The Morning Post.

L. HARPER, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.

PITTSBURGH:
SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 6.

THE VOICE OF PENNSYLVANIA!

FOR PRESIDENT,

JAMES BUCHANAN,

Subject to the decision of the National Convention.

DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL TICKET.

SENATORIAL ELECTORS.
William Bigler, of Clearfield.
David D. Wagener, of Northampton.

REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORS.

I.	Henry L. Benner, Philadelphia	County.
II.	Horn R. Kneass, do	City.
III.	Isaac Shunk, do	County.
IV.	A. L. Roumfort, do	do
V.	Jacob S. Yost, Montgomery	do
VI.	Robert E. Wright, Lehigh	do
VII.	William W. Downing, Chester	do
VIII.	Henry Haldeman, Lancaster	do
IX.	Peter Kline, Berks	do
X.	Bernard S. Schoonover, Monroe	do
XI.	Wm. Swetland, Wyoming	do
XII.	Jonah Brewster, Tioga	do
XIII.	John C. King, Clinton	do
XIV.	John Weidman, Lebanon	do
XV.	Robert J. Fisher, York	do
XVI.	Frederick Smith, Franklin	do
XVII.	John Criswell, Huntingdon	do
XVIII.	Charles A. Black, Greene	do
XIX.	George W. Bowman, Bedford	do
XX.	John R. Shannon, Beaver	do
XXI.	George P. Hamilton, Allegheny	do
XXII.	W. H. Davis, Crawford	do
XXIII.	Timothy Ives, Potter	do
XXIV.	James G. Campbell, Butler	do

FOR CANAL COMMISSIONER,

ISRAEL PAINTER,

Of Westmoreland County.

IN THIS PAPER, THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TREATIES, RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS, &c., ARE PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY.

Morning Post Job Printing Office,
CORNER OF WOOD AND FIFTH STREETS.
☞ See advertisement on the first page.

☞ *Advertisers are requested to hand in their favors before 4 o'clock, P. M. This must be complied with, in order to insure an insertion. When it is possible, an earlier hour would be preferred.*

☞ E. W. CARR, United States Newspaper Agency Sun Buildings, N. E. corner of Third and Dock streets, and 400 North Fourth street—is our only authorised Agent in Philadelphia.

☞ Single copies of the Morning Post, may be had at the Store of George M. Brislin & Co., N. E. corner of the Diamond and Ohio street, Allegheny City. Advertisements left there before 5 P. M. will be inserted the next day.

☞ A large number of Advertisements, new and old, have been crowded out of to-day's paper. We shall make all right hereafter.

☞ Several annoying errors, occurred in our Bank Note Table, as published in yesterday's paper. The List, as published this morning, will be found correct.

☞ The Order for the Funeral Honors in behalf of Com. Barney, Lieut. Parker, and S. D. Sewell, will appear in Monday's paper.

Rev. C. B. Parsons.—We understand that this gentleman—formerly an actor of fame, and Manager of the Pittsburgh Theatre for one season—who is now a Methodist Preacher, located in Louisville, is in this city, attending the sittings of the Conference.

☞ The alarm of fire yesterday was false. We noticed an Engine called the "Clipper." Where did it come from? Another like it, and the town would be secure!

MR. MARCY'S LETTER.

We insert, to-day, to the exclusion of other matter, the able Letter of the Secretary of War, in reply to a letter from General Scott, dated in Mexico on the 24th of February last. This letter, we are sure, will be read with interest by every friend of the Administration, throughout the country. It is a full, frank, fair and manly defence of the President and Secretary of War, against all the petty attacks which have been made upon them by their opponents, on account of the state of our affairs, from time to time, in Mexico: and certainly places Gen. Scott in no enviable position.

In consequence of the unqualified bravery which he has displayed throughout life; his long and faithful service in the army; and the unbending love of country always evinced by him; we have felt reluctant, at any time, to utter a word, that could be even unfairly construed into a disparagement of his merits, and his character as a man and an officer; but the position in which General Scott has placed himself, (by his course from the early part of 1846, up to the date mentioned,) is such as he could not have occupied by any act of *his enemies*, even admitting that there are those connected with the general administration who stand in that relation to him; which we deny. He has manifested, from the very beginning of his "hasty plate of soup" correspondence, a testiness, petty jealousy, and regard for the merest trifles, altogether beneath the exalted position of a veteran commander; and has magnified into personal hostilities, acts of the administration, which none but a quarrelsome old woman would ever have thought of a second time; and which only such a one would have referred to.

It is with profound regret we feel called on to write thus, of one for whom we had ever felt genuine respect—of whom, from childhood, we had ever entertained the most exalted opinion—until the commencement of the war with Mexico showed him to possess traits of character unknown to any truly great, magnanimous and noble mind. But, because Gen. Scott has served his country faithfully, we are not bound to magnify his foibles—the littleness he has displayed—into virtue; nor to condemn officers whose patriotism stands as unquestioned as his, merely to gratify his whims, or through fear of offending his friends. There are men still in the country as indispensable to her prosperity as Gen. Scott can ever be; and while we would not do him any injustice, we are equally unwilling that they shall be unjustly assailed by him and his especial *political* friends, merely because, by a possibility, they may be called on to vote for his elevation to a higher office than that which he now occupies.

We insert this letter as an off-set to that of Gen. Scott, which was given by our neighbors of the Gazette, a few days since. Had they been disposed to publish the Letter of Secretary Marcy, we would have presented to our readers that of Gen. Scott also: but they declined doing this; and we therefore give the letter of Mr. Marcy alone. We would remark, however, that a full idea of the letter of Gen. Scott is to be obtained from the letter of the Secretary of War.

Mr. Marcy's Letter.

War Department,
Washington, April 21, 1848.

Sir: It would not be respectful to you to pass unnoticed your extraordinary letter of the 24th of February, nor just to myself to permit it to remain unanswered on the files of this department.

To attempt to dispel the delusions which you seem to have long pertinaciously cherished, and to correct the errors into which you have fallen, devolves upon me a duty which I must not decline; but, in preforming it, I mean to be as cautious, as you profess to have been, to abstain from any "wanton discourtesy;" and I hope to be alike successful. Your prudent respect for the "5th article of war" has induced you to hold me ostensibly responsible for many things which you are aware are not fairly chargeable to me. The device you have adopted to assail the President, by aiming your blows at the Secretary of War, does more credit to your ingenuity as an accuser, than to your character as a soldier.—A premeditated contrivance to avoid responsibility does not indicate an intention not to do wrong.

