treated with, him and is declared even on the veiy face of the paper which he signed. " With refpeft therefore to the supposed demand of his majesty to be admitted to those negotiations, nothing more is neceita ry to be said. The note delivered to NI. IJe Tbogut, by lord Miuto, fufficiently ex plains the part which his majesty is really disposed to tak? in any negotiation which may be regularly let on foot for a general peace. The Kiwg has always been persuaded that the rel'ult of litch* a negotiation can alone effectually re-eftablilh the tranquility qjf Europe. " Experience has confirmed this opinion, and it is only from the conviction of its trnth that his majesty his' rioW'been in duced to wave his objeftion to the firft proposal of a naval armistice, and to enter into the discussion of the conditions on which it may be established. " His majesty judging from the experi ence of ft> many former negotiations, con siders such an arwiftice as in no degree likely either to expedite or facilitate an ar rangement of the direCt interests of Great Britain and France. " He views it in no other light than as ■ temporary adv<ntage which it is proposed to him to yield to his enemy, in order to prevent the renewal of continental hostili ties, and thereby to contribute to the con clafion of a general peace. " And on this ground notwithstanding the many disadvantages whieh he is feniible mqft rel'ult to the country, from such a •measure, he is resolved to give to hi J allies and to all Europe this new pledge of the sentiments by which he is aftuated, provi ded that his enemies are disposed to regulate the conditions of such an armistice, as far as the nature of the cafe will allow, in conformity to the obvious and ellablifhed principle of such arrangements: «' This principle is, that the refpe&ivi poliHon of the twp parties Ihould remain during the fontinu ar.ee of the armistice, such asit was at its coiHißcnc* ment j and that neither of tUem flxould by 'ta^* peration acquire fretb advantages or new means ot" annoying his enemy, such as he could not other wise obtiin. The difficulty of doing this with the fame prectftan in the cafe of naval operations, as by land, has atready been adverted to in a former notej and it coaftitutes a leading objection to the measure itfelf. " Bat the French projeft instead of attempting to remove or leflen these difficulties, departs at once, and in every article from the principle itfelf, although expressly recognized and ftudioutly main* tained inthje continental armistice, which is here referred to aa the foundation and model of this tranl s»dlion • " It is proposed, in effeft that the blockade of the aaral pods & arsenals of the Kings enemies (hould be razed ; that they fliould be enabled to " remove their fl-fits to any other Rations, and to divide or to collecl their force as they may judge mod advantageous to their future plans : the importation both of pro visions and of naval and military stores is to be wholly unrestrained. Even Malta and the ports'of Egypt, though expressly stated to be now blockaded, are to be freely vitlualled, and for an unlimited period, in direA contradiftion to the stipulations of the German Armistice rcfpefting Ulm and In goldftadt to which places it is nevertheless profefTrd to allimilate them': and this Go vernment is expeftsd to bind itfelf towards the Allies of France even before any recipro cal engagement can be received fr m them ; while, at the fame tune, all mention of the King's Allies is, on the other hand, totally -omitt-'d. " To a propofil so rnanifeftly repugnant to justice and equality, and so injurious not only to his Majesty's interests, but also to those of his Allies, it cannot be e*pe£ted that any motive Ihould induce the Kiug to ascede. ' " The counter-projefll which the under figneel has the honor to transmit to M. Otto contains regulations in this refped more nearly corresponding with that princi pal of equality on which alone his Majesty can consent to treat. " Even those articles r.rc, in many impor tant points, and particularly in what re lates to the. aftual Rations of his Majesty's squadrons, very far fliort of what his Majes ty might justly demand from a reference to the general principle above dated, from analogy to the conditions of the Continental Armistice, or from the relative Gtuation of naval force ; and a confidence is reposed in the good faith of his enemies which, although it can never be claimed in tranladtions be tween Belligerant Powers, his Majefly is nevertheless willing to hope he (hall not find to have been vnifplaced upon the prcl'ent occalion. » If M. Otto is empowered to accede to ftipulations. a proper person will im mediately be authorised to sign them on his Majesty's part ; If