

Daily Telegraph

HARRISBURG

Wednesday Afternoon, January 2, 1861.

LAST ANNUAL MESSAGE

GOVERNOR PACKER.

To the Honorable the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

GENTLEMEN:—In submitting to the General Assembly my last annual communication, I feel the source of unfeigned gratification to be able to announce to the people, and to their representatives, that notwithstanding the present untoward crisis in the monetary affairs of this country, and the general prostration of business and credit, the financial condition of Pennsylvania is highly satisfactory.

The receipts at the State Treasury, from all sources, for the fiscal year ending on the 30th of November, 1860, were \$9,479,237.31, to which was added the available balance in the Treasury on the 1st day of December, 1859, \$589,328.09, and the whole sum available for the year will be found to be \$4,818,580.40. The expenditures, for all purposes, for the same period, were \$3,687,147.32. Leaving an available balance in the Treasury, on the 1st day of December, 1860, of \$681,433.08. The following items are embraced in the expenditures for the fiscal year, viz:

Table with 2 columns: Item description and Amount. Includes items like Relief notes, Interest certificates, Domestic creditors, etc.

Making the entire debt of the Commonwealth, at the period named, \$38,638,961.07. The funded and unfunded debt of the State, at the close of the last fiscal year, December 1, 1860, stood as follows:

Table showing FUNDED DEBT and UNFUNDED DEBT with sub-items and amounts.

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The funded and unfunded debt of the State, at the close of the last fiscal year, December 1, 1860, stood as follows:

Table showing FUNDED DEBT and UNFUNDED DEBT with sub-items and amounts.

Making the entire public debt of Pennsylvania, on the first day of December, 1860, \$69,847.60.

To pay the principal and interest of this debt, besides the ordinary sources of revenue, the Commonwealth holds the following mortgage bonds, derived from the sale of her public improvements, viz:

Table listing various bonds and their amounts, such as Bonds of Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Bonds of Sunbury and Erie R. Co., etc.

At the close of the fiscal year, on the first day of December, 1860, the public debt of this Commonwealth, as reported, was \$39,831,738.22.

It is noted, as the close of the fiscal year 1860, having been reduced, during the last 3 yrs 1,911,890.76.

The available balance in the Treasury on the first day of December, 1859, was \$528,106.47, and on the 1st day of December, 1860, it was 681,433.08.

Exceeding the former bal. in the sum of 153,326.61. Add to this the sum paid at the Treasury during the past three years, for debts and claims against the Commonwealth arising out of the construction and maintenance of the public improvements, and which was substantially a part of the unfunded debt of the Commonwealth, amounting to 171,664.82.

And we have the sum of 324,991.42.

By adding this sum to the amount paid on the public debt from December 1, 1857, to December 1, 1860, to wit: \$1,911,890.76, it will be found that during the past three years the State has not only met all her ordinary liabilities, including the expenses of government, and the interest on her public debt, but has diminished her actual indebtedness the sum of \$2,280,582.16.

It is remembered that for the last three years the tax on real and personal estate has been but two and a half mills on the dollar, while from 1844 to 1857 it was three mills; that for the past two years and six months the State has received no part of the tax on tonnage due from the Pennsylvania railroad company; and that since July, 1859, the interest on the bonds held by the State against the Sunbury and Erie railroad company has remained due and unpaid, it is certainly cause for hearty congratulation, that, without aid from these important sources of revenue, so great a reduction of the public debt has been accomplished in comparatively so short a period. The funded debt of the State is now less than it has been since 1842, and the unfunded and floating debt, which at that time amounted to upwards of two millions of dollars, has been almost entirely redeemed. It is now reduced to \$120,721.78—and of this sum over ninety-nine thousand dollars consists of relief notes, most of which are undoubtedly either lost or destroyed, and will, therefore, never be presented for payment. The claims against the State, arising from the construction and maintenance of her canals and railroads, are now reduced to a mere nominal sum; and, in the future, will be provided for the ordinary expenses of government, her revenues and her energies may be exclusively applied to payment of the interest, and the discharge of the principal of her public debt.

