THE BRADFORD REPORTER.

ONE DOLLAR PER ANNUM INVARIABLY IN ADVANCE. "REGARDLESS OF DENUNCIATION FROM ANY QUARTER." VOL. XXI.—NO. 20

PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY AT TOWANDA, BRADFORD COUNTY, PA., BY E. O'MEARA GOODRICH.

TOWANDA:

Thursday Morning, October 18, 1860.

Selected Poetry.

PROPHECIES OF THE SEASON.

BY ANTHONY HOXIE.

Where late the meadows blushed with bloom
And daisy flakes were white as snow,
The spectral shades of autumn gloom
Prophetic wander to and fro.

The hills, so long encrowned with green,
A browner garb begin to wear;
Gay summer half inclines to screen
Her beauty from the daylight's glare.

The woods fall-leaved stand waiting nigh,
Their verdure touched with crimson stains,
Yet loth to lay their honors by,
As age to part with all its gains.

A sadder note from grove and glen,
Whereto the robin's young have flown;
While mournfully the little wren
Pipes through the fading trees alone.

The brook, that prattled one sweet tone
When summer mist was soft and dim,
Keeps up a low incessant moan,
That times with Nature's graver hymn.

The swallows too have left the eaves
And flit and form in noisy bands,—
The goldfinch plans among the leaves
Her coming flights to southern lands.

Above yon mountain's rocky side,
The wary hawk swings round and round,
A friendless rover, winged with pride,
That scorns the touch of kindred ground.

These, these are but the first faint signs
Of autumn's presence;—day by day
She draws in bright but fading lines,
The picture of her own decay.

Written for the Bradford Reporter.

The Power of Congress over Slavery in the Territories.

The second paragraph of section third of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States, says: "The congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory and other property of the United States."

Does this clause of the Constitution confer on Congress the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories?"

The Constitution regards "Territory" as existing in two conditions,—first, as land simply, and second as inchoate, or begun, commenced, surveyed, exposed to sale and partly settled. In its first condition, it is property, the property of the parent state; in its second, it is a province, a colony—in fact a Territory in the American sense of the word—and this sense attaches until it acquires the legal and proper attributes of sovereignty. What was the property of the Union or Government in its first condition, has, by occupancy, purchase, and cultivation, become the property of individuals, in fact, of a community,—in the second, The rules and regulations of the first condition attach, apply, and are continued to the second so far as they go, but they are not sufficient for the demands of an advanced civilization. Others are needed such as those which provide for the administration of justice, the security of property, and for public defense.—Now a community in this early stage is entirely incompetent to meet these demands—it is weak and powerless in the face of a savage foe,—it cannot even punish the midnight assassin or robber except by lynch law, and its only hope and salvation from foreign aggression and internal broil, is in the arms and treasure of the parent state. It has scarcely a single attribute of sovereignty, and especially that important one, the power of self-defense from foes without, and foes within. It cannot afford to have, and for these reasons, it is not sovereign within its boundaries, and the ability and power to protect and defend, comes from Congress.

The emigrant from the parent state carries with him to his new home the moral and political elements which have controlled his whole life. He surrounds himself with the institutions he has learned to love. He is a "martyr to an idea." His faith is seen in his hardships and perils, and voluntary toil,—in the dangers he encounters,—and still more in the tenacity with which he clings to aught of his early home. That is his ideal, his example, and he loathes and spurns the restraint which hinders his imitation. How easy for the parent state to impress upon the young community its own law of existence, and imbrue it with its own vitality. How naturally it follows that the latter places itself in communication with the former, giving little but receiving all, creating nothing but appropriating to itself the benefits of a more perfect society.

From the regard thus manifested by the new but imperfect community to the stronger and older, from its dependence and inability to protect itself, from its origin from the right of eminent domain which inheres in the parent state until the new acquires sovereignty, from the title which occupancy and ownership inevitably confers, is deduced the right which Congress exercises and is bound to exercise, of legislating in all cases over the Territory of the United States. It is not denied that Congress may *permit* a Territory to legislate for itself in some cases, but it reserves the power of sanctioning that legislation in its own executive head, and may withhold the permission to legislate at all, if it sees fit. If Congress neglects or refuses to pass a law organizing a territory, as it has often done, the people are without law except the law of nature which is always binding,—they are squatters not citizens.

