

18. As it is obvious that the present flourishing state of our navigation, is in a great measure owing to the operation of the laws I have mentioned, it most follows, that whatever counteracts the effect of those laws must bring it back to the state in which it was. Now as the profits of every voyage is calculated on the outward and homeward voyage, we pay in the British dominions exactly what they pay here, the charge upon the whole voyage is the same. If, then, previous to the passing our tonnage laws, the British, by the operation of their navigation laws, had such advantage over us, in our own commerce, as to employ two hundred and thirty thousand tons of her shipping, as she did in 1789; while the whole of American shipping employed in the trade with Britain and its dominions, amounted in the same year, to only 3,580 tons, less than one sixth part of the whole quantity engaged in the interchange of commodities between the two nations, it must follow that we shall again be reduced in consequence of the treaty to our former humiliating situation, our seamen must go into the service of the nation that is again to navigate for us, and our ship builders and the numerous trades connected with them, must starve or seek some other employment, since our merchants will no longer have occasion for ships, and the British merchants are not permitted to use those we build. It is observable too, that the tonnage duty which Britain is to lay, is not a countervailing duty, like that on goods imported, but is to be in the words of the article "equal to that which is payable by British vessels in the ports of America." Now foreign vessels pay 50 cents here, of course 50 cents may be imposed on our vessels in Britain, but our own vessels also pay six cents a ton at home, so that on every voyage to the British dominions, and home again, they will pay 56 cents, while the British pay only 50; and as the voyage may be performed three times a year, the American ship will pay on the whole, 18 cents a ton annually more than the British, and it may be a question whether we have any right to repeal the law laying the home duty, as it was imposed and enacted when the treaty was made and ratified, the repeal would put the British vessels in a less advantageous situation than they were at the time the treaty was made. But the discouragement does not rest here, except so far as our trade may be confined to the city of London, for in every other port we pay an extra light money of 18 9d sterling a ton, which is about 39 cents; so that an American vessel going to Bristol, Liverpool, &c. and returning, will pay (besides the 50 cents the British are to impose) six cents American tonnage, and 39 cents extra light and trinity money, that is 45 cents more a ton than a British vessel performing the same voyage, and which in three voyages, or one year, will amount, on a vessel of 400 tons, to 540 dollars, extra charge on American vessels. Thus then we give an annual and no inconsiderable bounty to British vessels, to the prejudice of our own navigation. I believe that this is the first instance in the history of nations, in which a commercial one has given greater encouragement to foreign ships than to her own. But the evil does not stop here, equalizing duties are to be imposed, what those are to be is not ascertained by the treaty; but as the power to impose them is referred to the British parliament, what is to prevent their exceeding their just measure. But supposing they are really inclined not to go beyond the right referred by the treaty, what is to be the rule of that right? The duties we impose upon their commodities amount to 12 per cent. on the India, and at the average, to about 10 per cent. on other articles. Are they to lay a duty which will amount to a mean of the relative quantities of these articles? if they are, how is it to be found, as the relative proportion between the importation of these articles is continually fluctuating? or is the countervailing duty to amount to as much on the whole of the articles imported from the United States, as the whole duty paid on foreign articles imported in British ships pay the United States? this seems to be the true construction of the article. If so then, as our imports from the British dominions, exceed our exports to them by more than one third, and supposing the average of the duty they pay here to be 10 per cent. the duty upon our exports, if carried to any of the British dominions, in American vessels, must amount to 15 per cent. otherwise the whole duty will not be equalized, the advantage that this will give to British ships over ours, particularly when they bring our cheap and bulky articles, or such as pay no duty, is too obvious to dwell upon. But this is not the only effect of this equalizing duty, as Britain has a right to choose the articles on which she may impose it, she has in some sort the regulation of our trade, so far as it may be carried on in American vessels; thus supposing she should put the greatest part of this equalizing duty upon the most bulky articles, it would necessarily follow that those articles must either rot on our hands, seek another market, or go in British ships, which would pay no duty at home. Could a more effectual way be devised to exclude us absolutely from carrying our own commodities? It may be said that independent of the treaty, Britain might have imposed these duties; true, and independent of the treaty we might have met them with other duties.

