treated with, him and is declared even on
the veiy face of the paper which he signed.
" With refpeft therefore to the supposed
demand of his majesty to be admitted to
those negotiations, nothing more is neceita
ry to be said. The note delivered to NI.
IJe Tbogut, by lord Miuto, fufficiently ex
plains the part which his majesty is really
disposed to tak? in any negotiation which
may be regularly let on foot for a general
peace.
The Kiwg has always been persuaded
that the rel'ult of litch* a negotiation can
alone effectually re-eftablilh the tranquility
qjf Europe.
" Experience has confirmed this opinion,
and it is only from the conviction of its
trnth that his majesty his' rioW'been in
duced to wave his objeftion to the firft
proposal of a naval armistice, and to enter
into the discussion of the conditions on
which it may be established.
" His majesty judging from the experi
ence of ft> many former negotiations, con
siders such an arwiftice as in no degree
likely either to expedite or facilitate an ar
rangement of the direCt interests of Great
Britain and France.
" He views it in no other light than as
■ temporary adv<ntage which it is proposed
to him to yield to his enemy, in order to
prevent the renewal of continental hostili
ties, and thereby to contribute to the con
clafion of a general peace.
" And on this ground notwithstanding
the many disadvantages whieh he is feniible
mqft rel'ult to the country, from such a
•measure, he is resolved to give to hi J allies
and to all Europe this new pledge of the
sentiments by which he is aftuated, provi
ded that his enemies are disposed to regulate
the conditions of such an armistice, as far
as the nature of the cafe will allow, in
conformity to the obvious and ellablifhed
principle of such arrangements:
«' This principle is, that the refpe&ivi poliHon
of the twp parties Ihould remain during the fontinu
ar.ee of the armistice, such asit was at its coiHißcnc*
ment j and that neither of tUem flxould by 'ta^*
peration acquire fretb advantages or new means ot"
annoying his enemy, such as he could not other
wise obtiin. The difficulty of doing this with the
fame prectftan in the cafe of naval operations, as by
land, has atready been adverted to in a former
notej and it coaftitutes a leading objection to the
measure itfelf.
" Bat the French projeft instead of attempting
to remove or leflen these difficulties, departs at
once, and in every article from the principle itfelf,
although expressly recognized and ftudioutly main*
tained inthje continental armistice, which is here
referred to aa the foundation and model of this tranl
s»dlion
• " It is proposed, in effeft that the blockade of the
aaral pods & arsenals of the Kings enemies (hould
be razed ; that they fliould be enabled to
" remove their fl-fits to any other Rations,
and to divide or to collecl their force as
they may judge mod advantageous to their
future plans : the importation both of pro
visions and of naval and military stores is to
be wholly unrestrained. Even Malta and
the ports'of Egypt, though expressly stated
to be now blockaded, are to be freely
vitlualled, and for an unlimited period, in
direA contradiftion to the stipulations of the
German Armistice rcfpefting Ulm and In
goldftadt to which places it is nevertheless
profefTrd to allimilate them': and this Go
vernment is expeftsd to bind itfelf towards
the Allies of France even before any recipro
cal engagement can be received fr m them ;
while, at the fame tune, all mention of the
King's Allies is, on the other hand, totally
-omitt-'d.
" To a propofil so rnanifeftly repugnant
to justice and equality, and so injurious not
only to his Majesty's interests, but also to
those of his Allies, it cannot be e*pe£ted
that any motive Ihould induce the Kiug to
ascede. '
" The counter-projefll which the under
figneel has the honor to transmit to M.
Otto contains regulations in this refped
more nearly corresponding with that princi
pal of equality on which alone his Majesty
can consent to treat.
" Even those articles r.rc, in many impor
tant points, and particularly in what re
lates to the. aftual Rations of his Majesty's
squadrons, very far fliort of what his Majes
ty might justly demand from a reference to
the general principle above dated, from
analogy to the conditions of the Continental
Armistice, or from the relative Gtuation of
naval force ; and a confidence is reposed in
the good faith of his enemies which, although
it can never be claimed in tranladtions be
tween Belligerant Powers, his Majefly is
nevertheless willing to hope he (hall not find
to have been vnifplaced upon the prcl'ent
occalion.
