

Mr. FENNO,

AFTER the long period which has elapsed since the publication of my observations on the calamity advanced against the southern states, I imagined I had done with the subject. But a reply, which you have published from the *Minerva*, renders some further remarks necessary on my part. The writer of them says my numbers "soon convinced him, that I did not know what I was about, and that it was idle to take any notice of me." Had he persisted in this opinion, he would have spared me some time and trouble.

I request the readers' particular attention to the origin of the controversy between us, in order to enable him accurately to decide the question at issue:—

This writer asserted that "the northern states fought the battles of the southern, during the late war. They fed, clothed, and supported the army. They secured independence." These assertions, which were advanced without any qualification, limitation, doubt or exception, I controverted, and adduced the most copious and unanswerable proofs, drawn verbatim from Ramsay and Gordon, that they were untrue.

I freely avow, that when I began the investigation, I had no idea how utterly and absolutely unfounded they were. I supposed it not only possible but highly probable, that considerable portions of the American armies at the southward, might have been drawn from the northern states. But the reader may readily conceive my astonishment, at finding that there was not even the most distant shadow of foundation for the assertions; that the southern states, in the fullest and most unbounded latitude of the words, fought their own battles; that in these awful "times that tried men's souls," they were almost literally abandoned by the general government. 1. When the invasion of South Carolina took place, "The North Carolina and Virginia continentals, amounting to 1500 men, and also two frigates, a twenty gun ship, and a sloop of war, were ordered from the Northward, for the defence of Charlestown. This was all the aid that could be expected from Congress." Ramsay's South Carolina, vol. ii. page 7. "Though Congress was unable to send either men or money for the relief of the southern states, they did what was equivalent, they sent then a general whose head was a council, and whose military talents were equal to a reinforcement." Ramsay's America, vol. ii. p. 229. And to make the calamity appear the more completely monstrous, that there were more southern troops in the battles of Germantown and Brandywine, than, on the fullest examination, I could discover, of northern troops engaged to the southward, during the whole war, except at Yorktown.

I shall not pretend to account for the motives that led to this misstatement; nor is it necessary to call the reader's attention to its flagitious tendency, particularly at a time when the passions and prejudices of the northern faction of the union, were industriously and insidiously excited and arrayed against their southern brethren and fellow citizens, by a series of the most wanton and intemperate abuse—abuse which, though to the superficial, it may have the appearance of plausibility, I do not hesitate to pronounce utterly unfounded. Except the scurrility lavished on the Scotch in the North Briton, I never knew of so indecent an attack made on one part of a nation, in the Gazettes of another part. It might not be time ill spent to reflect on the general degradation of the American character, in the eyes of the European world, from the dissemination of such black and malignant descriptions of so large a portion of our fellow citizens. But, unfortunately, this is only one of thousands of instances that might be produced of the inefficacy of the ties of patriotism or truth, when put in competition with the accomplishment of a favorite scheme in politics.

But this is a digression. To return to the subject, I have to observe, that the writer now attempts to explain away the obvious and unequivocal import of his own words, in order to make them wear the appearance, and only the appearance, of truth. He tells us with great gravity that, "The meaning of the assertion, the northern states fought the battles of the southern, is, that the northern states made the principal resistance—a fact, that the southern states themselves acknowledged, and which, during the war, was never questioned."

Reader, do you agree to this "meaning"? Is it admissible? Is it fair, honest, or candid? Is it warranted by the obvious and natural import of the words? If it be, all my knowledge of the English language is erroneous. A writer asserts that "the northern states fought the battles of the southern." His assertion is disputed. History is appealed to. Her impartial and conclusive evidence proves that the position is destitute of even the semblance of truth. Driven from this post, and unwilling to acknowledge his error, he now tells us, that the meaning of the words is, that "the northern states made the principal resistance." As well might he assert, that a monarchy is the best possible form of government, and then explain his "meaning" to be a defence of republicanism.