The people of this Commonwealth have hitherto met, with promptness, the demands made upon them, from time to time, for the ways and means of replenishing the Public Treasury; and now, that they see that the onerous debt which they have been so long burdened, is now vanishing, and that the interest is annually being diminished—that they are not only enabled to meet their obligations, but that they are enabled to pay the interest, and the discharge of the principal of her public debt, without resorting to additional sources of revenue—and that, with a proper husbanding of the resources of the State, the day is not far distant when direct taxation in Pennsylvania will cease altogether—the payment of such

taxes as may for the time be required to meet the public necessities, will continue to be met with cheerfulness and alacrity. But they will unquestionably hold those to whose care they have entrusted the financial interests of the State to a rigid accountability. That there is a business and monetary stagnation in the country are so greatly depressed, by the strictest economy in public expenditures, is so manifest, that it can scarcely be necessary to call attention to so plain a duty. It is equally clear that any legislation which would tend to lessen the revenues of the Commonwealth, would, at this time, be peculiarly unwise and inexpedient. The exigencies of the future no man can foretell—the prospect before us is beset with doubt and uncertainty—it is, therefore, no more than the part of wisdom to guard, with unceasing vigilance, all our present sources of revenue, and to thus be prepared for every possible contingency.

Since July, 1858, the Pennsylvania railroad company has refused to pay the tax on tonnage required to be paid by the act incorporating the company, and its various supplements; and there is now due to the State, on that account, exclusive of interest, the sum of \$674,236.22. Including the interest, the sum now due is about \$700,000. Before my last annual message was submitted to the Legislature, a case had been tried in the court of common pleas of Dauphin county, between the Commonwealth and the railroad company, involving the question of the constitutionality of this tax, which was decided in favor of the State, and the imposition of the tax pronounced constitutional. In January last, another suit was tried between the same parties, in the same court, involving the same question, with a like result. In December last, a judgment was obtained in the district court of Philadelphia, for the use of the Commonwealth, for the sum of \$110,000. So that judgment has been entered for the sum of \$365,000 of the debt, being the whole amount which became due prior to 1860. The tax which accrued during the past year, amounts to \$308,829.03. The first settlement for the year is before the Dauphin county court, on an appeal taken by the company; and the second, or last, settlement was made but a few days since, by the accountant department of the Commonwealth.

After the receipt, in the common pleas of Dauphin county, the cases were removed by writ of error, taken on behalf of the defendants, to the Supreme Court of this State, where they were argued in June last, and in October that tribunal sustained the decision of the court of common pleas, and held the tax to be clearly constitutional; thus uniting with the law making power in affirming the right of the State to tax a corporation under a law which itowes its existence. But, notwithstanding this concurrence of opinion and action on behalf of the Commonwealth, the litigation has not yet come to an end; for the railroad company has recently removed the cases, by writs of error, to the Supreme Court of the United States, where they are now pending. That the decision of that court will, when made, fully sustain the right of a sovereign State to enforce a contract between the State and a corporation, and entirely vindicate the power of a State to impose such taxes upon corporations, as in her sovereign will she may deem proper, I cannot for a moment doubt.

To complete the history of this important litigation, and to show that every effort has been made, to determine the payment of the large sum of money into the Treasury of the State, it is proper to add, that the law officer of the Commonwealth, being of opinion that the writs of error were not issued from the Supreme Court of the United States in time to prevent the collection of the judgments rendered in the State courts, executions were issued to the sheriff of the County of Dauphin, and proceedings are now pending in the Supreme Court of this State, to determine whether the Commonwealth can compel the payment of the judgments already recovered, before the final decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Sunbury and Erie railroad company have, by their present conduct, disappointed the expectations of the Commonwealth, and have not realized that most important improvement, have not been attained in this country—the supply of a want which has ever been felt by the agricultural community; the education of their sons, at once, to scientific knowledge, habitual industry, and practical skill, to fit them for the associations of rural life, and the occupation chosen for them by their fathers. The gains of the farmer, however certain, are small. The education of his sons, should, therefore, be measured by the nature of his business. There is no more practical mode of imparting education, but by combining an amount of expenditure, within the ability of a farmer, with the daily labor of the student, so as to make the institution so nearly self-sustaining as to bring it within the reach of that class who constitute so important a branch of the industry of our people. The original design of this school embraced the accommodation of four hundred students, a number essential to the economical working of the system; and, although the utility of their admission are numberless, the most efforts of the trustees have not been able to complete more than one-third of the building, or to accommodate more than a corresponding number of students. Many individuals throughout the State, convinced of the merit of an institution which promises so much good, have contributed liberally to what has already been done; and the board of trustees have labored with a zeal which cannot fail to commend itself to the kind feeling of all our citizens. Scientific education has advanced the interests of every avocation of life—agriculture far less than any other—and for the manifest reason that it has not reached to the same extent, and never will reach it, unless the body be educated to the plow, as well as the mind to the philosophical principles which the plow's work develops.