» If M. Otto is empowered to accede to
ftipulations. a proper person will im
mediately be authorised to sign them on his
Majesty's part ; If not, he is requested to
trailTmit them, without delay, to his Go
-vemment.
(Signed)
« powning-ftreet, Sept. 7, 1800.
(Ho. 25.) COUNTER PROJET.
It having been agreed that Negotiations
for a General Peace be immediately set on
foot between the Ereperor of Germany, his
Britannic and the French Repub
lic, and an arnnftice having been already con
cluded between the forces of his Imperial
Majelly and thole of the French Republic,
it is agreed that an armistice (lull also take
between the forces of his Britannic Majcfty
and those of tlie French Republic, on
the terms and in the manner following,
that is to fay,
w Article 1. All hostilities, both by sea
and land, between the forces of the two con
tradling parties fliall be fufpendtd, and fliall
not be renewed until after fourteen duys no
tice given of the termination ef the arroif
tice. This notice, in so fer as relates to the
parts of Europe, North of Cape St. Vincent,
jnuft be given by on» of the two govern
ments to the other, and is to be reckoned
froßi the d*jr on which the fame flmll be re
ceived by the government to whom it is
gi*en. 'lii tUe Meditsr rinean e!r ether parts
of the world, the notice imift be given by
therefpeciive commanding officers. But ii«
cafe of the renewal of hoflilities between
Austria and France, the armistice bAween
Great Britain and France is likely to be com
lidered as terminated, so loon as loch renew
al of hostilities (hall be known to tne officer
commanding the British forces, except only
in so far as rel-ates to prizes ot merchant
vcffels, which Ihall he regulated by the third
article of this convention.
Art. 2. Orders (hall ue immediately sent
by the two "governments to their officers in
the different parts oi the wdild, to conform
ihemfelves so this agreement ; sea palles
shall be given to the (hips which aie to carry
the ft orders ; and his Britannic Majesty's
officers to be sent for that purpose through
France, shall be fu mi filed wi.h the neeef.
fary paflports and facilities to expedite their
journey.
Art. 3. All prizes made in any part of
the world during the continuance and opera
tion of the armistice, by any officers having
aftually received due notice of this agree
ment, shall be restored ; and generally, whe
ther such notice (hall have been received or
not, all prizes made in the Channel, or in
the North Seas, after twelve days (to be
I'eckoned from the exchange of the ratifica
tions of this convention) (hall be restored ;
and the fame periods (hall be allowed in this
refpeift tor the other pans of she world, as
were flipulated by the 22d article of the pre
liminaries of the lafl peace.
Art. 4. Malta, and the maritime towns
and ports of Egypt, shall be placed on the
fame footing as those places which, though
conaprifed within the demarkation of the
French in Germany, are occupied by
the Auftriau troops, sonfequently nothing
shall be admitted by sea which can give
additional means of defence ; and provisions
only for fourteen days at a time, in propor
tion to the confumption,as it (hall
Hained by commiflioners to be named for
who shall have powers to estab
lish th? neceflary regulations for giving ef
fect to "■tjju stipulation, conformably to the
principles of the 4th article of the Conven
tion concluded between the Austrian and
the French Generals in Germany.
" Art 5. The blockade of Brest, Tou
lon, and any other of the ports of France,
by his Mijefty's fleets, Hull be discontinued
and all Britilh fliipi (liall be inftrutted not
to interrupt or obftruft the trade or navi
gation of any ships failing; to or from the
coaftsaf France, except in the article of na
val of military stores, which are not to be
brouglit thither by sea during the present
armistice. None of the Ihips of war now
(htioned ill the said ports refpettively (hall,
before the renewal<of hqftilities be removed
to any other station.
" Art. 6. The allies of the two parties
(hall severally be at liberty to accede to this
Armistice, if they so think fit ; provided that
they also engage to observe a like artniUice,
on conditions fnnilar to those here fpecified,
towards such of the allies *on the other fide
as (hall also accede to it.
