THE BRADFORD REPORTER.

ONE DOLLAR PER ANNUM, INVARIABLY IN ADVANCE. "REGARDLESS OF DENUNCIATION FROM ANY QUARTER." VOL. XVI.—NO. 5.

PUBLISHED EVERY SATURDAY AT TOWANDA, BRADFORD COUNTY, PA., BY E. O'MEARA GOODRICH.

TOWANDA:

Saturday Morning, July 14, 1855.

Selected Poetry.

SPARKING SUNDAY NIGHT.

Sitting in the corner
On a sunday eve,
With a taper finger
Resting on your sleeve;
Starting eyes are casting
On your face their light;
Bless me! this is pleasant—
Sparking Sunday Night?

How your heart is thumping
'Gainst your Sunday vest—
How wickedly 'tis working
On this day of rest.
Hours seem but minutes
As they take their flight;
Bless me! AIN'T it pleasant—
Sparking Sunday Night?

Dad and Mam are sleeping
On their peaceful bed,
Dreaming of the things
The folks in Meeting said—
"Love ye one another,"
Ministers recite;
Bless me! DON'T we do it—
Sparking Sunday Night?

One arm with gentle pressure
Lingers round her waist,
You squeeze her dimpled hand,
Her pouting lip you taste;
She freely slaps your face,
But more in love than spite;
Oh thunder! ain't it pleasant—
Sparking Sunday Night?

But hark! the clock is striking—
It's two o'clock, I snum,
As sure as I'm a sinner
The time to go has come;
You ask with spiteful accents,
If "that old clock is right,"
And wonder if it ever
Sparked on Sunday Night?

One, two, three, sweet kisses,
Four, five, six, you hook—
But thinking that you rob her,
Give back those you took;
Then as forth you hurry
From the fair one's sight,
Don't you wish each day was
Only Sunday Night?

COL. BENTON'S HISTORY.

Calhoun's Approval of the Missouri Compromise.

ANNO 1838—MR. VAN BUREN PRESIDENT.

This portentous agitation, destined to act so seriously on the harmony, and possibly on the stability of the Union, requires to be noted in its different stages, that responsibility may follow culpability, and the judgment of history fall where it is due, if a deplorable calamity is made to come out of it. In this point of view, the movements for and against slavery in the session of 1837-'38 deserve to be noted as of disturbing effect at the time, and as having acquired new importance from subsequent events. Early in the session a memorial was presented in the Senate from the General Assembly of Vermont, remonstrating against the annexation of Texas to the United States, and praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, followed by many petitions from citizens and societies in the northern states to the same effect, and further—for the abolition of slavery in the territories—for the abolition of the slave trade between the states—and for the exclusion of future slave states from the Union.

There was but little in the state of the country at that time to excite an anti-slavery feeling, or to excuse these disturbing applications to Congress. There was no slave territory at that time but that of Florida; and to ask to abolish slavery there, where it had existed from the discovery of the continent, or to make its continuance a cause for the rejection of the state when ready for admission into the Union, and thus form a free state in the rear of all the great slave states, was equivalent to praying for the dissolution of the Union. Texas, if annexed, would be south of 36 degrees 30 minutes, and its character, in relation to slavery, would be fixed by the Missouri Compromise line of 1820. The slave trade between the states was an affair of the states, with which Congress had nothing to do, and the continuance of slavery, in the District of Columbia, so long as it existed in the adjacent states of Virginia and Maryland, was a point of policy in which every Congress and every administration had concurred, from the formation of the Union, and in which there was never a more decided concurrence than at present.

The petitioners did not live in any territory, state or district subject to slavery. They felt none of the evils of which they complained, were answerable for none of the supposed sin which they denounced, were living under a government which acknowledged property in slaves, and had no right to disturb the rights of the owner, and committed a cruelty upon the slave by the additional rigors which their pernicious interference brought upon him.