not, he is requested to trailTmit them, without delay, to his Go -vemment. (Signed) « powning-ftreet, Sept. 7, 1800. (Ho. 25.) COUNTER PROJET. It having been agreed that Negotiations for a General Peace be immediately set on foot between the Ereperor of Germany, his Britannic and the French Repub lic, and an arnnftice having been already con cluded between the forces of his Imperial Majelly and thole of the French Republic, it is agreed that an armistice (lull also take between the forces of his Britannic Majcfty and those of tlie French Republic, on the terms and in the manner following, that is to fay, w Article 1. All hostilities, both by sea and land, between the forces of the two con tradling parties fliall be fufpendtd, and fliall not be renewed until after fourteen duys no tice given of the termination ef the arroif tice. This notice, in so fer as relates to the parts of Europe, North of Cape St. Vincent, jnuft be given by on» of the two govern ments to the other, and is to be reckoned froßi the d*jr on which the fame flmll be re ceived by the government to whom it is gi*en. 'lii tUe Meditsr rinean e!r ether parts of the world, the notice imift be given by therefpeciive commanding officers. But ii« cafe of the renewal of hoflilities between Austria and France, the armistice bAween Great Britain and France is likely to be com lidered as terminated, so loon as loch renew al of hostilities (hall be known to tne officer commanding the British forces, except only in so far as rel-ates to prizes ot merchant vcffels, which Ihall he regulated by the third article of this convention. Art. 2. Orders (hall ue immediately sent by the two "governments to their officers in the different parts oi the wdild, to conform ihemfelves so this agreement ; sea palles shall be given to the (hips which aie to carry the ft orders ; and his Britannic Majesty's officers to be sent for that purpose through France, shall be fu mi filed wi.h the neeef. fary paflports and facilities to expedite their journey. Art. 3. All prizes made in any part of the world during the continuance and opera tion of the armistice, by any officers having aftually received due notice of this agree ment, shall be restored ; and generally, whe ther such notice (hall have been received or not, all prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve days (to be I'eckoned from the exchange of the ratifica tions of this convention) (hall be restored ; and the fame periods (hall be allowed in this refpeift tor the other pans of she world, as were flipulated by the 22d article of the pre liminaries of the lafl peace. Art. 4. Malta, and the maritime towns and ports of Egypt, shall be placed on the fame footing as those places which, though conaprifed within the demarkation of the French in Germany, are occupied by the Auftriau troops, sonfequently nothing shall be admitted by sea which can give additional means of defence ; and provisions only for fourteen days at a time, in propor tion to the confumption,as it (hall Hained by commiflioners to be named for who shall have powers to estab lish th? neceflary regulations for giving ef fect to "■tjju stipulation, conformably to the principles of the 4th article of the Conven tion concluded between the Austrian and the French Generals in Germany. " Art 5. The blockade of Brest, Tou lon, and any other of the ports of France, by his Mijefty's fleets, Hull be discontinued and all Britilh fliipi (liall be inftrutted not to interrupt or obftruft the trade or navi gation of any ships failing; to or from the coaftsaf France, except in the article of na val of military stores, which are not to be brouglit thither by sea during the present armistice. None of the Ihips of war now (htioned ill the said ports refpettively (hall, before the renewal<of hqftilities be removed to any other station. " Art. 6. The allies of the two parties (hall severally be at liberty to accede to this Armistice, if they so think fit ; provided that they also engage to observe a like artniUice, on conditions fnnilar to those here fpecified, towards such of the allies *on the other fide as (hall also accede to it. " The periods or terms to be fixed for the commencement of the armistice in the dif ferent qwaiters of the world as with ref pe& to each of the said all es are to be regu lated iu conformity to the (Vipulations con tained in the third article of thi»convention as between Great Britain and France ; and the laid periods or terms are to Ue reckoned from the day on which the accession of such power to the armistice (hall have been duly ratifiedby such power to the party with whtfm it is at war. Such notification duly aothrn ticated by the government on wliofe part it is made, may either be traiifmitted dire£tly fey couriers or flags of truce, or through the channel of the two contrasting parties to each other reciprocally.