(HE DOLLAR PER ANNUM INVARIABLY IN ADVANCE.
TOWANDA:
Thursday Morning, November 20,1862.
Stluleb Uutlrj.
N OVEMBER.
The year grows splendid ! On the mountains steep
Xow lingers long the warm and gorgeous light,
Dviug by slow degrees into the deep,
Delicious night.
The final triumph of the perfect year,
Rises the woods, magnificent array ;
Beyond, the purple mountain-heights appear,
Aud slope array.
But where the painted leaves are falling fast,
Among the vales beyond the farthest hill,
There sits a shadow—dim, and sad, and vast—
And lingers still.
And still we hear a voice among the hills—
A voice that mourns among the haunted woods,
And with the mystery of its sorrow fills
The solitudes.
For while gay Autumn gilds the fruit and leaf,
Aud doth her fairest festal garuents wear,
Lo ! Time, all noiseless, in his mighty she if
Binds up the year.
The mighty sheaf which never is unbound!
The Reaper whom our souls beseech iu vain !
The love-lost years that never may be found,
Or loved again.
Ulistt lUntous.
The Surrender of Harper's Ferry.
Report of the Investigating Commission.
The Couiuiis-iou, consisting ol Major Gen.
I). Hunter, U. 6. A. ol Vols. Pres. ; Major
Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. A. ol Vols. ;
Brig. Gen. C. C Augur, U. S A oi \ ols ;
Major I)ouu I'iatl, A A G- of Vols ; Capl.
F. Ball, A 1). C of Vols ; Col. J Ho t,
Judge Advocate General, called by the Guv
eminent to investigate the conduct of certain
■officers connected with, and the circumstances
attending the abandonment of Maryland
Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry,
Have the honor to repOit Hie following ;
Ou the 3d of September, Gen White en
tered Harper's Ferry with ids lorce Irom Win
chester. The next day he was ordered to
Martiusburg, to take command of the forces
there. On the 12th of September he again
returned to Harper's Feriy, where he rem lin
ed uutil the surrender without assumiug the
•command.
Oa the Ttli of September, General McCiel
lan, the most of his forces having preceded
Li a), left W lshiiigton under orders issued some
•days previously, to drive the enemy from Mary
•laud. That night he established his head
quarters at llockville, from which place, on
the 11 tli of September, he telegraphed to Gen.
11 mill ck to have Col. Miles ordered to joiu
him at once.
Ou the sth of September Col. Thomas H
Ford, 32d Ohio, took command of the forces
on Marvlaud Heights. Forces were pluced
at Solomon's Gap and at Sandy Hook. Those
at Sandy Hook, under Col. Maulsby, retired,
by Col. Milts' oruer, to the eastern slope of
Maryland Heights, two or three days pre
vious to their evacuation by Col. Ford. 011
the 11th of September the force at Solomon's
Gap were dnveu in by the enemy. Colonel
Fold called upou Colonel Miles fur reinforce
tueirls. The 12Gtii New York and the 3i)th
New York (Garibaldi Guards) were sent him
on Friday, tne 12th of September, and on the
morning of the 13th he was further reinforced
by the 115 th New York and a portion of u
Maryland regiment uuoer Lieutenant Colouel
Downey.
Colouel Ford made requisition for axes and
spades to euable him to construct defences 011
the Heights, but obtained noue. With ten
axes, belonging to some Maryland troops,
hiring till that could be obtained, a slight
breastwork of trees was constructed on the
12th, uear the crest of the Heights, ar.d a
slashing of timber made for a short distance
in trout ot the breastwork. The forces under
Colonel Ford were stationed at various points
on Maryland Heights, the principal force be
itg on the crest of the hill uear the oreast
work and look cut. Skirmishing commenced
on Friday, the 12th, 011 the ciest of the hill.
