the reports of the several divisions and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the content of the particulars of regiments and corps, and a consolidated report of the killed, wounded and missing. From the latter it will be seen that our killed amounted to nineteen officers and four hundred and sixty-two non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to sixty-four officers and nine hundred and forty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under one thousand. The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Newington, many of the Zouaves to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at six hundred and sixteen, was yesterday reduced to one hundred and seventy-four. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.

Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag of truce, admitted eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much under the true number.

The officer commanding the Eleventh New York Zouaves, and Colonel Heintzelman, say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many of those reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return and have gone to New York. Among the missing reported were many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.

The issue of this hard fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march; and who acted on his own ground, on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, and should not prevent full credit being given to these officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not attain it.

To avoid repetition, I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject they be considered as part of my own. I claim credit for the officers of my staff, and for those acting as such during the day. They did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best circumstances admitted. They are as follows:—

First Lieutenant H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth artillery, aid-de-camp.

Major Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia Volunteers, aid-de-camp.

Major James S. Wadsworth, New York Militia Volunteers, aid-de-camp. The latter, who does me the honor to be on my personal staff, had a horse shot under him in the hottest of the fight.

Captain James B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain O. H. Tillingham, Assistant Quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and burdensome duties of his department with the army, and who was mortally wounded while acting with the artillery, to which he formerly

belonged, and in which he was deeply interested.

Captain H. F. Clark, Chief of Subsistence Department.

Major Meyer, Signal Officer, and Major Malcolm McDonnell, who acted as aids.

Surgeon W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department.

Major J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the army, gave most important aid.

First Lieutenant Fred. S. Prime, Engineers.

Captain A. W. Whipple.

First Lieutenant H. L. Abbott and Second Lieutenant H. S. Potham, Topographical Engineers.

Major W. F. Barry, Fifth artillery, Chief of Artillery.

Lieutenant George C. Strong, Ordnance Officer.

Inspector General.

Second Lieutenant Guy Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an aid de-camp.

The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called them did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:

Brigadier General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers.

Colonel David Hunter, Third cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division.

Colonel S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his division into action on the hill.

Brigadier General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second brigade, First division.

Colonel E. D. Keyes, Eleventh infantry, commanding First brigade, First division.

Colonel W. P. Franklin, Twelfth infantry, Third brigade, Third division.

Col. W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth infantry, commanding Third brigade, First division.

Colonel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth infantry, commanding First brigade, Second division.

Colonel A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second brigade, Second division.

Colonel O. B. Wilcox, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second brigade, Third division, who was wounded and taken prisoner while on the hill, in the hottest of the fight.

Colonel O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third brigade, Third division.

Colonel J. R. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth brigade, First division.

Colonel Benker, New York Volunteers, commanding First brigade, Fifth division.

Colonel Davis, New York Volunteers, commanding Second brigade, Fifth division.

As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the antecedents of the battle. When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 19th July, Monday. Every facility possible was afforded by the various Departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to Gen. Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster General, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and artillery, did not all arrive for a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished on Tuesday, the 16th ultimo, to lay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo.

When I did set out on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I was forward trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.

I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centerville on the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to get into action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles farther to Centerville—in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of light marching order.

We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the fifth division (Miles and Richardson's brigades) on the left, at Blackburn's ford to Centerville, and Schenck's brigade, at Tyler's division, on the left of the road, near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could with me, not engaged elsewhere. He had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major General Butler, and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnson joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, if I knew them all. This was not done, and the enemy were free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, which we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax station, Germantown and Centerville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond author-

ties, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to, I cannot say—certainly much more than we attacked them with.

I could not, as I have said, more early push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three months volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers, and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. But in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night.

It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.

In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.

In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to the events of the 21st ult., that the general order for the battle to which I referred was, with slight modifications, literally conforming to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged, and that up to late in the afternoon every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting—that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication and intervene between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston. And could we have fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is everything to show how we could have continued successful, even against the odds with which we contended.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant.