The subject of the petitions was disagreeable in itself; the language in which they were couched was offensive; and the wantonness of their presentation aggravated a proceeding sufficiently provoking in the civilest form in which it could be conducted. Many petitions were in the same words, bearing internal evidence of concert among their signers; many were signed by women, whose proper sphere was far from the field of legislation, all united in a common purpose which bespoke community of origin and the superintendence of a general direction. Every presentation gave rise to a question and debate, in which sentiments and feelings were expressed, and consequences predicted, which it was painful to hear. While almost every senator condemned these petitions, and the spirit in which they originated, and language in which they were couched, and considered them as tending to no practical object, and only calculated to make disunion and irritation, there were others who took them in a graver sense, and considered them as leading to the inevitable separation of the states. In this sense, Mr. CALHOUN said:—

"He had foreseen what this subject would come to; he knew its origin, and that it lay deeper than was supposed. It grew out of a spirit of fanaticism, which was daily increasing, and if not met *in limine*, would by-and-by dissolve this Union. It was particularly our duty to keep the matter out of the Senate, out of the halls of the National Legislature. These fanatics were interfering with what they had no right. Grant the reception of these petitions and you will next be asked to act on them. He was for no conciliatory course, no temporizing; instead of yielding one inch he would rise in opposition, and he hoped every man from the South would stand by him to put down this growing evil. There was but one question that would ever destroy this Union, and that was involved in this principle. Yes: this was potent enough for it, and must be early arrested if the Union was to be preserved. A man must see little into what is going on, if he did not perceive that this spirit was growing, and that the rising generation was becoming more strongly imbued with it. It was not to be stopped by reports on paper, but by action, and very decided action."

The question which occupied the Senate was, as to the most judicious mode of treating these memorials, with a view to prevent their evil effects; and that was entirely a question of policy, on which senators disagreed who concurred in the main object. Some deemed it most advisable to receive and consider the petitions—to refer them to a committee—and subject them to the adverse report which they would be sure to receive; as had been done with the Quakers' petitions at the beginning of the government. Others deemed it preferable to refuse to receive them.

The objection urged to this latter course was, that it would mix up a new question with the slavery agitation which would enlist the sympathies of many who did not co-operate with the abolitionists—the question of the right of petition; and that this new question, mixing with the other, might swell the number of petitioners, keep up the applications to Congress, and perpetuate an agitation which would otherwise soon die out. Mr. CLAY and many others were of this opinion; Mr. CALHOUN and his friends thought otherwise, and the result was, so far as it concerned the petitions of individuals and societies, what it had previously been—a half-way measure between reception and rejection—a motion to lay the question of reception on the table. This motion, precluding all discussion, got rid of the petitions quietly, and kept debate out of the Senate.

In the case of the memorial from the state of Vermont, the proceeding was slightly different in form, but the same in substance. As the act of a state it was received, but after reception was laid on the table. Thus, all the memorials and petitions were disposed of by the Senate in a way to accomplish the twofold object, first, of avoiding discussion, and next, condemning the object of the petitioners. It was accomplishing all that the South asked, and if the subject had rested at that point there would have been nothing in the history of this session on the slavery agitation to distinguish it from other sessions about that period; but the subject was revived, and in a way to force discussion, and to constitute a point for the retrospect of history.

Every memorial and petition had been disposed of according to the wishes of the senators from the slaveholding states, but Mr. CALHOUN deemed it due to those states to go further, and to obtain from the Senate declarations which should cover all the questions of federal power over the institution of slavery. For that purpose he submitted a series of resolves, six in number, which derive their importance from their comparison, or rather contrast, with others on the same subject presented by him in the Senate ten years later, and which have given birth to doctrines and proceedings which have greatly disturbed the harmony of the Union and palpably endangered its stability.