The general aspect of your letter discloses an evident design to create a belief that you were drawn forth from your quiet position, in a bureau of this department, and assigned to the command of our armies in Mexico, for the purpose of being sacrificed; and that to accomplish this end, "neglects, disappointments, injuries, and rebukes" were inflicted" on you, and the necessary means of prosecuting the war with success withheld; or, in other words, the government, after preferring you to any other of the gallant generals within the range of its choice, had labored to frustrate its own plans, to bring defeat upon its own armies, and involve itself in ruin and disgrace, for an object so unimportant in its bearing upon public affairs. A charge so entirely preposterous, so utterly repugnant to all the probabilities of human conduct, calls for no refutation.

For other purposes than to combat this fondly-cherished chimera, it is proper that I should notice some of your specific allegations.

It is true that, after you were designated for the chief command of our armies, the President was desirous that your departure should not be unnecessarily delayed; but you were not restricted, as you allege, to "only four days" to make the necessary preparations at Washington. You were not ordered away until you had reported that these preparations were so far completed that your presence here was no longer required. Then, instead of going directly to Mexico, you were permitted, at your own request, to take a circuitous route through New York, and there to remain a few days. You staid at New York nearly an entire week; and not until the 19th of December, (twenty six days after leaving Washington,) did you reach New Orleans, where you would have arrived in seven days if you had been required to take the direct route. This solicited indulgence, by which your arrival at New Orleans was delayed nearly three weeks, is incompatible with your allegation that you were allowed "only four days at Washington, where twenty might have been most advantageously employed." This complaint has relation to facts within your own knowledge; error, therefore, is hardly reconcilable with any solicitude to be accurate. As this is your opening charge against the War Department, and may be regarded as indicative of those which follow, I shall make the refutation of it still more complete, for the purpose of showing with what recklessness you have preformed the functions of an accuser, and how little reliance, in the present state of your feelings, can be placed on your memory. You are the witness by whom your allegation is to be disproved. On the day of your departure from Washington, you left with me a paper *in your own handwriting*, dated November 23, 1846, with the following heading:

"Notes suggesting topics to be embraced in the Secretary's instructions to General S., drawn up (in haste) at the request of the former.

From that paper I extract the following paragraph: "I (the Secretary of War) am pleased to learn from you (General Scott) that you have in a very few days already through the general staff of the army here, laid a sufficient basis for the purposes with which you are charged, and *that you now think it best to proceed at once to the southwest*, in order to organize the largest number of troops that can be obtained in time for that most important expedition"—(the expedition against Vera Cruz.)

Here is your own most explicit admission that you represented to the Secretary of War, before leaving Washington, that arrangements were so far completed, that *you thought it best to proceed at once* to the army in Mexico; and yet you make it your opening charge against the department, that you were forced away to Mexico before you had time for necessary preparations.

I present the next charge in your own language: "I handed to you a written request that one of three of our accomplished captains, therein named, might be appointed assistant adjutant general, with the rank of major, for duty with me in the field, and there *was* a vacancy, at the time, for one. My request has never been attended to; and thus I have had no officer of the Adjutant General's Department with me in the campaign. Can another instance be cited of denying to a general-in-chief, in the field at the head of a large army—or even a small one—the selection of his chief of the staff—that is, the chief in the department of orders and correspondence?"

Were the case precisely as you have stated it to be, you have given too much prominence, as a matter of complaint, to the President's refusal to be controlled, in his exercise of the appointing power, by your wishes. Had there been a vacancy such as you mention for "one of the accomplished captains" you named, no one knows better than you do that your request could not have been acceded to without departing from the uniform rule of selection for staff appointments, without violating the right of several officers to regular promotion, and offering an indignity to all those who held the position of assistant adjutants general, with the rank of captain.—The rule of regular promotion in the staff is as inflexible, and has been as uniformly observed, as that in the line. It must appear surprising that you, who were so deeply "shocked and distressed" at the suggestion of appointing, by authority of Congress, a "*citizen* lieutenant general," or vesting the President with power to devolve the command of the army on a major general without regard to priority in the date of his commission, should, in your first request, after being assigned to command, ask the President to disregard the rights of at least four officers as meritorious as "the three accomplished captains" named by you. The President's views on this subject undoubtedly differ from yours. His regard for the rights of officers is not graduated by their rank. Those of captains and major generals have equal value in his estimation, and an equal claim to his respect and protection. I cannot admit that it is a just ground of censure and rebuke against the "head of the War Department" that the President did not see fit, in order to gratify your feelings of favoritism, to disregard the claims and violate the rights of all the assistant adjutants general of the rank of captain then in commission.

But, so far as it is made a ground of complaint and reproof, this is not the worst aspect of the case. You are entirely mistaken in the assertion that there was then a vacancy in the adjutant general's staff, with the rank of major, to which either of the captains recommended by you could have been properly appointed. There was no such vacancy. To show the correctness of this statement, and to demonstrate your error, I appeal to the Army Register and the records of the Adjutant General's Office.—Your mistake as to an obvious fact, lying within the range of matters with which you are presumed to be familiar, has excited less surprise than the declaration, that by the non compliance with your request, you "have had no "officer of the Adjutant General's Department with me" [you] in the campaign." Every officer of that department—at least eight—was, as you well knew, subject to your command. When you arrived in Mexico, there were with the army at least five assistant adjutants general, all at your service. That you chose to employ none of them at your headquarters, and detached from other appropriate duties an officer to act as an assistant adjutant general, may well be regarded as a slight to the whole of that staff then with you in Mexico, and a cause of complaint; but certainly not a complaint to emanate from you against the War Department. Willing as I am to presume, though unable to conceive, that circumstances justified you in passing over all the assistant adjutants general then with the army, and in selecting an officer of the line to perform the duties of adjutant general at your headquarters, I was much surprised to learn from you that, when General Worth sent to you one of these "accomplished captains," the first on your list, under the belief that you desired his services as an acting assistant adjutant general, you declined to employ him in that capacity; and I am still more surprised to perceive that you have made it a distinct ground of charge in your arraignment of the War Department, that you were not permitted to have him as an assistant adjutant general at your headquarters. Had you selected him instead of another, as you might have done, you would have been bereft of all pretext for complaint. Though there was no vacancy in the Adjutant General's staff of the grade of major, for which only you recommended the "accomplished captains;" and to which, only, they were properly eligible; there was a vacancy in it of the rank of captain. For this position you recommended an officer in General Wool's staff, then on the Chihuahua expedition. This officer was subsequently appointed assistant adjutant general with the rank of captain, as you desired, and has ever since been at the headquarters of that general.—Thus it will be perceived that your request, so far as it was proper and reasonable, was actually complied with.