- The nava! ports and artenals of the allies of France are, du ring such armistice to be placed on the fame footing with those of France ; and the no tices which are to precede the renewal of hoitili'.ies, as well as all matters relating to such armistice, are to be regulated accord ing to the terms of this Convention. 4t Art. 7. This convention lhall be ra tified, and the ratifications fliall be exchan ged within the term of ten day», or sooner if the fame be pradlicable." (No. 26.) Translation. Hereford street, Sept. 8, ißoo.- " My Lord, «' 1 received yesterday, at eleven o'clock at night, the note and the counter projet which your excellency did me the honour toaddrefs to me. The principles contained in these two pieces are, in several refpe£ts so little analogous to the proposals which I have been diretted to make, and the obje& of which was to coinpenfate by a Britifli ar mistice, the inconveniences which might re sult to France from the eventual prolonga tion of the German armistice, that I can not take upon myfelf to admit them with out previously receiving furtherinftrnttions. I have therefore complied with your excel lency's intentions by uanfmittihg to my go vernment those two pieces, with as little delay as poflible. I have the honour to be, kc. (Signed) (No. 27.) Translation. Hereford (Ireet, Sept. 16, 1800. •' My Lord, " I have the honor t« sddreft your Excellency (hi stntwer which my_,governn)cnt hai diredted me to make to the note which you did me Ch« honor to addrefa to inc. ''The First Consul, hopihg that it is still pofllble to approximate the interefl of the two governments, and their wilhes for a fpeecly and solid peace, and being willing to give, on his part, a frcfli proof of his paci fic diTpotations, has dispatched orders for deferring for foaie days longer, the atXack which the French army had been dire&d to make upon the whole line. * I fhill give verbally, eithei to yoiw Ex cellency vourfelf, or to such perj'pp as you Hull judge proper to appoint tor that pur pose, fatifa-ttory explanations, refpedling the principal ob'jettions contained in your note of the 7th of this tnynth, aud I flatter myfelf, that they will produce the efleft your Excellency had in view,by making known to me, the intentions of his majesty. The high importance of thele communi cations, authorises me to intreat, that you would give them every facility in your power. I lave the honor to be, with the rnoft refpeitful my lord, your excellency's mod obedient, and most hum ble servant. (Sigi.ed) ' The undersigned, has transmitted to his government, the note of his excellency lord Greoville, dated the 7th of September. The counter-projet which accompanied it, having been laid before the First Consul, he has observed thafr the armistice, such as was proposed did not offer any advantages to the French Republic, and consequently could not compensate it, for the serious inconveniences which would result to it, from the continuance of the continental armiftiee, hence it follows, that the counter projeft could be admitted inasmuch ouly, as the question might simply be, to fettle the preliminaries of a particular arrange ment between France and England, by a truce, alike particular to the two states, but the effeft of the proposed maratiine truce, heing intended to serve as a compensation to the French Republic, for the continen tal truce, the former ought to afford to it, advantages equal to the inconveniences which k sxperiences from the latter. ' Vbe -undersigned, is therefore direfted to make t wo proposals, of which his Britan nic majesty may choose that which may ap pear to him, most cotyfonant to the interest of his dominions, or to his continental re lations. , ' The firfl is, that the projeft far an ar mistice be drawn up and admitted, in terms analogous to those which hart been propos ed by the wmiftry of his Brittannic majeflir, but iolely under the fappofition, that this armistice Ihould be iidppenderit of the events of the continent, and relative only to a separate negotiation, to be immediate ly opened between the two powers. ' The second is, that his Britannic ma jesty should continue to make a common fcaufe with the Emperor, but that, in cafe he (hould conient that the maratime truce may offer to the French Republic, advan tages equal to those fecared to the house of Austria, by the cintinental truce. ' ' And with this view, the comparison may be easily fettled. ' By the continental armistice, the court 'of Vienna acquires the meins of re-organi sing its armies, of converting into men, arms and anuinition of exery kind, the subsidies paid to it -by England, of fortify ing and viftnalling'its places on the 2d and 3d line which weie in a 6ad fta'e, in confe rence of the rapid march of the French nrmics having no: been forefctn;. 