The six resolutions of this period ('37-'38) undertook to define the whole extent of the power delegated by the states to the federal government on the subject of slavery—to specify the acts which would exceed that power—and to show the consequences of doing anything not authorized to be done. The first four of these related to the states; about which there being no dispute, there was no debate.—The sixth, without naming Texas, was prospective, and looked forward to a case which might include her annexation; and was laid upon the table to make way for an express resolution from Mr. Preston on the same subject. The fifth related to the territories, and to the District of Columbia, and was the only one which excited attention, or has left a surviving interest. It was in these words:

"Resolved, That the intermeddling of any state or states, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this District, or any of the territories, on the ground or under the pretext that it is immoral or sinful; or the passage of any act or measure of Congress, with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholding states."

The dogma of "no power in Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in territories," was not then invented, and of course was not asserted in this resolve, intended by its author to define the extent of the federal legislative power on the subject. The resolve went upon existence of the power and deprecated its abuse. It put the District of Columbia into the same category, both for the exercise of the power and the consequences to result from the intermeddling of states or citizens, or the passage of any act of Congress to abolish slavery in either. The intermeddling and the legislation were deprecated solely on the ground of inexpediency.

Mr. CLAY believed this inexpediency to rest upon different grounds in the District and in territory of Florida—the only territory in which slavery then existed, and to which Mr CALHOUN's resolutions could apply. He was as much opposed as any one to the abolition of slavery in either of these places, but believed that a different reason should be given for each, founded in their respective circumstances; and therefore submitted an amendment, consisting of two resolutions—one applicable to the district, the other to the territory. In stating the reasons why slavery should not be abolished in Florida, he quoted the Missouri compromise line of 1820. This was objected to by other senators on the ground that that line did not apply to Florida, and that her case was complete without it. Of that opinion was the Senate, and the clause was struck out.—This gave Mr. CALHOUN occasion to speak of that compromise, and of his own course in relation to it, in the course of which he declared himself to have been favorable to that memorable measure at the time it was adopted, but opposed to it now from having experienced its ill-effects in encouraging the spirit of abolitionism.

"He was glad that the portion of the amendment which referred to the Missouri Compromise had been struck out. He was not a member of Congress when that compromise was made, but it is due to candor to state, that his impressions were in its favor; but it is equally due to it to say, that with his present experience, and knowledge of the spirit which then, for the first time, began to disclose itself, that he had entirely changed his opinion. He now believed that it was a dangerous measure, and that it has done much to rouse into action the spirit. Had it then been met with uncompromising opposition, such as a then distinguished and sagacious member from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) now no more, opposed to it, abolition might have been crushed forever in its birth. He then thought of Mr. RANDOLPH as, he doubts not, many think of him now, who have not fully looked into this subject, that he was too unyielding, too uncompromising, too impracticable; but he had been taught his error, and took great pleasure in acknowledging it."

This declaration is explicit. It is made in a spirit of candor, and as due to justice. It is a declaration spontaneously made, not an admission obtained on interrogatories. It shows that Mr. Calhoun was in favor of the compromise at the time it was adopted and has since changed his opinions—"entirely changed" them, to use his own words—not on constitutional but expedient grounds. He had changed upon experience, and upon seeing the dangerous effects of the measure. He had been taught his error, and took pleasure in acknowledging it. He blamed Mr. Randolph then for having been to uncompromising, but now thought him sagacious, and believed that if the measure had met with uncompromising opposition at the time, it would have crushed forever the spirit of abolitionism. All these are reasons of expediency, derived from after-experience, and excludes the idea of any constitutional objection. The establishment of the Missouri Compromise line was the highest possible exercise of legislative authority over the subject of slavery in a territory. It abolished it where it legally existed. It forever forbid it where it had legally existed for one hundred years.

