THE DEFENCE.—No. VUi.
ONE of the particulars, in which our envoy is
alledged to have fallen fhoit of what might ami
ought to have been done, refpedls the time for the
surrender of the Weltern Puds. It is alledged
there ought either to have been an immediate fur
lender, 01 foitte guarantee or surety for the perform,
ance of the new promrfe. Both parts of the altef
n'ati've preKppofe that Great Britain was to have d 6
will upon the fubjeft ; that no circumftartces of sec
urity to her were to be confuted ;
that oiir envoy* vfaS not t- 4 > negociaie.but to com
ma;. !. iiow'UnUibftantuil-the.foundation on which
this cOurse of pYoecidbg is reebmn'ieiTdc'd has been
already developed.
1 ! 5 ~ ,faci \Va~, that our envoy pi'effed an early
ev,»ctt*»ion of the PoiU ; but t,here was an thflsx
ible ao'iwi.emid c*n the other fide to the term limit
id in the treaty, Tne reasons undertV'od to have"
been affigiicd for it, were to t!. is elfeti : (viz.)
Tint according tct the cohrfe of'th.e Indian trade,
it w.hs cuiiomary to spread through the nations,
goods to a targe amount, the returns for which
could not be drawn in:o Canada, in a snorter pe
riod than ivjs propufed tube fixed for tjhe evacua
tion ; that the imprefljbn which the fairender of
all the PostS to American garrisons might make on
the minds of the Indian*; could not be forefeen ;
that there was the greater rekfoh for caution, as
on a fornler occasion it lijd been intimated, to them
by public agents of the United Slates, that they
had forjuien nntl'/tvcn upb)' the British Jjb
verpmpnt; that {lie protection promised on oUr part
however lincereaird howcvercompetent in other res
pects, might not -be fuffieient in the firfl mftance
to the emharraflment which might ensue ;
that for these rei'fons the traders ought to have'
tinie to coi rlu !e their adventures, whi; h werepre
dicMted upon the. exilti. jjj ilate of things j that they
would, in future calvulat'e upon the new Hate of
things,, but that in the mean time the care of go
vernment ought not to be withdrawn from them.
There is gronnd to believe that there were repte
f-n:ationS pti behalf or" the Canada, traders, alleging
a "longer term than that which was adopted in the
•rejtv -senary to wind up and adapt
their arrangements to the new Hate of things ; and
that the term luggejied by .hem was abridged feve
-lal montna, And,it. may not be tiielefs to observe,
explanatory of the reasons given, that in fadi it
is the course of toe trade to' give long credit to tli«
Indians, and that the returns for goods furnished in
one year only, come in the next.
• ■ What n>2» to be.done in this cafe? Was the *ne
gociatron to break oi", or was the delay to bead
rriitted r Ihe'la't was preferred by our envoy, and
the preference was rightly judged.
... The .coiifcquence of breaking off the negotiation
has been ftatad. No reasonable man will doubt
that delay was preferable to war, if there be good
ground of rfrliWe; that\he ftipulatjon will be ful
filled at the appointed time. Let- us calmly exa
mine this point,
- . The argument againll it is drawn from the breach
<>f the formerpromife. To be authoi ized to press
•this argument, we ought to be fore that all was
fight ou our part. After what has been offered
on tins lubieCt, arc we j\tl! convinced that ■ this
w,.!S ihe cafe j Are we able to fay that there was
nothing in our conduit which fiirmfhed a ground
tor that of Great Britain i .Has it not been lhewn
t(v be a fatl, that, from the'afrival of theprovilion
at articles i i this country, tiff.after the:ratification
here of the definitive treaty, adts of fhtesinterdidl-
•/rig die recovery of -Britiih debts and wmracis mi
litdt'fog again ft the tteatv, contimuvi in operation :
Can we doubt tliut fubjecis of Great Britain, af
feilcd by these a£ts, earned complaints to the
enrs of their government ? Can we wonder if they
rvade IVrious irapreilians there, if they produced dif
tatisfaftion anddiilruft ? It is very' extraordina: y
jf t'iiey excited the idea of detaining Ihe po/tsasa
pied.jc, till inert were better indications r.i pnr part?
