11)? Lancaster 3ntdUgcn?a:
VOL. LXIII.
THE LANCASTER INTELLIGENCER.
3LISESD V7CBT TURBDAT, AT NO. 8 NORTH DUU STRUT,
3Y GKO. SANDERSON.
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IMPORTANT LETTERS.
Gen. Scott’s Views on the Re-
bellion.
SOUTHERN FORTS—A SUMMARY, &C.
October 30, 1860,1 emphatically called
the attention of the President to the ne
cessity of strong garrisons in all the forts
below the principal commercial cities of the
Southern States, includiug, by name, the
forts in Pensacola harbor. October 31,
1 suggested to the Secretary of War that
a circular should be sent at onee to suoh
of those forts as had garrisons to be on the
alert against surprises and sudden assaults.
my “ Views,” since printed.)
After a long confinement to my bed in
New York, 1 came to this city (Washing
ton) December 12. Next day I personally
urged upon the Secretary of War the same
views, viz : strong garrisons in the South
ern forts —those of Charleston and Pensa
cola harbors, at onee ; those on Mobile
Bay and the Mississippi, below New Or
leans, next, &0., &o. 1 again pointed out
the organized companies and the recruits
at the prinoipal depots available for the
purpose. The Secretary did not concur
in any of my views, when 1 begged him
to procure for me an early interview with
the President, that 1 might make one
effort more to save the forts and the Union.
By appointment the Secretary accom
panied me to the President, Deoember 15,
when the same topics, Seoessionism, &c.,
were again pretty fully discussed. There
being at the moment (in the opinion of the
President) no danger of an early Secession,
beyond South Carolina, the President, in
reply to my arguments lor immediately
reinforcing Eon Sumter, said :
“The lime has not arrived for doing so ; that ho
should wait the action of the Convention of South
Carolina, in the expectation that a Commission
would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him
and Congress respecting the Secession of the State,
and the property of the United States held within
its limits; and that if Congress should decide against
the Secession, then he would send a reinforcement,
and telegraph the commanding officer (Major Auder
son) of Fort Moultrie to hold the Forts (Moultrie
and Sumter) against attack.”
And the Secretary, with animation, ad
ded ;
“ We have a vessel of war (the Brooklyn) held in
readiness at Norfolk, and he would theu send three
hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charles
ton.”
To which .1 replied, first, that so many
men could not be withdrawn from that
garrison, but oould be taken from New
York. Next, that it would then be too
late, as the South Carolina Commissioners
would then have the game in their hands,
by first using and then cutting the wires ;
that as there was not a soldier in Port
Sum ter,any handful of armed Secession
ists might seize and occupy it, &c.
Here the remark may be permitted,
that if the Secretary’s 3UO men had then,
or some time later, been sent to Ports
Moultrie and Sumter, both would now have
been in the possession of the United
States, and not a battery below them could
have been erected by the Secessionists ;
consequently the access to those forts from
the sea would now (the eud of March), be
unobstructed and free.
The same day, Deoember 15, I wrote
the following note :
“Lieut. Gen. Scott begs the President to pardon
him for supplying, in this note, what he omitted to
Bay this morning at the interview with which he
was honored by the President.
“Long prior to the force bill (March 2, 1833,)
prior to the issue of his proclamation, and in part
prior to the passage of the ordinance of nullifica
tion, President Jackson, under the act of March 3,
1807, ‘ authorizing the employment of the land and
naval forces,’ caused reinforcements to be sent to
Fort Moultrie, and a sloop-of-war, the Natchez with
two revenue cutters, to be sent to Charleston harbor,
in order 1, to prevent the seizure of that fort by the
nullifiers, and 2, to enforoe the execution of the
revenue laws. Gen. Scott himself arrived at
Charleston the day after the passage of the ordi
nance of nullification, and many of the additional
companies were then en route for the same destina
tion.
“President Jackson familiarly said at the time,
*that by the assemblage of those forces, for the law
mi purposes, he was not making war upon South
Carolina; but that if South Carolina attacked them,
it would be South Carolina that made war upon the
United States.’
“ Gen. S., who received his first instructions (oral)
from the President, in the temporary absence of the
Seoretary of War, (Gen. Caas,) remembers those ex
pressions well.
“ Saturday Night, Deoember 15, 1860.”
Deo. 28.—Again, after Major Ander
son had gallantly and wisely thrown his
handful of men from Fort Moultrie into
Fort Sumter—learning that, on demand
of South Carolina, there was great danger
he might be ordered by the Secretary back
to the less tenable work, or out of the har
bor—l write this note :
“Lieut.-Gen. Scott (who has had a bad night and , Camp Lay, aboM Jan. 12, of the Presi
o^rt < i» r ?h ly h hold t U ?i, hl u hea ' i this mornin s) b eg s to ’ dent’s reply to a message from me.) Next
express the hope to the Secretary of War. 1 That -. /L j l
orders may not be given for the evacuation of Fort 11 WaS aou u ,;e O Whether It would be safe
Sumter. 2. That,lso recruits may instantly be sent to send re-enforcements in an unarmed
trom Governor s island to re-enforce that jrarrisnn . j.> . , r
with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence’ i steamer > and the want, as usual, of a suit
including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions’ able naval vessel—the Brooklyn being
sent tt) B s’upport^the^saiVfort 01 tW ° V ° 33el3 be 1 loD g held in reserve at Norfolk for some
“Lieut.-Gen. S. avails himself of this opportunity | P ar POSC unknown to me. Finally, after I
a body of 301.) recruits in New
pooling Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan and Pu-i JLOru Wart, or ready tor some time — and
particularly in respect to Forts Pickens "they would have been sufficient to re-en
ana MacKea and the Pensacola Naw Yard ; n Mn. ' f nr . n ~ *_ .