Congress possesses the right to legislate for the Territories from the nature of the case itself even though the constitution were silent. Every community in every stage of its formative process, by a law of nature's own ordination, owes allegiance to the parent state which protects it in its helpless existence, which creates and establishes it a power in the earth, and this allegiance is due from the inchoate community until it is entitled to form a Constitution and erect a sovereign state. Congress has decreed that this period shall arrive when the Territory shall attain a population of a little over ninety-three thousand. It might it is true, have said a less number, and have been nearer right, but whatever the number, in reason, its will is sovereign and decisive.

The government of the United States by a treaty with a foreign power, solemnly agreed to "maintain and protect in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property and the religion they profess" all the people and inhabitants of the Louisiana purchase. This obligation is still binding, and that, too, in reference to those peculiar institutions over which it is claimed that Congress has no power—the domestic.

What most affects the domicil? What comes nearer home, the family and social relations than the right to liberty, property and religion? And if these are rightful subjects of legislation by Congress, why not others which as nearly pertain to his domestic state? Why not slavery?

The clause we have placed at the head of this article, places the matter on precisely the same ground. It means *all* legislation which a Territory needs, for a Territory not being sovereign, can have no relations which are not domestic, hence if Congress legislates at all in reference to it, its legislation must have the character of domestic legislation.

But we admonished that this clause of the constitution, has an application only to the *property* of the general government in the land of the territory and also that included in navy yards, dock-yards, and the property contained therein.

If this be so, the convention which framed it was guilty of an unmeaning tautology, for in its enumeration of the powers of Congress, Art. 1, Sec. 8, this species of legislation is expressly provided for, and why would the convention provide for the same object twice? There can be no reasonable question, but that the power to make all "needful, rules and regulations respecting the territory" includes the power to legislate upon its domestic condition in all its parts and institutions, slavery included.

Nor is this conclusion in the least weakened by the terms used in confirming the power.—To make "needful rules and regulations" is entirely equivalent to enacting laws. A rule is a law; a regulation has the potency of a law. The terms in this connection are synonimous—meaning the creating and enacting power of Congress expressed in the usual form, and embodying the wisdom and will of the people.

There is nothing more true in the political history of the nation, than that until a late period, our public men—those whom we have most delighted to honor—held to the opinion that the convention which framed the constitution authorized the territorial prohibition of slavery by Congress. It is vain to deny this. That convention must certainly understood its meaning. It consisted of thirty-nine members. Sixteen of the thirty-nine fresh from the debates of the convention, voted two years later in the first Congress held under the constitutions to confirm the Jeffersonian ordinance prohibiting slavery in all the territories then held by the United States. How did these men understand the constitution? As withholding the power to legislate in its broadest sense upon the subject of slavery in the territories? As sanctioning slavery in any other sense than as recognizing it in the states?—Certainly not. But this is not all. Seven others of the thirty-nine, either before as members of the Congress under the confederation, or after as members of Congress under the constitution voted upon bills legislating upon the subject of slavery in the territories, making twenty-three—a majority of all the convention. Thus we see the principle of Congressional control over slavery in the territories, was fully recognized by the very men who framed the constitution. There is no sophistry which can evade these simple facts. They stand out as land marks to guide us,—as precedents to which we may recur,—as proofs that the fathers of the republic cherished no doubts of the power of Congress to legislate and control the domestic institutions of the territories, and especially slavery.

And there were great men in that convention,—Washington, Franklin, Madison, King, Sherman, Pinkney, Rutledge and others,—a galaxy, a constellation, which even now illumines our political horizon with the splendor and glory of its patriotism, and will through all time.

