Clearfield Republican

D. W. MOORE, Editor and Proprietor.

PRINCIPLES, not MEN.

VOL. XXXVI.—WHOLE NO. 1844. CLEARFIELD, PA., WEDNESDAY, FEB. 8, 1865. TERMS:—$2 00 Per Annum, if paid in advance

NEW SERIES—VOL. V.—NO. 30.

PLENTY LEFT

For Sale:

At the cheap Store of J. I. Morris & Co., Philipsburg, Penna.

10 Tons Fresh Pork! 5 Tons Salted Pork!
5 Tons Fresh Beef! 100 Bushels Dried Apples!
20 Bushels Prime Green Apples! 100 Bushels Potatoes!
10 Tons Rye Chop! 5000 Bushels Corn Ears!
ALSO,
Rafting Rope—All Sizes—Augers &c.
500 Barrels Flour, (Extra Family.)
400 Barrels Corn Meal,
250 Bags of Salt. Dec. 29-3t.

Ladies Furs. Purchasers may rely upon getting the best Furs at CHAS. OAKFORD & SONS, Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. jan. 11.

ADMINISTRATOR'S NOTICE.—Notice is hereby given that Letters of Administration have been granted to the undersigned on the estate of Patrick Quinn, late of Penn township, Clearfield county, deceased: therefore all persons indebted to said estate are required to make immediate payment, and those having demands against the same will present them duly authenticated for settlement.

JAMES CLARK, Adm'r.
Penn township, Dec. 28, 1864.

Large Photographs, $1 75; Duplicates, $1. 4 Cards plain 1 25; Duplicates, 25 cts. 4 Cards Vignette, $1 50; Duplicates, 30 cts. 4 Cards Ferrotypes, $1 50; Dup., 25 cts. ☞ Particular attention paid to copying all kinds of Picture

NEW GOODS
AT THE
Cheap Cash Store
OF
WILLIAM F. IRWIN!

Market street, opposite the 'Clearfield House,' Clearfield, Pa.

A FRESH ARRIVAL OF
Winter Goods
AT THE CHEAP CASH STORE.

I am just receiving and opening a carefully elected stock of fashionable Spring & Summer

GOODS

of almost every description,

STAPLE & FANCY

A beautiful assortment of Prints and Dry goods, of the newest and latest styles. Also a great variety of useful notions.

DRY-GOODS AND NOTIONS.
Bonnets, Shawls,
Hats and Caps,
Boots and Shoes, a large quantity,
Hardware, Queensware,
Drugs and Medicines,
Oil and Paints,
Carpet & Oil Cloths,

GROCERIES,
Fish, Bacon and Flour,
Mackerel in ½ ¼ and ⅛ barrels,
of the best quality, all of which will be sold at the lowest cash or ready pay prices.

My old friends and the public generally, are respectfully invited to call.

☞ N. B.—All kinds of *GRAIN* and approved *COUNTRY PRODUCE* taken in exchange for Goods.

WM. F. IRWIN.

Clearfield, Jan 11, 1865.

CAUTION.—The public are hereby cautioned against buying or selling, or in any way meddling with a certain BAY HORSE, now in the possession and use of Xavier Conts, of Girard township, as the same is my property.

Girard, jan. 11,'65. JUSTIN PIE.

Ladies' Furs, The largest assortment at CHAS. OAKFORD & SONS, Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. jan. 11.

ADMINISTRATOR'S NOTICE.—Noteie is hereby given that letters of administration on the estate of Eliza A. Lee, late of Beccaria township, Clearfield county, deceased, having been granted to the undersigned, all persons indebted to said estate are requested to make immediate payment, and those having demands against the same will present them duly authenticated for settlement.

A. W. LEE, Administrator.
Beccaria tp. jan. 6t.11-

Ladies' and Children's Hats, Latest Styles at CHAS. OAKFORD & SONS, Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. jan. 11.

Ladies Furs, The largest assortment at CHAS. OAKFORD & SONS, Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. jan. 11.

LEATHER! LEATHER!