neotion with the last two named works may be re- ' orCe temporarily Fort Pickens and to OC
considered by the Secretary. ’ | cupy Fort Mcllae also—the President
“Lieut-tien. S. will further ask the attention ofthe ; about Jan IIS nermrnnd tW fk A
Secretary to Forts Jefferson and Taylor, which are “t> w ’ th at the sloop-of
wholly national —being of far greater value even to i " a " -DrooKiyn should have a single com
the most distant points of the Atlantic coast and the i pany, 90 men, from Foit Mnnrnp Hamn
people on the upper waters.of the Missouri, Missis- | ton nnd ™ yiyurue, namp
sippi, and Ohio Kivers chan to the State of Florida. 1 . on J^ oad ®» aQ d re-eotorce Lieut, feiemmer
There is only a feeble company at Key West for the m -^ ort Pickens, but without a surnlus
defense of Fort Taylor, and not a soldier in Fort \ man fer the neighboring fort Mnßoa
Jeffereon to resist a handful of fillibusters or a row- T , u B “ el ß no ? rln g tort, Mcliae.
boat of pirates; and the Oulf, soon after the begin* i -Brooklyn, with Capt. Vodges* com
ning of Secession or revolutionary troubles in the pany alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort
adjacent States, will swarm with such nuisances.” p io k enS about lanuarv •>)7„Y
December 30.—1 addressed the Presi- »o t k p„.iJ P „t R,„.b ““t at ? d ’ 0n l^e
dent again, as follows ■ ' ; r 9th ’ Presldent Buchanan, having entered
. 7#l u . • mto a quasi armistice with certain leading
Statute pardon* tfmirregularity 6 o*f thi^ommunio I seci ; ders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caus
tion. It is Sunday, the weather is bad, and Gen s j ed Secretaries Holt and Toney to instruct
importance; 1 7“’ *7“*™
seem to forbid a moment’s delay, and. if misled by ' veSsels on Pensacola, and Lieut. Slemmer,
ZO “Wm h th P e e p^m ho . Pre3id - Dt ! 3for l iven ® s t commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no
Will the President permit (ren. b.. without re- a ,.t u t -i* 4 j / , ,
ference to the War Department, and otherwise as: 0t “Ostility, and not to land Captain
seoretiy as possible, to send 250 recruits from New | » odges’ company unless that fort should
York harbor to reintorce Fort Sumter, together with j be attacked t
some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and sub- I
sistenoe? '
“It is to be hoped that a sloop.of-war and outter
may be ordered for the same purpose as earlv as to
morrow. J
“Gen. S. will wait upon the President at any
moment he may be oalled for. J
The South Carolina Commissioners had
already been many days m Washington,
and no movements of defense <on the part
of the United States) was permitted.
I will here olose my notice of Fort Sum
ter by quoting from some of my previous
reports.
It would have been easy to re-enforee
this fort down to about the I2th of Febru
ary. In this long delay Fort Moultrie had
been re-armed and greatly strengthened
in every way by the Rebels. Many pow
erful new land batteries (besides a formi
dable raft) had been constructed. Hulks,
too, had been sunk in the principal channel
so as to render access to Fort Sumter from
the sea impracticable without first carrying
all the lower batteries of the Secessionists.
The difficulty of re-enforcing had thus been
increased ten or twelve fold. First, the
late President refused to allow any attempt
to be made because he was holding nego
tiations with tbe South Carolina Commis-
Afterward Seoretary Holt and myself
endeavored, in vain, to obtain a Bhip of war
for the purpose, and were finally obliged to
employ the passenger steamer “ Star of;
the West.” That vessel, but for the hes
itation of the master, might, as is gener
ally believed, have delivered at the fort the
men and subsistence on board. This at
tempt at suooor failing, 1 next, verbally,
submitted to the late Cabinet either that
succor be sent by ships-of-war, fighting
their way by the batteries (increasing in
strength daily,) or that Major Anderson
should be left to ameliorate his condition
by the muzzles of his guns;—that is, enforc
ing supplies by bombardment and by bring
ing to merchant vessels, helping himself
(giving orders for payment,) or, finally, be
allowed to evacuate the fort, which, in that
ease, would be inevitable.
But before any resolution was taken,the
late Secretary of the Navy making diffi
culties about the want of suitable war ves
sels, another Commissioner from South
Carolina arrived, causing further delay.—
When this had passed away Secretaries
Holt and Touey, Capt. Ward of the Navy,
and myself—with the knowledge of the
President (Buchanan) —settled upon the
employment, under the Captain (who was
eager for the expedition) of three or four
small steameis belonging to the Coast
Survey. At that time (late in January) 1
have but little doubt Capt. Ward would
have reached Fort Sumter, with all his
vessels. But he was kept back by some
thing like a truce or armistice [made here],
embracing Charleston and Pensacola har
bors, agreed upon between the late Presi
dent and certain principal scoeders of
South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &0.,
and this truce lasted to the end of that
Administration.
That plan and all others, without a
squadron of war ships and a considerable
army—competent to take and hold the
many formidable batteries below Fort Sum
ter, aud before the exhaustion of its sub
sistence—having been pronounced, from
the change of circumstances, impractica
ble by Major Anderson, Captain Foster
(Chief Engineer,) and all the other officers
of the fort, as well as by Brig. G-eneral
Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers ;
and, concurring in that opinion, I did not
hesitate to advise (March 12) that Major
Anderson be instructed to evacuate the
fort, so long gallantly held by him and
his companions, and immediately on pro
curing suitable transportation to take them
to New York. His relative weakness had
steadily increased in the last eighteen
days.
