

The Dispatch.

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PITTSBURG, SATURDAY, JAN. 5, 1889.

MR. ROBINSON'S POINTS.

Mr. Robinson, in an interview elsewhere, makes clear his position on the subject of that smothered revenue bill. He does not charge personal responsibility on the Governor, but he does make a very distinct statement of his reasons for believing that the "quiet investigation" to which the Governor alludes in his message did not give an accurate statement of the facts.

Mr. Robinson's points are in brief: (1) An affidavit that will be taken from the House to the Senate for signature there before going to the Executive Department; (2) that it was in the hands of the latter department two days before the Legislature adjourned; and (3) that the lack of a proclamation calling an extra session to pass a bill in a single day, while in possession of a different theory than the one advanced in the Governor's message.

The assertions of the outspoken ex-member certainly appear to leave the Governor's message in a position where it devolves on them to do or say something.

A SOURCE OF DANGER.

The authorities at City Hall, including the Special Council Committee, are still drifting into contention over the erection of wooden buildings within what are known as the fire limits. Nothing better can be looked for until an absolute rule is set up and then reported to permit one man and to refuse another is an exercise of discretion for which there is no call, and looks very much like putting a premium on favoritism or official neglect. Too much is at stake to allow of any more frame buildings in the older part of the city. Those which are there now should be removed. It should not require a confirmation starting with such material to make this clear to Councils and to the authorities.

AN EVIDENCE OF PROSPERITY.

The statement that the Pittsburgh and Western is doubling its track to Callery Junction, and will probably give the Shenango and Allegheny a connection that will open a new route from Pittsburgh to Erie, indicates a gratifying prospect for the young enterprise of Pittsburgh's railroads. This enterprise was heavily handicapped at the start by the prevailing corporate vice of over-capitalization; but it is now overcoming that difficulty by building up a traffic that places it on a sound basis.

In this connection, it is pertinent to point out that the remark attributed to one of the officials of the corporation, that it would not give the Shenango and Allegheny an entrance to Pittsburgh, "without an agreement that there will be no competition on the ore traffic," is not based on sound business principles. The Pittsburgh and Western has two or three strong competitors in the ore traffic already; and the admission of another, with a royalty that will yield material contribution to the fixed charges of the Pittsburgh corporation, will be as much of an advantage to it as to the public.

HAARDLY A VALID EXCUSE.

There seems to be a slight lack of respect in the reported remarks of the ore operators, that they cannot have a conference with the coke workers "because there is no syndicate." There is no syndicate in the iron business, nor has there been until recently at least in the coal business; but that has never prevented the employers from meeting the men to discuss the wage question. In view of the intimations that coke is selling above the open rate, it would seem more than justice to the miners to give their claim a fair hearing at least. The coke workers can hardly be blamed if they refuse to be put off with a plea of that sort; and inasmuch as they can very easily get along without a conference, by presenting the scale to the operators separately, it is not likely that they will accept it. The conciliatory course of discussing the matter fairly and frankly with the men will be found the most profitable in the long run.

SENSATIONAL JOURNALISM.

Newspaper enterprise in Chicago is always presenting novel departures, but it is nevertheless astonishing to learn that a reporter there has killed himself because his copy of a Cincinnati girl had been unsuccessful. Such self-sacrifice in the manufacture of sensational news is almost unheard of even in Chicago. It is not desirable that other reporters in that city, charged as they may be at their comrades' undeniable "scoop," should follow his example.

Much safer and more comfortable is the method of Henry Andrus, an advertising agent of a Brooklyn newspaper, who has achieved notoriety by stealing \$10,000 of his employers money. This journalistic episode, however, cannot be considered complete until Mr. Andrus has been ended with a striped suit at Sing Sing.

AN APPEAL TO CHICAGO.