In the Congress which immediately followed the convention—the first under the constitution—James Madison was a leading and influential member, he having been a member of the constitutional convention also. Would he not have denounced as unconstitutional the Jeffersonian ordinance when it was submitted for confirmation and enforcement, had such been his private opinion, or had it been so considered in the convention two years before? Would not others of the sixteen have done the same, and yet the vote to confirm was not opposed by any member north or south. The expression was unanimous in favor of the ordinance, so far as unanimity can be predicated of a vote where the yeas and nays were not called. And further George Washington was also a member of the constitutional convention, and was now President under the constitution. Would he have signed the confirmatory bill had he doubted its constitutionality, or questioned the power of Congress thus to legislate? He would not, have done it, he could not under his oath of office.

In like manner every executive of the government since, has recognized the principle of congressional intervention, the only exception being the present incumbent of the Presidential chair.

It was during the latter portion of the life of John C. Calhoun, that the principle of congressional protection to slavery in the territories was first distinctly announciated. And yet, southern statesmen hesitated long to embrace it. They were startled at its boldness—its novelty—at its utter disregard of the usages and precedents of the government—at its sophistry and logical tendency to disunion and revolution—at its insulting demands of political power where plain and obvious construction denied it—at its contempt of the dictates of common sense and common justice—at its apparent determination to override all the compromises of the government, and reduce it to an instrument—a machine subservient to sectional aggrandizement. They hesitated until northern pusillanimity emasculated the manhood of the north—until the north wove the web of its own dishonor and proffered with willing hands its subjection, and gloried in its self inflicted shame. What the constitution and usage had always given it, it surrendered at the first blast of the trumpet. Nay more, it sold itself in advance of the summons to capitulate, and gave up the Missouri Compromise before it was demanded, as much a surprise and astonishment to the south as it was a humiliation to the freeman of the north.

The logic of the south is set forth in these three propositions: First, the constitution recognizes slavery. Second, it recognizes slaves as property. Third, the slaveholder has the same right to take his property to the territories that the northern freeman has to take his. Let us examine these propositions.

First the constitution does indeed recognize slavery. In three several passages or clauses it speaks of it, not as slavery but as *service due;*—it also speaks of slaves not as slaves but as persons from whom labor or service is due. In either case it means slavery and slaves,—it means the black man with the wooly head, and his condition of servitude.—But the constitution only recognizes slavery in the states where for years it has had an existenee, and is still a creature of *State law* or of local law if the phrase is any more correct.—In these three cases the constitution only recognizes it,—it sees it there,—looks at it,—apprehends it,—just as it does any other state institution which the state has created, but it does not sanction it, or protect it, or interfere with it, except for the purposes severally set forth in the clauses. It simply lets it alone in every other respect, as a state right or institution, over which the state only has control. Now just looking at it, observing it, recognizing it, but not sanctioning it, or controling it, gives Congress no authority over it any where,—because it is a state institution and not a national one, and can only exist as such. Congress can not meddle with it except as the constitution prescribes,—it cannot go beyond the three cases mentioned in the text, but by direct enactment under the article defining its power in the territories. Outside the original states in which the constitution found it, and those which have since come into the union as slave states, and those which may hereafter be admitted as such, slavery can have no legal existence, not even in the territories, for the constitution has made no provision for it there, and it could not as in its letter, spirit, tenor, and design, it recognized and treated it as a *state* institution only.

The second proposition that the constitution recognizes slaves as property is only true where state sovereignty has made them so. Inasmuch as the states at the time of the formation of the constitution had legalized slavery and made persons property by usage custom and law, no matter how repugnant to the moral sense of the world, and violative of justice and right,—no matter how far and how much it transgressed every sound principle of political economy; the convention in the spirit of compromise forbore to meddle with it, but left it to the states to "vote it up or vote it down," to cherish or discourage, to abolish or establish, as state wisdom might decide. And Congress does not at this day assume any duty connected with it as a question of property except where the constitution provides for the rendition of fugitives from labor, and this it does only to discharge an obligation it had solemnly covenanted to perform, as a condition of the more perfect union. It is so "nominated in the bond," and being so, it stands out the sole exception to the rule inculcated by that instrument, that freedom is the normal condition of the people of these United States and that man, under God, *owns* himself.