AN assortment for sale in Clearfield, by Dec. 21. MERRELL & BIGLER.

Ladies' and Children's Hats, Latest Styles at CHARLES OAKFORD & SONS, Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. jan. 11-3mos.

PORTER'S REPLY TO BUTLER.

The following is Commodore PORTER's reply to the Report of Gen. BUTLER in relation to the Wilmington failure:

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship Malvern,
Cape Fear River, Jan. 23, 1865.

Sir: I have read the report of Major-General Butler in relation to the late expedition to Wilmington (in which he bore a part), and though late results (the capture of Fort Fisher) have completely refuted the assertions of Gens. Butler and Weitzel, I deem it due to the naval part of the expedition that General Butler's report should receive some notice at my hands.

To use the mildest terms I can, I pronounce the whole report a tissue of misstatements from beginning to end, scarcely equaled by the misstatement made regarding the Lieutenant General.

The navy had been waiting two months to start on this expedition, but for reasons known to the Lieutenant-General and myself, and which were perfectly satisfactory to me, the proper time was waited for. We wanted a success, not a failure.

Gen. Weitzel was selected, and General Butler's name was never connected with the expedition, except to fit it out. When the expedition did prepare to start, it was going to the attack on the supposition that the powder vessel (originally prepared by Gen. Butler) would blow the forts down, and the troops would have nothing to do but to walk in.

I was not opposed myself to the experiment (for I think everything worth trying), and gave all my time and attention to the enterprise and fitting out the vessel. I was hard at work getting ready, filling her with powder, and had placed her in the carpenter's hands, the weather looking very squally. Judge of my surprise, when Gen. Butler came on board the flag-ship at Norfolk, and told me he was embarking the troops in transports, and would be ready to start in two days. I told him that was out of the question, a heavy southwest gale was coming on that would last three days at least, and we could not go to sea at such a time, neither could his transports move. My advice was "not to embark the men until the gale was over."

He did embark the troops nevertheless. The gale blew heavy for four days, and the troops must have been very uncomfortable. At the end of that gale the fleet sailed. I told General Butler that my vessels were all slow; the monitors would have to be towed; would have to go into Beaufort to fill up with ammunition and coal, as I was afraid to venture them at sea with too much in. I advised him to wait until we had got thirty-six hours start of him, and also recommended him to rendezvous at Beaufort, North Carolina, where he would find a good harbor. Even up to this time he did not tell me that he himself was going along, but led me to believe Gen. Weitzel was to be in command. He did not take my opinion about sailing. His transports sailed before any fleet except the monitors, and instead of rendezvousing at Beaufort, where I could find him he rendezvoused off Masonboro inlet; showed his flagship decked out with flags to the enemy at Ft. Fisher and had one of his transports fired on by guns near the fort. In the meantime I worked night and day at Beaufort to get the monitors ready and complete the arrangements for the powder boat, and I sailed when ready. There was no time when any troops could have landed without danger up to the time the first attack took place. I was to be the judge of that, not Gen. Butler, for I had not that faith in his generalship which would induce me to follow him blindly, though I determined to do all I could for him, and make the expedition a success if possible.

I soon saw, though, that Gen. Butler depended on the powder boat entirely, and I said we would have no assault from the beginning.

I will now proceed to notice Gen. Butler's report in detail, and state where it is incorrect.

He first says he gave the navy thirty-six hours start. That is untrue; the transports started before the navy, or disappeared. Gen. Butler himself left after I did. He speaks of the "finest possible weather" he had at sea, but says nothing about the surf on the beach. No boat can land on the beach unless the wind has been blowing strong off the land, and on the days in question, by looking at the log-book, you will find the wind blowing southwest and south. On the 15th the monitors had not arrived at Beaufort, and on the 16th and 17th were coaling and filling with ammunition, and had to wait a smooth time to get over the bar, the wind blowing southwest on the 16th, 17th and 18th, and throwing in a heavy surf on the beach. On most of those nights, Mr. Bradford, of the coast survey, came near being capsized in the breakers, while making a reconnoissance. It was Gen. Butler's duty to have rendezvoused at Beaufort, and wait until the monitors and powder boat, on which he so much depended, were ready. The movements of the light transports should have been subordinate to the large and slow-moving frigates and iron-clads, and he should have been where he could have arranged with me all the details of the attack, but no, he kept out of my way, and, I think, did it studiously.