I have always looked upon the Farmers' High School with peculiar favor, as well because of my own convictions of its promised usefulness, as the favor which has hitherto been shown to it by the Representatives of the people. Its charter requires an annual exhibition of its receipts, expenditures, and operations generally, and these will doubtless be laid before you.

By the act passed by the last Legislature, establishing a system of free banking in Pennsylvania, and securing the public against loss from insolvent banks, radical changes were made in the banking laws of this State. Instead of corporations created by special laws, voluntary associations are authorized to transact the business of banking, without further legislation, and as an indispensable prerequisite to the issuing of bank notes for circulation as money, the security must be provided by the Auditor General for their prompt redemption. The law makes provision, not only for the incorporation of new banking associations, but enables banking institutions already in existence, to continue their business for twenty years after the expiration of their present charters, upon complying with its provisions; by withdrawing their old circulation, and giving the new issues. The public, I am sure, will rejoice that no further necessity exists for legislative action, either in the way of creating new, or re-chartering old banks; and that the time and attention of their Representatives will now, happily, be no longer monopolized in the consideration of a subject hitherto productive of so much strife and contention, if not of positive evil. The rapid increase of private banks, throughout the State, makes it eminently right that they should be placed under proper legislative restrictions, and that the large amount of capital, thus employed, should be made to contribute its fair proportion to the revenues of the

Commonwealth. Their business, in the aggregate, is now believed to amount to a sum almost, if not quite, equal to the whole business of the regularly chartered banks; and yet it is entirely unrestricted, and, with the exception of a merely nominal license tax, is free from taxation. It is just to every other class of our population, and especially so to the banking institutions holding charters from the Commonwealth, for which they have each paid a liberal bonus, and are, in addition, subject to a very large tax on their dividends. I respectfully commend this subject to the attention of the Legislature.

A high sense of duty impels me again to call the attention of the Legislature to the inadequacy of existing laws, regulating the receipt, keeping and disbursement of the revenues of the State. The public moneys are now paid directly to the State Treasurer, who deposits them, at his own discretion, wherever, and whenever he chooses; and pays them out in sums, either small or great, upon his own untested check exclusively. The amount thus received, kept and disbursed is annually between three and four millions of dollars, with balances on hand, at times, exceeding one million of dollars; while the bond of the State Treasurer is for only eighty thousand dollars. His accounts are settled monthly by the Auditor General, by whom the receipts for money paid into the Treasury are countersigned, and these are the only safeguards provided by law to prevent the illegal and improper use of the money of the State by the State Treasurer.

Happily the revenues of the Commonwealth have hitherto been safely kept, properly disbursed, and promptly accounted for, by those in charge of the Public Treasury; but in view of the serious delinquencies which have occurred elsewhere, and in other States, this fact should furnish no reason why we ought not to guard against loss in the future. Referring to my former annual messages, I respectfully, but most earnestly, recommend that provision be made by law:

First—That no money shall be deposited by the State Treasurer in any bank, or elsewhere, without first requiring ample security to be given to the Commonwealth for the prompt repayment of such sum as may be deposited; and that such securities shall be deposited in the office of the Auditor General.

Second—That all checks issued by the State Treasurer, shall be countersigned by the Auditor General, before they are used, and that daily receipts shall be kept of the moneys received, deposited and disbursed, in the Auditor General's office, as well as in the Treasury Department.

