(HE DOLLAR PER ANNUM INVARIABLY IN ADVANCE. TOWANDA: Thursday Morning, November 20,1862. Stluleb Uutlrj. N OVEMBER. The year grows splendid ! On the mountains steep Xow lingers long the warm and gorgeous light, Dviug by slow degrees into the deep, Delicious night. The final triumph of the perfect year, Rises the woods, magnificent array ; Beyond, the purple mountain-heights appear, Aud slope array. But where the painted leaves are falling fast, Among the vales beyond the farthest hill, There sits a shadow—dim, and sad, and vast— And lingers still. And still we hear a voice among the hills— A voice that mourns among the haunted woods, And with the mystery of its sorrow fills The solitudes. For while gay Autumn gilds the fruit and leaf, Aud doth her fairest festal garuents wear, Lo ! Time, all noiseless, in his mighty she if Binds up the year. The mighty sheaf which never is unbound! The Reaper whom our souls beseech iu vain ! The love-lost years that never may be found, Or loved again. Ulistt lUntous. The Surrender of Harper's Ferry. Report of the Investigating Commission. The Couiuiis-iou, consisting ol Major Gen. I). Hunter, U. 6. A. ol Vols. Pres. ; Major Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. A. ol Vols. ; Brig. Gen. C. C Augur, U. S A oi \ ols ; Major I)ouu I'iatl, A A G- of Vols ; Capl. F. Ball, A 1). C of Vols ; Col. J Ho t, Judge Advocate General, called by the Guv eminent to investigate the conduct of certain ■officers connected with, and the circumstances attending the abandonment of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, Have the honor to repOit Hie following ; Ou the 3d of September, Gen White en tered Harper's Ferry with ids lorce Irom Win chester. The next day he was ordered to Martiusburg, to take command of the forces there. On the 12th of September he again returned to Harper's Feriy, where he rem lin ed uutil the surrender without assumiug the •command. Oa the Ttli of September, General McCiel lan, the most of his forces having preceded Li a), left W lshiiigton under orders issued some •days previously, to drive the enemy from Mary •laud. That night he established his head quarters at llockville, from which place, on the 11 tli of September, he telegraphed to Gen. 11 mill ck to have Col. Miles ordered to joiu him at once. Ou the sth of September Col. Thomas H Ford, 32d Ohio, took command of the forces on Marvlaud Heights. Forces were pluced at Solomon's Gap and at Sandy Hook. Those at Sandy Hook, under Col. Maulsby, retired, by Col. Milts' oruer, to the eastern slope of Maryland Heights, two or three days pre vious to their evacuation by Col. Ford. 011 the 11th of September the force at Solomon's Gap were dnveu in by the enemy. Colonel Fold called upou Colonel Miles fur reinforce tueirls. The 12Gtii New York and the 3i)th New York (Garibaldi Guards) were sent him on Friday, tne 12th of September, and on the morning of the 13th he was further reinforced by the 115 th New York and a portion of u Maryland regiment uuoer Lieutenant Colouel Downey. Colouel Ford made requisition for axes and spades to euable him to construct defences 011 the Heights, but obtained noue. With ten axes, belonging to some Maryland troops, hiring till that could be obtained, a slight breastwork of trees was constructed on the 12th, uear the crest of the Heights, ar.d a slashing of timber made for a short distance in trout ot the breastwork. The forces under Colonel Ford were stationed at various points on Maryland Heights, the principal force be itg on the crest of the hill uear the oreast work and look cut. Skirmishing commenced on Friday, the 12th, 011 the ciest of the hill. Early on the morning of the 13tli, the cue my made au attack 011 the crest of the hill, and, after some time, the troops retired in some confusion to the breastwork, where they were rallied. About uiue o'clock, a second attack was made, which the 'roups behind the breastwoik resisted lor a short time, ami un til Colonel Sbernli, ol the 12Gth N\-w York, was wounded, and carried off the field, when -the entire 12Gth Regiment, as some witnesses testify, a'l but two compauies, Major Hewitt states, broke uud fled in uiter 0 n . s on. Men and most of the officers all fled together, no effort being made to rally the regiment, ex cept by Colonel Ford, Lieutenant 11 irras, net ing adjutant, and some officers of oilier regi ments, directed by Colonel M ies, then on the Heights. Soou after the remaining forces at the breastwork fell buck, under a supposed ordyr Iroru Major Hewitt, who himself say that he gave no such order, merely sent 111 struct ions to the captains 01 his own regiment that, if -they were compelled to retire, to do so iu good order. <3l tiers were given by Colo nel Ford for the troops to return to their po Mtion. They advanced some distance up the Heights, but did not regain the breastwork Tkat evening Colonel Miles was on Maiy land Heights lor some hours, consulting wiin Culonel Ford. He left between II and 12 o'clock, without directly ordering Colonel lord to evacuate llie Heights, but instructing him, in case be was compelled to do so, to Al'ikc his guns, aud throw the heavy siege guns ■Gown the ULouulaio. About 2 o'clock, perhaps a lt'le later, by the order of Colonel Ford, the Heights were abandon* d, the guus biing 6 pik d according to instructions. Oa Sunday, Colonel D'Utassy sent over to tie Maryland Heights four companies, uuder THE BRADFORD REPORTER. Major Wood, who brought off, without oppo sition, four bra-.3 