

treated with him and is declared even on the very face of the paper which he signed.

"With respect therefore to the supposed demand of his Majesty to be admitted to those negotiations, nothing more is necessary to be said. The note delivered to M. De Thugut, by Lord Minto, sufficiently explains the part which his Majesty is really disposed to take in any negotiation which may be regularly set on foot for a general peace.

"The King has always been persuaded that the result of such a negotiation can alone effectually re-establish the tranquility of Europe.

"Experience has confirmed this opinion, and it is only from the conviction of its truth that his Majesty has now been induced to waive his objection to the first proposal of a naval armistice, and to enter into the discussion of the conditions on which it may be established.

"His Majesty judging from the experience of so many former negotiations, considers such an armistice as in no degree likely either to expedite or facilitate an arrangement of the direct interests of Great Britain and France.

"He views it in no other light than as a temporary advantage which it is proposed to him to yield to his enemy, in order to prevent the renewal of continental hostilities, and thereby to contribute to the conclusion of a general peace.

"And on this ground notwithstanding the many disadvantages which he is sensible must result to the country, from such a measure, he is resolved to give to his allies and to all Europe this new pledge of the sentiments by which he is actuated, provided that his enemies are disposed to regulate the conditions of such an armistice, as far as the nature of the case will allow, in conformity to the obvious and established principle of such arrangements:

"This principle is, that the respective position of the two parties should remain during the continuance of the armistice, such as it was at its commencement; and that neither of them should by its operation acquire fresh advantages or new means of annoying his enemy, such as he could not otherwise obtain. The difficulty of doing this with the same precision in the case of naval operations, as by land, has already been adverted to in a former note; and it constitutes a leading objection to the measure itself.

"But the French project instead of attempting to remove or lessen these difficulties, departs at once, and in every article from the principle itself, although expressly recognized and studiously maintained in the continental armistice, which is here referred to as the foundation and model of this transaction.

"It is proposed, in effect that the blockade of the naval ports & arsenals of the King's enemies should be raised; that they should be enabled to remove their fleets to any other stations, and to divide or to collect their force as they may judge most advantageous to their future plans: the importation both of provisions and of naval and military stores is to be wholly unrestrained. Even Malta and the ports of Egypt, though expressly stated to be now blockaded, are to be freely visited, and for an unlimited period, in direct contradiction to the stipulations of the German Armistice respecting Ulm and Ingoldstadt to which places it is nevertheless professed to assimilate them: and this Government is expected to bind itself towards the Allies of France even before any reciprocal engagement can be received from them; while, at the same time, all mention of the King's Allies is, on the other hand, totally omitted.

"To a proposal so manifestly repugnant to justice and equality, and so injurious not only to his Majesty's interests, but also to those of his Allies, it cannot be expected that any motive should induce the King to accede.

"The counter-project which the under signed has the honor to transmit to M. Otto contains regulations in this respect more nearly corresponding with that principle of equality on which alone his Majesty can consent to treat.

"Even those articles are, in many important points, and particularly in what relates to the actual stations of his Majesty's squadrons, very far short of what his Majesty might justly demand from a reference to the general principle above stated, from analogy to the conditions of the Continental Armistice, or from the relative situation of naval force; and a confidence is reposed in the good faith of his enemies which, although it can never be claimed in transactions between Belligerent Powers, his Majesty is nevertheless willing to hope he shall not find to have been misplaced upon the present occasion.

"If M. Otto is empowered to accede to these stipulations, a proper person will immediately be authorized to sign them on his Majesty's part; if not, he is requested to transmit them, without delay, to his Government.

(Signed)

GRENVILLE."

Downing-street, Sept. 7, 1800.

(No. 25.) COUNTER PROJECT.