Third—That condensed monthly statements, verified by the signatures of the Auditor General and State Treasurer, shall be published in one newspaper in Philadelphia and one in Harrisburg, showing the balances in the Treasury, and where deposited, with the particular amount of each deposit; and

Fourth—That the bond of the State Treasurer be increased to the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

Our various charitable and reformatory institutions—the State Lunatic Hospital, at Harrisburg—the Western Pennsylvania Hospital for the insane, at Pittsburgh—the asylum for the blind, and deaf and dumb, at Philadelphia—the Houses of Refuge at Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and the Pennsylvania Training School for idiotic and feeble minded children, at Media, will present their usual annual claims upon the bounty of the State. These excellent charities are continually dispensing benefits and blessings upon suffering and destitute humanity, which can scarcely be overrated. They are heartily commended to the discriminating liberality of the Legislature. I refrain, as I have heretofore done, from recommending, as proper objects for appropriations from the State Treasury, other charitable and benevolent institutions, not because they are undeserving the confidence and patronage of the public, but because they are local in their character, and in my judgment have no claims upon the Commonwealth, but are respectfully referred to the annual report of the Commonwealth School Department, herewith submitted.

I desire again, specially, to call the attention of the General Assembly, to the Eastern District Penitentiary for the State of Pennsylvania, in their annual report for the years 1859 and 1860, called the attention of the Legislature to the security of such parts of the penitentiary buildings as were exposed to their own fires and those of the neighborhood, and recommended that roofs of such of the corridors as were covered with shingles, and needed renewal, should be replaced with slate or metal.

On visiting the institution, my attention was called to the subject by the inspectors. The necessity for the change was so apparent and urgent, that I advised them not to hesitate in having the old, dilapidated and dangerous wooden roofs of such corridors replaced with the more substantial material. This has accordingly been done, and I respectfully recommend that a small appropriation be granted to defray the expense incurred.

I commend to your consideration the report of the State Librarian, whose attention to the interests of the Library under his care, deserves the warmest commendation. The system of exchanges, with the different States of the Union, and with foreign governments, commenced and prosecuted under his auspices, has resulted in great benefit to the Library, and deserves the continued countenance of the Legislature. The increase of the Library, at a comparatively small expense to the State, has been such, that it now needs enlarged accommodations for the safe-keeping of the volumes, and, if the increase continues, will soon require a separate building for its exclusive use.

The reports of the State Treasurer, the Auditor General, the Surveyor General, the Adjutant General, and the Attorney General, will inform you, in detail, of the operations of the government for the last fiscal year. They are submitted to the last fiscal year. They are entrusted to the attentive consideration of the Legislature.

Soon after my inauguration, upon the recommendation of my predecessor in office, a dwelling house was purchased in this city for the residence of the Governor of the Commonwealth. The purchase included several articles of heavy furniture, then in the building, and a small appropriation would complete the necessary furnishing of the house, so as to make it a fit and convenient residence for the incoming Executive. I cheerfully recommend the immediate passage of a bill making a suitable appropriation for this purpose.

The extraordinary and alarming condition of our national affairs demands your immediate attention. On the twentieth of December last, the Convention of South Carolina, organized under the authority of the Legislature of that State, by a unanimous vote, declared "that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the United States, is hereby dissolved; and that the act, already passed in that State, in conformity with the Southern States, indicates, most clearly, their intention to follow this example.

On behalf of the advocates of secession, it is claimed that this Union is merely a compact between the several States composing it, and that any one of the States, which may feel aggrieved, may, at its pleasure, declare that it will no longer be a party to the compact. This doctrine is clearly erroneous. The Constitution of the United States is something more than a mere compact, or agreement, between the several States. As applied to nations, a compact is but a treaty, which may be abrogated at the will of either party; responsible to the other party for its bad faith in refusing to keep its engagements, but entirely irresponsible to any superior tribunal. A government, on the other hand, whether created by consent, or by conquest, when clothed with legislative, judicial and executive powers, is necessarily in its nature sovereign; and from this sovereignty flows its right to enforce its laws and decrees by its fair process, and, in an emergency, by its

military and naval power. The government owes protection to the people, and they in turn owe it their allegiance. Its laws cannot be violated by its citizens, without accountability to the tribunals created to enforce its decrees and to punish offenders. Organized resistance to it is rebellion. If successful, it may be purged of crime by revolution. If unsuccessful, the persons engaged in the rebellion may be executed as traitors. The government of the United States, within the limits assigned to it, is as potent in sovereignty, as any other government in the civilized world. The Constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, are expressly declared to be the supreme law of the land. Under the Constitution, the general government has the power to raise and support armies, to create and maintain a navy, and to provide for calling forth the militia to execute its laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasion. Appropriate statutes have been enacted by Congress, to aid in the execution of these important governmental powers.