When I arrived on the ground of the naval rendezvous with the monitors, I found Gen. Butler there.

I ordered the powder boat in, on the night of the 18th (the smoothest beach we had had), but at Gen. Butler's request, communicated through Gen. Weitzel, in presence of the fleet captain (Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breese), I postponed the explosion until General Butler should say he was ready. The correspondence on this subject has all been sent to you, and you can judge for yourself how far Gen. Butler's statement is true.

Gen Butler states that "Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher, he was then urged, if that were so, to run by the batteries into Cape Fear river, and then troops could land and hold the beach without difficulty, or without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboat Tallahassee, seen on the river." This is a deliberate misstatement. Gen. Butler does not say who urged me; but I never saw him, or his staff, after the landing on the beach, nor did I ever have any conversation with him, or see him, (except on the deck of his vessel as I passed by in the flag-ship), from the time I left Fortress Monroe until he left here after his failure.

He showed himself by that remark just as ignorant about hydography as the rebel General Whiting did when he built his fort where he supposed large ships could not get near enough to attack it. Neither myself or any one of the squadron had the faintest idea where the channel was or what depth of water there was in it. We knew there was an outer and inside bar, between which was included the heaviest fortifications in this country, on which bars the blockade runners constantly grounded, and had to wait for high water to get off. After we had no guns to annoy us, and I had the channel sounded out and carefully buoyed, nearly all the gunboats of light draught got badly aground, and remained there for a whole tide. We were forty-eight hours getting gunboats of light batteries over the first bar, and they had to anchor under the guns of the heaviest forts. They would have fared badly had the rebels manned them.

Three days were consumed in getting the gunboats over the "Rips," and one of them is stuck there still. The "Rips" are commanded by about twenty 10 inch guns and 100-pounders, and not a gunboat would have been left had they attempted to run the batteries. It might have been sport to General Butler, but it would have been death to the gunboats. I never had the slightest intention of passing the batteries until the fort was taken. The department saw my plan, and the utter impossibility of doing so.

I would certainly not have been influenced by "General Butler's" opinions in nauticle matters, or risked my vessels to amuse him.

All the next paragraph in General Butler's report, in relation to what the "Admiral" said, and what the "Admiral," declined to do, is false from beginning to end.

I never had any conversation of the kind with any one—indeed, the whole report is a tissue of misrepresentations, including the part that says the instructions he received did not contemplate a "siege, &c" when he knows he never received any instruction, and joined the expedition without orders.

General Butler speaks of pushing up his men to within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and capturing Half-moon battery and its men. The "General" certainly must have had something in his eye, and did not see well. Half-moon battery is four miles from Fort Fisher, had one gun in it, which was silenced after a few shots from the gunboats, and no one ever entered it. It was a small sand hill, that twenty men could have taken. Flag Pond battery was a large work, thrown up by the rebels, in which was one eight inch gun that had burst some time ago. The gunboats shelled it, and, on the landing of the first boat-load of troops, the seamen went up and found some boys and old men in it (North Carolina Junior Reserves,) and carried them off to the Santiago de Cuba. The prisoners were quite willing to go. The troops afterwards surprised 218 officers and men near Fort Fisher, and captured them.

General Butler speaks of having run in the Chamberlain to within a few hundred yards of the fort. If he ran that close and was not fired at, he must have supposed the fort silenced; but he never was within one mile and a half of the fort nor did he ever land himself.

What General Butler says about the difficulties of assaulting, owing to palisades, ditches, and other bugbears, has been refuted by the successful assault, made by General Terry on the land side, and the sea face of the fort, when thirty gallant officers and seamen reached the top of the parapet and planted the flag. Soldiers, who were accustomed to the work, would have succeeded there easier than where General Terry assaulted, as the ascent (where the sailors went in) was easier. The same troops that General Butler had did the work finally, and took the most difficult side of the works.