It having been agreed that Negotiations for a General Peace be immediately set on foot between the Emperor of Germany, his Britannic Majesty, and the French Republic, and an armistice having been already concluded between the forces of his Imperial Majesty and those of the French Republic, it is agreed that an armistice shall also take place between the forces of his Britannic Majesty and those of the French Republic, on the terms and in the manner following, that is to say,

"Article 1. All hostilities, both by sea and land, between the forces of the two contracting parties shall be suspended, and shall not be renewed until after fourteen days notice given of the termination of the armistice. This notice, in so far as relates to the parts of Europe, North of Cape St. Vincent, must be given by one of the two governments to the other, and is to be reckoned from the day on which the same shall be received by the government to whom it is given. In the Mediterranean or other parts of the world, the notice must be given by the respective commanding officers. But in case of the renewal of hostilities between Austria and France, the armistice between Great Britain and France is likely to be considered as terminated; so soon as such renewal of hostilities shall be known to the officer commanding the British forces, except only in so far as relates to prizes of merchant vessels, which shall be regulated by the third article of this convention.

Art. 2. Orders shall be immediately sent by the two governments to their officers in the different parts of the world, to conform themselves to this agreement; sea passes shall be given to the ships which are to carry these orders; and his Britannic Majesty's officers to be sent for that purpose through France, shall be furnished with the necessary passports and facilities to expedite their journey.

Art. 3. All prizes made in any part of the world during the continuance and operation of the armistice, by any officers having actually received due notice of this agreement, shall be restored; and generally, whether such notice shall have been received or not, all prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve days (to be reckoned from the exchange of the ratifications of this convention) shall be restored; and the same periods shall be allowed in this respect for the other parts of the world, as were stipulated by the 22d article of the preliminaries of the last peace.

Art. 4. Malta, and the maritime towns and ports of Egypt, shall be placed on the same footing as those places which, though comprised within the demarcation of the French army in Germany, are occupied by the Austrian troops, consequently nothing shall be admitted by sea which can give additional means of defence; and provisions only for fourteen days at a time, in proportion to the consumption, as it shall be ascertained by commissioners to be named for the purpose, who shall have powers to establish the necessary regulations for giving effect to this stipulation, conformably to the principles of the 4th article of the Convention concluded between the Austrian and the French Generals in Germany.

"Art. 5. The blockade of Brest, Toulon, and any other of the ports of France, by his Majesty's fleets, shall be discontinued, and all British ships shall be instructed not to interrupt or obstruct the trade or navigation of any ships sailing to or from the coasts of France, except in the article of naval or military stores, which are not to be brought thither by sea during the present armistice. None of the ships of war now stationed in the said ports respectively shall, before the renewal of hostilities be removed to any other station.

"Art. 6. The allies of the two parties shall severally be at liberty to accede to this Armistice, if they so think fit; provided that they also engage to observe a like armistice, on conditions similar to those here specified, towards such of the allies on the other side as shall also accede to it.

"The periods or terms to be fixed for the commencement of the armistice in the different quarters of the world as with respect to each of the said allies are to be regulated in conformity to the stipulations contained in the third article of this convention as between Great Britain and France; and the said periods or terms are to be reckoned from the day on which the accession of such power to the armistice shall have been duly notified by such power to the party with whom it is at war. Such notification duly authenticated by the government on whose part it is made, may either be transmitted directly by couriers or flags of truce, or through the channel of the two contracting parties to each other reciprocally. The naval ports and arsenals of the allies of France are, during such armistice to be placed on the same footing with those of France; and the notices which are to precede the renewal of hostilities, as well as all matters relating to such armistice, are to be regulated according to the terms of this Convention.

"Art. 7. This convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within the term of ten days, or sooner if the same be practicable."

(No. 26.) Translation.

Hereford street, Sept. 8, 1800.

"My Lord,

"I received yesterday, at eleven o'clock at night, the note and the counter project which your excellency did me the honor to address to me. The principles contained in these two pieces are, in several respects so little analogous to the proposals which I have been directed to make, and the object of which was to compensate by a British armistice, the inconveniences which might result to France from the eventual prolongation of the German armistice, that I cannot take upon myself to admit them without previously receiving further instructions. I have therefore complied with your excellency's intentions by transmitting to my government those two pieces, with as little delay as possible. I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

"OTTO."

(No. 27.) Translation.

Hereford street, Sept. 16, 1800.

"My Lord,

"I have the honor to address your Excellency the answer which my government has directed me to make to the note which you did me the honor to address to me.

"The First Consul, hoping that it is still possible to approximate the interest of the two governments, and their wishes for a speedy and solid peace, and being willing to give, on his part, a fresh proof of his pacific dispositions, has dispatched orders for deferring for some days longer, the attack which the French army had been directed to make upon the whole line.