" The periods or terms to be fixed for the
commencement of the armistice in the dif
ferent qwaiters of the world as with ref
pe& to each of the said all es are to be regu
lated iu conformity to the (Vipulations con
tained in the third article of thi»convention
as between Great Britain and France ; and
the laid periods or terms are to Ue reckoned
from the day on which the accession of such
power to the armistice (hall have been duly
ratifiedby such power to the party with whtfm
it is at war. Such notification duly aothrn
ticated by the government on wliofe part it
is made, may either be traiifmitted dire£tly
fey couriers or flags of truce, or through the
channel of the two contrasting parties to
each other reciprocally.- The nava! ports
and artenals of the allies of France are, du
ring such armistice to be placed on the fame
footing with those of France ; and the no
tices which are to precede the renewal of
hoitili'.ies, as well as all matters relating to
such armistice, are to be regulated accord
ing to the terms of this Convention.
4t Art. 7. This convention lhall be ra
tified, and the ratifications fliall be exchan
ged within the term of ten day», or sooner
if the fame be pradlicable."
(No. 26.) Translation.
Hereford street, Sept. 8, ißoo.-
" My Lord,
«' 1 received yesterday, at eleven o'clock
at night, the note and the counter projet
which your excellency did me the honour
toaddrefs to me. The principles contained
in these two pieces are, in several refpe£ts
so little analogous to the proposals which I
have been diretted to make, and the obje&
of which was to coinpenfate by a Britifli ar
mistice, the inconveniences which might re
sult to France from the eventual prolonga
tion of the German armistice, that I can
not take upon myfelf to admit them with
out previously receiving furtherinftrnttions.
I have therefore complied with your excel
lency's intentions by uanfmittihg to my go
vernment those two pieces, with as little
delay as poflible. I have the honour to
be, kc.
(Signed)
(No. 27.) Translation.
Hereford (Ireet, Sept. 16, 1800.
•' My Lord,
" I have the honor t« sddreft your Excellency
(hi stntwer which my_,governn)cnt hai diredted me
to make to the note which you did me Ch« honor to
addrefa to inc.
''The First Consul, hopihg that it is still
pofllble to approximate the interefl of the
two governments, and their wilhes for a
fpeecly and solid peace, and being willing to
give, on his part, a frcfli proof of his paci
fic diTpotations, has dispatched orders for
deferring for foaie days longer, the atXack
which the French army had been dire&d
to make upon the whole line.
* I fhill give verbally, eithei to yoiw Ex
cellency vourfelf, or to such perj'pp as you
Hull judge proper to appoint tor that pur
pose, fatifa-ttory explanations, refpedling
the principal ob'jettions contained in your
note of the 7th of this tnynth, aud I flatter
myfelf, that they will produce the efleft
your Excellency had in view,by making
known to me, the intentions of his majesty.
The high importance of thele communi
cations, authorises me to intreat, that you
would give them every facility in your
power. I lave the honor to be, with the
rnoft refpeitful my lord, your
excellency's mod obedient, and most hum
ble servant.
(Sigi.ed)
' The undersigned, has transmitted to
his government, the note of his excellency
lord Greoville, dated the 7th of September.
The counter-projet which accompanied it,
having been laid before the First Consul,
he has observed thafr the armistice, such as
was proposed did not offer any advantages
to the French Republic, and consequently
could not compensate it, for the serious
inconveniences which would result to it,
from the continuance of the continental
armiftiee, hence it follows, that the counter
projeft could be admitted inasmuch ouly,
as the question might simply be, to fettle
the preliminaries of a particular arrange
ment between France and England, by a
truce, alike particular to the two states, but
the effeft of the proposed maratiine truce,
heing intended to serve as a compensation
to the French Republic, for the continen
tal truce, the former ought to afford to it,
advantages equal to the inconveniences
which k sxperiences from the latter.
' Vbe -undersigned, is therefore direfted
to make t wo proposals, of which his Britan
nic majesty may choose that which may ap
pear to him, most cotyfonant to the interest
of his dominions, or to his continental re
lations.
, ' The firfl is, that the projeft far an ar
mistice be drawn up and admitted, in terms
analogous to those which hart been propos
ed by the wmiftry of his Brittannic majeflir,
but iolely under the fappofition, that this
armistice Ihould be iidppenderit of the
events of the continent, and relative only
to a separate negotiation, to be immediate
ly opened between the two powers.
' The second is, that his Britannic ma
jesty should continue to make a common
fcaufe with the Emperor, but that, in cafe
he (hould conient that the maratime truce
may offer to the French Republic, advan
tages equal to those fecared to the house
of Austria, by the cintinental truce. '
' And with this view, the comparison
may be easily fettled.