12 pounders, two of which were imperfectly spitied, and a wagou load of ammunition. Gen. White, on his return to Harper's Per ry ou the 12ih of September, suggested to Col. Miles the propriety of contracting his liues on Bolivar Heights so as to make a bet ter defence, but Col. Miles adhered to his origiual line of defence, stating that he was determined to make his stand on Bolivar Heights Gen. White also urged the itnpor tance of holding Maryland Heights, even should it require the taking the entire force over there from Harper's Ferry. Col. Miles, uuder his orders to hold Harpers Ferry to the last extremity, while admitting the impor tance o: Maryland Heights, seemed to regard them as applying to the town of Harper's Ferry, aud held that to leave Harper's Ferry, even to go on Maryland Heights, would be disobeying his instructions Geu. McClellan established his headquar ters at Frederick City on the morning of the 13th of September. On the night of the 13i.h, aher the evacuation of Maryland Heights, Col. Miles directed Captain (now Major) Russell, of the Maryland Cavalry, to tuki; with him a few men ami endeavor to get through the enemy's line and reach some of our forces —Gen. AicCleliau, if possible—and to report the condition ul Harper's Ferry, thai it could not hold out more than 43 hours, unless rein forced, and to urge the sending of reinforce incuts. Capt Russell reached Gen. AlcClel lau's headquarters at Frederick, at 9 A. A1 on the 14iii cjepleinber, and reported as direct ed b> Col Allies. Immediately on his arrival Geu. AlcCicllun sent off a messenger, as Cap tain Russell understood, to General Franklin At 10 A. M , Captain Russell left for Gene ral h raiikiin's command, with a communication lo General Franklin from General MeCieliau. He t'euched General Franklin about 3 o'clock that afternoon, and lound Inm engaged wiili the enemy at Cramptou's Gap. The enemy were driven Irom tue Gap, and the next morn ing, Hie loth, General Franklin passed through the Gap, udvauciug about a mile, and finding the enemy drawn up iu liue of battle iu his iront, diew lus own forces up in liue of batile. While thus situated, the caunouading in the directiou of Harper's Ferry, which bad beeu heard very distinctly all the moruuig—liar per'a Ferry being it bout seven miles distant— suddenly ceased, whereupon General Franklin sent wo.d lo General McClellan of the probu hie surrender of Harper's Ferry by Colonel MiLs, und did not deem it necessary to pro ceed further in that direction. The battle ul So 111 Mountain was fought on Sunday, the 14th. On the suineday, Sun day, during the atternoon, the enemy at Har per's Fi-ny attacked the extreme left of the line ou Bolivar Heights, but, after some lime, were repulsed by the troops under command of General White. Sunday night the cavalry at Harper s Ferry made their escape, under Colouel Davis, ot the 12lh llliiuis Cavalry, by permission of Cuioucl Miles, and reached Greencastie, Pa., the uext morning, capturing an tram belonging to General Lougstreet, consisting of some fifty or sixty wagons, &c. Several of the infantry officers desired peromsiou to cut their way out, at the same time the cavalry made their escape, but Colouel Miles refused upon the ground that he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity. Ou the morning of the 15th the enemy opeued their batteries from severai points— seven to uiue, as estimated by d.ffereut wit uesses—directing their attack principally upon our batteries 011 the left of Bolivar Heights. The attack commenced at daybreak. About 7 o'clock Col. Miles represeuted to Gen. White tuat a would be necessary to surrender. Gen. White suggested that the brigade commanders be culled together, which was done. Col. Miles stated that the ammunition lor the batteries was exhausted, and he had übout made up ills mind to surrender. That was agreed to by all present, uud Gen. White was sent by Coi. Miles to arrange terms. The white flag was raised iy order of Col. Miles, lor the enemy did uol cease fire for some half or three quarters of au hour after. Col. Miles wus mortally wounded after the white flag was raised. The surrender was agreed upon about 8 A. M. on Monday, the 15th of Sep tcmber. The following was the testim my respective ly ol the officers commanding batteries: At Lite time ol the surrender You Sehlen bad some ammunition, could not tell what amount, but mostly shrapnel ; had lost about 100 rounds 011 Saturday, the 13th, by the ex plosion ot a limber caused by oue of the ene my's shells. C with freight trains. Ao army of tbe size of that under General McClellan will frequently be for some days without supplies it has ask ed for, oa account of not making timely tious for them, aud unavoidable delays iu tor warding them aud distributing them to the dif ferent brigades and regiments. From all the information that 1 can obtain I am of the opiniou that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, aud that the men, as a general rule, have beeu bet ter supplied, than in the case of our armies operating iu the West. The latter have ope rated at much greater distances from the sour ces of supplies, aud have hud far less facilities for transportation. Iu fine, I believe that uo armies iu the world in campaigning have been mor*> promptly or better supplied than ours. Third Soon after the battle of Autietam, General MeClellan was urged to give tue in formation of his intended movements, in order that if be moved belweeu the enemy and Wash ington the reinforcements could be sent from this place. On the first of October, finding he proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was prompt ly ordered to cross the Potomac and give bat tle to the enemy, or drive him South. 