The constitution having reference only to states, will not, therefore, permit the holding of men as property in the territories. Contrary as this opinion may be to that of the courts, it will abide the examination of the world. It is not merely for the day or the hour that we are discussing this question, but for all time, and if we err in deciding it it will again and again intrude,—like Banquo's ghost it will rise in our places, and "push us from our stools" and "will not down at our bidding."

And here we may remark, *en passant*, that the Fugitive Slave Law, in just so much, as it embraces the *territories* is clearly unconstitutional.

The right which the south claims in the third proposition to have slaves regarded and protected as property in the territories is thus found to be no right at all. The absurdity of the claim is pointed out in the foregoing remarks. The constitution does not, and cannot, carry slavery with it wherever it goes. Its whole spirit is antagonistic to that institution, and for this reason the friends to freedom in the territories, may with more justice claim that the constitution forbids its introduction to all places where it is not established by state law. The true construction will at least be found, that the constitution neither prohibits nor establishes it, but that Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power to make "all needful rules and regulations," and to "provide for the general welfare" may and should, prohibit it in the territories.

But there are those among us who contend that Congress has no power either to protect, or prohibit, slavery in the territories, but that the question should be left to the people inhabiting them to decide. This is the doctrine of Popular Sovereignty,—plausible it is true, but fallacious, and in some respects, simply ridiculous.

It is plausible because it promises to secure to the settler in some way not well understood, the right to self-government in more extended sense. And how? Will it give him the right to elect his own governor or judges or magistrates? Not so. Will it allow him to institute his own judiciary system, and inaugurate any code of public instruction or improvement which is denied him now? Not so. Will it allow him te enact any law in his territorial legislature, which will not be subject to the veto of Congress or the President? Not so, not so. The territory not being sovereign, all it does must undergo the inquisition and dicta of the home government at Washington. In fact the sole and only right it contemplates conlering, additional, is that of deciding upon the admission or prohibition of slavery in the territory. And here the privilege will be merely nominal. Slavery, if it goes at all, will go with the first ten or first hundred settlers under squatter law. Before a territorial organization can be effected it will be an institution coterminous with the boundries of the territory, mocking any effort to expel it. Precisely the same if freedom is the order of progress,—the first ten or one hundred will settle the question before a protecting or prohibitory code can be brought to bear. What then the need of convulsing the country with this exciting question, but to make some demagogue president?

It is plausible because it promises to transfer the agitation of the slavery question from halls of Congress to the territorial arena. But will it? Let the settlement of the Missouri question answer. Whichever way the territory may decide, the same violence which then shook the union to its centre will be inevitable. Let Kansas answer the question. In fact, Popular Sovereignty proposes two theatres of agitation and violence instead of one—one theatre is the territory where the struggle commences,—the other the Capitol in Washington where it ends. In the one, the pioneers and settlers will grapple in the conflict,—in the other, representatives and senators, and judges, and cabinet officers, and presidents, will mingle in the fight. The first quarrel will be based upon protection and prohibition,—the last upon admission as a state.

But if the principle of Popular Sovereignty should be accepted by the people, how long will it stand? As long as the Missouri Compromise line stood think you? No, not a fourth of that time. It came with the tide of agitation, it will go with it and some other quack will put forth his nostrum, assuring a perfect cure as this does. Since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, charlatans and adventurers with the brains of cats have launched their scallop shells upon this great sea of political experiment, promising all things without the power of performing any. They have glutted the market with their placebos and false pretences, and the people are beginning to return to the time honored principles of their fathers.