Is it lurpriziiig if (he continuance of these a£ts and
the addition of others which were new and positive
breaches of the treaty, prolonged the detention of
the Foils?
In fine, was the delay in fin-remitting so entirely
delhiate ofcaufe, 10 unequivocal a proof of a perfi
uimls character, as to jnllify the conclutioi, that
s.-o future dependence can be made on the pvomifes
of the British government- ? Difceraing ir.en v iH
not haltily 'fuhfcri'oe to this (.onc'mlon;
MuttJal charges of brtach of faith are not uncom
mon between nations: yet this does not prevent their
unking new lU'pidations with each other, and re'ry
ingnpon their' performance. The argument from
tile breach of one pioinife, if real, to the breach of
every other, is not fapported by experience, and if
adopted as a general rule would multiply, infinitely
the impediments to accord and agreement among
nations'.
The truth.is, that tftmigh nations will too often
jwfe their promises on colour 61c pretexts, yet few
are so profligate as to do if without such pretexts,
fu vicar cases, fclf intereit dictates a regard to the
obligations of good faith : noi fs there any thing in
ti:< hiilo'.y ot Grear Britain which warrants the o
jknion that (lis is more unmindful than other nations
of her char'adcr for good faith:
\et the must be so, and in an extreme degree, if
fne be capable of breaking, without real cause, a
fecund promise on the fame poirit, after the termina-
tion by a new of an old Jifpute concerning
it. and'this'too on tile bafts of mutual reparation.—
It would indicate a dcflit'.i: ion- of principle, a con
tempt of chara&eiy much beynn J the usual rrteaflire,
and to an extent which it may be affirmed is entire
ly improbable.
It is a eircuinriaP.ce'of force moment in theqlief.
tion that the lecond promise is free fiorfi tliern'-ue-
Sfels ot the firft, as to the time of execution —Tt is
riot to be performed tuilb aiU convenient fietrT, but
by a day certain, which'car.not be exceeded. This
would give point to violation' and render it unecjui-
Another argument 33310 ft* iKe"probability of per
formance has been deduced fi-'-rr> rhe fuppo'fed defi
ciency of good reasons for the delay, which is re
presented as evidence of want' of sincerity 'in the
uroiaife.
reasons which were ailigned for that
V: 'S^:,
. > "
delay, theie are others that may be conje&ured to
have operated, which it would not have been equal
ly convenient to avow, but which serve to explain
the delay different from the supposition ofits having
been calculated-for uIHHjUW tvafion. If, as we have
with'too milchcaule fufpeftedj Great Britain, oi
lier Representative in Canada,, whether with or
vi-ithotit orders, has really countenanced the hostil
ities of the Weltern .Indians, it was to be exped
ed that she should think it incumbent upon Jier to
give them fflffieient time to make peace before a:i
evacuation of the Posh should put them entirely in
oar power. , She might ot'nerwife have.provoked
them to hoflilities againil hit own feCtlements, and
have kindled in their minds, JnexUngiliihable re
ientments. It was not certain how foori a peaee.
could be brought about, fcnd it might be fuppofe'd,
that the difpofitioti to it on our pait might be weak
ened or ttrengthened by the.proximity or remoti
neij ot the period of the fui render. Moteovcr fame
considerable time might be requisite to prepare
those eftablilhmcatt for the security of Canada,
which the relinqniflirnent of the Polls on our fi«e
would be deemed to render ueceffarv.
The latter motive is one, not ju'ftly objeftiona
b'e : the fotmer implies an embarrassment resulting
from a culpable policy, which was entitled to no
indulgence from us, but which, nevertheleft, mufl
have hsd a pret.y impelious influence on the con
dufl of the other party, and mull have crested an
obftaele to a speedy surrender not easy to be sur
mounted. Taken together, we find in the reasons
afligned, and in those which may be prcfumed to
have operated, a solution of the pertinacity of G.
Britain oil the fubjeiH: of time, without impeaching
on that account, the sincerity of the ptomife to
surrender.