' By the continental armistice, the court
'of Vienna acquires the meins of re-organi
sing its armies, of converting into men,
arms and anuinition of exery kind, the
subsidies paid to it -by England, of fortify
ing and viftnalling'its places on the 2d and
3d line which weie in a 6ad fta'e, in confe
rence of the rapid march of the French
nrmics having no: been forefctn;. 'Ffcuj
Afoppo, Palmanova, Venice, Vcrone, and
Lintz, had been negletted, every day their
fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingold
ftadt although blockaded are improving
their means of defence ; and it is the ar
mistice that procures them this advantage,
for at the moment when those places were
inverted, the enemy thought only of besieg
ing ours, and confeqtiently theix own were
not prepared for so early an attick.
" By the Continental Armistice the im
preflion made by the victories of the French
armies diminilh, their effetts.are weakened.
Six months of repose would fuflice to restore
the *nora| and physical strength of the Au
strian armies ; to rally the conquered, to
recover from the imprelEon of Alcendancy
required by the conquerors, and to make it
neceflary once nacre to regairf that csntin
gent superiority so well earned by the Re
public.
" It would alfs follow as a consequence
of the. continental armistice, that the king
dom of Naples, now a prey to every kind of
calamity, and containing all the feeds of
infurredtion* hiigJit be recognized, and fur
iiilh frelh refourcerto the enemies of France
word that men are raifmg in Tufcany and
in the marlhes of Ancona ; that Austria is
every where preparing new means of de
fence ; that every where ftie is amelioiat
ing her position, which perhaps was despe
rate, whilst the advantages of the Republic
are diminilhing or disappearing.
" The First Consul has already made to
the love of peace a fufficiently great facri
fice of those advantages ; if he Ihould con
tinue to derive no benefit fi"Bm them-, it
would no longer be the means of arriving
at the conclusion of peace, but that of per
petuating the war. Peihaps in the judg
ment of statesmen the French Government
may have already too long delayed to avail
itfelf of the contigency which was favour
able to it ; but it has only done so upon
the positive assurances which had been givea
to it of a speedy and feparato peace.
" At this moment, when the two Allied
Courts infill upon a joint negociation and a
general peace, the French government is
to well aware that so complicated a work is
not to be accompli(hed iw a few days, and it
ought to avoid putting itfelf in a pofitjon
which would b« diametrically opposite to the
accelerations of the negotiations, by giving
to the inimieal powers, and principally to
Austria, a real interest to prolong the dii
cuffions, iw order daily to acquire the means
of appearing wit-h greater advantage in the
field of battle, and sonfequently with grea
ter pretentions at the Congress.
" It is with a v » ew avoiding, in part,
so nianifeft an inconvenience, that France
requires that the maritime armiflice should
be stipulated in such a manner as to be equi
«OTTO"
Otto.
translation.
(No. 28) Note,
valent to the continental armistice, & to
place England, orvits fide,in the fituationof
being delirous of the conclusion of Peace.
The advantages which the Republic can &
ought to expeft. frpm the naval armistice,
are the free navigation of her (hips, and the
facilities necessary for her communications
with the islands of France ani Reunion,
and with her American colonies ; and al
though Ihe should make use of it to fend a
few thousand men more to Egypt, do not
the places belonging to the Emperor daily
acquire in like manner frelh ftren-jth upon
the Continent ?
" With refpeft to the vi&ualling the
harbours of the French Republic itfelf, in
ternal means of circulation are not wanting,
ani this objett is but of l'rnall importance
to it. When the Britilh government pro
polcsthat the harbeurs 8c places blockaded
fliould only receive provilisns for fourteen
days, it is aware that the greater part of
those establishments are still far from want
ing provisions ? and besides that, the feal'on
is drawing near which, by rendering a naval
blockade almost always illusory, make the
proposed favour quite ufeltfs.
" That if, besides, it be considered how
little it is the interest of Great Britain, if it
be sincerely desirous of peace, to prevent
France from preserving and consolidating
the small number which remain ta her of
foreign settlements, and how much Eng
land, by making new acquisitions 'of this
nature, would augment still farther the
uneasiness and jealaufy of Europe ; and
the disposition which it evinces not to
fee with indifference the unlimited eX
tension of the power and cominerre of
England, it will be acknowledged, at the
fame time that the advantages to be derived
to the French Republic from a maritimetruce
are admitted, that this trure would not be
so eminently disadvantageous to England
as her government appears to imagine.