'Ffcuj Afoppo, Palmanova, Venice, Vcrone, and Lintz, had been negletted, every day their fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingold ftadt although blockaded are improving their means of defence ; and it is the ar mistice that procures them this advantage, for at the moment when those places were inverted, the enemy thought only of besieg ing ours, and confeqtiently theix own were not prepared for so early an attick. " By the Continental Armistice the im preflion made by the victories of the French armies diminilh, their effetts.are weakened. Six months of repose would fuflice to restore the *nora| and physical strength of the Au strian armies ; to rally the conquered, to recover from the imprelEon of Alcendancy required by the conquerors, and to make it neceflary once nacre to regairf that csntin gent superiority so well earned by the Re public. " It would alfs follow as a consequence of the. continental armistice, that the king dom of Naples, now a prey to every kind of calamity, and containing all the feeds of infurredtion* hiigJit be recognized, and fur iiilh frelh refourcerto the enemies of France word that men are raifmg in Tufcany and in the marlhes of Ancona ; that Austria is every where preparing new means of de fence ; that every where ftie is amelioiat ing her position, which perhaps was despe rate, whilst the advantages of the Republic are diminilhing or disappearing. " The First Consul has already made to the love of peace a fufficiently great facri fice of those advantages ; if he Ihould con tinue to derive no benefit fi"Bm them-, it would no longer be the means of arriving at the conclusion of peace, but that of per petuating the war. Peihaps in the judg ment of statesmen the French Government may have already too long delayed to avail itfelf of the contigency which was favour able to it ; but it has only done so upon the positive assurances which had been givea to it of a speedy and feparato peace. " At this moment, when the two Allied Courts infill upon a joint negociation and a general peace, the French government is to well aware that so complicated a work is not to be accompli(hed iw a few days, and it ought to avoid putting itfelf in a pofitjon which would b« diametrically opposite to the accelerations of the negotiations, by giving to the inimieal powers, and principally to Austria, a real interest to prolong the dii cuffions, iw order daily to acquire the means of appearing wit-h greater advantage in the field of battle, and sonfequently with grea ter pretentions at the Congress. " It is with a v » ew avoiding, in part, so nianifeft an inconvenience, that France requires that the maritime armiflice should be stipulated in such a manner as to be equi «OTTO" Otto. translation. (No. 28) Note, valent to the continental armistice, & to place England, orvits fide,in the fituationof being delirous of the conclusion of Peace. The advantages which the Republic can & ought to expeft. frpm the naval armistice, are the free navigation of her (hips, and the facilities necessary for her communications with the islands of France ani Reunion, and with her American colonies ; and al though Ihe should make use of it to fend a few thousand men more to Egypt, do not the places belonging to the Emperor daily acquire in like manner frelh ftren-jth upon the Continent ? " With refpeft to the vi&ualling the harbours of the French Republic itfelf, in ternal means of circulation are not wanting, ani this objett is but of l'rnall importance to it. When the Britilh government pro polcsthat the harbeurs 8c places blockaded fliould only receive provilisns for fourteen days, it is aware that the greater part of those establishments are still far from want ing provisions ? and besides that, the feal'on is drawing near which, by rendering a naval blockade almost always illusory, make the proposed favour quite ufeltfs. " That if, besides, it be considered how little it is the interest of Great Britain, if it be sincerely desirous of peace, to prevent France from preserving and consolidating the small number which remain ta her of foreign settlements, and how much Eng land, by making new acquisitions 'of this nature, would augment still farther the uneasiness and jealaufy of Europe ; and the disposition which it evinces not to fee with indifference the unlimited eX tension of the power and cominerre of England, it will be acknowledged, at the fame time that the advantages to be derived to the French Republic from a maritimetruce are admitted, that this trure would not be so eminently disadvantageous to England as her government