

The Independent Republican.

"FREEDOM AND RIGHT AGAINST SLAVERY AND WRONG."

CHARLES F. READ & H. H. FRAZIER, EDITORS.

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Poet's Corner.

Correspondence of the Republican.

The Harvest.

From Chamber's Journal.
The Wanderer's Return
BY MARIE J. EWEN.

You have come back to us, my brother,
With your pale and thoughtful brow,
Is the joy of old about your path?
Is your life's rose blooming now?

Look us, dear, for a fairer clime,
And a brighter sun than ours;
For the deep repose of the forest shades,
And the gold of orange boughs.

We half rejoiced that you were not here
When our winter's skies grew dim;
For we rightly deemed—"A glorious sun
There shines fair for him!"

And oh! when your first dear letter came,
How the gladness flashed through tears;
For each word of cheer and blessings fell
Like a silence on our fears.

And although you said that clime was bright,
And although that land was fair,
There was no place like your dear home;
Te he met with anywhere!"

You have come back to us, my brother,
To your childhood's home once more;
To the music of the loving voice,
To the warm, true hearts of yore.

You have come back to us, my brother,
With your pale and thoughtful brow,
And the star of hope about your path,
Is it beaming brighter now?

Do a point from earth to that fair clime
Where the sunbeams shinest best;
Where the wanderer's weary soul may find
Both a refuge and a rest?

We bid you welcome back, my brother,
To your childhood's home once more;
To the music of the loving voice,
To the warm, true hearts of yore!

For the Independent Republican.

Passmore Williamson.

This gentleman is still confined in a Philadelphia prison, without any trial whatever ever being had in his case. There has been no indictment, no trial by jury—notthing but the order of our American Jeffries, Judge Kane. Williamson is emphatically the victim of the whim of that tyrant's caprice. It would seem that to-day scenes are enacted in the United States Judiciary which were the shame of England in the feudal ages. When Judicial tyranny became intolerable, England sent her vile judges to the block, or the people took all law into their own hands and inflicted summary punishment. But in the United States we must adopt a different course, to secure inviolate the happiness, the lives, and the liberties of the people. Although great as is the prostration for the people to open the prison doors of Williamson and give him a fair and honorable trial by a jury of his countrymen, and to inflict upon Judge Kane that righteous punishment which his invasion of the dearest rights of man so justly merits, yet we would not be understood as recommending, even in this case, a resort to *ad lata*. It is true that Kane has outraged every principle which we as Americans hold dear, yet the *modus operandi* is a dangerous power which aroused, and if it sometimes rights great wrongs, it likewise commits many exceptions, and is withal a dangerous precedent.

We had much rather, all things considered, see Judge Kane impeached; and most fully punished by, under, and through the instrumentality of those very laws he so wickedly set at defiance and violated, than on the other hand, great as is the seeming provocation, the people should take the law in their own hands, and inflict that punishment due unto all Kanes or Jeffries.

THE LOED'S PRAYER.

A friend tells us an anecdote of Booth, the great tragedian, which we do not recall having seen in print. It occurred in the palmy days of his fame, before the sparkle of his great black eye had been dimmed by that genius, strong drink. Booth and several friends had been invited to dine with an old gentleman in Baltimore, of distinguished kindness, urbanity, and piety. The host, though disapproving of theatres and theatre-going, had heard much of Booth's remarkable powers, that curiosity to see the man had, in this instance, overcome all his scruples and prejudice. After the entertainment was over, lamps lighted, and company seated in the drawing-room, some one requested Booth as a particular favor, and one which all present would doubtless appreciate, to read aloud the Lord's Prayer. Booth expressed his willingness to afford them this gratification; and all eyes were turned expectantly upon him. Booth rose slowly and reverently from his chair. It was wonderful to watch the play of emotion that convulsed his countenance. He became deathly pale, and his eyes, turned tremblingly upwards, were wet with tears. As yet he had not spoken. The silence could be felt. It became absolutely painful, until at last the spell was broken as if by an electric shock, as his rich-toned voice, from white lips syllabled forth, "Our Father who art in Heaven!" etc., with a pathos and fervid solemnity that thrilled all hearts. He finished. The silence continued. Not a voice was heard nor a muscle moved in his rapt audience, until from a remote corner of the room, a subdued sob was heard; and the old gentleman (their host) stepped forward with streaming eyes and tottering frame, and seized Booth by the hand.