But the subject deserves further consideration. Admitting the words to have the meaning which is now ascribed to them, they are still untrue. The northern states did not make the principal resistance. The resistance of the southern states was, to say no more, equally brave, equally honorable, equally inspired. Were I disposed to increase the irritation that has been artfully excited, I might, with perfect safety make comparisons, which, though they would perhaps appear invidious, would speak a very different language from that of the present day. I might draw a contrast between the southern battles and those fought to the northward; and that shamefully vilified part of the union would not have cause to shrink from, or blush at, the investigation. But I waive this. And shall only observe, that the journals of Congress bear ample testimony of the glories of Eutaw. At the battle of Cowpens, the boldest and most successful of the British generals was defeated by southern bravery. At Kings mountain, a motley collection of raw and totally

inexperienced militia hastily collected together, defeated superior numbers of veteran troops. In this battle the American forces were only 910 men, and they took 810 prisoners, and 1500 stand of arms. I might easily add to the glorious list.—I might trace Gen. Greene's army over the burning sands of North and South Carolina, by their bloody footsteps. I might dwell on the gallant defeat of the British armament which attacked Sullivan's Island, defended by only 374 men. And shall the laurels of such heroes be tarnished by an anonymous writer in a newspaper! O shame! where is thy bluth?

To corroborate his former assertions, he advances another. "Burgoyne, with an army of double the strength of that which laid waste three or four southern states for two years, marched several miles into the country, and maintained himself a week or two after leaving the lake, before he was compelled to surrender with his whole army."

Are we never to have done with assertions unsupported by truth or the testimony of history? The force under Burgoyne is stated by Gordon at "more than 7000 men." Vol. ii. p. 204. Ramsay says, in nearly the same words "the regular troops, British and German, allotted to this service, were upwards of 7000." Vol. ii. p. 25. Stedman, a later historian, and one who had the examination of the orderly books of Burgoyne's army, makes them amount to "7183 men" exclusive of the corps of artillery. Vol. i. p. 357.—Now, reader, let us examine if this army be "double the strength of that which laid waste the southern states."

Gen. Clinton, when he took Charleston, had an army of above 9000 men, the flower of the British troops on the continent. Ramsay's American Revolution, vol. ii. p. 135. It will require some new arithmetical calculations to prove that 7000 men are "double" 9000. Such power of figures, if properly applied to the public debt, might be made to produce wonderful effects.

Lord Cornwallis had at one time "under his orders, above 11,000 men." Gordon's America, vol. iii. p. 135. Subsequent to this, he received a reinforcement of 2000 men, under General Philips. *ibid.* 178. This gave him 13,000. At his surrender, after all his losses in killed, prisoners previously taken, and deserters, of whom the number was very considerable, his army was 7000 strong. Ramsay's America, vol. ii. 272. Yet we are now assured, that "Burgoyne's army was double the strength" of Cornwallis'. To which emotion shall we yield, astonishment or indignation, at such palpable and glaring aberrations from historical truth?

Burgoyne "maintained himself a week or two, after leaving the lake." The writer's abilities at subtraction and division are equal to those he possesses in addition or multiplication. After having made 7000 double 13,000, it is not surprising that entire months should be reduced to "a week or two." Let us examine this matter minutely. Gen. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga, the 6th of July—from which time to the 16th of October, the day of his surrender, was above fourteen weeks. To heighten New England bravery at the expence of that of the southern people—to "build up their house, by pulling down that of their neighbours," fourteen weeks are reduced to one or two. I do not deem it necessary to take much notice of the expression "after quitting the lake," for, if it has any meaning, as applied here, it must be, that before that event his shipping on the lake protected him from his assailants; which is not the fact; for he was not molested for many weeks after he left Ticonderoga. However, to remove all cavils, let us calculate from the time of his arrival at Fort Edward, which was on the 30th of July—this leaves a period of eleven weeks.

