

LETTER I.

IT has from the first establishment of your present constitution been predicted, that every occasion of serious embarrassment which should occur in the affairs of the government—every misfortune which it should experience, whether produced from its own faults or mistakes, or from other causes, would be the signal of an attempt to overthrow it, or to lay the foundation of its overthrow, by defeating the exercise of constitutional and necessary authorities. The disturbances which have recently broken out in the western counties of Pennsylvania, furnish an occasion of this sort. It remains to see whether the prediction which has been quoted, proceeded from an unfounded jealousy excited by partial differences of opinion, or was a just inference from causes inherent in the structure of our political institutions. Every virtuous man, every good citizen, and especially EVERY TRUE REPUBLICAN must fervently pray, that the issue may confound and not confirm so ill omened a prediction.

YOUR firm attachment to the government you have established cannot be doubted.

If a proof of this were wanting to animate the confidence of your public agents, it would be sufficient to remark, that as often as any attempt to counteract its measures appear, it is carefully prepared by strong professions of friendship to the government; and disavowals of any intention to injure it. This can only result from a conviction, that the government carries with it your affections;—and that an attack upon it to be successful, must veil the stroke under appearances of good will.

It is therefore very important that you should clearly discern in the present instance, the shape in which a design of turning the existing infurrection to the prejudice of the government would naturally assume. Thus guarded, you will more readily discover and more easily shun the artful snares which may be laid to entangle your feeling and your judgment, and will be the less apt to be misled from the path by which alone you can give security and permanency to the blessings you enjoy, and can avoid the incalculable mischiefs incident to a subversion of the just and necessary authority of the laws.

The design alluded to, if it shall be entertained, would not appear in an open justification of the principles or conduct of the insurgents, or in a direct dissuasion from the support of the government. These methods would produce general indignation and defeat the object. It is too absurd and shocking a position to be directly maintained, that forcible resistance by a sixtieth part of the community to the representative will of the whole, and no constitutional laws expressed by that will, and acquiesced in by the people at large, is justifiable or even excusable. It is a position too untenable and disgusting to be directly advocated—that the government ought not to be supported in exertions to establish the authority of the laws against a resistance so incapable of justification or excuse.

The adversaries of good order in every country have too great a share of cunning, too exact a knowledge of the human heart, to pursue so unpromising a cause. Those among us would take upon the present occasion one far more artful, and consequently far more dangerous.

They would unite with good citizens, and perhaps be among the loudest in condemning the disorderly conduct of the insurgents. They would agree that it is utterly unjustifiable, contrary to the vital principle of republican government, and of the most dangerous tendency—But they would at the same time, slyly add, that excise laws are pernicious things, very hostile to liberty, (or perhaps they might more smoothly hint that the government had been imprudent enough to pass laws so contrary to the genius of a free people) and they would still more cautiously hint that it is enough for those who disapprove of such laws to submit to them—too much to expect their aid in enforcing them upon others. They would be apt to intimate further, that there is reason to believe that the Executive has been to blame, sometimes by too much forbearance, encouraging the hope that laws would not be enforced, at other times in provoking violence by severe and irritating measures; and they would generally remark, with an affectation of moderation and prudence, that the case is to be lamented, but difficult to be remedied; and that a trial of force would be delicate and dangerous; that there

is no foreseeing how or where it would end; and that it is perhaps better to temporize, and by mild means to allay the ferment and afterwards to remove the cause by repealing the exceptionable laws.

They would probably also propose, by anticipation of and in concert with the views of the insurgents, plans of procrastination. They would say if force must finally be resorted to let it not be till after Congress have been consulted, who, if they think fit to persevere in continuing the laws, can make additional provision for enforcing their execution. This too, they would argue, will afford an opportunity for the public sense to be better known, which (if ascertained to be in favor of the laws) will give the government a greater assurance of success in measures of coercion.

By these means, artfully to divert your attention from the true question to be decided, to combat by prejudices against a particular system, a just sense of the criminality and danger of violent resistance to the laws; to oppose the suggestion of misconduct on the part of government to the fact of misconduct on the part of the insurgents; to foster the spirit of indolence and procrastination natural to the human mind, as an obstacle to the vigor and exertion which so alarming an attack upon the fundamental principles of public and private security demands; to distract your opinion on the course proper to be pursued, and consequently on the propriety of the measures which may be pursued. They would expect (I say) by these and similar means, equally insidious and pernicious, to abate your just indignation at the daring affront which has been offered to your authority and your zeal for the maintenance and support of the laws to prevent a competent force, if force is finally called forth, from complying with the call—and thus to leave the government of the Union in the prostrate condition of seeing the laws trampled under foot by an unprincipled combination of a small portion of the community, habitually disobedient to laws, and itself destitute of the necessary aid for vindicating their authority.