"I shall give verbally, either to your Excellency yourself, or to such person as you shall judge proper to appoint for that purpose, satisfactory explanations, respecting the principal objections contained in your note of the 7th of this month, and I flatter myself, that they will produce the effect your Excellency had in view, by making known to me, the intentions of his Majesty. The high importance of these communications, authorises me to treat, that you would give them every facility in your power. I have the honor to be, with the most respectful consideration, my lord, your excellency's most obedient, and most humble servant.

(Signed)

Otto.

Translation.

(No. 28.) Note.

"The undersigned, has transmitted to his government, the note of his excellency Lord Grenville, dated the 7th of September. The counter-project which accompanied it, having been laid before the First Consul, he has observed that the armistice, such as was proposed did not offer any advantages to the French Republic, and consequently could not compensate it, for the serious inconveniences which would result to it, from the continuance of the continental armistice, hence it follows, that the counter-project could be admitted inasmuch only, as the question might simply be, to settle the preliminaries of a particular arrangement between France and England, by a truce, alike particular to the two states, but the effect of the proposed maritime truce, being intended to serve as a compensation to the French Republic, for the continental truce, the former ought to afford to it, advantages equal to the inconveniences which it experiences from the latter.

"The undersigned, is therefore directed to make two proposals, of which his Britannic Majesty may choose that which may appear to him, most consonant to the interest of his dominions, or to his continental relations.

"The first is, that the project for an armistice be drawn up and admitted, in terms analogous to those which have been proposed by the ministry of his Britannic Majesty, but solely under the supposition, that this armistice should be independent of the events of the continent, and relative only to a separate negotiation, to be immediately opened between the two powers.

"The second is, that his Britannic Majesty should continue to make a common cause with the Emperor, but that, in case he should consent that the maritime truce may offer to the French Republic, advantages equal to those secured to the house of Austria, by the continental truce.

"And with this view, the comparison may be easily settled.

"By the continental armistice, the court of Vienna acquires the means of re-organizing its armies, of converting into men, arms and ammunition of every kind, the subsidies paid to it by England, of fortifying and victualling its places on the 2d and 3d line which were in a bad state, in consequence of the rapid march of the French armies having not been foreseen. Thus Aloppe, Palmanova, Venice, Verona, and Lintz, had been neglected, every day their fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingoldstadt although blockaded are improving their means of defence; and it is the armistice that procures them this advantage, for at the moment when those places were invested, the enemy thought only of besieging ours, and consequently their own were not prepared for so early an attack.

"By the Continental Armistice the impression made by the victories of the French armies diminish, their effects are weakened. Six months of repose would suffice to restore the moral and physical strength of the Austrian armies; to rally the conquered, to recover from the impression of Alcantara required by the conquerors, and to make it necessary once more to regain that contingent superiority so well earned by the Republic.

"It would also follow as a consequence of the continental armistice, that the kingdom of Naples, now a prey to every kind of calamity, and containing all the seeds of insurrection, might be recognized, and furnished fresh resources to the enemies of France. It is by means of the armistice, in a word that men are raising in Tuscany and in the marshes of Ancona; that Austria is every where preparing new means of defence; that every where she is ameliorating her position, which perhaps was desperate, whilst the advantages of the Republic are diminishing or disappearing.

"The First Consul has already made to the love of peace a sufficiently great sacrifice of those advantages; if he should continue to derive no benefit from them; it would no longer be the means of arriving at the conclusion of peace, but that of perpetuating the war. Perhaps in the judgment of statesmen the French Government may have already too long delayed to avail itself of the contingency which was favourable to it; but it has only done so upon the positive assurances which had been given to it of a speedy and separate peace.

"At this moment, when the two Allied Courts insist upon a joint negotiation and a general peace, the French government is to well aware that so complicated a work is not to be accomplished in a few days, and it ought to avoid putting itself in a position which would be diametrically opposite to the accelerations of the negotiations, by giving to the inimical powers, and principally to Austria, a real interest to prolong the discussions, in order daily to acquire the means of appearing with greater advantage in the field of battle, and consequently with greater pretensions at the Congress.