Early on the morning of the 13tli, the cue
my made au attack 011 the crest of the hill,
and, after some time, the troops retired in
some confusion to the breastwork, where they
were rallied. About uiue o'clock, a second
attack was made, which the 'roups behind the
breastwoik resisted lor a short time, ami un
til Colonel Sbernli, ol the 12Gth N\-w York,
was wounded, and carried off the field, when
-the entire 12Gth Regiment, as some witnesses
testify, a'l but two compauies, Major Hewitt
states, broke uud fled in uiter 0 n . s on. Men
and most of the officers all fled together, no
effort being made to rally the regiment, ex
cept by Colonel Ford, Lieutenant 11 irras, net
ing adjutant, and some officers of oilier regi
ments, directed by Colonel M ies, then on the
Heights. Soou after the remaining forces at
the breastwork fell buck, under a supposed
ordyr Iroru Major Hewitt, who himself say
that he gave no such order, merely sent 111
struct ions to the captains 01 his own regiment
that, if -they were compelled to retire, to do
so iu good order. <3l tiers were given by Colo
nel Ford for the troops to return to their po
Mtion. They advanced some distance up the
Heights, but did not regain the breastwork
Tkat evening Colonel Miles was on Maiy
land Heights lor some hours, consulting wiin
Culonel Ford. He left between II and 12
o'clock, without directly ordering Colonel
lord to evacuate llie Heights, but instructing
him, in case be was compelled to do so, to
Al'ikc his guns, aud throw the heavy siege guns
■Gown the ULouulaio. About 2 o'clock, perhaps
a lt'le later, by the order of Colonel Ford,
the Heights were abandon* d, the guus biing
6 pik d according to instructions.
Oa Sunday, Colonel D'Utassy sent over to
tie Maryland Heights four companies, uuder
THE BRADFORD REPORTER.
Major Wood, who brought off, without oppo
sition, four bra-.3 12 pounders, two of which
were imperfectly spitied, and a wagou load of
ammunition.
Gen. White, on his return to Harper's Per
ry ou the 12ih of September, suggested to
Col. Miles the propriety of contracting his
liues on Bolivar Heights so as to make a bet
ter defence, but Col. Miles adhered to his
origiual line of defence, stating that he was
determined to make his stand on Bolivar
Heights Gen. White also urged the itnpor
tance of holding Maryland Heights, even
should it require the taking the entire force
over there from Harper's Ferry. Col. Miles,
uuder his orders to hold Harpers Ferry to
the last extremity, while admitting the impor
tance o: Maryland Heights, seemed to regard
them as applying to the town of Harper's
Ferry, aud held that to leave Harper's Ferry,
even to go on Maryland Heights, would be
disobeying his instructions
Geu. McClellan established his headquar
ters at Frederick City on the morning of the
13th of September. On the night of the 13i.h,
aher the evacuation of Maryland Heights,
Col. Miles directed Captain (now Major)
Russell, of the Maryland Cavalry, to tuki; with
him a few men ami endeavor to get through
the enemy's line and reach some of our forces
—Gen. AicCleliau, if possible—and to report
the condition ul Harper's Ferry, thai it could
not hold out more than 43 hours, unless rein
forced, and to urge the sending of reinforce
incuts. Capt Russell reached Gen. AlcClel
lau's headquarters at Frederick, at 9 A. A1
on the 14iii cjepleinber, and reported as direct
ed b> Col Allies. Immediately on his arrival
Geu. AlcCicllun sent off a messenger, as Cap
tain Russell understood, to General Franklin
At 10 A. M , Captain Russell left for Gene
ral h raiikiin's command, with a communication
lo General Franklin from General MeCieliau.
He t'euched General Franklin about 3 o'clock
that afternoon, and lound Inm engaged wiili
the enemy at Cramptou's Gap. The enemy
were driven Irom tue Gap, and the next morn
ing, Hie loth, General Franklin passed through
the Gap, udvauciug about a mile, and finding
the enemy drawn up iu liue of battle iu his
iront, diew lus own forces up in liue of batile.
While thus situated, the caunouading in the
directiou of Harper's Ferry, which bad beeu
heard very distinctly all the moruuig—liar
per'a Ferry being it bout seven miles distant—
suddenly ceased, whereupon General Franklin
sent wo.d lo General McClellan of the probu
hie surrender of Harper's Ferry by Colonel
MiLs, und did not deem it necessary to pro
ceed further in that direction.