The Popular Sovereignty claimed by the colonies before the Revolution, was not the Popular Sovereignty of 1860. They were crushed, but who will say that the territories of this Union have been deprived of a single right which freemen prize, except in the solitary case of Kansas. Twenty territories, or thereabouts, have come in as states since the adoption of the federal constitution, and although, in the instance of Missouri, there was a struggle, yet its memory had been obliterated and and forgotten. The violence and blood-shed in Kansas, are not to be placed to the fault of our territorial system,—they arose from the folly and tyranny of the federal executive of the government,—from the recklessness and ambition of those whose threat "we'll crush you" still lingers in a million hearts, and whose right hands will in November next, play the same crushing game.

The colonies had acquired a title, a right to sovereignty. They were three millions, not three hundred,—their arms rested upon the Atlantic on one side and the Alleganies on the other. They looked out upon a long line of sea-coast from the Bay of Passamaquoddy to the Gulf of Mexico,—they had statesmen and warriors and orators and a yeomanry burning for freedom. Why should they not be sovereign and independent? CATO.

WHAT AILED HIM.—A late number of the *Albion* has a good anecdote of a man who rarely failed to go to bed intoxicated, and disturb his wife the whole night. Upon his being charged by a friend that he never went to bed sober, he indignantly denied the charge, and gave the incidents of one particular night in proof. "Pretty soon after I got into bed, my wife said, 'Why, husband, what is the matter with you? You act strangely!' 'There's nothing the matter with me,' said I; 'nothing at all.' 'I'm sure there is,' said she; 'you don't act natural at all. Shan't I get up and get something for you?' And she got up, lighted a candle, and came to the bedside to look at me, shading the light with her hand. 'I knew there was something strange about you,' said she; 'why, *you are sober!*' Now this is a fact, and my wife will swear to it, so don't you slander me any more by saying that I haven't been to bed sober in six months, because I have!"

COMMON STYLE OF PULPIT VERBOSITY.—The other Sunday, an eminent divine was preaching upon the parable of Dives and Lazarus, and when he arrived at the point where, in great heat, Dives lifted up his eyes and asked Abraham to allow Lazarus to come to him with a drop of water, he said, "To this apparently reasonable, but, under the circumstances, totally inadmissible request, a negative answer was returned."

SUCCESS.—The first and chief element of success is decision of character. Without this, and the kindred traits that are always found in its company, such as resolution, courage and hope, there is little chance of success. With it "there is no such word as fail," and seldom any such a thing as a failure. To such a spirit even difficulties afford a stimulus, and dangers a spur. "For a resolute mind," it has been forcibly said, "is omnipotent."

Educational Department.

☞ The annual examinations for Teachers for 1860, will be holden at the following times and places, viz:

October 24, at the Milan School House, in Ulster.

Oct. 25, at the borough house, Athens.

Oct. 26, at the center house, Litchfield,

Oct. 27, at the Kuykendall house, Windham.

Oct. 29, at the Bowen Hollow house, Warren.

Oct. 30, at the Orwell Hill house.

Oct. 31, at the Academy, LeRaysville.

Nov. 1, at the Black house, Tuscarora.

Nov. 2, at the Merryall house.

Nov. 3, at the Ingham house, Wilmot.

Nov. 5, at the McGuyre house, Terry; also at the Frenchtown house, Asylum.

Nov. 6, at the Brown school house, for Albany and Overton; also at the Stevens house, Standing Stone, (at which last named place the examination will commence at 11 o'clock, a. m.

Nov. 7, at the borough house, Monroe; also at the Herrickville school house.

Nov. 8, at the borough house, for the Towandas; also at the Academy at Rome.

Nov. 9, at the Gore house for Sheshequin.

Nov. 10, at the Myersburg house, Wysox.

Nov. 12, at the Varney house, Franklin; also at the borough house for Burlingtons.

Nov. 13, at the Taylor house, Granville; also at the center house, Sprinnfield.

Nov. 14, at the center house, LeRoy; also at the Burnham house, Ridgbury.

Nov. 15, at the Corners house, for Canton and Armenia; also at the Gillett house, South Creek.

Nov. 16, at the borough house, Troy; also at the Rowley house, Wells.