This abolition and prohibition extended over an area large enough to make a dozen states; and of all this Mr. Calhoun was in favor; and now had nothing but reasons of expediency, and they *ex post facto*, against. His expressed belief now was that the measure was dangerous,—he does not say unconstitutional, but dangerous—and this corresponds with the terms of his resolution then submitted, which makes the intermeddling to abolish slavery in the District or territories, or any act or measure of Congress to that effect, a "dangerous" attack on the institutions of the slaveholding states. Certainly the idea of the unconstitutionality of such legislation had not then entered his head. The substitute resolve of Mr. Clay differed from that of Mr. Calhoun in changing the word "intermeddling" to that of "interference," and confining that word to the conduct of citizens, and making the abolition or attempted abolition of slavery in the District an injury to its own inhabitants as well as to the states, and placing its protection under the faith implied in accepting it cession from Maryland and Virginia. It was in these words:

"That the interference, by the citizens of any of the states, with the view to the abolition of slavery in this District, is endangering the rights and security of the people in the District; and that any act or measure of Congress, designed to abolish slavery in this District, would be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the states of Virginia and Maryland; a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholding states, and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union."

The vote on the final adoption of the resolution was:

YEAS—Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Clay of Kentucky, Thomas Clayton, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon, Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Franklin Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane, Robinson, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Strange, Tallmadge, Tipton, Walker, White, Williams, Wright, Young.

NAYS—Messrs. Davis, Knight, McKean, Morris, Prentiss, Smith of Indiana, Swift, Webster.

The second resolution of Mr. Clay applied to slavery in a territory where it existed, and deprecated any attempt to abolish it in such territory as alarming to the slave states, and as violation of faith towards its inhabitants, unless they asked it, and in derogation of its right to decide the question of slavery for itself when erected into a state. This resolution intended to cover the case of Florida, and ran thus:

"*Resolved*, That any attempt of Congress to abolish slavery in any territory of the United States, in which it exists, would create serious alarm and just apprehension in the states sustaining that domestic institution, would be a violation of good faith towards the inhabitants of any such territory who have been permitted to settle with and hold slaves therein; because the people of any such territory have not asked for the abolition of slavery therein; and because, when any such territory shall be admitted into the Union as a state, the people thereof shall be entitled to decide that question exclusively for themselves."

And the vote upon it was—

YEAS—Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay, of Alabama, Clay of Kentucky, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon, Merrick, Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Pierce, Preston, Rivers, Roan, Robinson, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Strange, Tipton, Walker, White, and Young.

NAYS—Messrs. Thomas Clayton, Davis, Knight, McKean, Prentiss, Robbins, Smith of Indiana, Swift and Webster.

The few senators who voted against both resolutions, chiefly did so for reasons wholly unconnected with their merits; some because opposed to any declarations on the subject as abstract and inoperative, others because they dissented from the reasons expressed, and preferred others. Mr. Calhoun voted for both, not in preference to his own, but as agreeing to them after they had been preferred by the Senate, and so gave his recorded assent to the doctrines they contained. Both admit the constitutional power of Congress over the existence of slavery both in the District and the territories, but deprecate its abolition where it existed for reasons of high expediency, and in this view, it is believed, nearly the entire Senate concurred, and quite the entire Senate on the constitutional point, there being no reference to that point in any part of the debates. Mr. Webster, probably, spoke the sentiments of most of those voting with him when he said: "If the resolutions set forth that all domestic institutions, except so far as the constitution might interfere, and any intermeddling therewith by a state or individual, was contrary to the spirit of the confederacy, and was thereby illegal and unjust, he would give them his hearty and cheerful support; and would do so still, if the senators from South Carolina would consent to such an amendment; but in their present form he must give his vote against them."

The general feeling of the Senate was that of entire repugnance to the whole movement—that of the petitions and memorial on the one hand, and Mr. Calhoun's resolutions on the other. The former were quietly got rid of, and in a way to rebuke as well as to condemn their presentation, that is to say, by motions, (sustained by the body,) to lay them on the table.—The resolutions could not so easily be disposed of, especially as their mover earnestly demanded discussion, spoke at large and often himself, "and desired to make the question, on their rejection or adoption, a *test* question." They were abstract, leading to no result—made discussion where silence was desirable—frustrated the design of the Senate in refusing to discuss the abolition petitions—gave them an importance to which they were not entitled—promoted agitation—embarrassed friendly senators from the North—placed some in false positions—and brought animadversions from many. Thus, Mr Buchanan:

"I cannot believe that the senator from South Carolina has taken the best course to attain these results, (quieting agitation.) This is the great centre of agitation. From this capitol it spreads over the whole Union. I therefore deprecate a protracted discussion of the question here. It can do no good, but may do much harm, both in the North and in the South.