2d. As the British must necessarily be the principal carriers between us and their dominions, so they will be in a great measure the carriers between us and foreign nations: because while by their navigation all they absolutely forbid us to enter their ports with any commodities not the growth and manufacture of our own country; they bring the commodities of other nations upon the same terms as those might by whom they were raised, and they can take back a return cargo to Britain, or its dominions, with greater advantage than we can carry our own produce, by the whole difference of the tonnage, and countervailing duties with six cents supra added if they return to London, and 45 cents if to any other port in the British dominions, and from thence again return with British commodities to the original port. It is evident that the benefits attending such privileged ships, must give their owners great advantages over others; and as they can only be held by British subjects, who are by

the terms of the treaty to be in every respect upon a footing with our own merchants, while they enjoy all those additional advantages as British subjects, it requires no great foresight to discover, that the whole trade of America must be engrossed by them. Nor does it require much more to see that the leading object of this treaty, is to establish the navigation and commerce of Britain upon the ruins of our own. To fill the atlantic ports, and the western territory with British merchants and factors—to establish a certain degree of rank for British officers, whom the humiliated American is directed, under pain of being "considered as a disturber of the peace of both nations, to treat with respect due to his commission;" to put such fetters upon our legislature: as would forever bind them to the will of that imperious nation—to disgust our republican allies, and leave us only to the justice and humanity of the man who has urged our slaves to cut our throats—savages to murder our women and children—barbarian pirates to enslave our mariners—and his own banditti to profane our churches—burn our dwellings, and rob, plunder, and massacre our citizens. If we compare this treaty with many speeches, made about the period of Mr. Jay's appointment, with the support he has avowedly received from the British faction, with the warmth with which he engaged in the controversy between our government and the French minister: If we add the readiness that ardent or vindictive men feel, to suppose every thing right which strengthens their party, we shall be less surprised at the treaties, contravening the existing laws of the country, where they bore hard upon the British, or its giving them such additional encouragement as should induce them to pour in their myrmidons to support and strengthen the hands of government against native Americans, and the friends and well wishers to foreign and domestic republics—whom the courtiers have dared to calumniate with the names of antifederal and Jacobin.

Mr. Pinckney informs us in his letter to Mr. Jefferson, that Lord Grenville, in stating the principles on which they had issued the instruction of 8th January, 1794, made use of these terms, "the second was that he [Lord Grenville] could not mention to me officially, but that he still thought it right I should be apprised of, that no misconception of their motives might be entertained, that he was aware of the delicacy of speaking to a foreign minister concerning the internal state of his country, neither could he expect an answer from me on the subject. But that the second reason was to take away every pretext from evil disposed persons among us [the citizens of the United States] who according to the intelligence he had received were endeavouring to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, and in short, to reduce us to the present situation of France." It is evident from this communication, that Lord Grenville supposed that all those persons in America, who sit for the honor of their country—who were irritated at the piracies of the British, and the insults and injuries we had suffered, which I believe included every native American not holding an office, a seat in Congress, or money in the funds were the opposers of our own government.

As the instructions alluded to, directed the taking our vessels, going from the French West Indies to any port in Europe, Lord Grenville must have conceived, that the way to strengthen the hands of our government, was to destroy our commerce—imprison our seamen in unhealthy climates, and lessen our connection with France; the whole was evidently thrown out to Mr. Pinckney to induce him to enter into conversation with him on the subject of such a convention between the two governments as should engage America in a war with France, permit Britain to plunder our trade, and in return lend her aid for the support of our government.—The whole speaks this plain language, "the friends of Britain in America, are the friends of your government, the enemies to British depredations are the enemies of your government, and Jacobins who love the French; let us make a common cause of it, we can mutually assist each other." Mr. Pinckney was too prudent to enter into any discussion with Lord Grenville on this delicate subject; I hope Mr. Jay has been equally so.

C A T O.

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North America, 30 -
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August 18. 32w 3w

MR. EDWARD ALLEN,
BORN at Cambridge, England, and educated at Kirkbride's, near Barnard Castle, Yorkshire—Who is supposed to have come to America in the year 1787; is requested to call on, or write to Captain James Thomas Bishop, at Doctor Spence's, No. 120, South Second-street, Philadelphia, where he will hear of something much to his advantage.
Capt. Bishop will thank any person for any information respecting the above EDWARD ALLEN.
August 18. 22w 1f

MR. FENNO,
I most cordially join in the general joy of every good citizen, on the patriotic firmness exhibited by our worthy President in supporting the constitution of the country; for though he discreetly waves hazarding a sentiment on the right of exercising an absolute negative on the determination of the Senate, yet he is under no hesitation in giving their constitutional decision, a formal effect.