The next specification in the catalogue of charges preferred against me, is that a court-martial was not instituted by the President for the trial of General Marshall and Captain Montgomery on your charges against them. The offences imputed to them were certainly not of an aggravated character. The one, as was alleged, had been incautious in relation to a certain despatch under circumstances that might admit of its coming to the knowledge of the enemy, and the other had not carried a despatch with as much expedition as you thought he might have done. As one was a general officer, a court to try him must have been composed of officers of high rank. Before the order for assembling it could have reached Mexico, it was foreseen that your command would be at Vera Cruz, and probably engaged in active siege of that city. Officers could not, therefore, have been then sent from your column to Monterey or the Rio Grande, (where the court must have been held,) without great detriment to the public service. Had you been deprived of several officers of high rank at that critical period by order of the President, it would have afforded a better pretence of complaint than any one in your extended catalogue. Had the court been composed of officers taken from General Taylor's command, it would still further have weakened his condition, already weak in consequence of the very large force you had withdrawn from him. Subsequent events have proved that it was most fortunate the President did not comply with your request, for had he done so, some of the officers highest in rank, and most conspicuous at Buena Vista, might, at that critical conjuncture, have been separated from their commands, and engaged on a court at a distance from that glorious scene of action. It is not fanciful to suppose that their absence might have changed the fortune of that eventful day; and that, instead of rejoicing, as we now do, in a triumphant victory—among the most brilliant in the whole course of the war—we might have had to lament a most disastrous defeat, and the almost total loss of the whole force you had left to sustain that frontier. No man has more reason to rejoice than you that no order came from Washington, though requested by you, which would have further impaired the efficiency of General Taylor's command in the crisis that then awaited him.

My letter of the 22d February, conveying the President's views in regard to your order depriving Colonel Harney of his appropriate command, is severely arraigned by you as offensive, both in manner and matter.

The facts in relation to this case of alleged grievance are now before the public, and a brief allusion to them will place the transaction in its true light. Under your orders Colonel Harney had brought seven companies of his regiment—the 2d dragoons—from Monterey to the Brazos, to be under your immediate command; and two others—being all of the regiment in Mexico—were expected to follow within a few days. In the midst of his high hopes and ardent desire for active service, you took from him the command of his own regiment, devolved it on one of his junior officers, and ordered him back to General Taylor's line to look for what was not inappropriately denominated "an imaginary command." Outraged in his feelings and injured in his rights, he respectfully remonstrated; his appeal to your sense of justice was unavailing. Neither to this gallant officer nor to the President, did you assign any sufficient or even plausible reason for this extraordinary proceeding. The whole army, I believe, and the whole country, when the transaction became known, entertained but one opinion on the subject—and that was, that you had inflicted an injury and an outrage upon a brave and meritorious officer. Such an act—almost the first of your assuming command—boded disastrous consequences to the public service, and devolved upon the President the duty of interposing to protect the injured officer. This interposition you have made grave matter of accusation against the head of the War Department, and have characterized it as a censure and a rebuke. It may imply both, and still, being merited, may leave you without a pretence for complaint. The President, after alluding to his duty, to sustain the rights of the officers under your command, as well as your own rights, informed you that he did not discover in the case, as you had presented it, sufficient cause for such an order; that, in his opinion, Col. Harney had a just cause to complain; and that he hoped the matter had been reconsidered by you, and the Colonel restored to his appropriate command. Your own subsequent course in this case demonstrates the unreasonableness of your complaint, and vindicates the correctness of the President's proceedings. You had really rebuked and censured your own conduct; for even before you had received the President's views, you had, as he hoped you would, reconsidered the matter, become convinced of your error, reversed your own order, and restored Col. Harney to his command; thus giving the strongest evidence in favor of the propriety and correctness of all the President had done in the case. I give you too much credit for steadiness of purpose, to suspect that you retraced your steps from mere caprice, or for any other cause than a conviction you had fallen into error. After the matter had thus terminated, it appears unaccountable to me that you, who above all others should wish it to pass into oblivion, have again called attention to it, by making it an item in your arraignment of the War Department.

You struggle in vain to vindicate your course in this case, by referring to your own acts in the campaign of 1844. You then sent away, as you allege, against their wishes, "three senior field officers of as "many regiments who were *infirm, uninstructed*, "and *inefficient*, in favor of three juniors, and with "the subsequent approbation of Major General "Brown, and the head of the War Department." This precedent does not, in my judgment, change the aspect of the present case. Colonel Harney was not "infirm, uninstructed, and inefficient;" you did not assign, and, in deference to the known opinion of the army and country, you did not venture to assign, that reason for deposing him. I do not understand the force of your logical deduction, that because you, on a former occasion, had deprived officers under you of their commands for good and sufficient reasons, with subsequent approval, you may now and at any time, do the same thing without any reason whatever; and if the President interposes to correct the procedure, you have a just cause to complain of an indignity, and a right to arraign the War Department.

As your animadversion upon the tone of my letter is probably not a blow aimed at a much more conspicuous object, to be reached through me, I ought, perhaps to pass it without notice. On revision of that letter, I cannot perceive that it is not entirely respectful in manner and language. The views of the President are therein confidently expressed, because they were confidently entertained. It seems to be admitted by you, that "if dictated to the greenest general of the recent appointments," the letter would not have been exceptionable. I was not aware that it was my duty to modify and graduate my style, so as to meet, according to your fastidious views, the various degrees of greenness and ripeness of the generals to whom I am required to convey the orders of the President; and for any such defect in my official communications I have no apology to offer.

In the same letter wherein you complain of being censured for your course in relation to Col. Harney, you say: "I am now rebuked for the unavoidable—"nay, wise, if it had not been unavoidable—release, "on parole, of the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo, "even before one word of commendation from gov"ernment had reached this army on account of its "gallant conduct in the capture of those prisoners." Accident alone—not any oversight or neglect on my part—has given you the apparent advantage of the aggravation which you have artfully thrown into this charge. My letter commending yourself and the gallant army under your command for the glorious achievement at Cerro Gordo, was written and sent to you on the 19th of May—eleven days before that which you are pleased to consider as containing a rebuke.

But I meet the main charge with a positive denial. You were never rebuked for discharging the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo. This issue can be tried by the record. All that was ever said on the subject is contained in the following extract from my letter of the 31st of May:

"Your course hitherto, in relation to prisoners of war, both men and officers, in discharging them on parole, has been liberal and kind; but whether it ought to be still longer continued, or in some respects changed, has been under the consideration of the President, and he has directed me to communicate to you his views on the subject. He is not unaware of the great embarrassment their detention, or the sending of them to the United States, would occasion, but, so far as relates to the officers, he thinks they should be detained until duly exchanged. In that case, it will probably be found expedient to send them, or most of them to the United States.—You will not, therefore, except for special reasons in particular cases, discharge the officers who may be taken prisoners, but detain them with you, or send them to the United States, as you shall deem most expedient."