The battle ul So 111 Mountain was fought
on Sunday, the 14th. On the suineday, Sun
day, during the atternoon, the enemy at Har
per's Fi-ny attacked the extreme left of the
line ou Bolivar Heights, but, after some lime,
were repulsed by the troops under command
of General White. Sunday night the cavalry
at Harper s Ferry made their escape, under
Colouel Davis, ot the 12lh llliiuis Cavalry,
by permission of Cuioucl Miles, and reached
Greencastie, Pa., the uext morning, capturing
an tram belonging to General
Lougstreet, consisting of some fifty or sixty
wagons, &c. Several of the infantry officers
desired peromsiou to cut their way out, at the
same time the cavalry made their escape, but
Colouel Miles refused upon the ground that
he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry
to the last extremity.
Ou the morning of the 15th the enemy
opeued their batteries from severai points—
seven to uiue, as estimated by d.ffereut wit
uesses—directing their attack principally upon
our batteries 011 the left of Bolivar Heights.
The attack commenced at daybreak. About
7 o'clock Col. Miles represeuted to Gen. White
tuat a would be necessary to surrender.
Gen. White suggested that the brigade
commanders be culled together, which was
done. Col. Miles stated that the ammunition
lor the batteries was exhausted, and he had
übout made up ills mind to surrender. That
was agreed to by all present, uud Gen. White
was sent by Coi. Miles to arrange terms. The
white flag was raised iy order of Col. Miles,
lor the enemy did uol cease fire for some half
or three quarters of au hour after. Col. Miles
wus mortally wounded after the white flag
was raised. The surrender was agreed upon
about 8 A. M. on Monday, the 15th of Sep
tcmber.
The following was the testim my respective
ly ol the officers commanding batteries: At
Lite time ol the surrender You Sehlen
bad some ammunition, could not tell what
amount, but mostly shrapnel ; had lost about
100 rounds 011 Saturday, the 13th, by the ex
plosion ot a limber caused by oue of the ene
my's shells. C<pt. Rtgby had expended, dur
ing the siege ol Harper's Ferry, about GOO
rounds, wall the exception of cauister ; had
iiotlnng but canister left. Capt. Polls had
expended übout 1,000 louuds, with the excep
tion of canister ; bad only canister left. Capt.
Graham hud but two guns of his battery un
der nis immediate command ou the morning of
the surrender ; had probably 100 rounds ol
all kinds, but no long time fuses. Captain
Phillips had expended ull his ammunition, ex
cept some foriy rounds of canister and some
long r.aige shells too large lor his guns. Capt.
M Grain's battery had been spiked aud left
on Ma viand Heights on Saturday.
It appears that during the siege and shortly
previous, Col. Miles paroied several Confeder
al prisoners, permitting them to pass through
our Itucs. During the week previous to the
evacuation of .Vluryhind Heights, a Lieuten
ant Rouse, ol the 12th Virginia Cavulry, who
had been engaged in a raid upon a train from
Harper's Ferry to Winchester a short time be
hue, was captured and brought into Harper's
Ferry. He escaped while ou the way to the
ho-pttal to have his wounds dressed, but was
letak'U. He wus paroled, but leturncd iu
command of some rebel cavalry ou the morn
ing of the surrender.
The attentiou of Gen. A. P. Hill was call
ed lo the luci that Lieutenant Rouse was a
paroled prisoner, but no utteulion was paid
to it. Lieutenant Itouse hituself, on being
spoken to üboQt it. laughed at tbo idea of ob-
PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY AT TOWANDA, BRADFORD COUNTY, PA., BY E. 0. GOODRICH.
serving bis parole. On Saturday, the day of
the attack upon and evacuatiou of Maryland
Heights, Colonel Miles directed that sixteen
Confederate prisoners be permitted to pass
through our lines to rejoin the rebel army at
Winchester. Other cases are testified to, bat
those are the most important.
Of the subordinate officers referred to in
this case, the Commission finds, with the ex
ception of Co'onel Thomas H. Ford, nothing
in their conduct that culls for ceusure. Gen.
Julius White merits its approbation. He ap
pears, from the evidence, to have acted with
decided ability and courage.
In this connection the Commission.calls at
tention to the disgraceful behavior of the 126 th
New York regiment of infantry, and recom
mends that Major Baird should, for his bad
conduct, as shown by this evidence, be dis
n 1 ed from the -ervice. Some of the officers, af
ter ilie wounding of the gallant colonel,such as
Lieut Burras, and others not known to the
Commission, behaved with gallautry.and should
be commeuded.