"The senators from Delaware, although representing a slaveholding state, have voted against these resolutions, because, in their opinion, they can detect in them the poison of nullification. Now I can see no such thing in them, and am ready to avow in the main they contain nothing but correct political principles to which I am devoted. But what then? These senators are placed in a false position, and are compelled to vote against resolutions, the object of which they heartly approve.—Again: my friend, the senator from New Jersey, (Mr. Wall,) votes against them because they are political abstractions, of which he thinks the Senate ought not to take cognizance, although he is as much opposed to abolition, and as willing to maintain the constitutional rights of the South, as any senator upon shis floor. Other senators believe the right of petition has been endangered; and until that has been established, they will not vote for any resolutions on the subject. Thus we stand; and those of us in the North who must sustain the brunt of the battle are forced into false positions. Abolition thus acquires force by bringing to its aid the right of petition and the hostility which exists at the North against the doctrines of nullification.

"It is vain to say that these principles are not really involved in the question. This may be, and in my opinion is true; but why, by our conduct here, should we afford the abolitionists such plausible pretexts? The fact is, and it cannot be disguised, that those of us in the northern states who have determined to sustain the rights of the slave states at every hazard, are placed in a most embarrassing situation.—We are almost literally between two fires.—Whilst in front we are assailed by the abolitionists our own friends in the South are constantly driving us into positions where their enemies and our enemies may gain important advantages."

And thus Mr. Crittenden:

"If the object of these resolutions was to produce peace and allay excitement, it appeared to him that they were not very likely to accomplish such a purpose. More vague and general abstractions could hardly have been brought forward, and they were more calculated to produce agitation and stir up discontent and bad blood, than to do any good whatever. Such he knew was the general opinion of southern men, few of whom, however they assented to the abstractions, approved of this method of agitating the subject. The mover of these resolutions relies mainly on two points to carry the Senate with him: first, he reiterates the cry of danger to the Union; and next, that if he is not followed in this movement, he urges the inevitable consequence of the destruction of the Union. It is possible the gentleman may be mistaken. It possibly might not be exactly true that, to save the Union, it was necessary to follow him. On the contrary, some were of opinion, and he for one was much inclined to be of the same view, that to follow the distinguished mover of these resolutions, to pursue the course of irritation, agitation and intimidation which he chalked out, would be the very best and surest method that could be chalked out to destroy this great and happy Union."

And thus Mr. Clay:

"The series of resolutions under consideration has been introduced by the senator from South Carolina, after he and other senators from the South had deprecated discussion on the delicate subject to which they relate. They have occasioned much discussion, in which hitherto I have not participated. I hope that the tendency of the resolutions may be to allay the excitement which unhappily prevails in respect to the abolition of slavery; but I confess that, taken altogether, and in connection with other circumstances, and especially considering the manner in which their author has pressed them on the Senate, I fear that they will have the opposite effect; and particularly at the North, that they may increase and exasperate, instead of diminishing and assuaging the existing agitation."

And thus Mr. Preston, of South Carolina:

"His objections to the introduction of the resolutions were, that they allowed ground for discussion; and that the subject ought never to be allowed to enter the halls of the legislative assembly was always to be taken for granted by the South, and what would abstract propositions of this nature effect?"

