

Bradford Reporter.

E. O. GOODRICH, EDITOR.

TOWANDA:

Saturday Morning, February 10, 1855.

OUR NEW DRESS.

The Reporter this week, pays its usual visit, clad in an entire new suit. The change, is, out, which we presume, will be agreeable to our readers. To keep pace with the times, and particularly with the new terms we have adopted, we have procured, at considerable expense, new type, of a convenient size for reading matter, and for advertisements, smaller than we have been using, to make them occupy less space.

This is but one of the many improvements we design making in the Reporter to give the Dollar-in-advance system a fair trial. Having pay for every paper we send, we shall endeavor to have it a welcome visitor to every fireside. In the meantime, we invite and expect the co-operation of our friends throughout the County. To succeed, we shall need a large addition to our list of subscribers. It would be very easy for every subscriber to persuade some neighbor to subscribe, while others by a few hours' exertion could make up clubs of from five to fifteen. Shall we not have the aid of our friends?

INDUCEMENTS FOR CLUBS.

Many of our friends in the various towns have given us assurances that Clubs would be raised for the Reporter. We invite attention to our Club terms as being lower than any other country paper. We will send to clubs on the following terms:—

6 copies one year	\$ 3
12 " do	5
18 " do	7
24 " do	9
30 " do	11

It is not necessary that the subscribers in a club should all be at one post office, nor the papers sent to one address.

CHASE EXPLAINING MR. WILMOT'S VIEWS.

Our friend CHASE, the ex-Speaker, and editor of the *Montrose Democrat*, is not the first man, who has been spoiled by being made a great man before his time. When he was elected to the Legislature by the Democracy of Susquehanna, Mr. CHASE had every prospect of acquiring a fair reputation as an editor, being considered a young man of good abilities, lacking in anything, in that experience which time can only bring. We believe he passed through his first Legislative winter, without feeling that the whole affairs of State rested upon his shoulders.

Re-elected, before the next meeting of the Legislature, either seriously or in jest, some brother editor proposed his name for Speaker of the House. We don't know from whence the idea originated, but we do know how we came to have a part in keeping the subject "before the people." We are not certain that we should ever have considered the matter as seriously intended, if our *esprit du corps* had not been appealed to. Of course, we could not refuse to do a brother editor such a favor, though we well remember we had some compunctions lest the candidate for Speaker was not getting along too fast for his own good.—Speaker CHASE was not the first instance of the press puffing a man into notoriety who otherwise might have gone to his grave unknown, and unwept, unhonored and unscathed.

But the kindness intended by his editorial brethren, though well-meant, was attended by the most lamentable consequences. Presently the Speaker of the House of Representatives arrives at an exalted sense of his importance and consequence. He becomes bewildered by the responsibilities of his station, and overwhelmed with its dignity. The sphere wherein he might have shone, becomes too circumscribed for his ambition, and he aims at more extended boundaries. In short, he becomes one of the leaders of the State politics, and gives up Susquehanna for the whole Commonwealth.

"No seat up Uta contracts our powers,
But the whole unbounded Continent is ours."

It is not our purpose to follow him through the numerous perplexities in which became involved, in endeavoring to reconcile what was irreconcilable. Our business, just now, is with a later performance. It appears that the ex-Speaker has been at Harrisburg. The State Capital, our readers may be aware, rejoices in an editor named ANDY HOPKINS—a clever chap enough, except that he labors under the strange and unaccountable delusion, that he is printing an organ for the Democracy of the State, and persists in his error, despite the utmost endeavors of his friends. This queer fellow, having seen Judge WILMOT's letter regarding his action on the Tariff act of 1846, forms the brilliant idea of convicting Mr. W. of inconsistency by calling Mr. CHASE to the stand, and forthwith addresses him a letter, asking what were Mr. WILMOT's views upon the Tariff?