Iu the case of Colonel Ford, charged with
improper conduct iu abandoning the Mary land
Heights, the Commission, after a careful hear
ing of the evidence produced bv the Govern
ment and that relied on by tlie defence, and a
due consideration of the argumeuls offered by
counsel, find :
That on the sth of September, Colonel F- rd
was placed in command of Maryland Heights
by Colonel Miles. That Colonel Ford, find
ing the position unprepared by fortifications,
earnestly urged Colonel Miles to furnish him
means by which the Heights con'd be made
tenable for the small force under his command,
should a heavy one be brought against him.
That these reasonable demands were, from
nome cause unknown to the Commission, not
responded to by the officer in command at
Harper's Ferry. That subsequently, when the
enemy appeared in heavy force, Col Ford Ire
quently and earnestly culled upon Col. Miles
lore more troops, representing that he could
not hold the Heights unless reinforced That
these demands were feebly or not at all com
plied with. That as late as the morning ol
the 131 ii, Coi. Ford sent two written demands
to Col. Miles for reinforcements, and saying
that with the troops then under his command
he could not hold the Heights, and unless re
lieved or otherwise ordered, he would have to
abandon them That as late as 11 o'clock A.
M of tne 13' h, a few hours previous to the
abandonment of this position, Col. Miles said
to Col Ford that he (Col. Ford) could not
have another man, and must do the best he
could, and if unable to defend the place, he
must spike the guns, throw them down the
lull, aud withdraw to Harper's Ffrry iu good
order.
The court is then satisfied that Col. Ford
was given a discretionary power to abandon
the Height?, as his better judgment might dic
tate ; and it believes from the evidence, cir
cumstantial at:d direct, that the result did not,
to any great extent, surprise nor in any way
displease the officer iu command at Harper's
Ferry.
But this conclusion, so much relied upon by
the defence, forces the Commission to a con
sideration of the fact—did Colouel Ford, un
der the discretionary power thus vested in him,
make a proper deb nee of the Heights, and
hold tliem, us he should have done, until driv
en off by the enemy ?
The evidence shows conclusively that the
force upon the Heights was not well managed;
that the point most pressed was weakly de
fended as to numbers, and after the wounding
of the Colouel of the 12Gtb Regiment New-
York Infantry, it was left without a compe
tent officer in commaud, Col. Ford himself not
appearing, nor designating any one who might
have restored order and encouraged the men ;
that the abandonment of the Heights was pre
mature, is clearly proved. Oar forces were
not driven from the hill, as full time was given
to spike the guns and throw the heavier ones
down the cliff, aud retreat i 1 good order to
Harper's Ferry. The next day a force re
turning to the Heights found them unoccu
pied, and brought away unmolested four aban
doned guns aud a quantity of ammunition.
la so grave a case as this,with such disgrac
ful consequences,the court cannot permit an of
finer to shield himself behind the fact that
he did 11s well as he could, if iu so doing
he exhibits a link of m litary 'opacity—
It is clear to the Commission that Col.
Ford should not have been placed in com
uiand on Maryland Heights ; and that lie
conducted the deft nee without ability, and
lias shown through such a lack of military
capacity as to disqualify him, in the op'niou
of the Commission, for a commaud iu the ser
vice.
The commission bus approached aconsidera
tiou of tins officer's conduct iu connection
with the surrender of Harper's Ferry with ex
treme reluctance. An officer who cannot ap
pear before any earthly tribunal to answer or
explain charges gravely affecting his charac
ter; who has met bis death at the bauds of
the enemy, even upon the spot he disgracefully
surrenders, is entitled to the tenderest cate
aud most careful investigation. This the Com
mission has accorded Colouel Miles, aud in
giving a decision ouiy repeats what runs thro'
our 80U pages of testimony, strangely unani
mous upon tb3 fact, that Colonel Miles'inca
pacity, amounting to almost imbecility, led to
the shameful surrender of this important post.
Early as the loth of August he disobeys
the order of Major General Wool to fortify
Maryland Heights. When it is surrounded
and attacked by the enemy, its uaturally
strong positions are unimproved, aud trom his
crimiual neglect, to use the mildest term, the
large force of the enemy is almost upou au
equality with the small force uuder his com
maud.