The creation of the Federal Government, with the powers enumerated in the Constitution, was the act of the people of the United States, and it is perfectly immaterial that the people of the several States acted separately within the territorial limits of each State. The form of their action is of no consequence, in view of the fact that they created a Federal Government, to which they surrendered certain powers of sovereignty, and declared those powers, thus surrendered, to be supreme, without reserving to the States, or to the people, the right of secession, nullification or other resistance. It is, therefore, clear that there is no constitutional right of secession. Secession is in another form of nullification. Either, when attempted to be carried out by force, is rebellion, and should be treated as such; or those whose sworn duty it is to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

It is certainly true, that in cases of great extremity, when the oppression of government has become so intolerable that civil war is preferable to longer submission, there remains the revolutionary right of resistance; but where the authority of the Government is limited by a written Constitution, and each department is held in check by the other departments, it will rarely, if ever, happen that the citizens may not be adequately protected, without resorting to the sacred and inalienable right to resist and destroy a government which has been perverted to a tyranny.

But, while denying the right of a State to absolve its citizens from the allegiance which they owe to the Federal Government, it is nevertheless highly proper that we should carefully and candidly examine the reasons which are advanced by those who have evinced a determination to destroy the Union of these American States; and of it shall appear that any of the causes of complaint are just, and, as far as possible, reparation made for the past, and security given for the future; for it is not to be tolerated, that a government created by the people, and maintained for their benefit, should do injustice to any portion of its citizens.

After asserting her right to withdraw from the Union, South Carolina, declares that she is justified, in exercising, at this time, that right, because several of the States have refused to fulfill their constitutional obligations, but have enacted laws either nullifying the Constitution, or rendering useless the acts of Congress relative to the surrender of fugitive slaves—that they have permitted the open establishment of societies, to disturb the peace of other States; that the people of the non-slaveholding States have aided in the escape of slaves from their masters, and have inclined to servile insurrection those that remain; and have announced their determination to exclude the South from the commonwealth of the United States. The representatives of the people of Pennsylvania, it becomes your solemn duty to examine these serious charges, made by the authority of a sovereign State.

Pennsylvania is included in the list of States that are charged with having refused compliance with that clause of the Constitution of the United States, which declares, "that no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." So far from admitting the truth of this charge, I unhesitatingly aver, that, upon a careful examination it will be found, that the legislative and judicial action of Pennsylvania, whether as a colony, as a member of the old confederation, or under the existing Constitution of the United States, has been almost invariably influenced by a proper appreciation of her own obligations, and by a high regard for the rights, the feelings and the interests of her sister States.

As early as 1705, the provincial authorities of Pennsylvania, after reciting in the preamble, "that the importation of Indian slaves from Carolina, or other places, hath been observed to give the Indians of this province some umbrage and suspicion and dissatisfaction," passed an act against the importation of Indian slaves from any other province, or colony, in America, but at the same time declared, "that no such Indian slave, as deserting his master's service elsewhere, shall fly into this province, shall be understood or construed to be comprehended within this act." And when, in 1780, more than eight years before the Constitution of the United States went into operation, Pennsylvania passed her law for the gradual abolition of slavery; mindful of the rights of her confederates, she declared that "this act, or anything in it contained, shall not give any relief or shelter to any absconding or runaway negro or mulatto slave, or servant, who has absented himself, or shall absent himself, from his or her owner, master or mistress, residing in any other State or country, but such owner, master or mistress, shall have like right and aid to demand, claim and take away his slave, or servant, as he might have had in case this act had not been made." A provision much more unequivocal in its phrasing, and directed in its commands, than those found, on the same subject, in the Constitution of the United States, and in the act, by which the Governor of Pennsylvania, in conformity with the act of Congress from the other American States, and those held by persons while passing through this State or sojourning therein for a period not longer than six months.