That the tenor of the treaty is not coextensive with the wishes of the citizens of the United States, is admitted by all, but as our constitutional Representatives have still thought it politic to give it a partial confirmation, I ought not to suppose that, any real well wisher to his country would dare to substitute the hasty ill digested resolutions of uninformed individuals. Would not such measures tend to the destruction of all government? Have we not a constitution founded on rational and liberal principles, which though opposed by some in its formation, yet has been wisely and universally permitted to enter into full operation. Upon what principles then is it attempted to usurp the power of government and place it in a multitude of detached bodies. If one set of men meet and attempt to direct public councils, another may with equal propriety meet in opposition. Where will this terminate? will it not dissolve the bands of Society and cast us back into a state of nature? Surely no considerate man will lend his aid to the workers of confusion; for whatever pretences may be made, of a mere opposition to the treaty, there is too much reason to fear that it arises from a deep rooted hatred to the Constitution; a Constitution under which there is more true liberty and happiness enjoyed, than under any form of government in the world. Let us but support our present system of mild government and good laws flowing from constitutional sources and we must be a great and envied people. That there will be turbulent men in all countries must ever be expected, and that there will be weak men who will follow them blindfold into the absurd measures; but the great bulk of the people whilst they are enlightened will pursue their own happiness, and support good government.

It is not to be understood that by supporting good government we are tamely to submit to Injustice and injustice; the late conduct of the British cruisers, even in our ports should claim our most pointed resentment, not stopping at the dilatory mode of obtaining satisfaction by diplomatic complaints, the arms of government should be immediately pointed to the offender; when a commander of a ship of war shall insolently and wantonly break through the rules established by neutral nations, he should be denied the enjoyment of neutral rights. Though we are sincerely disposed to pursue pacific measures with all nations, yet their subjects shall not be permitted to affront us on our own territory, Capt. Home and his crew should be informed that the ports of America should be shut to them as men who have violated the rights of nations the rights of their own nation and of ours. Whilst foreigners treat us with decency and justice they shall find us the friends of mankind, but at the same time that we are men who know our rights and how to protect them.

I.
By this Day's MAILS.

NEW-YORK, August 17.
By the Hercules, arrived on Saturday, we have received our regular advices up to the 27th of June; and by a gentleman who came passenger, we were kindly favored with additional papers to the 30th, from which we present our readers with the following extracts:—

LONDON, June 25.
What will the sticklers for German honor and Imperial faith, the approvers of the Austrian loan, say, when they peruse the following letter, which we have no doubt will soon receive such a confirmation as will convince the most obstinate, that the Emperor, as if in perfect spite to his supporters in the British Parliament, has announced his intention to conclude a peace with France for his hereditary states, and also to enter into negotiations for the empire!

His majesty the Emperor of Germany to his excellency the Prince Colerado, president of the aulic tribunal of the Roman Empire.
"When I ascended the throne, I found myself involved in a war replete with ruin to my hereditary states, into which my father was led by his allies, and the most solemn promises of the Holy Roman Empire. At this moment I perceive myself abandoned by my allies, the strength of my people reduced, and my treasures exhausted, whilst my allies have only considered their own interest. I have therefore sent my minister, the Count de Lehrbach, to Brittensee, to conclude a peace, for the sake of my hereditary states, of which I shall render an account to no one. But, ever mindful of the engagements which I have contracted towards the German co-estates, I am silent on the subject of their ingratitude for these my last efforts, and therefore, at the same time, send to Brittensee my Vice-President of the Empire, the Baron de Barterlyn; there to negotiate an advantageous peace for the empire. I invite (if they should be pleased) those of the Germanic body who should be inclined to unite themselves to me, to send instructions and full powers to this ambassador, with an assurance that by placing a reliance on the ancient Austrian fidelity to its promises, they will most infallibly meet with more success, than those who with a blind confidence have involved themselves with a power faithless to the most solemn engagements.
Vid. T. (Signed) FRANCIS."

Paraph. Traut.
A commission passed the Board of Admiralty, appointing Admiral Hotham Commander-in-Chief of his majesty's Squadron in the Mediterranean, in the room of Admiral Lord Hood, resigned.
Admiral Pringle, lately returned to the Downs, from a cruise in the North Seas, will go back to his station as soon as he is joined by four ships of the line, two frigates, two sloops, a fire-ship, and

two cutters, which are the reinforcements ordered him by the Admiralty Board, on account of the appearance of the Dutch cruisers in that quarter.

Admiralty-Office, June 27. 1795.
Dispatches, of which the following are copies and extracts were yesterday received at the office.
Admiral Cornwallis, on board his majesty's ship Royal Sovereign, the 11th of June, to Evan Nepean, Esq. Secretary of the Admiralty.

