

Lancaster Intelligencer

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THE LANCASTER INTELLIGENCER.

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SPECIAL ADVERTISEMENTS.
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SPECIAL ADVERTISEMENTS.

HON. JOHN L. DAWSON.
OF PENNSYLVANIA,
ON FREEDMEN'S AFFAIRS.
February 24, 1864.
[CONCLUDED.]

But it will be seen that the proclamation of the 24th of September does not contravene Magna Carta, since it is confirmed by act of Congress. The answer to this is that the act of Congress itself contravenes the provisions of the Constitution, the paramount law. When we turn to article four of the amendments to that instrument we are met by this stern requirement: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

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Atty Gen. Webster, the king by his judges disposed what the law had already ordained, but not himself the legislator.
The learned commentator then takes occasion to regret that in being deprived of those advantages and being subject to military law, the soldier is placed in a condition of servitude; "for," said he, "Sir Edward Coke will inform us, that in one of the genuine marks of servitude to have the law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or precarious."
Another extraordinary measure inaugurated by the proclamation, and which constitutes the climax of despotic power assumed by the Executive, is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the existence of the rebellion. Having assumed the power of arrest without due process of law in the face of the express prohibitions of the Constitution, it was an offense of gigantic magnitude for the President to suspend the operation of this great and important defence of the liberties of the citizen. In those bitter and unscrupulous civil contests which were waged between the party of prerogative and that of the privileges of the people, which inflamed the heart of England in the middle of the seventeenth century, the writ of habeas corpus was disregarded by Charles I, as well as by the Long Parliament. This was during the long struggle between the Crown and the people. But after the constitution was settled as to this particular by the Petition of Right, and the 29th of Oct. 11, no sovereign had afterwards ventured enough to attempt an abuse of this great bulwark of English liberties. It is true that at a few instances within the history of the nation for two centuries back this great writ has been suspended by Parliament, the only power which could legally suspend it. The principle of this was during the transition from the reign of James II to that of William and Mary, in 1688. All through the American war of independence the friends and sympathizers of the American cause were held in their condemnation of the policy and measures of the Crown, and it was held that this was but the simple exercise of the unquestioned right of the subject. Burke, Fox, and Pitt all thundered in the bows of the court their eloquent denunciations of the tyranny and injustice of Government toward their countrymen in the colonies, and no one ever pretended to bring an objection against them, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The exercise of such arbitrary powers it was which lost Charles I of England the confidence of his subjects, and led to the establishment of new principles of monarchy. The practice of a similar tyranny in France, under the *lettres de cachet*, had filled the dungeons of the Bastille with innocent victims, until at the commencement of the reign of Louis XVI that hated prison was leveled to the ground in the indignant uprising of an outraged people. What right, sir, has Congress to authorize arbitrary arrests in the face of the prohibitions of the Constitution? Are these prohibitions without meaning? Or were they not on the contrary designed to meet just such exigencies as these in which the country is now placed, when, together with the possession of the physical and political power of the country, a party finds itself under the temptation to resort to usurpation in the administration of the laws. The Administration cannot, as in England, have recourse to the omnipotence of the Legislature to justify this abuse of power. The British Parliament is possessed of a legal omnipotence from the nature of the constitution, which is that of a consolidated Government and a monarchy. Even there, however, the subject has an adequate security against any violation of those great principles of personal liberty, property, and private property, which constitute the so much and justly lauded privileges of Britons, because the people themselves, through their representatives in the Commons, make a preponderant power in the Parliament, and the venerable landmarks of the rights of the subject have long been held sacred from encroachment by this country the National Legislature has no such large and unlimited powers. A written charter confers expressly all the powers which the Congress possesses, and clearly there is no authority contained in any of its provisions to arrest any one "without probable cause," and "upon oath or affirmation." Neither will the extension by Congress of martial law over the whole country cover the case. There is no such delegation of authority here as before. Says Chief Justice Blackstone in his Commentaries: "Martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is as little to be regarded as a law, as a law which is made by a man, but something indelible rather than a law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army or a navy, which can be maintained only by a strict and constant discipline, and therefore it ought not to be permitted in times of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land."

Does this "necessity of order and discipline," which this distinguished authority lays down as the only admissible ground for the application of martial law, apply also to civilians outside of the Army? Are not the courts as to them, both State and Federal, as open as to them in the States in rebellion, say as open now for the prosecution of offences against the Government and laws of the United States as under the condition of the most profuse peace? The contrary will not be asserted. There is therefore no necessity for this extraordinary stretch of authority, except in districts, if there are any such, in which the regular administration of justice by the civil tribunals is interrupted or obstructed by the operations of war; and this is nowhere beyond the lines of the Army, except as to persons in the military service.

The rules and articles of war and the acts of Congress for holding courts-martial (chiefly that of the 14th of April, 1814) by which the Army is governed, were framed chiefly from the English system upon the same subject. Its principles and modes of procedure are quite different from those of the common law, and in reference to them Blackstone remarked: "One of the greatest advantages of the English law is that not only the crimes themselves which it punishes, but also the penalties which it inflicts, are ascertained and notorious; nothing is left to arbitrary discretion; the king by his judges disposed what the law had already ordained, but not himself the legislator."

That country is the most prosperous where labor commands the greatest reward."
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