A man with common-sense, if he desired to ascertain what another's "views" were, would consult his votes and speeches. We cannot suppose our friend ANDY so dull that he can't find his way to the State Library, as Judge WILMOT directs him, if he doubts his historical statements. But his request affords neighbor CHASE too good an opportunity to write a letter (for which he seems to have a mania) in which he labors to show that Mr. WILMOT has abandoned his position on the Tariff. Now, we make a very humble salutation to the Ex-Speaker, as is due to our relative consequence, and beg leave to inform him that he don't know what he is talking about. He may tell what Mr. BUCHANAN's or Mr. BIGLER's opinions are, provided he has their letters in his breeches pocket, but as 1846 goes back of his impor-

tance he had better consult the records before he attempts to annihilate anybody. He had better consult Mr. WILMOT's votes and speeches, before he attempts to impeach either his veracity or his consistency.

Mr. CHASE concludes his letter by saying that Senator SANDERSON, and other gentlemen, resident in this District, were in town, who would corroborate his statements. We rather reckon not. We calculate that Mr. SANDERSON when called upon to testify, intends to tell the truth, and we believe he has not only more knowledge, but a better recollection than the Ex-Speaker. We have no idea that he intends to take the stand at all, but we re-publish the following article from the Reporter, of the date of July 29th, 1846, which was written by Mr. SANDERSON, and which corroborates the statements made in Mr. WILMOT's letter in every particular, to which we invite the particular attention of Mr. CHASE. The following is the article:—

PENNSYLVANIA AND THE TARIFF.—MR. WILMOT'S AMENDMENT.

What is to become of Pennsylvania? say the Whigs; how is her debt to be paid, or her manufactures sustained, deceived and deserted, as she is? We will tell them how. Let the Whigs be honest and sincere in their pretensions; let them act in good faith toward the people, and forever repudiate the despicable means adopted by them to get into power. Let them resolve to go for the best interests of their country, rather than the success of their party, and Pennsylvania will do well enough. What reason have the people to believe that they cherish more love for Pennsylvania, than they do for their party? We doubt whether any tariff bill, had its provisions been ever so favorable to the interests of this State, would have received the support of a Democratic Congress and Administration. As proof of this, we refer to the attempt made by Mr. WILMOT to effect an amendment of the duties on the new tariff on Coal and Iron; by which these articles could have had all the advantages given by the tariff of 1842. What support did his amendment receive? Every man within this State voted against it. Again, the delegation from this State had in their power to secure almost any duties they could reasonably ask for, on the new tariff; but they refused, and with the exception of Mr. WILMOT, voted against the bill; for the same reason we presume, that a similar delegation on a former occasion, except one, voted to re-shorten the United States Bank, assuming it to be granted that the people were too glib to understand their rights, or accept of any explanation. If Pennsylvania has not all the advantages under the tariff of 1842, that she had under that of 1846, it is her own fault. Mr. WILMOT endeavored to secure it for her; it was in his power to have it; but it was rejected. Why? Because it was not the tariff of 1842.—This is the beginning, conclusion, and the whole argument.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has issued a habeas corpus in the case of S. M. Booth and John Ryecraft, recently convicted in the United States Court at Milwaukee, of a violation of the provisions of the act generally termed the Fugitive Slave Law, and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. The State Court has heretofore declared the law in question unconstitutional and void. On the receipt of the news of the issuing of the writ of habeas corpus at Milwaukee, a public meeting was convened, at which resolutions strongly censuring the course of the federal authorities, and counselling revolutionary action to defeat the laws of the land, were adopted with frantic enthusiasm. The fine imposed upon Booth and Ryecraft amounts to \$1,661, and this is to be made up by voluntary subscriptions, in no instance to exceed one dollar. It has been stated that the anti-Nebraska members of Congress have contributed towards the fund.

A telegraphic despatch announces that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has acquitted BOOTH and RYECRAFT, on the ground of the indictment being illegal.

RE-ELECTION OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD.—The election of U. S. Senator from the State of New-York, took place on Tuesday last, and resulted in the re-election of Mr. Seward. He received 18 out of 31 votes cast in the Senate, and 69 out of 127 in the Assembly. It is said that there were several members of the latter body who would have voted for him, if their votes had been needed to secure his election. There seemed to be no organized opposition, while his friends have managed with consummate shrewdness. His election has caused the destruction of an immense amount of gunpowder throughout the Empire State.

CONGRESS.—On Monday, the Senate after variously amending Mr. Broadhead's Bounty Land bill, passed the same finally by a vote of 30 to 15. It is very comprehensive in its provisions, giving 160 acres of land to all who served in any of the Indian or other wars previous to and embracing the wars of 1812, with deductions where grants have already been made under former acts. It also increases the pay of invalid pensioners.