It was not till Jan. 3 (when the first
Commissioners from South Carolina with
drew) that the permission I had solicited
Oct. 13, was obtained to admonish com
manders of the few Southern forts with
garrisons to be on the alert against sur
prises and suddeQ assaults. (Maj. An
derson was not among the admonished,
being already straitly beleaguered.)
January 3.—To Lieut. Slemmer, com
manding in Pensacola Harbor :
“ The General-in-Chief directs that you take
measures to do the utmost in your power to prevent
the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola Har
bor, by surprise or assault, consulting first with the
Commander of the Navy Yard, who will probably
have received instructions to co-operate with you.”
(This order was signed by Aid-de-Camp Lay.)
It was just before the surrender of the
Pensacola Navy Yard ( Jan. 12) that Lieut.
Slemmer, calling upon Com. Armstrong,
obtained the aid of some 30 common sea
men or laborers, but no marines, which
added to his 46 soldiers, made up his
numbers to 76 men, with whom this meri
torious officer has since held Fort Pickens.
and performed, working night and day, an
immense amount of labor in mounting
guns, keeping up a strong guard, &c., &o.
Early in January 1 renewed, as has
been seen, my solicitations to be allowed
to reinforce Fort Pickens, but a good deal
of time was lost in vacillations. First,
the President u thought if no movement is
made by the United States, Fort Mcßae
will probably not be occupied nor Fort
Pickens attacked. In case of movements
by the United States, which will doubtless
be made known by the wires, there will be
corresponding local movements, and the
attempt to re-enforce will be useless.’''
(Quotation from a note made by Aid-de-
[That joint note I never saw until March 25, but
in!, p 6 arm i=tico wasconsequent upon the meet*
mSerßtnnH . eaC ,° Go ?™ n t'on at Washington, and was
understood to terminate with it.j
Hearing, however, of the most active
preparations for hostilities on the part of
the seceders at Pensa'oola, by the erection
of new batteries and arming Fort Moßea
—that had not a gun mounted when it was
seized—during the Peace Convention and
since, I brought the subject to the notioe
of the new administration, when this note
dated March 12, to Capt. Vodges was’
“ THAT OOUNTBT IS THE HOST PROSPEROUS WHIRR LABOR COMMANDS THI GREATEST REWARD/ '-
LANCASTER CITY. PA.. TUESDAY MORNING, NOYEMBER 11. 1862.
agreed upon, viz ; « At the first favorable
moment you will land with yonr company,
reinforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same
till further orders/ 5 This order, in dupli
cate, left New York by two naval vessels
about the middle of March, as the mails
and the wires could not be trusted, and
detached officers could not be substituted,
for two had already been arrested and par
oled by the authorities of Pensacola, dis
patches taken from one of them, and a
third, to escape like treatment, forecd to
turn back when near that city. Thus
those authorities have not ceased to make
war upon the United State since the capture
by them of the Navy Yard, January 12.
Respectfully submitted.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Headquarters of the Army, Washington,
March 30, 1861.
ME. BUCHANAN’S EEPLT.
To the Editors of the National Intelligencer :
On "Wednesday last I received the National
Intelligencer containing Gen Scott’s address to
the public. This is throughout an undisguised
censure of my conduct during the last months
of the Administration in regard to the seven
Cotton States now in rebellion. From our past
relations I was greatly surprised at the appear
ance of such a paper. In one aspect, how
ever, it was highly gratifying. It has justi
fied me; nay, it has rendered it absolutely
necessary that I should no longer remain si
lent in respect to charges which, have been
long vaguely circulating, but are now endor
sed by the responsible name of Gen. Scott.
1. The first and most prominent among
these charges is my refusal immediately to
garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scat
tered over six of the Southern States, accord
ing to the recommendation of Gen. Scott, in his
“views” addressed to the War Department on
the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it
has even been alleged that if this had been
done it might have prevented the civil war.
This refusal is attributed without the least
cause to the influence of Governor Floyd. All
my Cabinet must bear me witness that I was,
the President myself, responsible for all the
acts of the Administration ; and certain it is
that during the last six months previous to
the 29th of December, 1800, (the day on which
he resigned his office after my request,) he
exercised less influence on the Administration
titan any other member of the Cabinet. Mr.
Holt was immediately thereafter transferred
from the Post Office Department to that of
War; so that from this time until the 4th of
March, 1861, which was by far the most im
portant period of the Administration, he per
formed the duties of Secretary of War to my
entire satisfaction.
But why did I not immediately garrson
'these nine fortifications, in such a manner, to
use the language of Gen. Scott, “as to make
any attempt to take any one of them by
surprise or coup-de-main ridiculous ?” There
is one answer, both easy and conclusive, even
if oilier valid reasons did not exist. There
were no available troops within reach which
could be seut to these fortifications. To have
attempted a military operation on a scale so
extensive by any means within the President’s
power would have been simply absurd. Of
this l»en. Scott himself seems to have been
convinced, for on the day after the date of
his first “ views,” he addressed (on the 30th
October) supplemental views to the War De
partment, in which he states : “ There is one
( regular ) company in Boston , one here, (at the
Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta,
( G-a,.,) one at Baton Rouge”—in all fioe com
panies only within reach to garrison or reinforce
the forts mentioned in the “ views.''