He seems to have understood, and admitted
to his officers, that Maryland Heights is the
key to the position, aud yet he places Colonel
Ford iu command, with a feeble force ; makes
no effort to strengthen them by fortifications,
[although betweeu the sth and Hth of Sep
tember there was ample time to do so ; and
I to Colonel Ford's repeated demands for meant
" REGARDLESS OF DENUNCIATION FROM ANY QUARTER."
to entrench, aud additional reinforcements, he
makes either an inadequate return, or no re
sponse at all. He gives Colonel Ford a dis
cretionary power as to when he shall abandon
the Heights—the fact of abandonment having
it seems, been coucluded oa his own mind.—
For, when this unhappy event really occurs,
his only exclamation was to the effect that he
feared Col. Ford had given up too soon ; al
though he must have knowu that the aband
onment of Maryland Heights was the surrend
er of Harper's Ferry. This leaving the key
of the position to the keeping of Colonel Ford,
with discretionary power, after the arrival of
that capable und courageous officer, who had
waived his rank to serve wherever ordered, is
one of the more striking facts illustrating the
incapability of Colonel Miles.
Immediately previous to, and pending the
siege of Harper's Ferry, he paroles rebel pris
oners, and permits, indeed seuds, them to the
enemy's headquarters ; this, too, when he
should have known that the lack of ammuni
tion, the bad couducl of some of our troops,
the eniiia abseuce of fortifications, and the
abandonment of Maryland Heights, were im
portaut facts they could, aud undoubtedly did,
cooimuuicate to the enemy. Sixteen of these
prisoners were paroled on the 13th, and a
pass given them iu the handwriting of Colcnel
Miles, while a rebel officer, by the name of
Rouse after an escape, is retaken, and subse
quently bus a private interview with Colonel
Allies, is paroled and after the surrender ap
pears at the head of his men among the first to
enter Harper's Ferry.
It is not necessary to accumulate evidence
from the mass that throughout scarcely affords
one fact in contraction lo what each one es
tablisbes, that Colooel Miles was incapable of
conducting a delcuce so important as was this
of Harper's Ferry. The Commission would
not liuve dwelt upon this painful subject were
uot for the fact that the officer who placed
this incapable iu command should share in the
responsibility, and in the opiuiou of the Com
mission Alujor General Wool is guilty to this
exieutof a grave disaster,aud should be censur
ed for his conduct.
The Commission has remarked freely on
Colonel Miles, au old officer who lias been
killed iu the service of his country, and it can
not, from any motives of delicacy, refrain
from censuring those in high command ;
when it thinks such censure deserved. The
General in-Chief has testified that General
McClellan, after having received orders to re
pel the enemy invading the State of Maryland,
marched only six miles per day, 011 an aver
age, when pursuing this invading enemy.—
The Gene al-in Chief also testifies, that in his
opiuion General McClellan could and should
have relieved and protected Harper's Perry,
and in this opinion the Commission fully con
cur.
The evidence thus introduced confirm the !
Commission in the opinion that Harper's Fer |
ry, as well as Maryland Heights, was prema- !
turely surrendered The garrison should j
have been satisfied that relief, however long
delayed, would come at last, and that a thous
and men killed in Harper's Ferry would have
mude a small loss had the post been saved,
and probably saved two thousand at Antie
tam. How important was this defence we
can now appreciate. 01 the 97,000 men com
prising at that time the whole of Lee's army,
more than one third were attacking Harper's
Ferry. Ariel of this, the main body was in
Virginia. By reference to the evidence, it I
will be seen that at the very moment Colonel
Ford abandoned Maryland Heights his little
army was in reality relieved by Gen. Frank
lin and Sumner's corps at Cramplou's Gap,
within seven miles of his position ; and that
after the surrender of Harper's Ferry no time
was given to parole prisoners before 20,000
troops were hurried from Virginia, and the
entire lorce went off on double quick to relieve
Lee, who was being attacked at Antietam.
Had the garri.-on been slower to surrender, or
the army of the l'otomac swifter to inarch, the
enemy would have been forced to raise the
seige, or would have been taken in detail, with
the Potomac dividing his forces.