The hostilities have broken out again with renewed vigor between the cities of Chicago and St. Louis. It is not probable that Thomas W. Vines, after embarking a large sum of money in Chicago, cared very much whether he went in the Saratoga trunk wherein he stowed himself away. But Chicagoans are evidently disposed to judge him harshly because the trunk was directed to St. Louis. An embarras of money may have some excuse for his delinquency, but in the eyes of a loyal Chicagoan nothing can palliate the offense of preferring St. Louis to the Windy City.

The feeling in St. Louis is much the same. When a St. Louis man tells you that a certain man has gone to Chicago, it is customary to inquire whether the man is alive or dead, for Chicago is a pet synonym in St. Louis for a hot region which is said to be paved with good intentions. It is somewhat singular, therefore, that the advertiser who passed through the hands of the baggage-smashers in a trunk and sur-

vived should have been arrested by the St. Louis police and returned by them to Chicago. Perhaps it should be hailed as a laudable triumph of virtue over the local prejudices of the St. Louis police force.

But that trust with the lesson of St. Louis' magnanimity will not be thrown away upon Chicago. Let Vines be punished upon Louisiana, and let not preferring St. Louis to Chicago, also.

IT WILL HAVE NO OPTION.

The threat which has been attributed to some of the officials of the Western Union Telegraph Company, that if the State's suit for forfeiture on account of the telegraph consolidation is pushed, that corporation will withdraw from the State and leave without telegraphic facilities, calls for pointing out two facts.

The first point is that the Western Union corporation will not have any option about leaving the State. If the Constitution and laws are enforced, it will have to go, because it will have forfeited all its property and franchises in the State. But it is very true that the State has no option about finally deciding against it, for the very reason that to do so would cause the very result it is striving to avert. In other words it would thus surrender the franchises which the Attorney General's suit is proposing to forfeit.

The other point is that when the Western Union does leave the State—because it has to—the State will possess a very complete telegraphic plant of its own. It can lease or sell these lines to State telegraph companies; and it can provide that these lines shall exchange business with all competing companies outside the State. This will furnish a permanent corner-stone for competition with the Pennsylvania franchise company, millions of telegraphic business annually, it is perfectly safe to calculate that the Western Union will be glad to make an equitable arrangement for its share of the business any other way.

The course of the Mugwump-Democratic Boston Herald in booming Senator Allison for President in 1882 looks like an attempt to rival the New York Sun's record in this respect. The Herald's editorial candidacies by premature exposure.

The position of things in New York is illustrated by the fact that Alderman Dowling, who was at the head of an attack in the Board of Aldermen upon corporations that refused to put up the boodie, is leading a collection of Dowling's friends to make for himself and his coparceners, seems to be paramount in New York.

THE OTHER SIDE OF IT.

Yesterday THE DISPATCH drew attention to the lamentations of the Railway Age over the bankruptcies and failures of railroads. Before the subject passes out of notice it should be well to consider the effects of stock-watering and of fictitious indebtedness on the future of the roads. We hear a great clamor made from time to time, that the public sentiment is adverse to corporations; that the public are not paying enough; that property should pay dividends and so on. Now let us see what is to be said for the public.

In the first place it is a huge fallacy to assume that all the roads which either fail of dividends or even default on interest charges are therefore not paying properties. Many such would pay handsomely on the actual cash put into their construction. Whether they are able to pay also upon the wind and water in their capitalization is quite another matter. That depends very much on the moderation of the promoters or their capacity, whether they are content with moderate inflation or put the utmost tension on the bubble. To illustrate: it was estimated that \$12,000,000, possibly, but at the utmost \$15,000,000, would have been required to build the Pennsylvania road. Yet the first move of the Vanderbilt was to put \$20,000,000 of bonds and \$30,000,000 of stock—making a total of \$50,000,000, of which the public would be expected to pay interest and dividends. The road might give good returns on \$20,000,000, that is to say, on the full cost of construction, yet if it did not also pay on the \$30,000,000 of water the same talk of "non-remunerative railroads" would quickly be heard. Of course the rates would, if possible, be as quickly adjusted to cover the deficiency.

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