"Sir," said he, in broken accents, "you have afforded me a pleasure for which my whole future life will feel grateful. I am an old man, and every day, from my boyhood to the present time, I thought I had repeated the Lord's Prayer, but I have never heard it before, never."

"You are right," replied Booth, "to read that Prayer as it should be read, has cost me the severest study for thirty years, and I am far from being satisfied with my rendering of this great gem addressed to every citizen of the country to do something towards promoting its true interests. Other lands may be more fertile and susceptible of easier cultivation, but the farmer of Susquehanna county who follows a judicious system, will be remunerated with no sordid hand. He lives in a moral atmosphere, and breathes the air of health."

This address had been written thus far, when the Chairman of the Executive Committee received a letter from Samuel C. Morton, Esq., of Philadelphia, enclosing \$100 for the use of the Agricultural Society. Mr. Morton has been in the habit of spending a few weeks here every summer, and observing the capabilities of the county in an agricultural point of view, and how much it was improving, conceived that in no other way could its resources be more speedily developed than by aiding the Society, and nothing could be more opportune than this generous donation.

How many there who could lend a helping hand, aid yet withhold it; and how forcibly does the reality of this gentleman appeal to every citizen of the country to do something towards promoting its true interests. Other lands may be more fertile and susceptible of easier cultivation, but the farmer of Susquehanna county who follows a judicious system, will be remunerated with no sordid hand. He lives in a moral atmosphere, and breathes the air of health."

The undersigned would therefore appeal to their fellow citizens to ponder these things and render such support as is befitting an intelligent community.

HENRY DRINKER, President,

Thomas Nicolson, / Executive Committee,

Alvin Halloran, / Executive Committee,

Timas Johnson, / Executive Committee,

There has been a great trial of Threshing, Reaping, and Mowing Machines at the Paris Exhibition, open to all the world, and in which all the good European machines were represented, and every American manufacturer proved immensely superior to every European machine. Pitts' American Thresher, the only one from this country at the Exhibition, threshed almost twice as fast as the best English machines, which threshed almost twice as fast as the French! In labor-saving machines, the Yankees beat the palm at the Paris as they did at the London Exhibition.

Passmore Williamson.

OPINION OF JUDGE KNOX.

In the Matter of the Petition of Passmore Williamson for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Knox, J.—I do not concur in the opinion of the majority of this Court refusing the writ of habeas corpus, and shall state the reasons why, in my judgment, the writ should be granted.

This application was made to the Court while holding a special session at Belvoir, on the 13th day of August, and upon an application from the counsel that in case the Court had any difficulty upon the question of awarding the writ, they would like to be heard. Thursday, the 16th, of August, was fixed for the hearing. On that day an argument was made by Messrs. Meredith and Gilpin, in favor of allowance of the writ.

I may as well remark here, that upon the presentation of the petition it was in favor of awarding the habeas corpus, greatly preferring that the right of the petitioner to his discharge should be determined upon the return of the writ. If this course had been adopted we should have had the views of counsel in opposition to the discharge, and moreover, if necessary, we could, after the return, have examined into the facts of the case.

I am in favor of granting this writ, first, because I believe the petitioner has the right to demand it at our hands. From the time of Magna Charta the writ of habeas corpus has been considered a writ of right, which every person is entitled to *ex mortis iusticiam*.

But the benefit of it (says Chancellor Kent)

was in a great degree claimed in England prior to the statute of Charles II, as the Judges

of the said court, or was to inquire into a commitment under, or by color of the authority of the United States, or to relieve some one imprisoned for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, the District Court had no power to issue it, and a commitment for contempt was the party so bound, we are imperatively required to set aside.

It has aversered in his petition what, if true, would afford him relief, it is his constitutional right to be present when the truth of his allegations is inquired into; and it is his undoubted right, under our habeas corpus act, to establish his allegations by evidence, to be introduced and heard upon the return of the writ. To deny him the writ, is virtually to condemn him unheard; and as I see nothing in this case which requires us to hold the party of the petitioner to be guilty of the charge, it is a probable cause is made out, and there is no longer a discretionary power to refuse the writ. Whether the allegation of want of jurisdiction is true or not, is determinable only upon the return of the writ.

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