If I understand the force of terms, there is nothing in this language which by fair interpretation, can be made to express or imply a rebuke. I cannot conceive that any mind, other than one of a diseased sensitiveness, over anxious to discover causes for complaint and accusation, could imagine that anything like a rebuke was contained in this extract; yet on this substantial basis alone rests the charge, over and over again presented, that you were rebuked by the War Department for discharging the prisoners captured at Cerro Gordo. If, in a case where it was so easy to be right, and so difficult to get wrong, you could fall into such an obvious mistake, what may not be expected from you in other matters where your perverted feelings have a freer and a wilder range?

Before considering your complaints for not having been supplied with sufficient means of transportation for the expedition against Vera Cruz, I will notice your "four memorials to the War Department, in which you demonstrated, as you state, that "Vera "Cruz was the true basis of operations, and that the "enemy's capital could not probably be reached "from the Rio Grande."

I cannot discover the pertinacity of your allusion to these four memorials, except it be to put forth a claim to the merit of originating the expedition against Vera Cruz, and of being the first to discover that the most practicable route to the city of Mexico was from that point on the gulf; but your known abhorrence for a "purity of fame not earned," ought to shield you from the suspicion of such an infirmity.

I am sure you are not ignorant of the fact—but if you are, it is nevertheless true—that the expedition against Vera Cruz had been for some time under consideration; that great pains had been taken to get information as to the defences of the city, the strength of the castle, and the difficulties which would attend the debarcation of troops; that maps had been procured and carefully examined; that persons who had resided there, and officers of the army and navy, had been consulted on the subject, and the enterprise actually resolved on before the date of your first memoir, and before you were thought of to conduct it.

As early as the 9th of July, 1846, within two months after the declaration of war, and before the main body of troops raised for its prosecution had reached the scene of operations, considerate attention had been given to that subject. On that day, a letter from this department to General Taylor thus alluded to a movement from Vera Cruz into the interior of the enemy's country:

"If, from all the information which you may communicate to this department, as well as that derived from other sources, it should appear that the difficulties and obstacles to the conducting a campaign from the Rio Grande, the present base of your operations, for any considerable distance into the interior of Mexico, will be very great, the department will consider whether the main invasion should not ultimately take place from some point on the coast—say *Tampico*, or some other point in the vicinity of *Vera Cruz*. This suggestion is made with a view to call your attention to it, and to obtain from you such information as you may be able to impart. Should it be determined that the main army should invade Mexico at some other point than the Rio Grande—say the vicinity of *Vera Cruz*—a large and sufficient number of transport vessels could be placed at the mouth of the Rio Grande by the time the healthy season sets in—say early in November. The main army, with all its munitions, could be transported leaving a sufficient force behind to hold and occupy the Rio Grande, and all the towns and provinces which you may have conquered before that time. In the event of such being the plan of operations, your opinion is desired as to what increased force, if any, will be required to carry it out with success. We learn that the army could be disembarked a few miles distant from *Vera Cruz*, and readily invest the town in its rear, without coming within the range of the guns of the fortress of San Juan d'Ulloa. The town could be readily taken by land, while the fortress, being invested by land and sea, and all communications cut off, must soon fall. From *Vera Cruz* to the city of Mexico there is a fine road, upon which the diligences or stage coaches run daily. The distance from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico is not more than one-third of that from the Rio Grande to the city of Mexico."

The subject was again brought into view on the 13th of October, in the same year, and more particularly on the 22d of October, in letters addressed to General Taylor. At the last date, the plan had been so far matured, that several officers of the staff and line were indicated for that service. This was nearly a month before it was determined to employ you with the army in any part of Mexico.

It was never contemplated here to strike at the city of Mexico from the line occupied by General Taylor, or through any other except that from Vera Cruz. If the war was to be pushed to that extent, it required no elaborate demonstration—no profound military talents—nothing more than common sagacity and very slight reflection on the subject to see the propriety and the necessity of making Vera Cruz the base of military operations.

An alleged deficiency of means to transport the troops in the expedition to Vera Cruz seems to be most prominently presented, and most confidently relied on to sustain your charge against the War Department for neglecting this branch of its duties.

I issued, it seems to be admitted, the proper order, so far as the means of transportation were to be drawn from the north; but the allegation is that it was issued too late, and was never executed. It was issued at least four days before your arrival at New Orleans, on your way to the army. If promptly executed, it was a reasonable calculation that the "ten vessels," alluded to in your letter, would have arrived in season to receive the troops as soon as you could collect them from their remote and scattered positions in the interior of Mexico, bring them to the seacoast, and prepare for their embarcation. Whether an order for ships to be sent out in ballast, issued the 15th December, was or was not in season for the service they were designed for, depends upon the time when the expedition could be got ready to sail. To determine this, a regard must be paid to what you required to be done preparatory to the expedition, rather than to what you may have said on that subject.

A reference to two or three of your requisitions will show that no rational hope could be entertained that the expedition would set forth before the middle or the last of February. You required as one item of the outfit, one hundred and forty surf-boats—all to be constructed after you left Washington. Though the department urged a less number, you insisted on all. You estimated the expense of each at $200; and thought, by putting the principal ship-yards on the Atlantic coast in requisition, they might be constructed by the 1st of January. To show what reliance was to be placed on your calculation, I refer to the fact that, though due regard to economy was had in procuring these boats, each cost on an average $950—nearly five-fold your estimate. Conceding that you erred much less as to the time within which they could be constructed—any more, admitting they could have been ready by the 1st of January—and sooner you did not expect they could be made—by no reasonable calculation could they have reached the coast of Mexico before the 1st of February. The expedition could not go forth without them. In your letter to me dated the 28th February, off Lobos, you state that but a small part of the transports engaged at New Orleans, under your orders of the 28th December, &c., had arrived, and "*not one of the ten* ordered by your (my) memoran"dum of the 15th of that month, *and the whole were* "*due at the Brazos on the 15th January.*" Having thus shown, by your own opinion, that under my order "the ten vessels" ought to have been at the Brazos *at least fifteen days before the expedition could have been ready to sail*, I have vindicated myself from your charge of having neglected my duty in issuing that order at an earlier date. If issued earlier, it would have involved a largely increased expenditure for demurrage, and resulted in no public benefit.

But the graver part of this charge is, that none of these "ten vessels" ever arrived. "Relying (you "say in the letter now under consideration) upon "them (the ten vessels) confidently, the embarca"tion was delayed in whole or in part at the Brazos "and Tampico, from the 15th of January to the 9th "of March, leaving, it was feared, not half the time "needed for the reduction of Vera Cruz and its cas"tle before the return of the yellow fever." To whomsoever the calamitous consequences of the non arrival of these "ten vessels," and your "cruel disappointment" in relation to them, are imputable, he has certainly involved himself in a serious responsibility. I hope to remove the whole of it from "the head of the War Department," and entertain some apprehensions that it will fall in part upon the commanding general of the expedition.