Virtuous and enlightened citizens of a now happy country! ye could not be the dupes of artifices so detestable, of a scheme so fatal; ye cannot be insensible to the destructive consequences with which it would be pregnant; ye cannot but remember that the government is YOUR own work—that those who administer it are but YOUR temporary agents; that you are called upon to support their power, BUT YOUR OWN POWER. And you will not fail to do what your rights, your best interests, your character as a people, your security as members of society conspire to demand of you.

TULLY.

Foreign Intelligence.

By the ship ACTIVE, Captain BLAIR.

LONDON, June 20.

One of the letters from Brussels, of the 23d. states, that a rumour was the circulation, that a part of the Prince of Cobourgh's army had defeated the French at Charleroi, and forced them back into their own territories; and that the allies had regained possession of all the posts they had lost: but this can hardly be credited; for no date is given, and later advices in that case, must have been able to have come direct from that quarter.

In the present juncture, it will be difficult to obtain any intelligence at all to be depended upon, from the Netherlands.

Our Readers, however, may rest assured that, if we cannot, as speedily as might be wished, receive our regular communications from that quarter, we shall at least endeavor, to guard the public against the many vague and idle rumours, to which the interruption of all regular correspondence will most probably give rise.

Earl Moira arrived at Ostend on Wednesday night last. We have not learnt that he proceeded to land his troops. It is said his orders were to land unless circumstances should make it unadvisable; and that if he found the Duke of York had retreated from Tournay, he was to proceed up the Scheldt, and land his troops at Antwerp, by which he might effect a junction with the allied armies at Ghent or Oudenarde.

It has been made subject matter of much conversation, in consequence of the late naval victory, respecting what proportion of men different ships of war carry. We believe the following is a pretty accurate statement:

First rate ships of the line, of from 100 to 120 guns, bearing an Admiral's flag, have 900 men, formerly 1000—French vessels of this force usually carry 1200; in an English first or second rate, there is usually an addition of between 20 and 50 men, if an Admiral be on board, and if a commander in chief, double that number.

Third and fourth rates which are ranked of the line, carrying 60, 64, 74 and eighty guns, have 500, 560, 630, and 700 men.

Fifth and sixth rates, that is to say, 44, 36, 32, 28, 24, and 20 gun ships,

carry 330, 300, 250, 230, 200, and 180 men, varying the number according to the weight of metal. These latter are called frigates.

Sloops and cutters, of from 8 to 18 guns, have from 40 and 50 to 100 and 120 men.

The French on board all these different descriptions of vessels carrying a greater number of sailors in the proportion as above mentioned, of about 12 to 9.

So commanding is the new light-house, erected at Wicklow, that it can be seen at a very short distance from Holyhead, near sixty miles, if the atmosphere during the night shall not be clouded with fog or mist. It is of the greatest utility to the navigation of the southern coast, but more particularly to the packets plying between this and that port.

June 28.

We yesterday stated, that one plain inference to be drawn from the very contradictory accounts from Flanders was, that the French were in such force in that quarter as to cut off all direct communication between places only a few miles asunder. This fact is now established; for the mail, which arrived last night at eleven o'clock brought no bags from either Antwerp, Ghent, or Brussels, nor from the British army. The latest advices from any of these places are of the 23d inst. and were received at Ostend, so far back as Tuesday last: so that we have no accounts subsequent to that date, nor is any thing known of the events that have taken place to the Eastward of Brussels for even some days previous to that period.

It is certain that Ypres surrendered more than a week ago, but respecting the particulars the advices are as contradictory, as for several days they were respecting the fact itself—Some of them state that the commandant had delivered up the place before he was reduced to the absolute necessity of doing so; while others, on the contrary, assert that he made a most gallant defence, and did not surrender till not only his ammunition was expended, but also all the provisions in the place consumed. It is certain, however, that the garrison were made prisoners of war; the Austrians were sent to Lille, and the regiments of Hessians to Cassel. The town has received considerable damage.