Five companies—four hundred men—to oc
cupy and reinforce nine fortifications in six
highly excited Southern States! The force
“within reach” was so entirely inadequate that
nothing more need be said on the subject.—
To have attempted such a-military operation
with so feeble a force, and the Presidential
election impending, would have been an in
vitation to collision and sesession. Indeed, if
the whole American army, consisting then of
only sixteen thousand men, had been “ witbin
reach.” they would have been scarcely suffi
cient for this purpose. Such was ouY want
of troops that, although Gen. Scott, believing,
in opposition to the opinion of the committee
raised in the House of Representative, that
the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be
interrupted by military force, was only able
to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th
March, six hundred and fifty-three men, rank
and file of the array.. And, to make up this
army, even the Sappers and Miners were
brought from West Point.
But why was there no greater force within
reach ? This question could be better an
swered by General Scott himself than by any
other person. Our small regular army, with
the exception of a few hundred men, were out
of reach, on our remote frontiers, whore it
.had been continuously stationed for years, to
protect the inhabitants and the emigrants on
their way thither against the attacks of hos
tile Indians. All were insufficient, and both
General Seqjt and myself had endeavored in
vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several
additional regiments for this purpose In re
commending this augmentation of the .army,
tbe General states in his report to the War
Department' of November, 1857, that “it
would not more than furnish the reinforce
ments now greatly needed in Florida, Texas
New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington
(T.) Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving
not a company for “ Utah.” And again, in
bis report of November, 1858, he says:
“ This want of troops to give reasonable securi
ty to our citizens in distant settlements, including
emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strong
ly stated : but I will only add, that as often as we
have been obliged to withdraw troops from one
frontier in order to reinforce another, the weaken
ed points have been instantly attacked or threat
ened with formidable invasion.",.
These “ views’* of General Scott exhibit the
crude notions then prevailing even among in
telligent and patriotic men on this subject of
secession. In the first sentence the General
whilst stating that “ to save time the right of
secession may be conceded,” yet immediately
says, “ this is instantly balanced by the cor
relative right on the part of the Federal Gov
ernment against an interior State or States to
re-establish by force, if necessary, its former
continuity of territory.” (For this he cites
“ Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, last
chapter.” It may be there, but I have been
unable to find it.) Whilst it is difficult to as
certain his precise meaning in this passage, he
renders what he did not mean quite clear in
his supplementary “views." In these he
says : “ It will be seen that the “ views” only
apply to a case of secession that makes a gap
iu the present Union.”
The falling off say of Texas, or of all the
Atlantic States, from the Potomac south, (the
very case which has occurred) was not withiu
the scope of Gen. S.'s “provisional remedies;”
that is to say, to establish by force, if neces
sary, the continuity of our territory. In Mb
“viaws” he also states as follows: “But break
this glorious Union by whatever line or lines
that political madness may contrive, and there
would be no hope of recruiting the fragments
except by the laceration and despotism of the
sword. To effect such result the intestine
wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in com
parison with ours, sink into mere child’s play.”
In the General’s opinion, “a smaller evil (than
these intestine wars) would be to allow the
fragments of the great Republic to form them
selves into new Confederacies, probably four.”
He then points out what ought to be the
boundaries between the new Unions; and at
the end of each, goes so far as even to indi
cate the cities which ought to be the capitals
of the three first on this side of the Rooky
Mountains, to wit: “Columbia, South Caroli
na,” “AltoD, or Quincy, 111,” and “Albany,
New York,” excluding Washington City alto
gether. This indication of capitals contained
in the original, now in my possession, is cu
riously omitted in the verson published in the
Rational Intelligencer. He designates no cap
ital for the fourth Union on the Pacifio. The
reader will judge what encouragement these
views, proceeding from so distinguished a
source, must have afforded to the Secession
ists of the Cotton States.
I trust I have said enough, and more than
enough, to convince every mind why I did
not, with a force of five companies, attempt to
reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the
Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile;
Forts Pickens and McEae, in Pensacola har
bor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah; Forts
Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, and
Fort Monroe, in Virginia.
These “views,” both original and supple
mentary, were published by General Scott in
the National Intelligencer of January 18, 1861,
at the most important and critical period of
the Administration. Their publication at that
time could do no possible good, and might do
much harm. To have published them without
the President’s knowledge and consent was as
much in violation of the sacred confidence
which ought to prevail between the Command
ing General of the army and the Commander
in-Chief, as it would have been for the Secre
tary of War to publish the same documents
without his authority. What is of more im
portance, their publication was calculated in
juriously to affect the compromise measures
then pending before Congress and the coun
try, and to encourage the Secessionists in their
mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union
into fragments. From tbe great respect which
I then entertained for the General, I passed it
over in silence.
It is worthy of remark, that soon after the
Presidential elections representations of what
these “views” contained, of more or less cor
rectness, were unfortunately circulated, espec
ially throughout the South. The editors of
the National Intelligencer , in assigning a rea
son for their publication, state that both in
public prints and public speeches allusions had
been made to them, and some misapprehension
of their character had got abroad.
11. and 111. General Scott states that he ar
rived in Washington on the 12th, and accom
panied by the Secretary of War, had a con
versation with the President on the 15th of
December. Whilst I have no recollection
whatever of this conversation, he doubtless
states correctly that I did refuse to send three
hundred men to reinforce Major Anderson a£
Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to
Fort Sumpter. The reason far this refusal is
manifest to all who recollect the history of the
time. But twelve days before, in the annual
message of the 8d of December, I had urged
upon Congress the adoption of amendments to
the Constitution of the same character with
those subsequently proposed by Mr. Critten
den, called the “Crittendon Compromise.” At
that time high hopes were entertained through
out the country that these would be adopted.