1 said to him : " Your army must move now, while the roads are iu good conditiou." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since : that order was given. Fourth. In my opinion there his been no i such want of supplies in the army under Gen era! MeClellan as to prevent his compliance with my orders to advance upon the enemy. llad he moved his army to the south side of the Potomac, he could have received his supplies almost as realiiy as by remaining iu active ou the north side. Fifitb. On the seventh of October, in a tel grarn iu regard to his intended movements, Gen. MeClellan stated that he would require ; at least three days to supply the first, fifth and ! sixth corps ; that they needed shoes, aud oth er indispensable articles of clothing, as well as i shelter teuts. No complaint was made to me that his army requisitions had not been filled, \ and it was inferred from his language that he j was only waiting for the distribution of his | supplies. On the eleveuth of October he telegraphed , to me that a poitiou of his supplies sent by railroad had been delayed. As already stated ag< uts were immediately sent from here to in vestigate this complaint, aud they repotted | that everything had gone forward ou the same j date, the 11th. General MeClellan spoke of many of his j horses being brokeu down by fatigue. On the J 12th of October he complained that the rate of supply was only one hundred and B f ty hors es per week for his entire army there aud iu front of Washington. 1 immediately directed the Quartermaster j General to inquire into this matter, and report i why a larger supply was uot furnished to Geu- 1 era I MeClellan. Geu. Meigs reported to me, on the 14th of j October, that the average issue of horses to General McCleliau's army in the Geld aud in front of Washington, for the previous six weeks, had beeu 1,45U per week, or 8,754 in -all. In addition, he reported to me that a large number of mules had been supplied, and thai the number of these animals with General Mc- Cleliau's army ou the Upper Potomac was over 3,100. He also reported to me that he was theu sending thui army all the houses he could pro cure. Ou the 18th of October, General MeClellan stated, in regard to Gen. Meigs' report that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing : " Gen. Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded ; but ihey might as well remain in New York oi Philadelphia, so far as my array is concerned." I immedi ately called Gen. Meigs' attention to this ap parent neglect of his department. On the 25th of October, he reported as to the result of his investigation that 4,800 pairs of boots aud shoes had been received by ihe Quartermaster uf M'Clellau's army at Har per's Ferry, Frederick and Hagerstowu. 20,- 000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry Depot ou 21st, and that ten thousand mote were on the way, aud fifteen thousand more had beeu or dered. Colonel Ingulls, aid de-camp and chief of staff to General McCllan, telegraphed on the 25th as follows : " The suffering for want of clothing has been exaggerated, 1 think, aud certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions by the regimental and brigade commanders." On the 24th of October he telegraphed to Quartermaster-General Meigs that the clothing was not detained in the cars at the depots. " Such complaiuts are ground less. The fact is the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted 1 have or dered more than would seem necessarj from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you tiiat you have always very promptly met my requisitions. As far as clotiiiug is con cerned, our department is not at fault. It provides as soou as due notice is given. I can foresee no time when an army of 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles." In regard to General McCleliau's means of promptly communicating the wants of bis army to me, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I report that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been iu hourly commu nicalion rith Washington by telegraph. It is due to GeD. Meigs that I shou.d sub mit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from General MeClellan. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 11. W. HALLECK, General in-Chief. FROM MCLELLAN'6 HEADQCARTERS— —TO BRIGAI'IER GENERAL MEIGS Your despatch of this date is received. I have never iuteuded, in any letter or dispatch, to make any accusation against yourself or yoor Department for not furnishing or for warding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for yoa to do so. I btliev* •vwytbtus bai been VOL. XXIII. —NO.SS. done that could be done in this respect. Th# idea that I have tried to convey was that cer tain portions of the command were without clothing, and that the army would oot move until it was supplied. G. B. M'CLELLAN, MaJor-OeoenJ. (From the New York Time*.) The Removal of General McClellan Gen. McClellan has been removed from the command of the Army of the Potomac and Gen. Burnside uppoiuted iu his place. The immediate cause of bis removal has been Gen. McClellan's refusal to advance agaios the en emy, even under the most peremptory orders of the Geueral in-Cbief. It will be seen by 4 letter of General