As the capture of Gen. Burgoyne's army by the northern states is blazoned forth, for the purpose of compelling the southern states to "hide their diminished heads"—I shall be pardoned for a short investigation of its cause. To lessen the glory of those who performed such an essential service to their country, in a day when her sun rose in clouds and darkness, is not my intention. I acknowledge the bravery displayed in it. I acknowledge its important effects on the residue of the war. But as, by a strange perversion of ideas, it seems to be the opinion of many, that the reputation of New England cannot be sufficiently resplendent, without tarnishing or annihilating that of the southern states, particularly Virginia, it becomes a duty to place this business in a proper point of light.

Gen. Burgoyne, whatever may have been his bravery, was deficient in some of the most important qualifications requisite for the enterprise he undertook. He was both rash and headstrong. Early in his career, he committed some egregious errors, which rendered his subsequent fate inevitable. He harassed his men by forcing his way through an almost impassable country, instead of returning to Ticonderoga, and using the navigation of lake St. George. (10.) When he determined on the attack of Bennington, he was informed by a loyalist, acquainted with the country, that 3000 men would be indispensably necessary for the expedition. (11.) He sent only 600, and these heavy armed Germans, under Baum, commander, who understood not the language, and who was unable to distinguish a friend from an enemy. (12.) When Baum discovered his imminent danger, and sent an express for a reinforcement, he dispatched Breyman with 600 more Germans, armed like the former, and who marched sixteen miles in twenty four hours. (13.) By his error and their dilatoriness, the reinforcement under Breyman arrived just after Baum had been defeated, and became themselves an easy conquest to an enemy flushed with victory. Other errors, almost as fatal, might be pointed out. But I fear to be tedious.

Besides his incapacity, there were natural obstacles in his way, of which the southern invaders could scarcely form an idea. The impracticable nature of the country gave ineffimable advantages to the American forces. Perhaps there is hardly an unfortified country in the world, in which an invader would be in a worse situation than the very spot in which the whole of Burgoyne's operations were conducted. With all his exertions—and his bitterest enemies have never charged him with want

of industry—he advanced very little more than a mile a day in his progress from Skeeneborough to Fort Edward. (14.) And I will venture an assertion, for the truth of which I appeal to any man conversant in tactics, that ten thousand men would stand a fairer chance of overrunning and subduing such a level champaign country, as Virginia and the Carolinas, than 30,000 would such a tract as lies from Skeeneborough to Saratoga, where nature has done more towards defence, than the utmost skill and bravery could afford.

"The principal means of defence were furnished by the northern states. The British bent their force, on that account, against the northern states—and a great proportion of the resistance made to that force, was, of course, made in the northern states."

To this paragraph I can, without any sacrifice of truth, pay the compliment, of declaring it to be equally true with the others. The British did not bend their force against the northern states. Except the ill managed invasion of Burgoyne, and a few predatory incursions, neither intended nor expected to produce any permanent effect, the northern states, properly so called, had almost a total respite for above six years of the war. The British "bent their force" chiefly against the southern states. Thither they sent their bravest, most enterprising, and most experienced Generals—their Cornwallises, their Carletons, their Fergusons, their Rawdons. Thither they were allured by the hopes of plunder and of easy conquest. There they made by far the greatest exertions. To the succour of these states, most invitingly exposed to insult and invasion, by their numerous navigable rivers, their scattered population, their extraordinary number of slaves, who were tempted to rise against their masters—Congress, as I have already shewn, was for the most part of the war unable to contribute.