Besides, I believed, and this oorrectly, as the
event proved, that Major Anderson was then
in no danger of attack. Indeed, he and his
command were then treated with marked
kindness by the authorities and people of
Charleston. Under these circumstances, to
have sent such a force there would have been
only to impair the hope of compromise, to pro
voke collision, and to disappoint the country.
There are some details of this conversation
in regard to which the General’s memory must
be defective. At present I shall specify only
one. 1 could not have stated that on a future
contingent occasion 1 would telegraph “Major
Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts
(Moultrie and Sumpter) against attack be
cause, with prudent precaution, this had al
ready been dose several days before through
a special messenger sent to Major Anderson
for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell,
of the army.
The General’s supplementary note of the
same day presenting to me Gen. Jackson’s con
duct in 1833, during the period of nullification
as an example, requires no special notice.
Even if the cases were not entirely different, I
had previously determined upon a policy of
myown, as will appear from my annual mes
sage. This was, at every hazard, to collect the
customs of Charleston, and outside of the port,
if need be, in a vessel-of-war. Mr. Colcock,
the existing collector, as I had anticipated,
resigned his office about the end of December,
and immediately thereafter,! nominated to the
Senate, as his successor, a suitable person pre
pared at any personal risk to do his duty.
That body, however, throughout its entire ses
sion, declined to act on this nomination. Thus
without a Collector, it was rendered impossi
ble to collect the revenue.
IV. Gen. Scott’s statement alleges that “the
Brooklyn, with Capt. Vogdes’ company alone,
left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about
January 22d, and on the 29th President Buch
anan, having entered into a quasi armistice
with certain leading secedersat Pensacola and
elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey
to instruct in a joint note the commander of
the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieut. Slem
mer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no
act of hpstillity, and not to land Capt. Vogdes’
company unless the fort should be attacked.”
He afterwards states, within brackets, “That
joint note I never saw, but supposed the arm
istice was consequent upon the meetings of the
Peace Convention at Washington, and was un
derstood to terminate with it.”
These statements betray a singular want of
memory on the pari of Gen. Scott. It is scare
ly credible that this very joint note, presented
in such odious colors, was submitted to Gen.
Scott on the day it was prepared, (29th Janu
ary,) and met his entire approbation. I would
not venture to make this assertion if I did not
possess conclusive evidence to prove it. On
that day Secretary Holt addressed me a note,
from which the following is an extract: “7
have the satisjaction oj saying thai on submitting
the paper to Gen. Scott he expressed himselj
satigfied with it , saying that there could be no
objection to the arrangement in a military point
of view or otherwise .” This requires no com
ment. That the General had every reason to
be satisfied with the arrangement will appear
from the following statement:
A revolutionary outbreak bad occurred in
Florida ; the troops of the United .States had
been expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent
Navy Yard; and Lieut. Slemmer, of the ar
tillery, with his brave little command, had
been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens,
where he was in imminent danger every mo
ment of being captured by a vastly superior
force. Owing to the interruption of regular
communications, Secretary Holt did not re
ceive information of these events until several
days after their occurrence, and then through
a letter addressed to a third person. He in
stantly informed the President of the fact, and
reinforcements, provisions and military stores
were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pick
ens without a moment’s unnecessary delay.—
She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of Jan
uary.
Well-founded apprehensions were, however,
entertained at the time of her departure that
the reinforcements, with the vessela*of war at
no great distance from Port Pickens, could
not arrive in time to defend it against the im
pending attack. In this state of suspense,
and whilst Lieutenant Slemmer was in ex
treme peril, Senators Slidell, Hunter and Big
ler, received a telegraphic dispatch from Sen
ator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola,
on the 28th January, with the urgent request
that they should lay it before the President.—
This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to
maintain the peace, as well as the most posi
tive assurance that no attack would be made
on Fort Pickens if the present status should
e preserved
This proposal wasoarefully considered, both
with a view to the safety of the fort and to the
unhappy effect whi<jh an actual collision ei
ther at that or any other point might produce
on the Peace Convention, then about to assem
ble at Washington. The result was that a
joint dispatch was carefully prepared by the
Secretaries of War and Navy, accepting the
proposal, with important modifications, which
was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th
January to Lieutenant Slemmer and to the
naval cummanders near the station. It is too
long for transcription ; suffice it to say, it was
carefully guarded at every point for the secu
rity of the fort and its free communication
with Washington.
The result was highly fortunate. The
Brooklyn had along passage. Although she left
Fortress Monroe on the 24th January, she did
not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th Februa
ry. In, the meantime, ;Fort Pickens, with
Lieutenant Slemmer (whose conduct deserves
high oommendation) and his brave little band,
were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in
perfect security until an adequate force had
arrived to defend it against any attack. The
fort is still in our possession. Well might
Gen. Scott have expressed his satisfaction with
this arrangement. The General was correct
in the supposition that this arrangement was
to expire on the termination of the Peace Con
vention.
V. But we now come to an important period
when dates will be essentially necessary to
disentangle the statement of Gen. Scott. The
South Carolina Commissioners were appointed
on the 22d, and arrived in Washington on the
27th December. The day after their arrival
it was announced that Major Anderson had re
moved from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumpter.—
This rendered them furious. On the same day
they an angry letter to the President
demanding the sarrender of Fort Sumpter.