But we have very flrong holds for tha perform
ance of this promise upon the interefi; of Great-
Brifain. ill. The.intercft which every nation lias
in not entirely forfeiting its icputation for honour
and fidelity. 2d* The interest which lefolts from
the correlative flipulation with regard to the indem
nification fcr the British debts, a point upon wfiich
there will be r(o iuconfiderable mercantile sensibility.
3d. Ihe intrrrfl of pre£e?vmjr peare with this coun
try, the interruption ofwbich,,ifrcr all that haspiffed,
could not fail to attend the non-surrender of the
pods at the stipulated time.
It is morally certain that circumstances will eve
ty day add strength to this lalt motive. Time has
. aiieady done much for us, and will do more. Eve
ry hour's continuance of the war in Europe mud
iieceffarily add to the inconveniences of a rapture
with this country, and to the motives which Great-
Britain mull feel to avoid an incraafe of the num
ber of her enemies, to desire peace, and if obtained
to preserve it.
The enemies of the treaty, upon their own cal
culations, can hardly difpnte, that if the war con
tinues another year after the prcfent, the probable
situation of Great-Britain will be a complete secu
rity for her compliance with her promise to surrender
t.ie polls. But let us foppofe that a general peace
takes place in Europe this winter, what may then
be the disposition of Great-Britain in June next, as
to war or peace wi-h this country?
I answer, that the situation will be of "all o< hers
that whi.'h is mod likely to indispose her to a vrar
with us. There is no juncture at which war is mure
unwelcome to a nation,.than immediately after the
experience of another war, which has required
great exertions, and has been expeni'tve, bloody
and £alamitous. The minds of all men then dicad
tne renewal of fd great an evil, and are disposed ra
ther to make facrilices to peace than to plung'e a
frefh into holfilities. The situation of Great-Bu;
• ain at the end of the war in which she is now en
gaged, is likely to bij the m>ft discouraging that
tan be imagined to the provocation of new wars,
Here we may dtfcovci a powerful security for the
performance of other ftiputations.
As to the idea of a guarantee or surety for the
fulfilment of the promise, it cannot be feriou'fly be.
heved that it was obtainable. It would have been
an admission of the party, that there was a well
founded distrust of its faith. To consent to it,
thernore, would have been to subscribe to its own
humiliation and disgrace, the expectation of which
has been shewn to be ridiculous.
But why was there not good reason that we
ihould give a guarantee or surety for the perform
ance of our new promffe with regard to the debts ?
And :f there was to have been reciprocity, where
(hould we have coaveniently found that gnarantee
or surety Should we have thought it very repu
table to ourselves to have beer, obliged to furmfh
it ?
The arguments of the oppofers of the treaty are
extremely at variance with each other. On the
one hand they represent it as fraught with advan
tages to Great-Britain, without equivalents to the
United States—as a premeditated febeme to facri
iice our trade and navigation to her's—as a plan
dictated by her for drawing the two countries into,
close connection and alliance, and for making our
lnterefls subservient to her's. On the other hand,
they tell us, that there is no security for the surren
der of the pods, accordng to stipulation. How is
the one thing to be reconciled with the other ? If
4 "...v. ,
the treaty is such an immense boon to Great-Bri-
tain, if it be Arch a master-piece of political craft
on her fide, can there be any danger that she will
destroy her favorite work, by not performing the
conditions on which its efficacy and duration must
depend ? There is no position better fettled, than
that the breach of any article of a treaty l>y one
party, gives the other an option to consider the
whole treaty as annulled. Would Great-Britain
give us this option, in a safe in which she had so
much to lose by doing it i
I his glaring collision of arguments proves how
fuperficially the adverfaties-of the treaty have con
sidered the fubjed, and how little reliance can be
placed on the views they give of it.