The execution of the whole of the most difficult branch of duties appertaining to a military expedition—providing for transportation—is, by the distribution of the business in the War Department, allotted to the Quartermaster General. As an expedition against Vera Cruz had been resolved on some time before you were assigned to take command of it, General Jesup had gone to New Orleans to be in the best position to make the necessary preparations for such an enterprise. From his great knowledge and long experience in military affairs, not only in his appropriate department, but as a commander in the field, the government thought it fortunate that you could have the advice and assistance of so able a counsellor.

Your suggestion that it might be necessary to send ships in ballast from the north for transports was not neglected or unheeded by me. Whether it would be necessary or not, depended, according to your statement to me, upon the means of transportation which could be procured at New Orleans, &c. My first step was to write to the Quartermaster General, then at that place, for information on that subject. In my letter to him of the 11th December I said:

"It is expected that most of the vessels in the service of the quartermaster's department can be used as transports for the expedition. It will be necessary that the department here should know what portion of the transportation can be furnished by the ordinary means which the quartermaster's department has now under its control for the purposes of its expedition. I have to request that information on this point should be furnished without delay.

"Another point on which the department desires information is, what amount of means of transportation for such an expedition can be furnished at New Orleans, Mobile, and in that quarter.

"The expense of procuring transports from the Atlantic cities will be exorbitant. Freight is very high, and most of the good vessels are engaged for the ordinary purposes of commerce."

It is important to bear in mind that you saw this letter on your first arrival at New Orleans. In writing to me from that place, December 21, you observe: "I have seen your letter (in the hands of Lieut. Col. "Hunt) to the Quartermaster General, dated the 11th" You could not mistake its object, because it was clearly expressed. I asked distinctly, what means of transportation for the expedition could be furnished at New Orleans, &c., and referred to the expenses and difficulty of procuring transports from the Atlantic cities. You could not, therefore, but know that my course as to sending ships in ballast from the north would be regulated by the Quartermaster General's reply. While waiting for this information, and in order to prevent delay, and be sure not to deserve the imputation you now cast upon me, I issued the order on the 15th December, to which you refer, knowing that it could be modified and conformed to the exigencies of the service, according to the answer which I should receive from Gen. Jesup. His reply is dated the 27th of December, and in it he says:

"*Transportation can be provided here for all the* "*troops that may be drawn from the army under the* "*command of Gen. Taylor*, and for all the ordnance, "ordnance stores, and other supplies, which may be "drawn either from this depot (the Brazos) or from "New Orleans. The public transports—I mean those "owned by the United States—that can be spared for "the contemplated operations, it is estimated, will "carry three thousand men with all their supplies. "*Vessels can be chartered on favorable terms for any* "*additional transportation required.*" This letter was submitted to, and read by, you, as appears from your endorsement thereon.

And referring to some other matters in the letter, you conclude your endorsement as follows: "I recommend that Brevet Major General Jesup's suggestions be adopted." This fact shows that the letter received your particular attention. When this letter, (which you knew was forwarded to the department) was here received—showing that your apprehended difficulty in obtaining sufficient transportion at the south was unfounded, and that it could be provided in that quarter in great abundance on favorable terms—my order of the 15th December, so far, and only so far as related to sending out vessels in ballast, was countermanded. It is strange, indeed, that, after you were made acquainted with the object of my enquiries, and Gen. Jesup's letter in reply to them, you should have looked for transport vessels in ballast from the Atlantic cities; and still more strange that their non-arrival should be the proof you rely on to convict me of having neglected my duty in this instance. If, in truth, you delayed the expedition nearly two months for these transports, I am blameless. The responsibility is in another quarter. It cannot be said that this statement as to the sufficiency of transports to be obtained at the south had an implied reference to what I had ordered from the Atlantic cities, for my order was then unknown to yourself and the Quartermaster General. You first received a copy of it several days after the date of Gen. Jesup's letter to me, and of your endorsement thereon. [See your letter to me of the 12th of January.] Resisted as you were by head winds, enveloped in "frightful northers," and oppressed with complicated and perplexing duties in arranging and preparing the expedition against Vera Cruz, some temporary bewilderment may be excused; but to charge the War Department with your own misapprehensions and mistakes, is inexcusable.

My reply to your accusations forces me to expose some of your misstatements of fact. You allege that the expedition, for the want of "ten vessels," was delayed from the *15th of January* to the 19th of March. You certainly mean to be understood that on the 15th of January your troops were ready to embark, and were delayed for want of these transports. But this was not so; and I am indebted to you for most abundant proof to establish your inaccuracy. The great body of your troops for the expedition was drawn from Gen. Taylor's command at Monterey and in the interior of Mexico; and no part of them had either reached the Brazos or Tampico—the points of embarkation—on the 15th of January. In your letter of the 12th of that month to Gen. Brooke, at New Orleans, you said: "I have now "to state that it is probable the troops I have called "for from Gen. Taylor's immediate command to "embark here (the Brazos) and at Tampico, will "not reach those points, till late in the present "month, (January,) say about the 25th." In a letter to me of the 26th of January, you remark that Gen. Butler responded to your call for the troops with the utmost promptitude, and that Gen. Worth made an admirable movement. "The head of his "division arrived with him at the mouth of the Rio "Grande the day before yesterday." (24th January.) When the remainder came up, is not stated; yet one of your "naked historical facts" places the whole command at the points of embarcation waiting for the "ten vessels" at least nine days before the actual arrival of any part of them. But if they had been there, why should they have been detained for these vessels? In the same letter—written but two days after the arrival of the head of the first division, and probably before the other troops had come up—you say that "the Quartermaster General, (Brevet "Major General Jesup, at New Orleans,) I find, has "taken all proper measures, with judgment and "promptitude, to provide everything depending on "his department for the despatch and success of "my expedition." If more was wanted, cumulative proof might be drawn from the same source—your own correspondence—to show not only that this charge against me has no foundation in truth, but that you can have no apology for having preferred it.

After showing how unfortunate you have been in your specific charges, I may with propriety meet those of a general and sweeping character with a less particular detail of proofs to show their groundlessness.

Though the "ten vessels" were not, for the very sufficient reasons I have assigned, sent out in ballast from the Atlantic cities, yet a very large number were sent thence with stores, supplies, and troops, to co-operate in the expedition.

In General Jesup's letter to me of the 17th inst., a copy of which is sent herewith, he states that fifty-three ships, barques, brigs, and schooners, were sent from the north, and the department actually furnished at New Orleans, Brazos, and Tampico, for the army, before it took up the line of march into the interior, one hundred and sixty-three vessels.