General Butler admits that the fire of the navy did keep the enemy in his bomb-proofs, but he feared it would keep his (Butler's) men out when they attempted to assault. General Terry was influenced by no such fear; on the contrary, we fired twenty yards ahead of our troops, while they were fighting from bomb-proof to bomb-proof, and the General constantly signalled, "Fire away! your shells are doing good execution, and our men are in no danger from them."

In the meantime (General Butler says) "the weather assumed a threatening aspect, and the surf came rolling in on the beach, and the landing became difficult."

I assert that the landing on that day was smoother than when General Terry landed. I arranged with general Butler's chief staff, General Weitzel, to land the troops early in the morning. I gave him boats, vessels, everything in fact that he asked for, and at 3 o'clock P. M. not more than three thousand men were on shore, with one day's rations. With Gen. Terry I commenced to land the men at 8 30 A. M., and at 2 P. M. eight thousand five hundred men were on the beach, with twelve day's provisions and all the intrenching tools. The men were rolled in the surf, wet their cartridges, and filled up with more.

They went there to stay, and I knew we would have the fort before many days, from the conduct of the men and officers. There was no necessity for General Butler re-embarking his men on account of the weather. It was rough on the beach, but our boats from the fleet communicated at times, and when it was necessary. The gunboats laid within six hundred yards of the beach, and covered the troops left on shore, when the general went away after hearing the news from some North Carolina reserves that Hoke's brigade was advancing, and that the fort was strongly reinforced. But what if it was? We came down here to take it, and General Terry with the same men did it. They were determined to follow there brave general wherever he might think proper to lead.

After General Butler left for Fortress Monroe, it was rather rough—too rough to land troops or bring them off, but it only lasted twenty-four hours, and the troops came off without much difficulty; in fact there was no time when communication stopped altogether.

Had General Butler commenced landing men (with the determination to stay) at 8 o'clock in the morning, they would have all been on shore by sunset.

We landed General Terry's 8,500 men in 5½ hours, and had no time to give the fort a good shattering before dark.

General Butler says he gave order to the transports to sail for Fortress Monroe as soon as the troops were on board, in obediance to the orders of the Lieutenant General.

Gen. Grant never contemplated the withdrawal of the troops. He sent them there to stay, and having once effected a landing, he knew that the most difficult part was done. The army once in possession of that narrow neck of land, and covered by the guns of the fleet, the capture of Fort Fisher was a mere matter of time. (In a heavy gale blowing yesterday and to day, the vessels outside did not desert their posts.)

General Butler states that the garrison of Flag Pond battery belonged to Kirkland's brigade. He is in error there; they were a part of Junior North Carolina Reserves.

He also stated that he captured two heavy rifled guns, two light guns, some caissons, &c. No such captures were made, and the captured [illegible] which so much has been written, were rough earthworks, thrown up for the purpose of firing at blokeaders when they chased close in shore. They made no resistance after a few shots were fired by the gunboats.

I have nothing to say in relation to General Weitzel's report, beyond this—he has made mistakes in his statements. He admits that he requested me to wait a few days until we could co-operate more favorably, on which I suppose General Butler grounds his belief that the navy detained him.

I did not wait, and have waited ever since, until the right man and a good time offered to take the forts. They were taken, as I said they could be, and that is the strongest argument in favor of the navy, on whom it was foolishly attempted to fix this blunder.

As it has turned out, the first failure had its advantages, and the country will derive great comfort therefrom.

If General Butler had not descended to a subterfuge to cover the mistake, I would willingly have allowed him to go into retirement with the honors he has won; but no man shall reflect unjustly on me or the corps to which I belong without his hearing from me in some way or other.

I have sent you documents and extracts from log-books to show that what I say is correct, and the log-books of the whole fleet can be examined if necessary.

In conclusion, permit me to say that I dont see what it matters whether General Butler's troops landed one day or another. He decided the fort could not be taken when he did land. He could not expect the rebels to leave a work like that with less than 500 men in it, and he certainly could have tried to assault that number. General Terry had 2,300 to contend against, and he carried the works without a very serious loss, considering the importance of the position to the country.