In 1788 it was made a high penal offense for any person, by force, violence or fraud, to take out of this State, any negro or mulatto, with the intention of keeping or selling the said negro or mulatto as a slave, for a term of years. The act, by its terms, was made applicable to the negro or mulatto slave, or servant, who had absented himself, or shall absent himself, from his or her owner, master or mistress, residing in any other State or country, but such owner, master or mistress, shall have like right and aid to demand, claim and take away his slave, or servant, as he might have had in case this act had not been made." A provision much more unequivocal in its phrasing, and directed in its commands, than those found, on the same subject, in the Constitution of the United States, and in the act, by which the Governor of Pennsylvania, in conformity with the act of Congress from the other American States, and those held by persons while passing through this State or sojourning therein for a period not longer than six months.

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relative to fugitives from labor, for the prevention of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping." This excellent and well considered law met all the existing emergencies, required the judges, justices of the peace and aldermen, of the State, upon the oath of the claimant, to issue their warrant for the arrest of any fugitive from labor escaping into the State; directing, however, that such warrants should be made returnable, by whomsoever sued, before a judge of the proper court, and that such warrants, if authorized by the committee, be made provisions to secure its effectual execution, and at the same time to prevent its abuse.

This law continued quietly in operation until the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, made in 1842, in the case of Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The history of the case may be briefly stated: Edward Prigg was indicted by the Court of Oyer and Terminer of York county, for kidnapping a colored person, named Margaret Morgan, upon the trial it appeared that she was held a slave in the State of Maryland, and that she escaped into the State of Pennsylvania in the year 1832—that in 1837, Edward Prigg was appointed, by a fugitive from labor, to seize and arrest her as a fugitive from labor. In pursuance of this authority, Prigg, Peace, Prigg caught the negro woman on a farm, and without having obtained any warrant of removal, he delivered her to the court in the State of Maryland. These facts were found by a special verdict, and by the agreement of counsel, a judgment was entered against Prigg. From this judgment a writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the State, where a pro forma judgment of affirmance was again, by agreement, entered, and the case removed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

It will be observed that the question, whether Edward Prigg was really guilty of the crime of kidnapping, under the Pennsylvania statute of 1826, was never actually passed upon, either by the court or jury, in the county of York, or by the Supreme Court of the State. The jury returned the facts, and the action of both courts was but a matter of form.

In the argument and determination of the case, in the Supreme Court of the United States, it appears to have been taken for granted, that our act of 1826 made it a misdemeanor for a master to take his slave out of this State, without a warrant of removal; and upon this construction, the act was declared unconstitutional and void. This, I submit, was a clear misapprehension of the purport and meaning of our legislation. The first section of the act of 1826, under which the indictment against Prigg was framed, was almost literally copied from the seventh section of the act of 1783, to which a construction had already been given by the highest judicial tribunal of the State of Pennsylvania, where it was held in favor of the plaintiff whatever the removal of a slave by the master or his agent, with or without a warrant. Such was the undoubted law of the State under the statute of 1788, and in re-enacting that statute, in the act of 1826, with an increased penalty, it is manifest that the intention and object of the Legislature was to protect the persons of color, and to punish those who, by fraud, force or violence, were guilty of kidnapping, or holding or selling free men as slaves; that the State had no clear right to do anything but a misconception of her act, which had induced the declaration that it was forbidden by the constitution of the United States. It is perfectly clear, that Edward Prigg had committed no crime in removing Margaret Morgan from the State of Pennsylvania to the State of Maryland, and delivering her up to her owner; and it is equally clear, that no attempt was made, by the State of Pennsylvania, to declare her act a crime, and that she had been discharged, not because the act of the State was unconstitutional, but because she had not transgressed its commands.