In eflimating the plan which the treaty adopts
for the settlement of the old- controversy, it is sn
important reflexion, that from the course of things,
there will be nothing to be performed by us before
.he period for the restitution of the pofta will have
elapsed, and that, if this re'litution should be evad
ed, we shall be free to put an end to the whole
treaty, about which there could not be a moment's
helitation. We fhoijld then be where we Were be
fore the treaty, with the advantage of having
ftrqngthenfd the justice of our cause, by removing
every oceafion of reproach, which the inira&ions
of Khe treaty of peace may liave furniftied againil
Two other particulars, in which this part of the
tieaty is supposed to be defective, regard the waut
of indemnification for the detention of the pods, &
foi the expences of Indian wars.
i hose who rriake the objection, may he fafcly2
challenged to produce precedents of similar indcm
m.ications, tiniels impolcd by conquering powers on
Uievanquilhed, oi*by powers ofoverheating strength
upon thjfe which were too u ijak to dispute the lo
gic ps flipei ior force. If this were the velative situ
arion of the United States and Gteat-Biitain, then
is the treaty incxcufeably faulty ; but if the parties
were to treat am! agree as equal powers, then is the
pretention es'iayagant and impracticable. The res
titution ot the fpeitific thing detained, is Wl* that
was to be expected, and, it may be added, it is all
tnat was ever realiy expected on the part of this
country, io far as we may reason either (torn offici
al acts or informal exprefiions of the public opinion.
In cases where clear injuries are done, affecting
objefis of known or easily afcertainable values, pe
cuniary compensation may beexpedted to be obtain
ed by negociation ; but it is believed that it will be
impossible to cite an example of such compensation
so obtained, in a cafe in which territoiv has been
withheld on a difpilte of title, or as a hostage for
tome other claim (as in the present inflame, for
fecuting the performance of the 4th article of the
treaty of peace.) The recovery of the territory
withheld isthe usual iatisfattion.
1 he want of a rule to adjust consequential dama
ges, is, in such cases, a veiy great difficulty. In
the instance under discussion, this difficulty would
be peculiarly great. The posts are, for the molt
part, 111 a wilderness. There are but two of them
which have any adjacent settlements: Point-ivu-fer,
or Dutchman s Point, to one of which a part of-a
trait of lalu!, called Caldwell's Manor, with a few
inhabitants, has been claimed as appurtenant ; De
troit, which has a settlement in the town and neigh
borhood of between two and three thousand fouls.
In the vicinity of the other posts, on our fide, there
is fcarccly an inhabitant. It follows, that very
little damage could be predicated either upon the
loss of revenue from, or of the profits ot trade
with the settlements in the vicinity of the posts.
I he trade of the Indians within our limits would
conlequently be the basis of the claim of compensa
tion. But here the ignorance or.spirit of exagge
ration of the opponents bf tbe treaty has been par
ticularly exemplified. The annuallofs from this
source has been Hated, by a very zealous writer
again ft the treaty, who signs himfelf Cato, at '
800,odo dollars. v - |
Now it is a fas well ascertained, that the me?n
value of tht whole exports from Canada in peltries,
(which ronilitute the returns of Indian trade) in
the yeafs 1786 and 1787, was I'omething (hort of
800,000 dollars It is also a in which all
rcen informed on the fu!je& agree, that the trade
with the lmlians, within our limits*, is not more
than about one-eighth of that which furnifhes the
peltry exported from Canada. Hence the foul
product of our Indian trade could not be computed
at more than 100,oco dollars. What proportion
of may he profit, is not easy to be determined ;
but it js certain, that, tlie pr«>Hts of that trade,
from the decrease of wild animals, and the inferio
rity of their kinds, are not considerable. Many af
lert, that it is scarcely any longer worth following.
Twenty per cent, therefore, would probably be "a
large allowance, which would bring the loss on our
Indian trade, by the detention of the polls, to a
boiK 20,000, inltead ol 800,000 dollars per ann.
as has been asserted.
But might not a claim, even of this sum, by
way of indemnification, be encountered, with fcnif
force, by the obftrvation, that there is the highest
probability that the capital and labor which would
have been employed to produce 20,000 dollars pro
fit on the trade with the Indians, have been quite
as productively employed in other channels, and,
consequently, that there may have been no loss at
all ?
Thus we fee how erroneous the data which serve
to magnify claims in themfclves infignificant, and
which, from the gr/*at uncertainty of their quantum,
are exposed to serious abjections. Are claims like
thcfe proper fubjedts on which to flake the peace of
the United States ?