As soon as the French took possession of it, their General ordered a civic fest to be celebrated, at which all the inhabitants assisted. They dined in the open air, and afterwards danced, and sung Republican songs till the evening.

NATIONAL CONVENTION.

8 Prairial: Wednesday May 27.

A letter was read from a popular society, announcing the discovery of 600 marks of silver in a cave, belonging to an emigrant.

A decree was passed, by which a month's succour was granted to the citizens of the countries conquered by the enemy, and to such as have been sent into the interior from besieged places. This decree, however, contained a provision, by which persons of the latter description were only to be entitled to the benefit of the decree, on condition that they were good patriots and without fortunes.

A report of the situation of Geoffroi, who had been wounded by the assassin of Collot d'Herbois, was read, after which the Convention—decreed, 1st. That Geoffroi should receive a pension of 1,530 livres; 2d. That a daily account of Geoffroi's situation should be presented to the Convention; and 3d. That the examination of the assassin Admeral and the sentence passed by the Revolutionary Tribunal, should be printed and translated into all languages.

REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL.

8 Prairial—27 May.

Admeral being placed at the bar of the Revolutionary Tribunal, was questioned as to his name, age, quality, and profession. He replied, that his name was Henry Admeral, and that he was fifty years of age; that he left the place of his birth at the age of twenty-six, that he had lived, with several persons, and had been employed in the royal lottery.

President of the revolutionary tribunal. What matters did you serve?

Bertin the minister, the Abbe, his brother and the female Bellestie, his sister, emigrants.

Pres. Were you not employed by the Tyrant at the Thuilleries with the grenadiers?

I was there every time the Gen. was beat.

Pres. Where were you on the 10th of August?

At the Thuilleries, with the battalion of the Filles St. Thomas and I considered it as my duty to obey Taffin's orders.

Pres. By whom were you appointed to a situation in the lottery?

By M. de Mauzy, Chamberlain to the Emperor, whom I saw for the last time in October 1789.

Pres. Whom did you keep company with at Paris, and have you not seen Anjubeau?

I was intimate with no person; I was acquainted with those who used to be at the coffee-houses. I did see Anjubeau; I predicted to him that I should soon die, and said to him that I should die as a man.

Pres. How long ago did you see Anjubeau? On the day of my arrest.

Pres. What arms did you carry, and how long did you carry them?

A firelock given me some time ago by the Captain of my company. I had also a pair of pistols, which I bought of a hawker in the street des Petits Champs. The President observed, that hawkers never fold pistols.—Admeral made no reply to this observation.

Pres. Why did you purchase those pistols?

To execute a project which I had formed.

Pres. What was this project?

To assassinate Robespierre and Collot D'Herbois.

Pres. What attempts did you make to assassinate them?

For three days I sought an opportunity of assassinating Robespierre. Yesterday morning I went to the Rue St. Honore, near Robespierre's house, and asked a fruiterer at what hour Robespierre went to the committee. The fruiterer directed me to the end of a court, which I went into, and met a female and a volunteer with his arm in a sling. They told me, that Robespierre was busy. I then went to the committee of public safety, and waited at the door for some time, I afterwards breakfasted on the Terrace des Feuillans, from whence I proceeded to the Convention.

At the end of the sitting I retired under the porch which leads from the hall of the Convention to the place where the committee assembled, under a pretence of hearing the news, but really for the purpose of waiting for Robespierre, and of discharging a pistol at him. I saw several deputies pass whose names I asked. Not perceiving however Robespierre among them, I went to sup at Duffils.

I afterwards went home to my lodgings, at No. 4, in the Rue Favat, and formed the resolution of assassinating Collot D'Herbois.—I waited for him, and hearing him knock at the door at one o'clock in the morning, and seeing Collot's house-keeper open the door, I snatched up my pistols, and throwing myself upon Collot, snapped both of them at him, but they missed fire. I was afterwards told that one of them went off, but of this I have no recollection. I then returned to my own room with an intention of putting an end to my own existence; but having failed in this attempt, I heard the watch called, and persons coming up stairs. I called out that I would murder the first who entered. I was however secured, and conducted to the Comps de Garde.

Pres. Why did you wish to assassinate Collot D'Herbois?

Because I was urged thereto by my conscience—I repent that I failed in the execution of my design. It would, indeed, have been a brilliant exploit if I had succeeded, for I should thereby have saved the Republic, and have excited the wonder and regret of all France.