The President answered this letter on the 30th
December by a peremptory refusal. This
brought forth a reply from the Commissioners
on the 2d January, 1861, of such an insulting
character that the President instantly returned
it to them with the following endorsement:
“This paper, just presented to the President,
is of such a character that he declines to re
ceive it.” From that time forward all friend
ly, political and personal intercourse finally
ceaßed between the revolutionary Senators and
the President, and he was severely attacked
by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr.
Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse
had previously been of the coldest character
ever since the President’s anti-Secession mes
sage at the commencement of the session of
Congress.
Under these changed circumstances, Gene
ral Scott, by note on Sunday, the 80th of De
cember, addressed the following inquiry to
the President :
“Will the President permit General Scott, with
out reference to the War Department, and other
wise as secretly as possibly, to send two hundred
and fifty recruits from New York harbor to rein
force Fort Sumpter, together with some extra
muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsistence ? It
is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be or
dered for the same purpose ‘to-morrow.’ ”
The General seems not to have then known
that Mr. Floyd was out of office.
Never did a request meet a more prompt
compliance. It was received on Sunday eve
ning, December 30th. Qn Monday morning,
I gave instructions to the War and Navy De
partments, and on Monday evening; General
Scott came to congratulate me that the Secre
taries had issued the necessary orders to the
army and navy officers, and that they were in
his possession. The Brooklyn, with troops,
military stores and provisions, was to sail
forthwith from Fortress Monroe to Fort Sum
ter, I am, therefore, utterly at a loss to im
agine why the General, in his statement, should
have asserted that “ the South Carolina Com
missioners had already been many days in
Washington, and no movement of defence (on
the part of the United States) was permitted.”
These Commissioners arrived in Washington
on the 27th December; General Scott’s re
quest was made to the President on the 30th.
It was complied with on the 31st, and a single
day is all that represents the “many days” of
the General.
Again, General Scott asserts, in the face of
these facts, that the President refused to allow,
any attempt to be made—to reinforce Fort
Sumter—because he was holding negotiations
with tbe South Carolina Commissioners. And
still again, that “ afterwards Secretary Holt
and myself endeavored in vain, to obtain a
ship-of-war for the purpose, and were finally
obliged to employ the passenger steamer ‘Star
of the West.’” Will it be believed that the
substitution of the “Star of the West” for the
powerful war steamer Brooklyn, of which he
now complains, was by the advice of General
Scott himself ? I have never heard this doubt
ed until I read the statement.
At the interview already referred to between
the General and myself, on the evening of
Monday, the 31st of December, I suggested to
him that, although I had not received the
South Carolina Commissioners in their official
capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet
it might be considered an improper act to send
the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort
Sumter until I had received an answer from
them to my letter of the preceding day ; that
the delay could not continue more than forty
eight hours. He promptly* concurred in this
suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and
the orders were not transmitted to the Brook
lyn on that evening. My anticipations were
correct, for on the morning of the 2d of Jan
uary I received their insolent note, and sent it
back to them. In the meantime, however,
the General had become convtnced, by the rep
resentations of a gentleman whom I forbear to
name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries
of War and Navy informed me, to secure se
creay and success and reach the fort, would
be to send a fast side-wheel mercantile steam
er from New York with the reinforcement.—
Accordingly the “Star of the West” was se
lected for this duty. The substitution of this
mercantile steamer for the Brooklyn, which
would have been able to defend herself in
case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me
to the high military judgment of Gen. Scott.
The change of programme required a brief
space of time ; but the Star of the West, left
New York for Charlestown on the evening of
the sth January; On the very day, however,
when this ill-fated steamer left New York, a
telegram was dispatched by General Scott to
Colonel Scott to countermand her departure ;
but it did not reach its destination until after
she had gone to sea. The reason for this
countermand shall be stated in the language
of Secretary Holt, to be found in a letter ad
dressed by him to Mr? - Thompson, the late
Secretary of the Interior, on the sth of March,
1861, and published in the National Intelligen
cer. Mr. Holt says:
“ The countermand spokea of (by Mr. Thomp
son) was not more cordially sanctioned by the
President than it was by General Scott and my
self ; not because of any dissect from the order
on the part of the President, but because of a letter
received that day from Major Anderson, stating
in effect, that be regarded himself secure in bis po
sition ; and yet more from intelligence which late
on Saturday evening (sth January, 1861) reached
the Department, that a heavy battery had been
erected among the sand bills, at the entrance of
Charleston harbor, which would probably destroy
any unarmed vessel (and such was the Star of the
West,) which might attempt to make its way to
Fort Sumter. This important information satis
fied the Government that there was no present ne
cessity for sending reinforcements, and that when
sent they should go, not in a vessel of commerce,
but of war. Hence the countermand was dis
patched by telegraph to New York; but the ves
sel had sailed a short time before it reached' the
officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was addressed."
A statement of these facts, established by
dates, proves conclusively that the President
was not only willing but anxious in the brief
est period to reinforce Fort Sumter.
On the 4th of January, the day before the
departure of the Star of the West from : New
York, as General Scott in his statement admits,
succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West,
and to Fort Jefferson, Tongugas Island, which
reached these points in time for their security.
He nevertheless speculates on the consequen
ces which might have followed had the rein
forcements not reached their destination in
due time; and even expresses the extraordi
nary opinion that, with the possession of these
forts “ the rebels might have purchased an
qprly recognition.”