"It is with a view of avoiding, in part, so manifest an inconvenience, that France requires that the maritime armistice should be stipulated in such a manner as to be equivalent to the continental armistice, & to place England, on its side, in the situation of being delirious of the conclusion of Peace. The advantages which the Republic can & ought to expect from the naval armistice, are the free navigation of her ships, and the facilities necessary for her communications with the islands of France and Reunion, and with her American colonies; and although she should make use of it to send a few thousand men more to Egypt, do not the places belonging to the Emperor daily acquire in like manner fresh strength upon the Continent?"

"With respect to the victualling the harbours of the French Republic itself, internal means of circulation are not wanting, and this object is but of small importance to it. When the British government professes that the harbours & places blockaded should only receive provisions for fourteen days, it is aware that the greater part of those establishments are still far from wanting provisions; and besides that, the season is drawing near which, by rendering a naval blockade almost always illusory, make the proposed favour quite useless.

"That if, besides, it be considered how little it is the interest of Great Britain, if it be sincerely desirous of peace, to prevent France from preserving and consolidating the small number which remain to her of foreign settlements, and how much England, by making new acquisitions of this nature, would augment still farther the uneasiness and jealousy of Europe; and the disposition which it evinces not to see with indifference the unlimited extension of the power and commerce of England, it will be acknowledged, at the same time that the advantages to be derived to the French Republic from a maritime truce are admitted, that this truce would not be so eminently disadvantageous to England as her government appears to imagine.

"The undersigned is, in consequence directed to refer to the double proposition contained in the present note.

"If a separate negotiation and peace be the object, the armistice may be agreed to in the form in which it is proposed by the minister of his Britannic Majesty.

"If joint negotiation and a general peace be the object, the armistice must be stipulated in the manner in which it is proposed in the name of the French government, & it will be subsequently detailed by the undersigned.

(Signed)

"OTTO."

"Hereford street, Sept. 16, 1800.

(No. 29.) LORD GRENVILLE TO M. OTTO.

"SIR, Downing-street, Sept. 20, 1800.

"I enclose to you the answer to the last note which I have had the honour to receive from you.

"You will there observe that his Majesty is very far from thinking it proper for him to accede to the principle which is again urged in that note as the foundation of a naval armistice.

"While this fundamental difference subsists, there can be little reason to hope that any advantage could arise from discussing the details of such a measure.

"The counter-project which I have the honor to transmit to you, is considered here as going to the full extent of concession which can with any colour of reason be asked by France, or which could be admitted by this country, even in that view in which alone there can be any question of naval armistice.

"If you are authorized to make any such new proposals as shall be really consistent with those principles which form the only admissible basis for such a transaction, I am confident you will not be unwilling, in a matter of so much importance, to transmit them to me in writing.

"Should they then appear to his Majesty's government to afford any sufficient grounds for further discussion of this point, I shall very readily receive the king's commands for authorizing a proper person to converse with you on the subject of those communications.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"GRENVILLE."

(No. 30.) NOTE.

"The note enclosed in M. Otto's letter of the 16th inst. has been laid before the king.

"His Majesty has not seen in that paper any fresh suggestions on the subject of a naval armistice which can at all vary the answer transmitted to M. Otto on the 7th instant.

"Neither his Majesty's known engagements to his allies, nor his desire, so recently expressed, to contribute to the restoration of general tranquillity in Europe, will admit of his separating his interests from those of the powers with whom he is connected in the prosecution of the war: much less could he entertain the idea of consenting, for such a purpose to any naval armistice; a measure which he has already declared to be totally inapplicable to a separate discussion of the interests of Great Britain and France.

"This proposal being therefore one which the French government must have known that his Majesty could not accept, the supposed alternative professed to be offered to his Majesty's choice, amounts to nothing more than to the simple renewal of a demand already rejected. No fresh inducement is stated which should now dispose his Majesty to consent to these conditions of armistice for joint negotiation which he had before considered as wholly inadmissible.

"From information received since the last communications on this subject took place, his Majesty has observed with equal surprize and concern, that the orders for giving notice of the termination of the Continental armistice must actually have been dispatched from Paris at the very time when the continuance of that armistice was proposed to his Majesty as the

condition and inducement for a Maritime truce. And if, in addition to this circumstance, his Majesty were to collect the present dispositions of his enemies from the terms respecting his conduct and views, with which their recent communications with his allies are filled, the conclusion must be extremely unfavourable to the existence of any disposition to conciliation.