I have alluded to the large number of surf boats, and the great difficulty of procuring them, as the cause of the delay in their arrival. I have also a similar reason to offer in reply to your complaint for not having seasonably received the siege train and ordnance supplies. The delay is to be ascribed to the enormously large outfit you required. If it was necessary, and despatch was used in procuring it, no one is in fault. If too large, you certainly should not regard as a reprehensible delay the time necessarily taken up in preparing it. To show that it was large, and required much time to procure it, I will select from many a single item. You demanded from eighty to one hundred thousand ten-inch shells, and forty or fifty mortars of like calibre. This enormous quantity of shells, about four thousand tons, was mostly to be manufactured after you left Washington. All the furnaces in the country, willing to engage in the business, were set to work; but, with the utmost diligence and despatch, the supply of this one article, or even two-thirds of it, having to be manufactured and transported to the seaboard from the furnaces, (located in most instances in the interior of the country,) at a season of the year when water communications were obstructed by ice, could not be ready to be sent forward to you in many months after your departure from Washington.—Had your requisitions been moderate; and undoubtedly more moderate ones would have sufficed; they could have been furnished at a much earlier period. The memorandum which you left "for the siege-train and ammunition therefor," was submitted to me by the Ordnance Department, on the 26th of November, with an intimation that it could not be complied with in season for the expedition to go forward as early as you had contemplated. I endorsed upon it, "*comply with the above as far as practicable;*" and this order, I am satisfied, after full examination, was faithfully executed.

What could be done at Washington, was promptly done. You had with you the Quartermaster General, with all the means at the command of the War Department, and with unrestricted authority to do whatever you might require. He was under your supervision, and subject to your orders, able and willing to execute them. You have never intimated that he, in any respect, failed in his duty; but, on the contrary, you have spoken in highly commendatory terms of his efficient services.

I have already quoted your acknowledgment that he had taken all proper measures with judgment and promptitude to provide everything depending on his department for the despatch and success of your expedition. In an issue of fact between you and the head of the War Department, his testimony, next to your own confession, is the best that can be offered to correct your mis-statements and to refute your charges.

In his letter to me of the 2nd of January, 1847, he says: "General Scott left for the interior on the "29th ultimo, and I am taking active measures to "have everything depending upon me ready for his "operations. The quartermaster's department, I "find, is called upon to do a great deal that should "be done by other branches of the staff. So far as "General Scott's operations go, I shall have every"thing done that is necessary, whether it belongs to "my department or to other departments to do it."

You had with you, and subject to your orders, not only the Quartermaster General, but officers of the other staff departments. They did not look to the War Department, but to yourself, for directions; and it was your duty, and not mine, to see that your requirements were complied with. That they were so, to the utmost practical extent, I have no reason to doubt; but if they were not, the fault, if any, is not with the War Department. You also gave the instructions in relation to providing the means of land transportation, and the officers charged with that duty were under your immediate control; and if there is blame anywhere for any deficiency in this respect, it cannot be imputed to the War Department. Your whole correspondence with me, and the staff officers with you, shows that you very properly took upon yourself the whole charge of giving directions in this matter. In a letter to Captain Hetzel, senior quartermaster at the Brazos, speaking on the subject of the land transportation which may be needed after the descent on the enemy's coast near Vera Cruz, you say: "I have already discussed and "arranged with you the detail of the *early* land "transportation train," &c. On the 18th of March, you furnished General Jesup with your estimates and directions on this subject. The staff officers being with you, and under your orders, nothing further was, or properly could be, required or expected to emanate from Washington, beyond the supply of funds; and, this being done, if you were disappointed in not realizing your expectations, you have not a colorable pretence for imputing blame to "the head of the War Department."

As a just ground of complaint, and a matter of accusation, you refer to your deficiency of means to make the descent, and to capture the city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, and assume that the extent of that deficiency was the difference between what you received and what you required. It would be quite as correct reasoning to say, that what you had having proved sufficient to the purpose, that difference showed the extent of the errors in your estimate. The truth lies, perhaps, between the two extremes. You had less, probably, than you should have had, and you required much more than was necessary. That you did not have more, and, indeed, all you asked for, I have already shown was not the fault of the War Department.

Gen. Jesup was with you at Vera Cruz, saw your means, and is capable of forming an estimate of their sufficiency. He is, as his letter herewith shows, disposed to be just, and even generous to your fame. To his opinion on the subject, no well-founded exception can be taken. He says, in reference to your complaints on account of a deficient supply of surf-boats, siege train, and ordnance stores: "The result shows that he (General Scott) had surf-boats and stores enough!" And of the delay of which you complain, he fully exonerates the War Department, and ascribes the whole to yourself, and to unavoidable accidents. The imputation that you were *designedly* crippled in your means, is a charge as preposterous as it is unfounded.

I am aware that the execution of some of the many arrangements for the Vera Cruz expedition was obstructed and delayed by accidents, but they were such as common sagacity could not foresee, or human agency control. They were not, however, more than a considerate mind, bringing into view all the vast difficulties of the case, would have expected. When your complaints on this subject were first received here, evincing, as they did, that you intended to hold the department responsible for every untoward event, the heads of the several bureaus were called on by me to show how they had executed the duties which had been confided to them, particularly in regard to matters referred to by you. The evidence they presented of having done all that was required, or could have been expected, convinced me—and I venture to say that, on a full examination, it will satisfy any mind open to conviction—that all your complaints, so far as they imputed blame to the War Department, or any of its branches, are unfounded. It will do much more—it will show that great industry, promptness, uncommon capacity, and extraordinary exertions, in relation to everything connected with the war, have characterized the action of each of these subordinate departments. As a commendation justly merited by these several branches of the department, assailed as they are indirectly by you, I see no good reason for withholding my opinion, that an instance cannot be found where so much has been done, and well done, in so short a time, by any similar body of officers under similar circumstances.

As you have, by implication, laid a heavy hand upon the bureau which is charged with the onerous duties of executing the laws and orders for raising and sending forward the recruits and levies, I feel bound to affirm that you have done to that branch of the public service the greatest injustice. No industry has been spared—no possible effort omitted—to raise the forces which were authorized, and to send them to their destination within the briefest practicable period. The numerous orders issued from the Adjutant General's office, and its voluminous correspondence on that subject, will sustain this assertion.

You have pressed with unwonted zeal the charge in relation to diverting the detachments of the new regiments under Gen. Cadwalader's command to the Brazos; and have indulged in the wildest speculations as to the sad consequences which attended this imputed error. Assuming that my orders diverted these troops, or any others; (an assertion which I shall controvert hereafter,) the circumstances justified the measure. The critical condition of Gen. Taylor, according to all accounts received here at that time, is stated in my letter to you of the 22d of March. To show that the department acted properly, though it incurred your reproof, it is necessary to recall the facts as they then appeared here. They are presented in the following extract from that letter:

"The information which has just reached us in the shape of rumors, as to the situation of General Taylor, and the forces under his command, has excited the most painful apprehensions for their safety. It is almost certain that Santa Anna has precipitated the large army he had collected at San Luis de Potosi upon General Taylor; and it may be that the general has not been able to maintain the advanced position he had seen fit to take at Agua Nueva, but has been obliged to fall back on Monterey. It is equally certain that a Mexican force has been interposed between Monterey and the Rio Grande, and that it has interrupted the line of communication between the two places, and seized large supplies which were on the way to General Taylor's army.