IRWIN McDOWELL,
Brigadier General, Commanding.

BY TELEGRAPH.
FROM OUR MORNING EDITION.

AFFAIRS AT WASHINGTON.

A FEMALE REBEL SPY ESCAPES TO VIRGINIA.

Government Horses Drowned at Havre de Grace.

REBEL BATTERY AT MATTHIAS POINT.

Threatened Obstruction of the Potomac Navigation.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8.

Mrs. Hart, the wife of the late Superintendent of Public Printing, formerly of Charleston, S. C., has escaped from this city into Virginia, by way of the Potomac.

She has been trying to get away for some weeks, and as she is a furious secessionist, she has undoubtedly carried important information to the rebels.

Two cars loaded with horses for the Government, were accidentally run into the Susquehanna river at Havre de Grace this morning, and eighteen horses were drowned.

Mr. Faulkner, the late U. S. Minister to France, has left Baltimore for his residence at Martinsburg, Va.

Lieutenant Dempsey, of the New York Second regiment, is wounded at Manassas, and not killed as has been heretofore reported.

[SECOND DISPATCH.]

A vessel that came up the river arrived at the Navy Yard at noon to-day. She reports that some negroes came on board the Potomac squadron yesterday, and informed the officers that the rebels were erecting batteries at Matthias Point.

It is the opinion of experienced officers that if a battery is once planted there, the rebels will be able to sink passing vessels by cannon shot. The channel is within a few hundred feet of the shore, and the navigation of the Potomac would thus be stopped.

WARFARE OF THE CHIVALRY.

WISE'S CAMPAIGN IN THE KANAWHA VALLEY.

Wanton Destruction of Property.

Infamous Outrages Upon Union Men.

THE PEOPLE SICK OF SECESSION.

Moderate Secessionists Threatening to Shoot Wise.

[From the Wheeling Intelligencer of Aug. 7.]

By the arrival of a gentleman yesterday from the Kanawha country, we have further accounts of the doings of Wise in that region. The account which we receive is in confirmation of all previous news that we have had about the infamous and outrageous which Wise committed while in the Valley. For cool and wanton atrocity in robbery, theft and destruction of property, his career has no parallel in modern times. For weeks previous to his hurried and precipitate retreat, he kept his guerrillas constantly scouring and marauding the counties of Kanawha and Jackson, seizing all the cattle and horses of Union men, and pretending to buy them of the disunion men, but never paying anything to anybody.

These cattle and horses were sent on to the east, until there are very few good horses left in the counties named. Other counties fared but little better. He burned nearly every bridge in the valley, except the fine suspension bridge across Elk river, which he ordered cut down and fired. His order was partially prevented by the vigilance of some of the citizens. The bridge, however, was so weakened as to render it useless. He burned two fine steamboats after he was compelled to abandon them, and it is said, although our informant will not vouch for the truth, of his own personal knowledge, that one of these boats contained the bodies of several that were killed and wounded in the tragedy by which his troops retired into each other, in mistake, in their retreat. Many of the more moderate of the secessionists are as bitter towards Wise as the Union men. Many talk about shooting him—even some that were in his army. Many of his followers and adherents have left the country, now that he has gone; others are ready to swear allegiance, while others ask to be left alone. They say that this wanton destruction of property is more than they bargained for. Many honorable and worthy men have been carried to Richmond for expressing Union sentiments, some of whom have large families depending on them for sustenance. A great amount of suffering must be the result. The most violent of the rabble secessionists have gone with Wise's army, and many of their families are in a distressed and destitute condition. All hands are sick to death of secession. It has been a terrible trial to them. The new government of the State, although looked upon with considerable distrust by some, will eventually be sustained by a large majority.

New Advertisements.

A CHANCE FOR A BARGAIN.

To close up the concern the entire stock of SHOES, BOOTS, &c., late of Oliver B. I man, deceased, in the rooms in the Market Square, will be sold at private sale at 50¢; and the rooms will be let to the purchaser if desired. The terms will be made easy. J. H. DANF'L, H. W. Agent.

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