"His Majesty is, however, still willing to waive all reference to these considerations, and to regulate his conduct by the motives which he has already explained. He still looks, therefore, to a naval armistice, on suitable conditions, as to a sacrifice which he may be induced to make in order to prevent the renewal of hostilities on the continent, and thereby to facilitate those joint negotiations for a general peace which might perhaps be accelerated by such an arrangement, although they are by no means necessarily depending on it.

"But when it is required that the extent of the sacrifice which his Majesty is to make should be regulated neither by any fair standard of equality, nor by the ordinary rules which govern such transactions; when without any reference to the interests of his own people, he is called upon to proportion his concessions to the exaggerated estimates which his enemies have formed of the benefits derived to his allies from the continental armistice; and when on such grounds as these, conditions are insisted on which even these could not warrant, it becomes necessary to state distinctly that his Majesty neither recognizes this principle, nor if he did, could agree in this application of it.

"His Majesty is not, indeed, called upon to appreciate the relative advantages which the prolongation of the continental armistice might really afford to each of the belligerent powers. But even of those circumstances which are enumerated by the French government as exclusively advantageous to Austria, many are evidently beneficial to both parties, and are so nearly to an equal extent.

"If, during the interval of repose which has already elapsed, the Austrian armies have been re-established, recruited, and reinforced, France has not been inattentive to the same measures. If the subsidies which his Majesty has furnished are applied by his ally to the formation or transport of magazines, France has appropriated to similar purposes the rigorous contributions exacted from those countries which the existence of an armistice has not exempted from that calamity. The places in the rear of the Austrian army may have been repaired, but the position of the French armies has also been strengthened, and even the blockade towns may, perhaps, suffer more from the increased length of the blockade, than they can profit by any internal measures for improving their defences.

"In various points of comparison his Majesty forbears to enter. No part of the varied successes of the continental war appear to him to entitle his enemies to presume on any ascendancy over the spirit of the Austrian armies.

"But were the assertions of the French government in these respects better grounded than his Majesty conceives them to be, the principle itself would still be inadmissible. It is impossible that his Majesty can admit that compensation is to be demanded from him for the extent of those advantages, whatever they might really be, which his ally might derive from the continuance of the armistice; yet even such compensation is in a great degree offered by his Majesty. In consenting to a naval armistice on such terms as have already been acceded to by his Majesty's part he has made considerable sacrifices, and placed within the reach of his enemies great and obvious advantages which their representation in vain endeavours to depreciate, he has thereby given to all Europe a strong pledge of his concern for the general welfare, and to his enemies a decided proof of pacific disposition.

"But to yield to the present demand would be to sacrifice those means of present defence; and those pledges of future security which have been acquired by such great and memorable efforts, and which he can never be expected to forego till the result of those negotiations, in which he has declared his readiness to concur, shall have crowned his endeavours for the happiness of his people, by the restoration of safe and honourable peace.

(Signed) "GRENVILLE."

Downing-street, Sept. 20, 1800.

(No. 31.) TRANSLATION.

"MY LORD,

London, Sept. 21, 1800.

"I received yesterday at ten o'clock at night the letter and the note which your Excellency did me the honor to address to me; and I have learnt from them with the deepest regret, that his Majesty and his Ministry are not yet disposed to accede to the principles of conciliation contained in the Note which I had the honor to transmit to you on the 16th of this month.

"It was not merely with a view to discuss those principles, but in order to propose to your excellency fresh means of reconciliation, that I felt it my duty to request, in my letter of the 16th, to have an interview with you; and I had every reason to hope that the explanations into which I should have entered would effectually have obviated the difficulties which are still opposed to the conclusion of the general Armistice.

"You desire, my Lord, that I should give you those explanations in writing. They relate to two points, which your first Note are represented as being the most important; the power of altering the positions of the squadrons of the Republic during the Armistice, and the fate of the Allies of Great Britain.

"I am authorized to consent that the French ships of the line shall not go out of the harbours where they are at present; and if his Majesty insists upon his Allies being included in the proposed Armistice, I am authorized also to consent that they should enjoy