" The undersigned is, in consequence
dire&ed to refer to the double proposition
contained in the present note.
" If a separate negotiation and peace be
the objedl, the armistice maybt agreed to in
the form in which it is pr'opofed'by the aii
nifter of his Britannic majeftyj
" If joint negotiation and a general peace
be the objeft, the armistice must be stipu
lated in the manner in which it is proposed
in the name of the French goversmentj &
it will be subsequently detailed by the
undersigned.
(Signed) " OTTO."
" Hereford ftrect, Sept. 16, 1800.
(N0.29.)L0rd Grenville to M.Otto.
" Sir, Downing-ftreet, Sept. 20, 1800.
" I enclose to you the answer to the last
note which I have had the honour to re
ceive from you.
" You will there observe that his majesty
is very far from thinking it proper for him
to ar.cede to the principle which is again
urged in that note as the foundation of a
naval armistice.
" While this fund» l *"' nttl ' dfiih
fifts, there can be little reason to hope that
any advantage could arise from difcufiing
the details of i'uch a measure.
" The counter-project which I have the
honour to transmit to you, is considered
here as going to the full extent of conces
sion which can with any colour of reason
bfc alked by France, or which could be ad
mitted by this country, even In that view
in which alone there can be any question of
naval armistice. '
" If you are authorised to make any
such new proposals as lhall be really con
fident with thole principles which form the
only admissible basis for such a tranfattion,
I am confident you will not be unwilling,
in a matter of lb much importance, to
transmit them to me in writing.
" Should they then appear to his majesty's
government to afford any fufficient grounds
for further difcuflion ot this point, I lhall
very readily receive the king's commands
for authorising a proper person to converse
with you on the fubjett of those commu
nications.
« I have the honour to be, &c
« GRENVILLE."
(No. 30) NOTE.
" The note enclosed in M. Otto's letter
of the 16th inft. has been laid before the
king,
" His majesty has not seen in that paper
any- frefh suggestions on the fubjeft ot a
naval armistice which can at all vary the
answer transmitted to M. Otto on the 7th
instant.
" Neither his majesty's known engage
ments to his allies, nor his delire, io re
cently exprefled, to contribute to the resto
ration of general tranquility in Europe,
will admit of his separating his interests
from those of the powers with whom he is
connected in the prosecution of the war :
much less could he entertain the idea of
consenting, for such a purpose to any na
val armistice ; a measure which he has al
ready declared to be totally inapplicable to
a separate difcuflion of the interests of
Great Britain and France.
« This proposal being therefore one
which the French government mutl have
known that his majesty could not accept,
the supposed alternative profeffed to be
offered to his Majesty's choice, amounts
to nothing more than to the simple re
newal of a demand already rejected. No
frefh inducement is stated which Ihould now
dii'pofe his Majesty to confeut to thole
conditions of armistice for joint negotia
tion which he had before considered as
wholly inadmissible.
" From information received since the
last communications on this - subject took
place, his Majelty has observed with equal
surprize and concern, that the orders for
giving notice of the termination of the
Continental armistice must uftually have
been dispatched from Paris at the very
tirpe when the continuance of that ar
. miftice was proposed to his Majesty as the
condition and inducement for a Maritime
truce. And if, in addition to this circum
stance, his Majesty were to collett the pre
sent dispositions of his from the
terms refpe&ing his conduft and views,
with which their recent communications
with his allies are filled, the conclufiou
must be extremely unfavourable to the
existence of any difpolition to concilia
tion.
" His Majesty is, however, still willing
to wave all reference to these considera
tions, and to regulate his condutt by the
motives which he has already explained.
He still looks, therefore, to a naval armi
stice, on suitable conditions, as to a facrifice
which he maybe induced to make in order
to prevent the renewal of hoftihties on the
continent, and thereby to facilitate those
joint negotiations for a general peace
which might perhaps be accelerated by such
an arrangement, although they are by no
means necessarily depending on it.