Letter from Gen. Halleck to the Secre
tary of War.
THE GROI'XDS FOR M'CLELLAX'S REMOVAL.
IIBADQCAKTERS OF THE AKMV, )
Washington. Oct. 28, lsti2. f
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary oj War:—
Siu : In reply to the general interrogatories
contained in your letter of yesterday, I have
the houor to report :
First. That requisitions for supplies to the
army under Geueral McCiellau arc made by
his stall' officers ou the Chiefs of Bureaus here
—that is, the Quartermaster applies by his
Chief Quartermaster on Quartermasters Gen
eral ; tor Commissary supplies by bis Chief
Commissary Geueral, &c.
2so such requisitions have been, to my
knowledge, made upon tbe Secretary of War,
uud none upou the Gem ral in Chief.
Sccoud. Ou several occasions, General Me
Clellau has telegraphed me that his army was
deficient in certain supplies. All of these tel
egrams were immediately referred totheheads
of bureaus with ordeis to report. It was as
certained that in every instance the requisitions
have beeu immediately filled, except where the
Quartermaster Geueral had beeu obliged to
send from Philadelphia certain articles of
clothiug, tents, &c., not having a fu'l supply
here.
There has not been, so far as I could ascer
tain, any neglect or delay, in any department
or bureau, in issuiug alt the supplies asked for
by Geu. McCiellau, or by the k officers of his
staff.
Delays have occasionally occurred in for
warding supplies by railroad ou account of the
crowded condition of the railroad depots, or of
a want of a sufficient number of cars ; but,
wheuever notified of this fact, ugeuts have
been seut to (remove the oifficully under the
excellent superintendence of Geu. Haupt/ 1
think those delays have been less frequent and
of shorter duration than is usually tbe cus*>
with freight trains. Ao army of tbe size of
that under General McClellan will frequently
be for some days without supplies it has ask
ed for, oa account of not making timely
tious for them, aud unavoidable delays iu tor
warding them aud distributing them to the dif
ferent brigades and regiments.
From all the information that 1 can obtain
I am of the opiniou that the requisitions from
that army have been filled more promptly, aud
that the men, as a general rule, have beeu bet
ter supplied, than in the case of our armies
operating iu the West. The latter have ope
rated at much greater distances from the sour
ces of supplies, aud have hud far less facilities
for transportation. Iu fine, I believe that uo
armies iu the world in campaigning have been
mor*> promptly or better supplied than ours.
Third Soon after the battle of Autietam,
General MeClellan was urged to give tue in
formation of his intended movements, in order
that if be moved belweeu the enemy and Wash
ington the reinforcements could be sent from
this place. On the first of October, finding he
proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I
urged him to cross the river at once and give
battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the
disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains
had swollen the Potomac and impaired the
roads. On the 6th of October he was prompt
ly ordered to cross the Potomac and give bat
tle to the enemy, or drive him South. 1 said
to him : " Your army must move now, while
the roads are iu good conditiou." It will be
observed that three weeks have elapsed since :
that order was given.
Fourth. In my opinion there his been no i
such want of supplies in the army under Gen
era! MeClellan as to prevent his compliance
with my orders to advance upon the enemy.
llad he moved his army to the south side
of the Potomac, he could have received his
supplies almost as realiiy as by remaining iu
active ou the north side.
Fifitb. On the seventh of October, in a tel
grarn iu regard to his intended movements,
Gen. MeClellan stated that he would require ;
at least three days to supply the first, fifth and !
sixth corps ; that they needed shoes, aud oth
er indispensable articles of clothing, as well as i
shelter teuts. No complaint was made to me
that his army requisitions had not been filled, \
and it was inferred from his language that he j
was only waiting for the distribution of his |
supplies.
On the eleveuth of October he telegraphed ,
to me that a poitiou of his supplies sent by
railroad had been delayed. As already stated
ag< uts were immediately sent from here to in
vestigate this complaint, aud they repotted |
that everything had gone forward ou the same j
date, the 11th.
General MeClellan spoke of many of his j
horses being brokeu down by fatigue. On the J
12th of October he complained that the rate
of supply was only one hundred and B f ty hors
es per week for his entire army there aud iu
front of Washington.