"I will venture another assertion," adds this writer, "which I believe to be the truth, that the force which ravaged three or four southern states, during whole campaigns, could not have remained on the territory of the smallest of the eastern states, beyond the reach of their ships guns, and exposed to the force of that state only, for two weeks." This is as wild and extravagant an assertion, as any man ever hazarded in his sober senses. General Burgoyne's army, as we have already seen, was at no time equal to the southern invaders—they were fourteen weeks from their capture of Ticonderoga, and eleven from their arrival at Fort Edward, in the state of New-York, which is certainly as powerful, at least, as one of "the smallest of the eastern states"—they were "exposed" not "to the force of that state alone"—but to the force of all New-England, and even to some of the southern troops. (15.) Yet we are now told that the force that ravaged the southern states could not remain on the territory of "the smallest of the eastern states for two weeks"—yes, readers, for two weeks! that is the precise time fixed for them by a writer, who has lately assured his readers, that he "has always good authority for what he asserts," and that tho' his "enemies may contradict, they can not disprove his assertions!"

It gives me no small pleasure, that I have been instrumental in inducing this writer, after the abuse which he has so profusely thrown upon the southern states, to break forth at length in their praise. He says: "far be it from me to derogate from the honour or merits of the southern troops. They were excellent troops, though their numbers were small—and no better officers ever commanded men than those states furnished."—Had the means of defence existed in the southern states, the brave officers mentioned by Harrington, Morgan, Marion, Pickens, Lee, W. Washington, and others would soon have commanded those means, and expelled the enemy. No better officers ever lived. They did all they could do." How their well earned though extorted praises can be made to consist with the idea, that "the northern states secured independence," it is not my province to demonstrate. The "southern troops were excellent"—and "no better officers ever lived, than their commanders," yet, *mirabile dictu!* "the northern states fought their battles." This is only borrowing a little of the humbug, by which, to gratify the predilection of the Brunswick family for their continental dominions, the English have been very gravely persuaded that America was conquered in Germany.

In a former paper, "this same writer" charges the southern people with being "knarish" and with "sporting with property not their own." (16.) I cannot pretend to say whether he speaks from his own experience, or whether he takes the opinions of others on trust; but this I can and this I will say, that I have had dealings in Virginia to a considerable extent, and that I never had, nor do I desire better or fairer customers than they have uniformly been. Many of my friends and acquaintance can bear the same testimony in their favour. That there are unprincipled, dishonest men among them, cannot be denied. But are there none in New-England or New-York? "Let him that is without fault, throw the first stone."

I shall now take a final leave of this writer, unless he renews the controversy. In these essays, I have attempted to prove,

1. That the popular branch of a legislature are, to speak within bounds, not more liable to corruption than the senate.
2. That the northern states did not fight the battles of the southern.
3. That the southern states afforded more assistance to the northern, than they received from them.
4. That if the revolution was a crime, the southern states expiated their share of it by their sufferings; if meritorious, that they are entitled to a large share of the glory.
5. That if the newspaper writers to the southward, were disposed to abuse the people of New-England, topics are not wanting; and that therefore a cessation of this Billinggate warfare.
6. That the southern states are not a millstone about the neck of the prosperity of the northern.
7. That there can hardly be a more flagitious or execrable attempt than that of dissolving the Union.
8. That the tendency of the jealousy, hatred, and contempt, excited between the component parts of our confederation, is to produce a dissolution of the Union. And,

9. That a dissolution would be at least as severely and fatally felt by the northern states, who are sellers and the public creditors, as by the southern, who are buyers, and who contribute their full proportion to the payment of the interest on the public debt.

In this undertaking I have been influenced by a wish to promote, as far as a few desultory ideas can promote the general welfare. How far I have succeeded, the public will decide. I should have offered some apology for adducing proofs of what might appear self-evident. But that the necessity of apology is done away by an examination of the publications in our papers for some months past, by which it will appear, that the most obvious and incontrovertible maxims—maxims rendered sacred by the uniform support of the wisest and best men of every age and nation, have been, to serve the purposes of the moment, treated with as much derision as the fabrications of George Pflmanazer or the ravings of Richard Brothers.

HARRINGTON.