And thus Mr. Strange, of North Carolina:

"What did they set forth but abstract principles, to which the South had again and again certified? What bulwark of defence was needed stronger than the constitution itself? Every movement on the part of the South only gave additional strength to her opponents.—The wisest, nay, the only safe course, was to remain quiet, though prepared at the same time to resist all aggression. Questions like this only tended to excite angry feelings. The senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun,) charged with him "*preaching*" to one side.—Perhaps he had sermonized too long for the patience of the Senate; but then he had *preached* to all sides. It was the agitation of the question in any form or shape that rendered it dangerous. Agitating this question in any shape was ruinous to the South."

And thus Mr. Richard H. Bayard of Delaware:

"Though he denounced the spirit of abolition as dangerous and wicked in the extreme, yet he did not feel himself authorized to vote for the resolutions. If the doctrines contained in them were correct, then nullification was correct; and if passed, might hereafter be appealed to as a precedent in favor of that doctrine, though he acquitted the senator of having the most remote intention of smuggling in anything in relation to that doctrine under cover of these resolutions."

Mr. Calhoun annoyed by so much condemnation of his course, and especially from those as determined as himself to protect the slave institution where it legally existed, spoke often and warmly, and justified his course from the greatness of the danger, and the fatal consequences to the Union if it was not arrested.

"I fear (said Mr. C.) that the Senate has not elevated its view sufficiently to comprehend the extent and magnitude of the existing danger. It was perhaps his misfortune to look too much to the future, and to move against dangers at too great a distance, which had involved him in many difficulties, and exposed him often to the imputation of unworthy motives. Thus he had long forseen the immense surplus revenue which a false system of legislation must pour into the treasury, and the fatal consequences to the morals and institutions of the country which must follow. When nothing else could arrest it, he threw himself, with his state, into the breach, to arrest dangers which could not otherwise be arrested; whether wisely or not, he left posterity to judge.

"He now saw with equal clearness, as clear as the noonday sun, the fatal consequences which must follow, if the present disease be not timely arrested. He would repeat again what he had so often said on this floor. This was the only question of sufficient magnitude and potency to divide this Union, and divide it it would, or drench the country in blood, if not arrested. He knew how much the sentiment he had uttered would be misconstrued and misrepresented. There were those who saw no danger to the Union in the violation of all its fundamental principles, but who were full of apprehension when danger was foretold or resisted, and who held not the authors of the danger, but those who forewarned or opposed it, responsible for consequences.

"But the cry of disunion by the weak or designing has no terrors for him. If his attachment to the Union was less, he might tamper with the deep disease which now afflicts the body politic, and keep silent till the patient was ready to sink under its mortal blows. It is a cheap, and, he must say, but too certain a mode of acquiring the character of devoted attachment to the Union. But seeing the danger, as he did, he would be a traitor to the Union, and those he represented, to keep silence. The assaults daily made on the institutions of nearly one-half of the states of this Union by the other—institutions interwoven from the beginning with their political and social existence, and which cannot be other than, without their inevitable destruction, will and must, if continued, *make two people of one*, by destroying every sympathy between the two great sections, obliterating from their hearts the recollection of their common danger and glory, and implanting in their place a mutual hatred, more deadly than ever existed between two neighboring people since the commencement of the human race. He feared not the circulation of the thousands of incendiary and slanderous publications which were daily issued from an organized and powerful press among those intended to be villified. They cannot penetrate our section; that was not the danger; it lay in a different direction. Their circulation in the non-slaveholding states was what was to be dreaded. It was infusing a deadly poison into the minds of the rising generation, implanting in them feelings of hatred, the most deadly hatred, instead of affection and love, for one-half of this Union, to be returned, on their part, with equal detestation. The fatal, the immutable consequences, if not arrested, and that without delay, were such as he had presented.

"The first and desirable object is to arrest it in the non-slaveholding states; to meet the disease where it originated, and where it exists; and the first step to this is to find some common constitutional ground on which a rally, with that object, can be made. These resolutions present the ground, and the only one, on which it can be made. The only remedy is in the state rights doctrines; and, if those who profess them in slaveholding states do not rally on them, as their political creed, and organize as a party against the fanatics, in order to put them down, the South and West will be compelled to take the remedy into their own hands. They will then stand justified in the sight of God and man; and what, in that event, will follow, no mortal can anticipate.