" But when it is required that the extent
of the facrifice which his Majesty is to
make should be regulated neither by any
fair standard of equality, nor by the ordi
nary rules which govern such tranfattions ;
when without any reference to the interests
of his own people, he is called upon to pro
portion his conceflions to the exaggerated
estimates which his enemies have formed
of the benefits derived to his allies from
j the continental armistice ; and when on
l'uch grounds as these, conditions are in
filled on 1 which even these could not war
rant, it becomes necessary to state diftin&ly "
that his Majesty neither recognizes this
principle, nor if he did, could agree in this
application of it.
" His Majesty is npt, indeed, called upon
to appreciate the relative advantages whicji
the prolongation of the continental armi
stice might really afford to each of the
belligerent powers. But even of those cir
cumftanccs which are enumerated by the
French government as. exclusively advan
tageous to Austria, many are evidently be
neficial to both parties, and are so nearly
to an equal extent.
" If, during the interval of repose which
has already elapied, the , Austrian armies
have been re-established, recruited, and
reinforced. France has not been iilattejw
tive to the fame measures. If the fubfi.
dies which his Majesty has furniihed are
applied by his ally to the formation or
transport of mjigazines, France has, appro
priated to similar purposes the rigorous
contributions exacted from those countries
which the existence of an armistice has
not exempted from that calamity. The
places in the rear of the Austrian army may
have been repaired, but the position of the
French armies has alio been ftrengthenid,
and even the blockade towns may, per
haps, fuffer more from the increased length
of the blockade, than they can profit by
any internal measures for improving their
defences.
" llrlu " ''-**■ point* of cogjparifon his
Majesty forbears to enter. No paftTorme
varied successes of the continental war ap
peal" to him to entitle his enemies to pre
sume on any ascendant over the spirit of
the Austrian armies.
" But were the affertiqns of the French
government in these refpedls better ground
ed: than his Majesty conceives them to be,
the principle iti'elf would still be inadmif
fiblc. It is impotfible that his Majesty can
admit that compensation is to be demanded
from him for the extent of those advantages,
whatever they might really be, which his
ally might derive from the continuance of
the armiiUce ; yet even such compensation is
in a great degree offered by his Majesty. I*
consenting to a naval armiltice on fuco
terms as have already been acceded tohe
his Majesty's part he has made confideblcp
facrifices, and placed within the reach so
his enemies great and obvious advantages
which their representation in vain endea»
vours to depreciate, he has thereby give*
to all Europe a strong pledge of his concent
for the general welfaxe, and to his enemi©*
a decided proof of pacific disposition.
" But to yield to the present demand
would be to i'acrifice those means of pre
sent defence ; and those pledges of future
security which have been acquired by such
great and memorable efforts, and whichhe
can never be expefted to forego till the re-
fult of those in which he has
declared his readiness to concur, ihail have
crowned his endeavours for the happiness
of his people, by the restoration of fafe
and honourable peace.
(Signed) GRENVILLE."
„ Dpwn»ng-ftreet, Sept. 20, 1800."
(No. 31.) TRANSLATION.
"Mv Lord,
London. Sept. 21, 1800. .
" I received yefteiday at ten o'clock at night
the letter and the cote which your Excellency
did me the henor to adddrefs to me ; and I
have learnt frem them with the deepest regret,
that hit Majesty and his Ministry are not yet
difpoled to accede to the principle# of concilia
tion contained in the Note which 1 had the
honor to transmit to y<>u on the 16th of this
month.
" It was not merely with a view to discuss
those principles, but in order to propose to
vour excellency frefh means of reconcilation,
that I felt it my duty to request, in my let
ter of the 16th, to have an interview with
you ; and I had every reason to hope that
the explanations into which I lhould have en
tered would effectually have obviated the
difficulties which are still opposed to the co-n
clufion of the general Armiltice.
'• You desire, my Lord, that I Ihould give
you ttofe explanations in writing. They re
late to two points, whichin your firft Nose are
represented as being the mod important ; the
power of altering the positions of the squad
ron« of the Republic during the Armiltice,
and the fate of the Allies of Great Brita : n.
" x am auihorifed to coefent that the
French Ihips of the line (hall not go out of
the harbours where they are at present : and
if his Majesty infills upon his Allies being in
cluded in the' propefed Araiftice, I am au
ihorifed also to csnfent that they Ihould enjoy