Evening public ledger. (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, October 09, 1917, Final, Pictorial Section, Image 20

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    EVENING LEDGEEr-PHILADELPHTA', TTJESpiX OCTOBER 9, 1917
Pictorial Section
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(By CARL WACKERMAN
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an ..., a: a . vnf lio TTnitod States to enter the war with all the vlsm
Je u A.,,n nonnlo. ficrmanv calculated upon internal troubles, .
opposition to the war and upon the pacifists to have America make as many mistai
nH F.nc-lnnd did durimr the first two years of the war.
Coprrlghl. 1017. Ueorro IT. Uortn Company.
Germany Believed That Her Submarine Cam
a paign Would Bring Hen Victory Before Her
American Enemies Had an Opportunity to
Make Themselves Felt Along the Lines of
Battle, but the Allies Managed to Hold
on Long Enough to Keep Off a Decision Until
Our Aid Arrived
"The Best-Laid Plans" of the German Military
and of the Foreign Office Were Rudely Upset
by the Turn of Events in Russia After the
Revolution Deposed the Pro-Teutons and by
the Seriousness of Purpose Which Has Char
acterized the United States' Efforts Since
War Was Declared
TOURING the first three months of 1917 submarine warfare was
- a success in that it so decreased the ship tonnage and the impor
tations of the Allies that they needed American co-operation and
assistance. So the United States really enters the war at the
critical and decisive stage. Germany believes she can continue to
Bink ships faster than they can be built, but Germany did not
calculate upon a fleet of wooden-bottom vessels being built in the
United States to make up for the losses.
Germany did not expect the United States to enter the
war with all the igor and energy of the American people.
Germany calculated upon internal troubles, upon opposition to
the war and upon the pacifists to hare America make as many
mistakes as England did during the first two years of the war.
Hilt the United States has learned and profited by careful obser
vation in Europe. Just as England's declaration of war on
Germany in support of Belgium and France was a surprise to
Germany; just as the shipment of war supplies by American
firms to the Allies astonished Germany, so will the construction
of 3000 wooden vessels upset the calculations of the German
General Staff.
While American financial assistance will be a great help to
the Allies, that will not nffect the German calculations, because when
the Kaiser and his generals decided on the twenty-seventh of Jan
uary to damn all neutrals German. financiers were not consulted.
Calculations That Missed Fire
Neither did the German General Staff count upon the Russian
revolution going against them. Germany had expected a revolu
tion there, but Germany bet upon the Czar and the Czar's German
wife. As Lieutenant Colonel von Haeften, chief military censor
in Berlin, told the correspondents, 'Germany calculated upon the
internal troubles in Russia aiding her. But the Allies and the
people won the Russian revolution. Germany's hopes that the
Czar might again return to power or that the people might over
throw their present democratic leaders will come to naught now
that America has declared war and thrown her tremendous and
unlimited moral influence behind the Allies and with the Russian
people.
Rear Admiral Holhveg's calculations that 24,253,G15 tons of
shipping remained for the world's freight transmission at the begin
ning of 1917 'did not take into consideration confiscation by the
United States of nearly 2,500,000 tons of German and Austrian
shipping in American ports. He did not expect the United States
to building 3000 new ships in 1917. He did not expect the United
States to purchase the ships under construction in American yards
for neutral European countries.
The German submarine campaign, like all other German
"successes," will be temporary. Every time the General Staff
has counted upon "ultimate victory" it has failed to take into
consideration the determination of the enemy. Germany believed
:
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Theso indictments of the Allies were moro terriblo to hi
the war hscii.
General von Kirchhoff in this respect is typical of Gen
Most Germans, virtually every German I know, could .
stand why the Allies did not respect their enemies as the Geri
finld thev resDectcd tho Allies.
A few weeks later, in November, when I was on the Set
with nnotner gToup oi corrcsiJunueuiB, i was asKeu by nearly (
officer I mot why it was that Germany was so hated tW.
tho world. It was a question I could not easily answer J2
perhaps, hurting tho feelings of tho men who wanted to kn?
A few days later on tho train from Cambrai to Berlin t l
asked by n group of officers to explain why tho people fa
United States, especially, wore so fitter. To get the t..
under way the captain from tho General Staff who had 'actedsL
ftritgenumnur 120.