I enclose you the report of the rebel General Whiting, who states plainly that "no reinforcements had arrived until Tuesday morning (the 28th), when all our troops were embarked."

If the evidence already presented is doubted, the report of General Whiting cannot be, therefore the excuse for re-embarking the troops because the forts had been reinforced by Hoke's division is a pour one.

General Whiting says "the garrison remained, steadily awaiting the renewal of the assault of bombardment, until Tuesday morning (27th), when they were releived by the supports of Major General Hoke and the embarkation of the enemy." This was two days after the attack of the navy and the landing and re-embarking of the troops.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear Admiral.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Washington, D. C.

☞ Children and fools, says the old adage, always tell the truth;

"Mother sent me," said a little girl to a neighbor, "to ask you to come and take tea with her this evening."

"Did she say what time my dear?"

"No ma'am; she only said she would ask you, and then the thing would be off her mind; that was all she said."

[From the Old Guard, for February.]

Conspiracy in Congress.

The mountain has conceived and bro't forth a mouse—a contemptable, laughable, abortion of a mouse. The abolitionized Congress, after terrible labor, has brought forth the resolution paving the way for the alteration of the Constitution, for abolishing slavery. Now, all the company of fools or knaves who voted for this resolution have recorded themselves as being in favor of both of the following propositions:

1. The perpetual dissolution of this Union, by barring the last avenue left open for the return of the Southern States.

2. The destruction of the Government formed by our fathers, by blotting out the sovereignty of the States on which alone it was founded.

Stripped of all shams and lying disguises, it is simply a proposition to revolutionize, overthrow, and destroy this government. It is a hundred-fold worse than all the follies of secession combined. If the secessionist is a *traitor*, those who voted for this resolution are *double traitors*, because they go for destroying the organic principle on which our government is based. The original, inherent, and undelegated powers of a single State cannot be legally torn from it, not even by the action of all other States through the form of altering the Constitution. That clause of the Constitution giving a certain number of States the power of altering the instrument, does not, by any means, give the majority the right to overthrow the vested rights or so destroy the organic being of a State. The vote of the majority to alter the Constitution cannot touch the minority in any matters that were not delegated in the instrument under which the alteration claims to be made. The reserved, or undelegated, rights of the States are not subject to any jurisdiction which the States do not themselves sanction. Suppose that, under the plea of altering the Constitution three-quarters of the State should vote to reduce all the people of the other quarter to a State of vassalage—would that be law! Suppose that, under the style and title of altering the Constitution, three-quarters should vote that they would appropriate to themselves all the wives and daughters of the other quarter, would not the quarter say to the three-quarters, *"Show your authority! Where in that instrument did we delegate to any'body those sacred matters? They were never subjects of Federal legislation and chastisement. For aught which you may amend the Constitution until your bodies are rotten and your souls damned; we shall despise and defy you!* What State, what husband, what brother, would not talk after this strong fashion? No, we will not believe that there can be such a fool in Congress as one who really thinks that, under the plea of altering the Constitution, the organic and untransferable rights of States can be legally overthrown. We can no more alter the Constitution to rob States of their "slaves," than we can to kidnap their wives and daughters. We find it much easier to believe that those who propose this kind of thing are *knaves*, than to let them off under the more charitable conclusion that they are *idiots*. We leave it to those apostate Democrats who advocated this resolution to settle it with their constituents as best they can, whether they have been bribed outright or lost their senses.

Outrages Upon Free Masons—Their Lodges Burned and Destroyed by Gen. Grierson.

The desecration and burning of Masonic Lodges by Grierson has caused, as we learn by accident, no little excitement among the mystic brotherhood. The New England Masons have publicly repudiated their obligations, and declared that their "brethren" of the South are not deemed masons. Grierson, himself a Mason, accepts the New England creed and disregards the obligations of the order. When he first entered upon his career of crime, as a soldier, he burned the Masons' Lodge at Rising Sun, in West Tennessee.