The Supreme Court of the United States not only pronounced the particular section of the act of 1826, then before them, unconstitutional, but a majority of the Court held that the whole act was void, because the power to provide for the rendition of fugitives from labor, was vested exclusively in Congress, and the several States were, therefore, incompetent to pass statutes either in aid of, or in derogation of, or prevent, the delivery of such fugitives. This was the extent of the decision, as delivered by Judge Story, not only appears from the opinions of the majority, but also from the dissenting opinions delivered by the minority of the Court. By this unfortunate decision, it was authoritatively proclaimed that Pennsylvania, in enacting her liberal statute of 1826, making it the duty of her own officers to aid in arresting and delivering up fugitives from labor, had mistaken her constitutional obligation, and that her act was in violation of the solemn obligations to the Constitution of the United States. Under such circumstances, it was the manifest duty of the State to repeal her law thus declared unconstitutional. This was done by the act of 1847; and if that act had contained nothing more than a repeal of the law of 1826, and the re-enactment of the law against kidnapping, it could not have been subject to any complaint. But the third section of the act of 1847 prohibits, under heavy penalties, our judges, magistrates, or other officers, any act of Congress, or other law, in the execution of the case of a fugitive from labor; and the fourth section punishes with fine, and imprisonment, the tumultuous and riotous arrest of a fugitive slave, by any person or persons, under any pretence of authority whatever, so as to create a breach of the public peace. The sixth section, denying the use of the county jails for the detention of fugitive slaves, was repealed in 1852, and need only be referred to as showing the general spirit of the act. The seventh section repeals the provisions of the act of 1780, which authorized the rendition of fugitives from labor, and gave to sojourners the right to bring their slaves into the State, and retain them here for any period not exceeding six months.

The provisions of the third and fourth sections of the act of 1847, seem to have been dictated upon the language of the Supreme Court in Prigg's case. It is there admitted that the several States may prohibit their own magistrates, and other officers, from exercising authority conferred by an act of Congress; and that while in the Constitution of the United States, is clothed with power, in every State of the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, he must, nevertheless, do so without using any illegal violence, or committing any breach of the peace. It is evident that the framers of the act of 1847 had closely studied the case of Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and had kept this law strictly within its letter, and in every respect, the act is a codification of the principles enunciated by the Court; and no fault may justly be found with its temporary constitutionality.

If fugitive slaves were still claimed under the act of Congress of 1783, the denial to the master of the aid of State judges and magistrates, might be a source of great inconvenience to him; but the complete and perfect remedy now provided by the act of Congress of 1850, renders him entirely independent of State officers. And the punishment of arrests without warrant, by a master in the exercise of his constitutional right of recaption, but made in a violent, tumultuous and unreasonable manner, amounting to a breach of the peace, is but recognizing, by statute, what was before the common law. These sections were re-enacted in the revised penal code of Pennsylvania, at the last session of the Legislature, and are still the law of the State; but they are not now of any practical importance, and as their retention on our statute book is calculated to create the impression that the people

relative to fugitives from labor, for the prevention of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping." This excellent and well considered law met all the existing emergencies, required the judges, justices of the peace and aldermen, of the State, upon the oath of the claimant, to issue their warrant for the arrest of any fugitive from labor escaping into the State; directing, however, that such warrants should be made returnable, by whomsoever sued, before a judge of the proper court, and that such warrants, if authorized by the committee, be made provisions to secure its effectual execution, and at the same time to prevent its abuse.

This law continued quietly in operation until the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, made in 1842, in the case of Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The history of the case may be briefly stated: Edward Prigg was indicted by the Court of Oyer and Terminer of York county, for kidnapping a colored person, named Margaret Morgan, upon the trial it appeared that she was held a slave in the State of Maryland, and that she escaped into the State of Pennsylvania in the year 1832—that in 1837, Edward Prigg was appointed, by a fugitive from labor, to seize and arrest her as a fugitive from labor. In pursuance of this authority, Prigg, Peace, Prigg caught the negro woman on a farm, and without having obtained any warrant of removal, he delivered her to the court in the State of Maryland. These facts were found by a special verdict, and by the agreement of counsel, a judgment was entered against Prigg. From this judgment a writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the State, where a pro forma judgment of affirmance was again, by agreement, entered, and the case removed to the Supreme Court of the United States.