Nov. 17, at the Academy, Smithfield; also at the Morgan Hollow house, Columbia.

The examinations will commence precisely at 10 o'clock, A. M. No candidates will be examined who do not come in before 11, unless the tardiness be unavoidable. No person will be inspected who does not intend to teach in the county during the year, neither will any be examined that have attended inspections in other townships. Private examinations will in no case be granted, except in accordance with the provisions of the school law, as found on page 51. Each teacher will bring a Reader, one sheet of Foolscap Paper, pen and ink.

Directors and parents are earnestly invited to be present at the examinations in their respective townships.

C. R. COBURN, Co. Sup't.

Towanda, September 4, 1860.

☞ We clip the following from the School Journal for the benefit of those who do not have an opportunity of seeing it:

QUESTION: Should a certificate be granted to an old man who is a sufficient scholar, but whose energies are too greatly impaired to be a successful teacher?

ANSWER: Certainly not. It is learned *teachers*, and not mere *scholars* that are required, both by the school law and the youth of the land. A *scholar* is one who *knows* for his own information and satisfaction. A teacher is one who not only knows, but is "competent" to *impart* instruction in all the branches required to be taught in his school; and this competency consists not more in the necessary scholarly acquirements, than in professional skill and physical and mental energy. If he lack either of the latter, he is not a "competent" teacher, and should not receive a certificate.

QUESTION: Is "Laborer" an occupation?—*Same District.*

ANSWER: It is: and is to be taxed $1, unless its valuation in the adjusted valuation, is more than will yield $1 by the District rate.—In the latter case, the whole amount of its valuation is to be taxed by the rate, without the $1 tax being added.

QUESTION: If a County Superintendent receives a four months certificate, duly made out and sworn to, and yet knows positively that Teachers have been employed in the District during the year, without a certificate,—what must he do?—*County Superintendent.*

ANSWER: It is his duty, as it is that of any other public officer, to guard the trust confided to him. In this case, he should ascertain whether the act of apparent perjury was knowingly and fraduently committed. If not, as is barely possiule, he may return the document to the President of the District, leaving the difficulty growing out of the illegal employment of teachers, in the hands of the proper Board and District for solution. If the act was wilful and designed, then it is his duty to transmit the fraudulent certificate to this Department, with his statement of the facts of the case; whence it will be transmitted to the hands of the District Attorney of the proper county for investigation.

QUESTION: If nothing is said in the contract between a Teacher and the Board of Directors, about holidays and vacations, can the teacher grant holidays without making up for the time thus lost?—*Teacher in Bucks County.*

ANSWER: He cannot, unless he have the consent of the Board to the granting of the holiday. He must, if required, make up the lost time,—except, *perhaps* in the case of "thanksgiving day" which is now set apart by public authority, and, *certainly* in that of the 4th of July, if it occur in the school time, which is set apart by common consent.

QUESTION: I have refused a number of applications for Private Examinations. Have I been right in so doing?—*County Superintendent.*

ANSWER: Perfectly right, at present.—While the public examinations of a county are in progress, no private examination should be allowed. All persons desirous of being examined can attend one or the other of the public examinations. This will not only fulfil the law but avoid unnecessary occupation of the County Superintendent's time. Besides, it is a suspicious circumstance for any one to ask a private examination, when a public one can be so readily obtained.

Private examinations are to be granted only in extreme cases, and only after all the public examinations of the county have taken place. The only cases, now thought of, that seem to justify what is called a private examination, are those of a District having failed to secure teachers for all its schools, by means of the public examination, and of a school rendered vacant by the death, resignation, or dismissal of the teacher. In these cases, private, or more properly, *special* examinations should granted, but only at the written request of the proper Board, and with full opportunity for them to be present if they desire it.