1 immediately directed the Quartermaster j
General to inquire into this matter, and report i
why a larger supply was uot furnished to Geu- 1
era I MeClellan.
Geu. Meigs reported to me, on the 14th of j
October, that the average issue of horses to
General McCleliau's army in the Geld aud in
front of Washington, for the previous six
weeks, had beeu 1,45U per week, or 8,754 in
-all.
In addition, he reported to me that a large
number of mules had been supplied, and thai
the number of these animals with General Mc-
Cleliau's army ou the Upper Potomac was over
3,100.
He also reported to me that he was theu
sending thui army all the houses he could pro
cure.
Ou the 18th of October, General MeClellan
stated, in regard to Gen. Meigs' report that
he had filled every requisition for shoes and
clothing : " Gen. Meigs may have ordered
these articles to be forwarded ; but ihey might
as well remain in New York oi Philadelphia,
so far as my array is concerned." I immedi
ately called Gen. Meigs' attention to this ap
parent neglect of his department.
On the 25th of October, he reported as to
the result of his investigation that 4,800 pairs
of boots aud shoes had been received by ihe
Quartermaster uf M'Clellau's army at Har
per's Ferry, Frederick and Hagerstowu. 20,-
000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry Depot ou
21st, and that ten thousand mote were on the
way, aud fifteen thousand more had beeu or
dered.
Colonel Ingulls, aid de-camp and chief of
staff to General McCllan, telegraphed on the
25th as follows : " The suffering for want of
clothing has been exaggerated, 1 think, aud
certainly might have been avoided by timely
requisitions by the regimental and brigade
commanders." On the 24th of October he
telegraphed to Quartermaster-General Meigs
that the clothing was not detained in the cars
at the depots. " Such complaiuts are ground
less. The fact is the clothing arrives and is
issued, but more is still wanted 1 have or
dered more than would seem necessarj from
any data furnished me, and I beg to remind
you tiiat you have always very promptly met
my requisitions. As far as clotiiiug is con
cerned, our department is not at fault. It
provides as soou as due notice is given. I can
foresee no time when an army of 100,000 men
will not call for clothing and other articles."
In regard to General McCleliau's means of
promptly communicating the wants of bis army
to me, or to the proper bureaus of the War
Department, I report that, in addition to the
ordinary mails, he has been iu hourly commu
nicalion rith Washington by telegraph.
It is due to GeD. Meigs that I shou.d sub
mit herewith a copy of a telegram received by
him from General MeClellan.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
11. W. HALLECK, General in-Chief.
FROM MCLELLAN'6 HEADQCARTERS— —TO BRIGAI'IER
GENERAL MEIGS
Your despatch of this date is received. I
have never iuteuded, in any letter or dispatch,
to make any accusation against yourself or
yoor Department for not furnishing or for
warding clothing as rapidly as it was possible
for yoa to do so. I btliev* •vwytbtus bai been
VOL. XXIII. —NO.SS.
done that could be done in this respect. Th#
idea that I have tried to convey was that cer
tain portions of the command were without
clothing, and that the army would oot move
until it was supplied.
G. B. M'CLELLAN, MaJor-OeoenJ.
(From the New York Time*.)
The Removal of General McClellan
Gen. McClellan has been removed from the
command of the Army of the Potomac and
Gen. Burnside uppoiuted iu his place. The
immediate cause of bis removal has been Gen.
McClellan's refusal to advance agaios the en
emy, even under the most peremptory orders
of the Geueral in-Cbief. It will be seen by 4
letter of General Halleck to the Secretary of
War,which we pub isb iu auolher column, that
on the Ist of October Gen. McClellan was
urged by Gen. Halleck to cross the Potomac
and give battle to the enemy—being at tha
same lime reminded of the disadvantages of
delaying until the Potomac should be swollen,
and the roads impaired, by the autumnal rains.
Finding that this produced no effect, General
McClellan was " promptly ordered" by Geueral
Halleck, on the Gth ot October, to " cross the
Potomac and give bailie to the enemy or driv4
him South." For three weeks this order was
not obeyed, and the only excuse given for not
obeyiug it, so far as appears—the waut of sup
plies—is sliowu by the letter of Gen. Halleck
to Lave beets utterly without foundation. The
disclosures of that letter, concerning General
McClellau's constant and reiterated complaints
of lack of supplies, are very remarkable and
deserve special attention.