I shall next advert to the statement that
the expedition under Captain Ward, “of
three or four small steamers belonging to the
Coast Survey,” was kept back by something
like a truce or armistice, [made here,] embra
cing Charleston and Pensacola harbors agreed
upon between the late President and certain
principal Seceders of South Carolina, Florida,
Louisans, &c. And this truce lasted toy-the
end of the Administration.” Things alto
gether distinct in their nature are often so
blended in this statement that it is difficult
to separate them. Such is eminently the case
in connecting the facts relative to Charleston
with Penßacola.
Having already treated of the charge of
having kept back reinforcements from Pen
sacola, 1 shall now say something of-the
charge of having &Ibo kept them back., from
Charleston. Neither a trace, nor quasi truce,
nor anything like it, was ever concluded
between the President and any human au
thority concerning Charleston. On the con
trary, the South Carolina Commissioners, first
and last, and all the time were informed that
BUCHANAH.
the President could never surrender Fort
Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most en
tire liberty to send reinforcements to it
whenever it was believed to be in danger, or
requested by Major Anderson. It is strange
that Gen. Scott was not apprized of this well
known fact. It was then, with some aston
ment, that I learned from the statement of
the General that he had, : on the 12th of
March, 1861, advised that Major Anderson
should be instructed to evacuate the fort as
soon as suitable transportation could be
procured to carry himself and his command
to New York. A military necessity for a
capitulation may have existed in case there
should be an attack upon the fort, or a de
mand for its surrender, but surely none such
could have existed for its voluntary surrender
and abandonment.
Probably that to which the General means
to refer was not the quasi, but the actual,
truce of arms concluded at Charleston, on the
11th of January, 1861, between Governor
Pickens and Major Anderson, without the
knowledge of the President. It was on the
9th of January that the Star of the West, un
der the American flag, was fired upon in the
harbor of Charleston by order of Governor
Pickens. Immediately after this outrage Ma
jor Anderson sent a flag to the Governor sta
ting that he presumed the act had been unau
thorized, and for that reason he bad not open
ed fire frem Fort Sumter on the adjacent bat
teries ; but demanded its disavowal, and, if
this were not sent in a reasonable time, he
would consider it war, and fire on any vessel
that attempted to leave the harbor.
Two days after this occurrence, on the 11th
January, Governor Pickens had the audacity
to demand of Major Anderson the surrender
of the fort. In his answer of the same date
the Major made the following proposition:
“Should your Excellency deem, fit, previous
to a resort of arms, to refer this matter to
Washington, it would afford me the sincerest
pleasure to depute one of my officers to ac
company any messenger you may deem proper
to be the bearer of your demand.” This pro
position was promptly accepted by the Gover
nor, and, in pursuance thereof, he sent on his
part Hon. J. W. Hayne,-the Attorney General
of South Carolina, to Washington, whilst Ma
jor Anderßon deputed Lieut. Hall, of the Uni
ted States Army, to accompany him. These
gentlemen arrived together in Washington on
the evening of the 13th January, when the
President obtained the first knowledge of the
transaction. But it will be recollected that
no time intervened between the return of the
Star of the West to New York and the arrival
of the messenger bearing a copy of the truce
at Washington within which it would have
been possible to send reinforcements to Fort
Sumter. Both events occurred about the
same time.
Thus a truce, or suspension of arms, was
concluded between the parties, to continue
until the question of the surrender of the fort
should be decided by the President. Until
this decision Major Anderson had placed it
ou: of his own power to ask for reinforcements,
and equally out of the power of the Govern
ment to Bend them without a violation of pub
lic faith. This was what writers on public
law denominate “a under which
hostilliiies are suspended only in certain
places, as between a town and the army be
sieging it.” / *
It is possible that the President, under the
laws of war, might have annulled this truce
upon due notice to the opposite party ; but
neither Gen. Scott nor any other person ever
suggested this expedient. This would have
been to cast a reflection on Major Anderson,
who beyond question, acted from the highest
and purest motives. Did Gen. Scott ever pro
pose to violate this truce during its existence ?
If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware
of the fact. Indeed, 1 think he would have
been one of the last men in the world to pro
pose such a measure.
Col. Hayne did not deliver the letter which
he bore from Governor Pickens, demanding
the surrender of the fort, to the President un
til the 31st-of January. The documents con
taining the reasons for this worrying delay,
were communicated to Congress in a special
message of the Bth of Febuary, to which I refer
the reader. On the sth of February, the Sec
retary of War, under the instructions of the
President, gave a peremptory refusal to this
demand in an able and comprehensive letter,
reviewing the whole subject, explaining and
justifying the conduct of the President
throughout. Its concluding sentence is both
eloquent and emphatic:
“ If, (says Mr. Holt,) with all the multiplied
proofs which exist of the President’s anxiety for
peace, and of the earnestness with which he has
pursued it, thejauthorities of that State shall assault
Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the handful
of brave and loyal men abut up within its walls
and thus plunge our country into the horrors of
civil war, then upon them and those they repre
sent must rest the responsibility.”
The truce was then ended, and General Scot
is incorrect in stating “that it lasted to the
end of that Administration.”
An expedition was quietly fitted out at New
York, under the supervision of General Scott,
to be ready for any contingency. He arrang
ed its details, and regarded the reinforcements
thus provided for as sufficient. This was ready
to sail for Fort Sumpter on five hours’ notice.
It is of this expedition that Gen. Scott thus
speaks :
“At that time, when this (the truce) had passed
away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Capt. Ward,
of the navy, and myself, with the knowledge of
the President, settled upon the employment, under
the Captain, of three or four steamers belonging to
the Coast Survey, but he was kept back by this
truce.”