QUESTION: Is a provisional certificate, for one year, granted by an ontgoing County Superintendent, binding on his successor?—*County Superintendent.*

ANSWER: It is; and it can only be annulled for misconduct or incompetency, known by or proved to the successor. A provisional certificate is as valid as a professional one, during the term for which it is issued. This decision—which should render County Superintendents very cautious in the granting of provisional certificates,—is based on the principle, that though the person who holds the office of County Superintendent may change every three years or oftener, the office always remains the same in the eye of the law; and its acts, legally performed, are binding on all who hold it.

MY WIFE'S PIANO.—The deed is accomplished. My wife has got a piano. It came on a dray. Six men carried it into the parlor, and it grunted awfully. It weighs a ton, shines like a mirror, and has carved Cupids climbing up on its limbs. And such lungs—whew! My wife has commenced to practice, and the first time she touched the machine, I thought we were in the midst of a thunderstorm, and the lightning had struck the crockery chest. The cat, with tail erect, took a bee line for a particular friend upon the back fence, demolishing a six-shilling pane of glass. The baby awoke, and the little fellow tried his best to beat the instrument, but he couldn't do it. It beat him.

A teacher has been introduced into the house. He says he is the last of Napoleon's grand army. He wears a huge moustache, looks at me fiercely, smells of gartic, and goes by the name of Count Run-a-way-never-come-back-again-by. He played an extract de opera the other night. He ran his fingers through his hair twice, then grinned, then cocked his eye up to the ceiling, like a monkey hunting flies, and then came down one of his fingers, and I heard a delightful sound, similar to that produced by a cockroach dancing upon the tenor string of a fiddle. Down came another finger, and I was reminded of the wind whistling through the knot hole of a hen-coop. He touched his thumb, and I thought I was in an orchard listening to the distant braying of a jackass. Now he ran his fingers along the keys, and I thought of a boy rattling a stick upon a store box or a picket fence. All of a sudden he stopped, and I thought something had happened. Then he came down with fists, and, oh, Lord! such a noise was never heard before. I thought a hurricane had struck the house and the walls were caving in. I imagined I was in the cellar, and a ton of coal was falling about my head.

☞ About ten years ago, there lived near Cincinnati a family by the name of Stringer. The eldest son, Jake, was a most eccentric genius. One day his mother said:

"Jake, I want you to go to the store"—half a mile distant—"and get me a quarter's worth of sugar and a quarter's worth of soap."

Jake roused himself up, brushed the whittlings from his lap, and started forward on his errand. He did not return. Ten years passed by, and no tidings were heard of the errand. Yesterday, as the family were sitting down to their Thanksgiving dinner, the door opened and in came a tall, moustachoed, good-looking man, with some bundles in his hand. It was Jake Stringer. All the family sprang to their feet in astonishment, but the mother and Jake were perfectly cool.

"Mother," said Jake, "here's your sugar and soap."

"Lay them on the table and eat your dinner," said Mrs. Stringer; "you out to be whipped for staying so long."—*Exchange.*

YANKEE START FOR HEAVEN.—The following "business view" of religious values will not be amiss in statistics:—"A pew is for sale in the meeting house of the first parish in Amherst. The man that owns the pew owns the right of space just as long as the pew is, from the bottom of the meeting house to the top or roof, and he can go as much higher as he can get. If a man buy my pew, and sit in it on Sundays, and repent and be a good man, he will go to heaven, if God lets him go. Let a man start from the right place, let him go right, keep right, do right, and he will go to heaven at last; and my pew is as good a place to start from as any pew in the meeting house."

A PHYSICIAN, who lived in London, visited a lady who resided in Chelsea. After continuing his visits for some time, the lady expressed an apprehension that it might be inconvenient for him to come so far on her account. "Oh, by no means," replied the doctor; "I have another patient in the neighborhood, and I always set out hoping to kill two birds with one stone."

MIND WHERE YOU LAY THE EMPHASIS.—Sir Fletcher Norton was noted for his want of courtesy. When pleading before Lord Mansfield, on some question of manorial right, he chanced unfortunately to say, "My lord, I can illustrate the point in an instance in my own person: I myself have two little manors." The judge immediately interposed, with one of his blandest smiles, "We all know it, Sir Fletcher."