We presume that this particular instance of
disobedience of order, though the immediate
occasion, is not the whole cause of General
McClellau's removal. It is pretty generally
understood that ibis is only the coiumiuatiou
of a systematic disregard of orders, of a stea
dy uud obstinate tardiness in the conduct of
the campaign against the rebels, and of a con
sequent inefficiency iu command, which would
long ago nave secured his dismissal uuder any
Administration less timid than that which hot
possession of power. The fifteen months dur
ing which he has had virtual control of tha
war have becu utterly barrcu of results to tha
cause he has professed to serve. Few com
manders in history have had such spleudid op-,
port unities, and fewer still have so osteutati
ously thrown them away. With an army ca
pable of the most heroic achievements, power
lul in numbers, unrivaled in discipline and
equipment, eager always for active and on
ward movement, he has accomplished absolute
ly nothing but successful retreats from inferi
or forces, und tha defence of the Capital at
Washington, which he should have left no foo
capable oi menacing. The rebel armies bava
grown up in It's presence and by bis toleration.
Through all his long career he has made but
one attack and won but a single victory ; and
that became absolutely fruitless through hit
failure to follow it up.
We have no theory on which to explain thia
most extraordinary failure of Geueral McClel
lan as a commander,or the still more extraor
dinary persistance of tiie President in commit
ting the'fortunes of war to his hands. Geo.
McUlellau has shown too many of the quali
ties of an accomplished soldier to attribute hi|
failure to simple incapacity. That he is abso
lutely disloyal to the Government we hava
never permitted ourselves to believe. Yet we
tbiuk it quite probable that his heart has nev
er been iu the war—that through it all he hal
had hopes of a compromise whicli should end
it, and that he lias feared the effect upon mob
a compromise of a stern and relentless proie
eutiou of hostilities.
Li is position aud possibly his feeling# have
been those ascribed by Macaulay to Essex,
who commucded the armies of the Parliament
at the outbreak of the great civil war. He
was an accomplished soldier and a Parliamenta
rian: but he shrunk liom civil war—he hoped
through it all for an accommodation with the
King, and " next to a great defeat he dreaded a
great victory." Under such a leader the war
could never prosper, aud it was found neces
sary to replace him by Hampden, who carried
into the field the boldness and courage he had
shown in politics, and who had the sagacity to
see from the outset that " in war of all kinr i,
moderation is imbecility." As a politic au, Gen.
McClelluu's sympathies, previous to the rebel
lion, had u!ways becu with the South. He
has believed them wronged by Northern sen
timent and by Northern actiou. And beyond
all question he has hoped aud believed that a
time wculd come when the war could be ar
rested, and when the Southern leaders, back
ed by a powerful party iu the Northern Stateß,
would listen to terms of accommodation— and
that nothing would stand in the way of such
a compromise more than a victory which should
wouud their pride by humiliating their arms
and crushing their power.
In this view of the ease, Gen. McClellan
has beeu encouraged by the political partisan#
who, at an early state iu the war, made him
their prospective candidate for the Presidency
and came thus to have an interest in putting
him in opposition to the Administration which
he professed to serve. They defended his er
rors, aud made themselves the special chain
! pions of his worst mistakes. They had uu
! questionable provocation und some excuse for
much of this in the intemperate zeal with
which he was assailed ; but they betrayed
him into au uDdue reliance on the support of
a p irty, and a ruinous subsetvieucy to their
wishes and views. We know uot how elie
to account for the steady and systematic dis
regard he has shown of the wishes and orders
of the Government, and for his adherence to
a deliberate and methodical inactivity, wbieU
has brought the cause of the Uuion to the
very verge of ruin.
Unless we have been misinformed, President
Lincoln bason two occasions written to Gen.
McClellan, reviewing in detail his military
operations, aud demonstrating bis failures to
respond to the wishes aud just expectations of
the Government. One of these papers wo#
prepared just after McClellau had landed on
the Feuiosulq the other after the battle of
± .tietam ; aod we have beard both fpcltM