The reafonableneft of indemnification for the ex
pences of Indian wars, independent of the unusual
nature of the claim, might have been matter of end
less debate. We might .have beerr told, that the
Indians ascribe those wars to prrtenfions upon thcfr
lands, by virtue of treaties with the- former govern
ment of the United States, imposed by violence,
or Con-trafted with partial and inadequate represen
tations of then- nation—that our own public records
wituefs, that the proceedings of our agents, at
some of those treaties, were far from unexceptiona
ble—that the wars complained of are to be attribu
ted to errors iu our former policy, or mismanage
Account of peltries exported from Canada in
1786 and 1787.
Beaverfkins,
Martinfkins,
Otters do.
Minks do.
Fisher* do.
Foxes do.
Bears do.
Dccrs do.
Racoons do.
Cats cased do.
Do. open do.
Elks do.
Wolves do.
Carcajoux do.
Tyjer's do.
Seals do.
Musk rat's do.
Dreit dedrfkins,
Castors,
1786
1 7 57
*39>5 C 9'
68,132
26,330
17.95'
8,9 f 3
116,509
58,131
26 3so
9.951
5,813
6,213
22,108
17,108
102,656
140,346
12j6,C00
108,346
3,026
2,925
4,526
1,825
7.5'5
9,81.5
9,687
6 53
*2,287
503
'57
202,456
5,4881b.
.. 1,4541b.
2 4°>456
1,7381b.
1,434^.
ment oFoar public agents, sot the detention of the
polls—that it mull be problematical how much of
the duration or expences of tliofe wars are charge
able upon that detention, and, thai the potts hav
ing been detained by way of fceuriiy for the per
fenpance of the article refpe&uig debts, thae was
no responsibility for collateral and casual damages.
Had we to the chaise of their having i n .
ftigated or prompted those wars, would havi
denied the charge, as they (we repeatedly.done be.
fore ; and though yve might have been able to ad
duo? circumllances of fufpicinn against them, thev
would have conteiled their validity and force; am!,
whether guilty or not, would have thought their
honor concerned in avoiding the molt diltain con
cision of having participated in so improper a bu
(iin.-fs. •
In every »ievr, therefore, the clairr. for i.idemnifi.
cation was a l-opelefe one ; and to inlift upon it
could have arifwcred no other purpose than to ren
der an amicable adjt:!htießt iinjioffi' le. N r o Rritifh
rrnniiicr would h?.ve dared to go to a Britiih purlia.
merit to aik provision for such aa expenditure.
What, then, was to have been done ? We're we now
or hereafter to go ro war to enforce thu claim i Sup
pose this done, and rifty or a hundred millions of
dollars expended hi the contelt, what certainty is
there that we (hould at laii accoinplifh tin objedi ?
Moreover, the principle of i'ticli a war, would re.
quire, that we fliouhi feck indemnification fur ih<
cxpenoe* of the war it felt", ia addition to t;ur form
er claim. What piofpeft is tlie-e, that this a'f
would he effrttcd ? Vet if not effe&cd, it ia tvideir
that we should ir.-.ve rrx.je a moll wicteh ,-d
Why did we not ml'ut on in U-in-lfica' mn for rh<
exptneeso' our revolution war? Surely no', becaufi
it was less rtaioiiubli-, but bt-cau e tt w-s evicie-t
thst it, could in.t have been ibaiii.-t!, aid becanfs
peat e w<ss necefiaiy t>us as well as to our cne/ny,
This hkewiie would be the end of a wai undertaken
to enforce th; cl.-im cf iudrrroifi. for the de.
tendon of the poils. We in.uiid at Icnj. tli he glad
to rraKe pcace cither without the indeir o:!c;it ior
'OURI-'t, or belt at an cxoei'fe lo c;ir:y op ibe
war, without ?, ehiin -c of-tiT.hu: It a enr, wi.!. vvi,iai
the tlrhjr ti wouui -io cmp.u ilon
The idea which has been f r;.v,*., out of'tavinji
the po(l« in the hands of tie B ir'fh, '1. we might
be better able tl.au at prefi-ni i <( .<■> to w-r foi
indemnilieitioH, is a r.0T.1 I p i7c;.l e- r . dicnt,
This would be to p-if!p-ne ot choice l:,e j>of.