SIR,
I request that you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on the 6th instant, a ship having been chased by the Squadron, a signal was made to me from the Phaeton, that it was an enemy's frigate. But in the evening Capt. Stafford made me a signal, that he could not come up with the chase, upon which I called him in and brought to for the night, being then in latitude 47, 28, long 5, 57. In the morning of the 7th, a sail was seen again to the eastward. I made the signal for the Phaeton, Pallas and King-Fisher, to chase, and followed them with the line of battle ships. It was blowing fresh from the north; and as we came in with the land several large ships were seen under sail, which proved to be a French Squadron, consisting of three line of battle ships, six frigates, a brig a sloop a cutter. Some of them were at first standing off shore, but unfortunately, the wind was fair for them to get into Bellisle road, where we saw several large ships at anchor. We had got very near to the enemy's ships and had hopes at first we should have got up with them before they could have reached their ports; and made signals for the ships to form for their mutual support; and engage the enemy as they came up. The Phaeton fired several shots which the line of battle returned from their items. I followed as far as I thought prudent, and then hauled the wind. Soon after I saw three sail standing in, I made the signal to chase, they were two French frigates and a large Dutch built ship, in tow of one of them. They stood round the fourth end of Bellisle; the hindmost ship got within gun shot, and several were exchanged. The King Fisher fired several broad sides at the frigates; they were obliged to cast off the ship in tow and rounding the point of the island we came upon a convoy, chiefly brigs. Eight of them were taken, but the frigates running in shore among shoals, the Triumph and Phaeton having made signals to me of danger we were obliged to give over the pursuit.

By what I can learn the convoy came from Bourdeaux laden with wines and under the charge of three line of battle ships, and eight frigates. A brig Corvette had anchored close in with the fourth end of the island in the evening, whilst the frigates were chased at night. I directed Capt. Stopford, in the Phaeton, to work in shore, and if he did not perceive any works to protect the Corvette, to endeavour to bring her out. He attempted it in the morning, but they opened a battery on the ship which he had not seen; and the brig being close hauled inshore during the night, Capt. Stopford very properly thought it not an object of consequence to balance the loss the ship was likely to sustain, and therefore returned, having had one man killed, seven wounded and two of his guns dismounted. I find the vessels have naval stores as well as wine; the ship has cannon, and I understand is laden with naval and ordnance stores.

Two American vessels, laden with provisions of different kinds have been detained here by the Squadron, I send them in by the King-Fisher. I have ordered Capt. Gosselin to join me here again immediately.

Copy of a letter from Capt. Gosselin, of his Majesty's sloop King-Fisher, dated Falmouth, June 24th, 1795, to Evan Nepean, Sec. to the Admiralty.

You will be pleased to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the arrival of his majesty's sloop under my command, off this port, and having been the large ship captured by Vice Admiral Cornwallis's Squadron on the 7th inst. in safety: all the rest of the Squadron parted company with me on the 19th in a severe gale of wind.
I am &c.

T. L. COSSELIN.

Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Cornwallis, dated June 18, 1795, on board the Royal Sovereign, at sea, to Evan Nepean, Secretary to the Admiralty.
I have the honor to inform you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on the 16th, in the morning, standing in with the land near the Penmarks, I sent the Phaeton ahead to look out for any of the enemy's ships on the coast. I stood after her with the rest of the ships: at 10 she made a signal for joining a fleet ahead, and afterwards that they were of superior force; upon her bringing to, I made a signal to haul the wind upon the starboard tack.

At this time I could see the hulls of the frigate sails. Thirty were counted, and some of them had all their sails out upon a wind to leeward of us. I stood upon the starboard tack with all our sails, keeping the ships collected. Upon enquiring, by signal, the enemy's force, Capt. Stopford answered 13 line of battle ships, 14 frigates, a brig and a cutter, in all 30 sail. Near half of them tacked in shore, in the afternoon the wind fell very much and came round to the northward, and of course brought those ships of the enemy which had tacked to windward, and the other laid up for us; they were seen in the morning before it was day-light upon both quarters of the Squadron.

At nine in the morning one of the front line of battle ships began to fire upon the Mars; their frigates were arranged up abreast of us to windward, except one, which kept to leeward and ran upon the larboard quarter of the Mars; then engaged and fired, which was frequent and repeated. This was the only frigate that attempted any thing. A teasing fire with intervals was kept up during the whole day; in the evening they made a show of a more serious attack upon the Mars, which had fell a little to leeward, and obliged me to bear up for her support: this was their last effort—if any thing deserves this appellation. Several shot were fired for a hours after, but they appeared to be drawing off, and before the sun was set their whole fleet had tacked and was standing from us: the Mars and Triumph being the sternmost ships, were of course more exposed to the enemy's fire, and I cannot too much commend the spirited conduct of Sir Charles Cotton and Sir Erasmus Gower, the captains of those ships. Lord Charles Fitzgerald also in the Brunswick kept up a very good fire from the after guns; but that ship was obliged the whole time to carry every sail. The Bellorophon being nearly in the same circumstance I was glad to keep in some measure in reserve, having reason just to suppose there would be full occasion for the utmost exertion of us all; and being rather ahead of me was not able to fire much. I considered that ship as a treasure in store, having heard