"In a broken voice General von Kirchhoff remarked that these soldiers were sacrificing their lives for the Fatherland, but were
called 'Huns' and 'barbarians' for doing it. There was another long pauso and the general broke down, cried and had to leave
' his staff and guests."
that the world could be "knocked out" by big blows. Germany
thought when she destroyed and invaded Belgium and northern
France that these two countries would not be ablo to "come
back." Germany thought when she took Warsaw and a great
part of western Russian that Russia would not bo ablo to con
tinue the war. Germany figured after the invasion of
Rumania and Serbia that these two countries would not need
to be considered seriously in the future. Germany believed that
her submarine campaign would be successful before tho United
States could come to tho aid of the Allies. German hope of
"ultimate victory" has been postponed ever since September,
1914, when Von Kluck failed to take Paris. And Germany's
hopes for an "ultimate victory" this summer before the United
States can get into the war will be postponed so long that Ger
many will make peace not on her own terms, but upon the
terms which the United States of Democracy of the Whole
World will dictate.
One day in Paris I met Admiral LeCaze, the Minister of Marine,
in his office in tho Admiralty. Ho discussed tho submarine war
fare from every angle. Ho said tho Germans, when they figured
upon so many tons of shipping and of supplies destroyed by sub
marines, failed to take into consideration the fact that moro than
one hundred ships were arriving daily at French ports and that
moro than five million tons of goods were being brought into
France monthly.
When I explained to him what it appeared to me would bo tho
object of the German ruthless campaign, ho said:
Germany cannot win the war by her submarine campaign
or by any other weapon. That side will win which holds out
one week, ono day or one hour longer than the other.
And this admiral, who, dressed in civilian clothes, looked more
like a New York financier than a naval officer, leaned forward in
his chair, looked straight at me and concluded tho interview by
saying: "
"The Allies will win."
"Whii Do Theu Call Us Huns and Barbarians?"
During tho Sommo battles several of tho American corre
spondents in Berlin were invited to go to tho front near Peronno
and were asked to luncheon by the Bavarian General von Kirch
hoff, who was in command against tho French. When tho corre
spondents reached his headquarters in a littlo war-torn French
villago they were informed that tho Kaiser had just 'summoned tho
general to decorate him with the high German military order, the
Pour lo Merite. Luncheon was postponed until the general returned.
The correspondents watched him motor to the chateau where they
wero and were surprised to see tears in his eyes a3 ho stepped out
of the automobilo and received the cordial greetings and con
gratulations of his staff. Von Kirchhoff, in a brief impromptu
speech, paid a high tribute to tho German troops which wero
holding tho French and said the decoration was not his but his
troops'. And in a broken voice he remarked that theso soldiers
wero sacrificing their lives for tho Fatherland, but wero called
"Huns and barbarians" for doing it. There was another long
pause and the general broke down, cried and had to leavo his
staff and guests.
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WochcnbeUatfc turn Berliner Tnficblalt i ' t
45;Jahrflana Nr. ".November law i
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, ... .............. up hoc nc iorinaimi?ffl!
A GERMAN CARTpON
"The new old President Long live America! Long lire
peace! Long live tho ammunition factories l"
our escort presented his Indictment of American neutrality and
asked mo to reply. '
This feeling, this desiro to know why Germany was regards
as an outlawed nation, was not present in Germany early in 1915
vhen I arrived. In February, 1915, people wore confident. Thejj
wero satisfied with tho progress of tho war. They knew the Allietj
hated them and they returned the hate and did not care. Boll
between February, 1915, and November, 1916, a great change tookj
place. On my first trip to tho front in April, 1915, I heard of to
officers or men shedding tears becauso the Allies hated them.
(CONTINUED TOMORROW)
PICTORIAL PRESENTATION OF THE DAY'S NEWS EVENTS IN PHILADELPHIA AND ELSEWHERE
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'."'L HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS DRILL EACH MORNING UNDER SUPERVISION OF PROF. WILLIAM V. HAINES, WHO ATTENDED TOIE FIRST OFFICERS' TRAINING
CAMP AT FORT NIAGAKA. '
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