"Mr. President, (said Mr. C.) we are reposing on a volcano. The Senate seems entirely ignorant of the state of feeling in the South. The mail has just brought us intelligence of a most important step taken by one of the southern states in connection with this subject, which will give some conception of the tone of feeling which begins to prevail in that quarter."

Mr. BENTON did not speak in this debate.—He believed, as others did, that discussion was injurious—that it was the way to keep up and extend agitation—and the thing above all others which the abolitionists desired. Discussion upon the floor of the American Senate was to them the concession of an immense advantage—the concession of an elevated and commanding theatre for the display and dissemination of their doctrines.

The Senate, in laying all their petitions, and the memorial of Vermont, on the table, without debate, signified its desire to yield them no such advantage. The introduction of Mr. CALHOUN's resolutions frustrated that desire, and induced many to do what they condemned.—Mr. BENTON took his own sense of the proper course in abstaining from debate, and confining the expression of his opinions to the delivery of votes; and in that he conformed to the sense of the Senate and the action of the House of Representatives. Many hundreds of these petitions were presented in the House, and quietly laid upon the table under motions to that effect; and this would have been the case in the Senate had it not been for the resolutions, the introdution of which was so generally deprecated.

The part of this debate which excited no attention, but has since acquired a momentous importance, is that part in which Mr. CALHOUN declared his favorable disposition to the Missouri Compromise, and condemnation of Mr. RANDOLPH, (its chief opponent,) for opposing it, and his change of opinion since, not for unconstitutionality, but because he believed it dangerous in encouraging the spirit of abolitionism. This was the highest, the most solemn, the most momentous, the most emphatic assertion of Congressional power over slavery in a territory which had ever been made or could be conceived. It not only abolished slavery where it legally existed, but forever prohibited it where it had long existed; and that over an extent of territory larger than the area of all the Atlantic slave states put together; and thus yielding to the free states the absolute predominance in the Union.

Mr. CALHOUN was for that resolution in 1820, blamed those who opposed it, and could see no objection to it in 1838 but the encouragement it gave to the spirit of abolitionism. Nine years afterwards, (session of 1846-47,) he submitted other resolutions, (five in number,) on the same power of Congress over slavery legislation in the territories—denied the power—and asserted that any such legislation to the prejudice of slaveholding emigrants from the states in preventing them from removing, with their slave property, to such territory, "would be a violation of the constitution and the rights of the states from which such citizens emigrated, and a derogation of that perfect equality which belongs to them as members of this Union, and would tend directly to subvert the Union itself."

These resolutions, so new and startling in their doctrines, so contrary to their antecessors and to the whole course of the government, were denounced by the writer of this View the instant they were read in the Senate; and being much discountenanced by other senators, they were never pressed to a vote in that body, but were afterwards adopted by some of the state legislatures. One year afterwards, in a debate on the Oregon territories bill, and on the section which proposed to declare the anti-slavery clause of the ordinance of 1787 to be in force in that territory, Mr. CALHOUN denied the power of Congress to make any such declaration, or in any way to legislate upon slavery in a territory. He delivered a most elaborate and thoroughly considered speech on the subject, in the course of which he laid down three propositions:—

1. That Congress had no power to legislate upon slavery in a territory so as to prevent the citizens of slaveholding states from removing into it with their slave property.

2 That Congress had no power to delegate such authority to a territory.

3. That a territory had no such power in itself—(thus leaving the subject of slavery in a territory without any legislative power over it at all.)

These propositions being in flagrant conflict with the power exercised by Congress in the establishment of the Missouri Compromise line, which had become a tradition as a southern measure, supported by southern members of Congress and sanctioned by the cabinet of Mr. MUNROE, of which Mr. CALHOUN was a member—the fact of that compromise, and his con-