A strange inconsistency. The truce had
expired with Mr. Holt’s letter to Col. Hayne
on the sth of February, and General Scott, in
hishtatement says, “It would have been easy
to reinforce this fort down to or about the 12th
of February.” Why then did the reinforce
ments not proceed ? This was simply because
of communications from Major Anderson. It
was most fortunate that they did not proceed;
because the three or four small steamers which
were to bear them would never have reached
the fort, and in the attempt must have been
captured or destroyed. The vast inadequacy
of the force provided to accomplish the object,
was demonstrated by information received
from Major Anderson at the War Department
on the last day of the Administration.
I purposely forbear at present to say more
on this subject, lest I might, however uninten
tionally, do injustice to one or more of the
parties concerned, in consequence of the brev
ity required by the nature of this communica
tion. The facts relating to it, with the appro
priate acccompaniments, have been fully pre
sented in a historical review, prepared a year
ago, which will ere long be published. This
review contains a sketch of the four last months
of my administration. It is impartial ; at least
such is my honest conviction. That it has
not yet been published has arisen solely from
an apprehension, no longer entertained, that
something therein might beunjußtly perverted
into an interference with the Government in a
vigorous prosecution of the war for the main
tenance of the Constitution and the restoration
of the Union, which was far, very far, from
my intention.
After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly
declare, before God and my country, that I
cannot reproach myself with any act of com
mission or omissuuTßince the existing troubles
commenced. I have never doubted that my
countrymen would yet do me justice. In my
special message of the Bth of January, 1861, I
presented a full and fair exposition of the
alarming condition of the country, and urged
Congress either to adopt measures of compro
mise, or, failing in this, to prepare for the
last alternative. In both aspects, my recom
mendation was disregarded. I Bhall close this
document with a quotation of the last senten
ces of that message, as follows :
“ In conclusion, it may be permitted me to re
mark that I have often warned my countrymen of
the dangers which now surround ns. This may
be the last time I shall refer to the snbjeet
officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully,
though it may be imperfectly, performed; and
whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my
grave the consciousness that I at least meant well
for my-country.”
Your obedient servant, -
James Buchanan.
Wheatlandj near Lancaster , Oct. 29, 1872.
WANTED— An experienced salesman
wishes a situation In a Dry Goods' Store. For par
ticulars apply at thi« Office. Loot 4 3t 43.
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SCHOOL MAPS, OHARTS AND CARDS,
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THE DAT SCHOOL BELL
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man words, 30 cents. Where liberty dwells is my country,
Plumley. Forget "if you can, bat forgive; I hear sweet
voices singing, and Home is home, by J. R. Thomas, 30
cents each. These songs are very popular. Mujiad free at
retail price.
Foreign Sheet Music at 2 cents per page. All of
Mosic merchandise at war prices.
HORACE WATERS, Publisher,
481 Broadway, New York.
NEW MUSIC FOB THE MILLION,
m CHEAP FORK, ARRANGED AS QUARTETTES Aim CHORUSES 79
MUSICAL SOCIETIES, CHOIRS, SUNDAY SCHOOLS,
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SEMINARIES, ETC.
Shall we know each other there; Shall we meet beyond
the river? Be in time; There is4t beautiful world; Don’t
you bear the Angels coming; Where liberty dwells is my
country; Freedom, Truth and Right, (national songs.) Is
there a land of love ? Sorrow shall come ng*l«i no more.
Price 3 cents, 25 cents per doz., $2 per 100. Postage 1 cent.
In sheet form, with Piano accompaniment, 25 cents.
Published by HORACE WATERS, 481 Broadway, New
York, and for sale by N. P. Kemp, Boston; Chas. 8. Luther,
Philadelphia; G. Croasby, Cincinnati; Tomlinson A Bros.,
Chicago, and J. W. Mclntyre, Bt. Louis. juiy 20 6m 20
THE PEOPLE'S HAT AND CAP
STORE.
SHULTZ A 880,
BATTERS
No. 20 North c Queen Street, Pa.
The subscribers are desirous to inform their Customer!
and the Public generally, that their preparations of a large
assortment of fine
SOFT FELT AND SILK HATS,
adapted for Spring and Summer wear, have been com
pleted ; the same comprises the richest and most beautiful
shades of color and style, which taste and long experience
could produce.
In our assortment will be found all the Newest Styles of
SILK,_C A 88IMERE AND SOFT HATS.
STRAW HATS, ' ?
every Style and Quality for Gentlemen’s and Boys’ Wear.
A fall Tine of
CHILDREN’S STRAW <*OODB.
SUMMER STYLE CAPS.
Zn conclusion we would return our sincere for
past favors, and trust by unvaried exertions, attention and
dispatch to meiit its continuance.
JOHN A. BHULTZ, HENRY A. SHULTZ.
may 27 . tf2o
COTTON LAPS, TIB TARN AHD
CANDLE WICK.
To the Merchants of Lancaster county. We have on
hand a good assortment of
COTTON LAPS,
TIB YARN,
AND CANDLE WICK,
which we offer for sale at the lowest cash prices." ■ i
F. SHRODSB* Agent,
Conestogo Steam BUu No. L
oct 7 3m 391
FARMER'S UNION HOT B<L ,
No. 929 MARKET STBS ST .
Between 9th and loth,-
PHILADELPHIA.
J. 0. EWING end J. H. KUBTZ, Proprietor*. -4
BOABDEBB accommodated on reasonable terms, end
transient enstomere at $l,OO per day. ■-"* -' ‘
19* Stabling tor SerentyFlTO Hawes. “Wt - f.jjn
julylS # '
NO. 44,