Pres. Whence did you derive those resources that enabled you to enter into expences, which your situation did not seem to afford?

From economy and the sale of my effects.

Pres. Did you not wound a citizen?

On returning to my room, I loaded my arms, opened, shut, and opened my door again, and discharged my firelock on the first person who approached.

Admeral having declared that the above examination was strictly true, signed it.

UNITED STATES.

BOSTON, August 16.

Extract of a letter from a gentleman, belonging to this town, now residing at Rotterdam, dated May 30th, 1794.

"A majority of this nation appear to have a just idea of the value of liberty, and reprobate the war now carried on against the French; but in arbitrary governments public opinion is but of little avail, provided it militates with the despot who rules; and it is not

until the people are driven to extremities that they rouse in support of their rights. How far the people in this country, and in England, are from this point, I cannot say; but it appears highly probable that a change must take place in the governments of both countries in a short time. To prevent this change in England, and effectually to put it out of the power of the people to establish their rights, the British ministry think best to adopt the most rigorous measures. In pursuance of this plan they have lately caused the British Parliament to suspend the Habeas Corpus act; therefore imprisonment at least must be the lot of him, who will dare to say in England, that they have not the best of governments, or that there is any need of reform. O, Britannia! are these thy sons whom THOMSON, filed

"The dread of tyrants, and the sole resource
"Of those that under grim oppression groan."

"About two days ago I was informed of the Embargo, laid by Congress on all vessels destined for a foreign port, and of the general dissatisfaction that prevailed in America, in consequence of so many of our vessels being captured by the English.—At the time I last wrote you, I apprehended something of this kind, and supposing that remonstrances from Congress would soon arrive in England, I was fearful they would come at a time when the combined powers had met with some success; and was therefore of opinion they would be very little attended to; Be assured every thing will depend on such circumstances, for it is not reason, but power, which now rules England, and if they thought France could be conquered, the King of Great Britain, and his ministers would be glad of a war with America, at whose increasing strength they look with a jealous eye;—But happily for us the French nation are sufficiently formidable to contend against all their enemies. Since I last wrote you, the affairs of the Combined Powers wear a gloomy aspect—many bloody engagements have taken place, and in most of which victory has decided, as the ought, in favour of liberty and courage, against despotism and discipline. The defeats of General Clairfait on the 11th, and the Duke of York on the 18th inst. were particularly disastrous to them; both their armies were totally routed and put to flight, with immense loss in men, artillery, and baggage. In the account of the engagement which took place on the 26th of April, the English took notice only of the centre of the attack, where according to the plan of the famous Gen Mack, the allies had concentrated their whole force, and by which means the French were worsted in that part, and Landrecy was taken; but for this advantage the combined powers paid very dear; on both flanks the French were completely victorious, their left wing taking Courtray and Menin, and the right penetrating to Charleroi, and seizing an immense quantity of cattle, forage and provisions, at the same time the army of the Ardennes formed a junction with that of the North, which, previous to that, was more than 200,000 strong; and now forms a force that one would suppose must be irresistible.

"Indeed, from every appearance, it does not require a profound politician to say in whose favor the present campaign will terminate, and any one who has lately been in France, and knows the exertions and resources of that wonderful nation, must think the plan of conquering them as wild & quixotic as that of the Crusades in the 11th century. If the Allied powers could not penetrate into France last year, when their forces were equal to the French, when Lyons and the whole department of La Vendee was in open rebellion, and Toulon in the possession of the English, I would ask if there be now any probability of their succeeding in such an attempt—Toulon being reconquered, the internal rebellion nearly crushed, and the French having in the field more than a million of men, most of which are from 18 to 25, and enthusiasts in the cause which they are engaged in.—But the Combined Powers now pretend they have hopes of conquering France by famine—setting aside the danger of attempting to starve twenty five millions of people, I am convinced their hopes on that score are as ill-grounded as their others. It is true, a scarce city of provisions is felt in many parts of France, particularly the Southern—but in the North they have plenty of wheat to last until they gather in their harvest, which promises to be a very abundant one; as the country (at least what I have seen of it) was never in a higher state of cultivation than at present.

"In thus expressing my opinion of the absurd attempt of the combined powers, I would not for a moment, be supposed to justify every thing the French have done. On the contrary, I have felt extremely hurt at some of their proceedings; and I am sensible at this moment there is more arbitrary power exercised in France, than in any part of Europe; but when it is considered