Halleck to the Secretary of War,which we pub isb iu auolher column, that on the Ist of October Gen. McClellan was urged by Gen. Halleck to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy—being at tha same lime reminded of the disadvantages of delaying until the Potomac should be swollen, and the roads impaired, by the autumnal rains. Finding that this produced no effect, General McClellan was " promptly ordered" by Geueral Halleck, on the Gth ot October, to " cross the Potomac and give bailie to the enemy or driv4 him South." For three weeks this order was not obeyed, and the only excuse given for not obeyiug it, so far as appears—the waut of sup plies—is sliowu by the letter of Gen. Halleck to Lave beets utterly without foundation. The disclosures of that letter, concerning General McClellau's constant and reiterated complaints of lack of supplies, are very remarkable and deserve special attention. We presume that this particular instance of disobedience of order, though the immediate occasion, is not the whole cause of General McClellau's removal. It is pretty generally understood that ibis is only the coiumiuatiou of a systematic disregard of orders, of a stea dy uud obstinate tardiness in the conduct of the campaign against the rebels, and of a con sequent inefficiency iu command, which would long ago nave secured his dismissal uuder any Administration less timid than that which hot possession of power. The fifteen months dur ing which he has had virtual control of tha war have becu utterly barrcu of results to tha cause he has professed to serve. Few com manders in history have had such spleudid op-, port unities, and fewer still have so osteutati ously thrown them away. With an army ca pable of the most heroic achievements, power lul in numbers, unrivaled in discipline and equipment, eager always for active and on ward movement, he has accomplished absolute ly nothing but successful retreats from inferi or forces, und tha defence of the Capital at Washington, which he should have left no foo capable oi menacing. The rebel armies bava grown up in It's presence and by bis toleration. Through all his long career he has made but one attack and won but a single victory ; and that became absolutely fruitless through hit failure to follow it up. We have no theory on which to explain thia most extraordinary failure of Geueral McClel lan as a commander,or the still more extraor dinary persistance of tiie President in commit ting the'fortunes of war to his hands. Geo. McUlellau has shown too many of the quali ties of an accomplished soldier to attribute hi| failure to simple incapacity. That he is abso lutely disloyal to the Government we hava never permitted ourselves to believe. Yet we tbiuk it quite probable that his heart has nev er been iu the war—that through it all he hal had hopes of a compromise whicli should end it, and that he lias feared the effect upon mob a compromise of a stern and relentless proie eutiou of hostilities. Li is position aud possibly his feeling# have been those ascribed by Macaulay to Essex, who commucded the armies of the Parliament at the outbreak of the great civil war. He was an accomplished soldier and a Parliamenta rian: but he shrunk liom civil war—he hoped through it all for an accommodation with the King, and " next to a great defeat he dreaded a great victory." Under such a leader the war could never prosper, aud it was found neces sary to replace him by Hampden, who carried into the field the boldness and courage he had shown in politics, and who had the sagacity to see from the outset that " in war of all kinr i, moderation is imbecility." As a politic au, Gen. McClelluu's sympathies, previous to the rebel lion, had u!ways becu with the South. He has believed them wronged by Northern sen timent and by Northern actiou. And beyond all question he has hoped aud believed that a time wculd come when the war could be ar rested, and when the Southern leaders, back ed by a powerful party iu the Northern Stateß, would listen to terms of accommodation— and that nothing would stand in the way of such a compromise more than a victory which should wouud their pride by humiliating their arms and crushing their power. In this view of the ease, Gen. McClellan has beeu encouraged by the political partisan# who, at an early state iu the war, made him their prospective candidate for the Presidency and came thus to have an interest in putting him in opposition to the Administration which he professed to serve. They defended his er rors, aud made themselves the special chain ! pions of his worst mistakes. They had uu ! questionable provocation und some excuse for much of this in the intemperate zeal with which he was assailed ; but they betrayed him into au uDdue reliance on the support of a p irty, and a ruinous subsetvieucy to their wishes and views. We know uot how elie to account for the steady and systematic dis regard he has shown of the wishes and orders of the Government, and for his adherence to a deliberate and methodical inactivity, wbieU has brought the cause of the Uuion to the very verge of ruin. Unless we have been misinformed, President Lincoln bason two occasions written to Gen. McClellan, reviewing in detail his military operations, aud demonstrating bis failures to respond to the wishes aud just expectations of the Government. One of these papers wo# prepared just after McClellau had landed on the Feuiosulq the other after the battle of ± .tietam ; aod we have beard both fpcltM