Idlion of an winrh hay li"en lluwn to b:
oenii-u'cd by vciy ur-.-ent and i-«j.»itant genera
confuleratioiK, i () fnbrnt to ccii:.ir, ami yit?,
inconvenicruvs i.uiii tiu«t pnwii'n,
ably the continu ir.ee or renewal of Indian bo!>i!i
tics, a- cl to iu • the rifle, fom the r .f Bt it
ifh fettlcments in the neioijb.nii b-uid of the
ar.d various uiitorrU-oi caiun'ii » oi th -b n'timati
acqui/itioß, being- ditlLult ami pn c o ioiii : f () i
what ? why, ro take at I..it the ch .r.ivs of war
the ifiue o( which is ev-tr d: !:> obt"i . ai
"bjci", v.-hi. h, if obtaii v<l, will cerf>i.i]y cod ®,t,
th..[i it v, w rth.
}K'CUiu«:vy n.'!cM ■\ n at ion *r *n l'i
Would ill conspewfalc for the evils or t!
detention, til! the mot? tfonve'
in£to war fhnohj arrive. What (hould we tTni ,
of tuis pu>cy, if it (hould turn out thut t}*c p.-iii
and tlie indemnification too were to !>e finally a-'
'>and«ned ? CAMTT I T7£
Jsy this Day's Mails.
BOSTON, August 14, f795.
IMPORTANT NAVAL AC'I lON,
ON Wedhefdayevenm.fr arrived at r.lbm/efler,
fehooner Martha, Capt. Hafkell, in 40 d. yst from
Rochelle, and yelterday flic came round to this h'ar
hour. From information cottefled at the former
place, and obligingly forwarded to us, and from
what we have obtained finct ;;rr arrival here, we
are enabled to give the public the* followine IXL
TERESTING INFORMATION.
i Oii the fourth of July the ftb<»Yc fchoonrr fell
in with an Ehglifh fk-et of fourteen fa I of the line,
seven frigate*, three fh.ojs of war, 2 aiiried brigs,
and several smaller vtflels, making in all thirty fail.
The fehooner was brought too by the Orion, wf 74
guns, on board which by desire, Capt. Hafkell went
with his papers. Oil finding the fehooner waft
bound for Boston, the Captain of the Otior, desir
ed him to mention on his arrival, That the Eiig
lifh fleet had engaged the I'tench fleet on ihe 24th
June, off and defeated it ; that they Uad
captured three French 84 gun (hips ; a«id should,
had they have had two hours more daylight, have
captured the whole fleet ; but that the French had
after daik got into L'Oiient ; That they intended
to cruize off there fomc days, to ascertain whether
the French were disposed to come out & renew the
aflion after a little refitting or not ; and that they
had much hopes of having another flap at them.
The captain of the Orion said the force of the two
fleets was equal One of the Lieutenants pointed
to Capt. Hafkell to where two ports had been bro
ken into one; and told him, that an unlucky fliot
had killed them seven men, befitics, dismounted a
gun. Captain Haftell, saw on board, a Mr, Igna
tius Medley, of Glouceller, who had heeri.impreffed
in London ; and who confirmed moll of the par
ticulars dated by the Captain. After a short de
tention Capt. H. dcpaited.
Capt.Hafkell saw the three prizes which had
been taken, they were entirely dismasted mere
wrecks. He saw four English dismasted {hips,
and evident marks of a l'evere adioii were visible in
every vefTel he passed.
He supposes, from what he heard at Rochelle,
that the above fleet was bound from Breit, to join
a con fide table fleet lying at Daix, a jao&\mn with
which would hare made them superior to the Eng
hfU fleet then cruizing ; and the British, profcablv
from information of the design, had intercepted
them as related.
Capt. H. s aw the Harmony f lo m Baltimore for
r ranee, with flour; and two other American vt-f
ids, luppoltd from the fame port, brought t«H> by
tle fleet; but whether detained or not cannot
m
12 5
The above fleet was commanded by Lord Brid» '
port, when k fiik J. frum jifoe li,
The expei:ce3
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