"If the hostile force between the Rio Grande and General Taylor's army is as large as report represents it, our troops now on that river may not be able to re-establish the line, nor will it, perhaps, be possible to place a force there sufficient for the purpose, in time to prevent disastrous consequences to our army, unless aid can be afforded from the troops under your immediate command.

"From one to two thousand of the new recruits for the ten regiments, will be on their way to the Brazos in the course of three or four days. All the other forces will be directed to that point, and every effort made to relieve General Taylor from his critical situation. You will have been fully apprized before this can reach you of the condition of things in the valley of the Rio Grande, and at the headquarters of General Taylor, and have taken, I trust, such measures as the importance of the subject requires. I need not urge upon you the fatal consequences which would result from any serious disaster which might befall the army under General Taylor; nor do I doubt that you will do what is in your power to avert such a calamity."

The course pursued by the War Department on that occasion, which you convert into a charge, must, on revision, I think, commend itself to general approbation. Had it been indifferent to the alarming condition of General Taylor's army, and forborne to use, at the earliest moment, the most energetic measures to guard against the fatal consequences of its defeat, then too probable, it would have deserved an arraignment as severe as that which you have made against it for having done its duty in that critical emergency. When you first received the reasons assigned for the course adopted here, they appear to have been satisfactory. In your despatch of the 28th of April, you say: "Yesterday I learned, by your letter of the 22d, and "the Adjutant General's of the 26th ult., that all "the recruits of the regiments—some 3,000—raised "or likely to be raised in time for this army, have "been ordered to the Rio Grande." You did not then intimate the slightest dissatisfaction—not even a premonitory symptom of that deep distress with which, instantly on Mr. Trist's arrival in Mexico, you represent yourself to have been seized. It is a coincidence not unworthy of notice, that the letter containing your first condemnatory remark on this subject, was written on the day of the date of Mr. Trist's first note to you, and only the day before your captious reply to it; and in both you assail the War Department. Your withering disappointment seems to have slumbered for ten days, and then to have been aroused by the appearance of Mr. Trist in Mexico and your quarrel with him. If the order from the War Department had in fact "diverted" the forces with General Cadwalader, still it was fully justified by the threatening aspect of affairs on the Rio Grande; but I am quite sure it did not divert them. No previous order from the department had designated any other place of rendezvous than the Brazos for the troops that were to join your column. It was well understood, before you left Washington, that all the troops for both armies were to be sent to that place, and there to fall under your command.

This arrangement was not, nor was it expected that it would be here changed, until you had penetrated so far into the enemy's country as to render your communications with that place of general rendezvous difficult and dilatory.

You also complain that the order was not countermanded. If there had been such an order, and it had been countermanded, what would have been the consequence? The troops would have gone forward from the United States under the former orders of the department, which would have taken them to the same place.

You allege that "the news of the victory of "Buena Vista reached Washington in time to coun"termand Cadwalader's orders for the Rio Grande "before his departure from New Orleans." I notice this specification of neglect of duty, to show the extent to which you have carried your fault-finding, and the industry with which you have searched for occasions to indulge it.

Your assumption is, that the news of the victory of Buena Vista should have satisfied the War Department that Cadwalader's forces were not needed on the Rio Grande; and that the omission to countermand, as soon as that news was received, the orders to send them there, was a neglect deserving severe animadversion. How did you act under similar circumstances? With better means of information as to the actual condition of the Rio Grande frontier, after the victory of Buena Vista, you did not deem it prudent, after being forty-one days in possession of the news of that victory, to issue positive orders to remove a single man from that frontier; yet you venture to censure me for not having sent the troops away the moment the news reached Washington.

You received information of that victory on or before the 14th of March, for on that day you proclaimed it in orders to your army. On the 25th of April, more than forty days thereafter, you issued an order to the commanding officer at the Brazos to embark for Vera Cruz "such detachments of the new regiments as may have been ordered by the War Department to Point Isabel;" but you made it conditional with reference to the safety of the line of the Rio Grande; and said to that officer, that you relied upon his "sound judgment to determine on the spot "whether that line would not be too much exposed "by the withdrawal of the troops in question." Thus it appears that you do not hesitate to impute neglect of duty to me, for not having adopted and acted on the conclusion that the line of the Rio Grande was safe the moment I heard of the victory of Buena Vista; but, when acting on the same subject, you dared not adopt that conclusion, although you had been in possession of the same information forty-one days. Your own conduct in this matter completely refutes this charge of yours against the War Department. It does more: it shows how rash and inconsiderate you have been in selecting topics for attack.

But the most serious consequences are attributed to the long delay of these troops at the Brazos. For your sake, I sincerely hope these consequences are much exaggerated, because I am quite confident it will be shown that you alone are responsible for the delay. The War Department did not—and it was proper that it should not—issue any order in regard to the movement of these troops after their arrival in Mexico. The order from the department of the 30th of April, making a division of the new levies between the two columns, does not contradict this assertion, for these levies were mostly then within the United States; only portions of them had then reached Mexico. Until this order took effect, the troops at the Brazos, and, indeed, on the Rio Grande and with General Taylor, were under your entire and unrestricted command. As to this matter, you were under no misapprehension; for on the 25th of April, before you were informed what had been done here to secure the Rio Grande line, you issued an order in relation to the troops at the Brazos. This place, you well knew, was the general rendezvous of the new levies from the United States, and before you sailed on your expedition to Vera Cruz, you were notified that the Mexican army were advancing upon General Taylor. To have assumed that you had not left at the Brazos, with a view to meet any probable contingency, orders for the proper disposition of the troops which were, or might be sent there, would have implied an opinion that you wanted suitable qualifications for the high station which had been assigned to you.

These troops were a part of your command, and subject to your orders; and if they remained one day at the Brazos after it was there known that they were not needed on the Rio Grande line, and would be servicable with your column, the fault was entirely your own, and in nowise imputable to the War Department. If your opinion be not extravagant—and you say it is not—that but for the diversion of Gen. Cadwalader's forces from you, and the "much precious time" lost at the Brazos, you "might easily have taken this city [Mexico] in the month of June, and at one-fifth of the loss sustained in August and September," you have, indeed, a most fearful account to settle with your country.