appears to imagine. " The undersigned is, in consequence dire&ed to refer to the double proposition contained in the present note. " If a separate negotiation and peace be the objedl, the armistice maybt agreed to in the form in which it is pr'opofed'by the aii nifter of his Britannic majeftyj " If joint negotiation and a general peace be the objeft, the armistice must be stipu lated in the manner in which it is proposed in the name of the French goversmentj & it will be subsequently detailed by the undersigned. (Signed) " OTTO." " Hereford ftrect, Sept. 16, 1800. (N0.29.)L0rd Grenville to M.Otto. " Sir, Downing-ftreet, Sept. 20, 1800. " I enclose to you the answer to the last note which I have had the honour to re ceive from you. " You will there observe that his majesty is very far from thinking it proper for him to ar.cede to the principle which is again urged in that note as the foundation of a naval armistice. " While this fund» l *"' nttl ' dfiih fifts, there can be little reason to hope that any advantage could arise from difcufiing the details of i'uch a measure. " The counter-project which I have the honour to transmit to you, is considered here as going to the full extent of conces sion which can with any colour of reason bfc alked by France, or which could be ad mitted by this country, even In that view in which alone there can be any question of naval armistice. ' " If you are authorised to make any such new proposals as lhall be really con fident with thole principles which form the only admissible basis for such a tranfattion, I am confident you will not be unwilling, in a matter of lb much importance, to transmit them to me in writing. " Should they then appear to his majesty's government to afford any fufficient grounds for further difcuflion ot this point, I lhall very readily receive the king's commands for authorising a proper person to converse with you on the fubjett of those commu nications. « I have the honour to be, &c « GRENVILLE." (No. 30) NOTE. " The note enclosed in M. Otto's letter of the 16th inft. has been laid before the king, " His majesty has not seen in that paper any- frefh suggestions on the fubjeft ot a naval armistice which can at all vary the answer transmitted to M. Otto on the 7th instant. " Neither his majesty's known engage ments to his allies, nor his delire, io re cently exprefled, to contribute to the resto ration of general tranquility in Europe, will admit of his separating his interests from those of the powers with whom he is connected in the prosecution of the war : much less could he entertain the idea of consenting, for such a purpose to any na val armistice ; a measure which he has al ready declared to be totally inapplicable to a separate difcuflion of the interests of Great Britain and France. « This proposal being therefore one which the French government mutl have known that his majesty could not accept, the supposed alternative profeffed to be offered to his Majesty's choice, amounts to nothing more than to the simple re newal of a demand already rejected. No frefh inducement is stated which Ihould now dii'pofe his Majesty to confeut to thole conditions of armistice for joint negotia tion which he had before considered as wholly inadmissible. " From information received since the last communications on this - subject took place, his Majelty has observed with equal surprize and concern, that the orders for giving notice of the termination of the Continental armistice must uftually have been dispatched from Paris at the very tirpe when the continuance of that ar . miftice was proposed to his Majesty as the condition and inducement for a Maritime truce. And if, in addition to this circum stance, his Majesty were to collett the pre sent dispositions of his from the terms refpe&ing his conduft and views, with which their recent communications with his allies are filled, the conclufiou must be extremely unfavourable to the existence of any difpolition to concilia tion. " His Majesty is, however, still willing to wave all reference to these considera tions, and to regulate his condutt by the motives which he has already explained. He still looks, therefore, to a naval armi stice, on suitable conditions, as to a facrifice which he maybe induced to make in order to prevent the renewal of hoftihties on the continent, and thereby to facilitate those joint negotiations for a general peace which might perhaps be accelerated by such an arrangement, although they are by no means necessarily depending on it. " But when it is required that the extent of the facrifice which his Majesty is to make should be regulated neither by any fair standard of equality, nor by the ordi nary rules which govern such tranfattions ; when without any reference to