- May 23, 1796.
- 10. Ramsay, p. 34.
- 11. Stedman, vol. I. 368.
- 12. *Ibid.* 371.
- 13. *Ibid.*
- 14. Ramsay II. 34.
- 15. Among the American forces at the capture of Burgoyne, was the celebrated Morgan's rifle corps, and other troops from the southward.
- 16. American *Minerva*, May 6, 1796.

CONGRESS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Thursday, May 26.

Mr. Tracy said, as he understood Harrington, & Sterret had received information respecting their bill of exchange which led them to wish to withdraw their petition, he should move that the committee of claims be discharged from the further consideration of the said petition, and that leave be given to withdraw the same; which was granted accordingly.

Mr. Tracy also made reports on the petitions of Henry Hill and Oliver Pollock, in their favor, also on the petition of John Marie de Borde, against the petitioner; which were severally twice read, and ordered to be committed to committees of the whole to-morrow.

He also reported a bill for the relief of John Sieyes, which was twice read and ordered to be committed to committees of the whole to-day.

The house took up the amendments yesterday made in a committee of the whole on the bill for satisfying certain demands occasioned by the trials during the late insurrection, for providing additional pay to Marshals, Jurors, and Witnesses, and to allow a further compensation to the district Attorney of Kentucky. They were agreed to, and the bill was ordered to be engrossed and read the third time to day. It was afterwards read the third time and passed. By this bill an additional allowance of a dollar per day is made to marshals, who had before 5 dollars; of 1-2 dollar to grand & petty jurors, who had before only 50 cents; of 50 cents to witnesses who were before paid agreeably to the practice of each state; and 200 dollars were allowed in addition to his fees, to the district attorney of Kentucky.

A message from the Senate informed the house, that the Senate insisted upon their disagreement to the bill altering the compensation of clerks. A committee of conference was appointed on the subject of disagreement.

On motion of Mr. S. Smith, the house formed itself into a committee of the whole on the bill providing passports for ships and vessels of the United States, which was agreed to without amendment, and ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.

After some debate upon the propriety of postponing the business till next session, the house went into a committee of the whole on the bill making an extra allowance to certain clerks of public offices and the widows of such as are deceased, who remained in Philadelphia during the Yellow-Fever, together with the report of the committee of claims, to whom the bill had been referred thereon. The report stated that the objects of the present bill divided themselves into three classes, viz. the widows of such clerks as died in the calamity; such as remained to transact business which was necessary to be done and could not be transacted at any other time; and, such as remained to do business, which, though of some importance, might have been done afterwards. With respect to the first, the committee had no doubt as to the justice of their claim; with respect to the latter two classes, they were at a loss how to discriminate between them, and therefore had reported in favor of the whole, and yet they were aware it would be introducing a principle that would extend itself to New-York, Baltimore, Norfolk and New-Haven, which had been visited by a similar calamity and consequently bring forward a considerable number of claimants. The persons included in this bill were between 60 and 70, and though a hundred dollars each was only proposed to be allowed, it would make a considerable sum in the whole.

Mr. Swanwick advocated with all his force, the cause of these men who had remained he said at their stations, when their superiors fled from the pestilence which threatened them, and which swept a number of clerks away, whose widows and orphans were now left to lament their temerity. Mr. Rutherford also plead their cause. Mr. Heath and Mr. S. Smith opposed the bill, as establishing too broad a principle, whilst they had been obliged to turn a deaf ear to the distressed widows and orphans of soldiers, and that, as these persons had no real claim upon them, they ought to be just before they were generous. At length on motion of Mr. Coit, the first section of the bill was agreed to be struck out 35 to 25, and the other parts of the bill so altered as to include the widows of such persons as died during the fever. Mr. S. Smith approved of this measure, as being analogous to the relief granted to wounded soldiers or their widows; but Mr. Swanwick denied the analogy of the two cases.—When a soldier enlisted into the army he knew he had risks to run, his business was to meet danger; but these clerks entered into the service of govern-