I cannot, however, but regard your speculative opinions on this subject as fanciful and wild. You greatly over-estimate the force which landed at the Brazos and subsequently joined you. From the best calculation that can be made from details in the Adjutant General's office, the number was much less than you imagine, and did not probably exceed one thousand. As the refutation of your charge against the department for diverting these troops is in nowise impaired by the number, be it more or less, it is not important to inquire into that matter. But there is a question of serious import, to which I think the country will expect you to answer.

If these new levies, which had just entered the service, would have enabled you to capture the city of Mexico in June, with a comparatively small loss, why did you, at the very time that you discovered that they were so much needed, and would have been so useful, send away from your army three times as many volunteers, who had been many months in service, and were, as you acknowledge, "respectable in discipline and efficacy," and who had distinguished themselves at Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo, and, in the hour of peril, had fought by the side of your veteran troops, and merited an honorable share in the glories of those memorable conflicts. The period of their engagement had not expired. When thus sent away, but one of the seven regiments had less than thirty, and most of them had forty-five days to serve. According to your own opinion, concurred in by the department, they could have been legally retained on your line of operations till the last hour of their engagement. If not deemed expedient to take them on towards Mexico with you, their services, at that critical period, would have been of inestimable value in holding the post at Jalapa—so important, and so unexpectedly abandoned—and in keeping open the communication between Vera Cruz and your headquarters, whereby supplies, munitions, and recruits could be safely and expeditiously forwarded to you. Had this been done, you would have been spared the trouble of inditing many items of grievances and complaints against the War Department for having failed to furnish them. If you had retained the twelve months' volunteers until the end of their agreement—and no sufficient reason has yet been shown for their premature discharge—you might, for a season at least, have received, without much obstruction, supplies from the main depot on the Gulf; the army might have been strengthened by reinforcements at an earlier period; and many of the revolting scenes of butchery on the road from Vera Cruz to Jalapa, in which so many lives of our fellow citizens have been sacrificed by the ruthless guerillas, would not have occurred.

Another and still more lamentable calamity is I think fairly to be ascribed to the early obstruction of this important line of communication. The brave and patriotic men who were hurried on to Mexico, in small detachments, in order to reinforce your army, were unexpectedly, but necessarily, detained at Vera Cruz until the numbers there collected were sufficient to force their way through the strong guerilla bands which held the difficult passes on the Jalapa road. While thus detained on that inhospitable coast, in the sickly season, they were exposed to the attacks of a wasting pestilence, more destructive, than the Mexican army.

When the unwelcome news of the premature discharge of this large body of volunteers was received here, unaccompanied by any explanation to show the necessity of the act, it excited very general surprise and regret. Its consequences were at once foreseen; but the step had been taken, and could not be retracted. It was loudly condemned. Many did not believe that a measure which appeared to be so unwise and so injurious to the operations of the army, could have emanated from yourself; but they were less charitable towards the President and Secretary of War. Both were denounced for what you had done; they were unscrupulously charged with weakness and incapacity; with being actuated by hostility to you, and a desire to secure popularity with the volunteers. Nor were these bitter assaults intermitted, until it began to be suspected that they were misdirected.

If you really regarded on the 6th of May, the augmentation of your forces as being of such vital importance, it is almost as difficult to account for the course taken to re-engage the volunteers, as for their premature discharge. I am misled by information, on which I ought to rely, if many of these volunteers would not have continued in service, if proper measures had been taken at Jalapa, while they were indulging the hope of participating in further triumphs, and of being among those who would enjoy the enviable distinction of first entering as victors the proud capital of the Mexican republic. Though the subject was there presented to their consideration, no vigorous efforts seem to have been made—no attempt to form new companies—or muster them in to service, until this powerful inducement was weakened or withdrawn—until they had been detached from a victorious army, as if no longer deemed worthy to be a part of it—sent sixty miles towards their homes into a pestilential region, and there brought within the sympathetic influence of the sentiments which was natural that many should feel and manifest at the moment of embarking to return to their families and friends. Considering the manner in which the President's order on this subject was attempted to be executed, it is not strange that, among more than three thousand patriotic volunteers, sent away by your order of the 4th of May, only about "fifty individuals" were found willing to re-engage.

You seem to have suddenly conceived the notion of converting the army, "like Cortez," "*into a self-sustaining machine;*" and to make the resemblance between yourself and the Spanish hero more complete, you indulged a dream of fancy, until you seem to have adopted it as a matter of belief, that you were "doomed at Washington," and you became, "like him, always afraid that the next ship "or messenger might recall or further cripple" you. It should not be forgotten, that the design of this unaccountable military movement was *first* communicated to Mr. Trist, before you had given any intimation of it to your government, and while under the perturbation of mind which his unwelcome presence in Mexico had produced. Had you confided this extraordinary plan of a campaign to him after the "happy change" in your relations—after you had digested his "farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance"—and after he, too, mistaking notoriety for fame, had sought to win it by disobeying the orders of his government, defying its authority, and assailing its conduct—this distinguishing mark of your confidence in him would have occasioned much less surprise. This novel conception, so suddenly adopted, was as suddenly carried out; your army was, indeed, converted "into a self-sustaining machine;" you discharged the twelve months' volunteers, and broke up your posts at Jalapa, and on the way to your main depot, "resolved," as you announced, "no longer to depend on Vera Cruz or home"—you put yourself beyond the reach of the supplies which had been provided by government, and rendered yourself, in a great measure, inaccessible to the recruits and levies (except in strong parties) which had been raised to augment your command. In this way, you rendered unavailing, for a time at least, all that had been or could be done by the assiduous and incessant labors of the War Department in all its branches; and then you recklessly put forth the groundless complaint of "a total want of support and sympathy" from it.

Your letter of the 25th of July, which was not received at Washington until the 30th of December last, abounds with complaints against the department, and refers in strong terms to the wants and sufferings of the army at that time. Before you ventured to make its then destitute condition a ground of charge against the War Department, you ought to have recollected that these afflictions fell upon it in the midst of your experiment of making it "a self-sustaining machine"—and were the legitimate fruits of that experiment. These sufferings came upon it before your estimated period of isolation from "Vera Cruz and home" had half expired. When you had designedly and unnecessarily abandoned both, and entered upon your self-sustaining position, "cut off from all supplies and reinforcements from home, until perhaps late in November," by what pretence of justice do you complain of the War Department for the distresses you thus voluntarily inflicted upon yourself and the gallant army under your command? Something very different from censure and reproof is due for the extraordinary efforts which were successfully made to reach you with recruits and supplies in your sequestered situation, and to rescue you from the embarrassments in which your ill-judged measures had involved you.

I have brought into view this unaccountable movement of yours, with no purpose to make any comment upon it as a military measure, but solely to show that the evils resulting from it are not just grounds of accusation against the War Department;