On our outside will be found the prospectus of the "Farm Journal" for the current year. We have no hesitation in recommending the publication to our readers, as worthy of patronage. Under its present editor, it has become one of the very best agricultural papers published in the country.

The "Farm Journal," heretofore published at West Chester, will hereafter be issued from No. 32-1/2 North 7th Street, Philadelphia.

NORTH PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD.—A meeting of the Stockholders of this Road, was held last week, in their new office in Walnut street, Philadelphia, for the election of officers of the Company, which resulted as follows:—

President.—THOMAS S. FERNON.
Directors.—Isaac S. Waterman, John Brock, John Welsh, Charles W. Churchman, J. Gil-lingham Fell, Isaac R. Davis, David S. Brown, Albertson S. Roberts, John O. James, John Ely.

SUDDEN DEATH.—ALVAH REDFIELD, of Tunkhannock, was found dead on the Railroad track between Painted Post and Corning, N. Y. He left the cars to walk the distance, and it is supposed expired of a disease of the heart, as his money was found on his person. Mr. Redfield was aged about 50 years, and leaves a wife and children to mourn his loss.

We are under obligations to Messrs. HOLCOMB, LAPORTE and E. SMITH, of the House, and to PLATT, of the Senate, for various documents.

JUDGE WILMOT'S LETTER.

In another column, will be found a correspondence between B. LAPORTE, Representative from this County, and Hon. D. WILMOT, in regard to the efforts of the latter for the protection of Pennsylvania interests. In copying this letter, which was published at Harrisburg, we should have deemed all remarks superfluous; but that it has been made the subject of misadversion by those who fancy that Judge WILMOT is in some one's way for an election to the U. S. Senate.

We have observed some comments in the newspapers, much in the same vein with Speaker CHASE's letter, which are so manifestly disingenuous, and their assumptions so unjust and unfair, that any person who will read the letter cannot fail to discover that the whole tone and object of it has either been misconceived or purposely misrepresented. The very men who were the foremost in denouncing Mr. WILMOT as a "Free Trade" man, are now assuming that he has changed his position. The charitable conclusion is, that they have never understood his views upon the Tariff question, and particularly with regard to fostering the great interests of Pennsylvania.

We say that all these invidious comments upon Mr. WILMOT's letter are uncalled for.—Mr. LAPORTE asks him only for a history of his course in Congress, during the time the Tariff bill of 1846 was before that body. To this he replies, confining himself to a simple statement of facts, and referring to his votes and speeches. If he has falsified history—if he has not veraciously narrated the occurrences which there took place—the evidence is within the reach of almost every man to condemn him.

In the struggle which followed the passage of the law of 1846, we profess to have had some part. We have published more columns upon the subject, than any four papers in the Commonwealth. We have never misunderstood Mr. WILMOT's position upon the Tariff, and we have certainly heard him relate the facts narrated in his letter in speeches made to Democratic meetings on several occasions; and the Democrats of the County will bear witness that the same positions have been assumed in regard to the Coal and Iron interests of Pennsylvania laid down in his letter.

We give below the closing part of a speech made by Mr. WILMOT, in the House, July 1, 1846, on the bill reported from the Committee of Ways and Means, amendatory of the tariff of 1842, and also an extract from a letter written by a correspondent of the *Pennsylvaniaian*, and published in that paper, just after the passage of the bill through the House:

Extract from the Speech of Hon. D. WILMOT, delivered in the House, July 1, 1846.

I desire, before resuming my seat, to say a few words upon the subject of specific duties, and a duty upon iron. Under a specific duty, the same article is sold at widely different prices, and the quality is unequal and unjust. A duty of one dollar a yard upon all woollen cloth, would be like a judicial sale, because of their great difference in quality and value, and would be like a pond on the top of a mountain, to be open to the most serious and well-grounded objections; some quality of cloth would be sold at a price which would be as much as others. Indeed, this difference of quality runs through almost every article of commerce, and therefore ad valorem duties should, as a general rule, alone be resorted to. But when an article such as iron, and some others that could be named, is nearly of the same intrinsic value, I can see no objection to imposing a specific duty upon it, and which would be equal and just. 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