the interests of his own people, he is called upon to pro portion his conceflions to the exaggerated estimates which his enemies have formed of the benefits derived to his allies from j the continental armistice ; and when on l'uch grounds as these, conditions are in filled on 1 which even these could not war rant, it becomes necessary to state diftin&ly " that his Majesty neither recognizes this principle, nor if he did, could agree in this application of it. " His Majesty is npt, indeed, called upon to appreciate the relative advantages whicji the prolongation of the continental armi stice might really afford to each of the belligerent powers. But even of those cir cumftanccs which are enumerated by the French government as. exclusively advan tageous to Austria, many are evidently be neficial to both parties, and are so nearly to an equal extent. " If, during the interval of repose which has already elapied, the , Austrian armies have been re-established, recruited, and reinforced. France has not been iilattejw tive to the fame measures. If the fubfi. dies which his Majesty has furniihed are applied by his ally to the formation or transport of mjigazines, France has, appro priated to similar purposes the rigorous contributions exacted from those countries which the existence of an armistice has not exempted from that calamity. The places in the rear of the Austrian army may have been repaired, but the position of the French armies has alio been ftrengthenid, and even the blockade towns may, per haps, fuffer more from the increased length of the blockade, than they can profit by any internal measures for improving their defences. " llrlu " ''-**■ point* of cogjparifon his Majesty forbears to enter. No paftTorme varied successes of the continental war ap peal" to him to entitle his enemies to pre sume on any ascendant over the spirit of the Austrian armies. " But were the affertiqns of the French government in these refpedls better ground ed: than his Majesty conceives them to be, the principle iti'elf would still be inadmif fiblc. It is impotfible that his Majesty can admit that compensation is to be demanded from him for the extent of those advantages, whatever they might really be, which his ally might derive from the continuance of the armiiUce ; yet even such compensation is in a great degree offered by his Majesty. I* consenting to a naval armiltice on fuco terms as have already been acceded tohe his Majesty's part he has made confideblcp facrifices, and placed within the reach so his enemies great and obvious advantages which their representation in vain endea» vours to depreciate, he has thereby give* to all Europe a strong pledge of his concent for the general welfaxe, and to his enemi©* a decided proof of pacific disposition. " But to yield to the present demand would be to i'acrifice those means of pre sent defence ; and those pledges of future security which have been acquired by such great and memorable efforts, and whichhe can never be expefted to forego till the re- fult of those in which he has declared his readiness to concur, ihail have crowned his endeavours for the happiness of his people, by the restoration of fafe and honourable peace. (Signed) GRENVILLE." „ Dpwn»ng-ftreet, Sept. 20, 1800." (No. 31.) TRANSLATION. "Mv Lord, London. Sept. 21, 1800. . " I received yefteiday at ten o'clock at night the letter and the cote which your Excellency did me the henor to adddrefs to me ; and I have learnt frem them with the deepest regret, that hit Majesty and his Ministry are not yet difpoled to accede to the principle# of concilia tion contained in the Note which 1 had the honor to transmit to y<>u on the 16th of this month. " It was not merely with a view to discuss those principles, but in order to propose to vour excellency frefh means of reconcilation, that I felt it my duty to request, in my let ter of the 16th, to have an interview with you ; and I had every reason to hope that the explanations into which I lhould have en tered would effectually have obviated the difficulties which are still opposed to the co-n clufion of the general Armiltice. '• You desire, my Lord, that I Ihould give you ttofe explanations in writing. They re late to two points, whichin your firft Nose are represented as being the mod important ; the power of altering the positions of the squad ron« of the Republic during the Armiltice, and the fate of the Allies of Great Brita : n. " x am auihorifed to coefent that the French Ihips of the line (hall not go out of the harbours where they are at present : and if his Majesty infills upon his Allies being in cluded in the' propefed Araiftice, I am au ihorifed also to csnfent that they Ihould enjoy
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