The then commander of the department condemned Grierson's conduct, and compelled him to make restitution. It seems, however, that he has received specific instructions to destroy every vestige of Southern Masonry. He burned the Masons' building in Verona, and also at Okalona. The wife of a colonel in our service, who is a Mason, made herself known as such, and was ruthlessly driven from her house with an infant in her arms. Her house was plundered and burned.

Masons may fight each other to the death on the battle-field, but when the field is lost or won, their obligations as members of a world wide fraternity are revived, and philanthropy supplants bloodthirstiness and barbarity. It is said that the Masons at Verona, Okalona and adjacent points have offered a large sum for the head of Grierson. If we are correctly informed, it becomes the duty of every Mason in the world to take his life. If that absurd old story about the death of Morgan has any foundation, it surely is not improbable that some loyal Mason will put an end to Grierson's career of plunder, rape and robbery.—*Macon Beacon.*

☞ "Heaven bless the Wives! they fill our hives with little bees and honey.—They ease life's shocks, they mend our socks, but don't they spend the money! When we are sick, they heal us quick—that is if they do love us; if not, we die, and yet they cry, and raise tombstones above us.

☞ A divorce suit is pending in the Superior Court of Brooklyn, Connecticut, in which both parties are 70 years of age. If they would only wait a bit death would pronounce divorce for them.

ADDRESS

Read to the Soldiers Quartered at Curwensville, by John Russell, on the occasion of a Collation Presented to them by the Ladies of Penn Township, on the 4th of January, 1865.

To the Officers and Soldiers composing the different Companies of U. S. Troops stationed at Curwensville, Clearfield County Pa. GENTLEMEN:—On behalf of the Loyal Ladies of Penn tp., and vicinity, (a number of whom are now present,) I have the honor to present to you on the present occasion, a small donation consisting of such things as they have been able to collect, which they hope will contribute to your comfort. To you veteran soldiers of the Republic, who have perilled your lives in the cause of the Union, the cause of our common Country, of the liberties of the nation, against the foul attempt to destroy the best government among men and to establish upon its ruins, a despotism worse than that of Nero, with "the sum of all villanies" for its corner stone. To you gentlemen, who have laid aside all minor interests and rallied forth in defence of our glorious and time honored institutions, and of Liberty throughout the world. I beg leave to say, on behalf of those whom I represent, that while we regret the necessity which brought you among us, we are glad to have an opportunity to meet you face to face, to present to you our scanty gift, and to assure you that you have our best wishes, that wherever your lot may be cast you will have a place in our memories, together with all others who like you have left homes and friends and families perhaps, with all that is near and dear on earth, to take their place in the ranks of the armies of the Union. Accept these gifts as a free will offering from those who feel that they with you have a common interest in the restoration of our great and good government, and of the preservation of law and order throughout its entire domain. Our hearts were saddened with the intelligence that blood was shed in your efforts to enfin our county in an encounter with the deserters from the draft in a neighboring district. We trust for the county that we may be saved from the disgrace which would follow the repetition of so grave an outrage.

Thanking you for your orderly deportment we bid you a kind adieu, and when the war shall be over, when the rebellion (which is now waning) shall have been conquered and broken down, when the rightful authorities of our government shall have been restored, and the Stars and Stripes, the proud ensign of the nation's greatness and power, shall once more float over all the land, may you all return again to your homes and to your loved ones, with the happy assurance that you were engaged on the side of Justice, of Right, and of universal Liberty, and my God's blessing accompany you.

RESISTING THE DRAFT.—We learn that a posse of officers from the Ulster and Chenango provost marshals' office recently undertook an expedition for the arrest of a band of deserters, who were reported to have encamped in the mountains, on the line between Ulster and Delaware counties, in numbers variously estimated at from twenty-five to one hundred, with intrenchments, &c. The approach of the officers to the place was signaled to the deserters by the firing of guns by some residents of the neighborhood, and when they arrived on the spot they found an empty backwoods encampment, but no intrenchments, and there had evidently not been more than a dozen persons occupying the camp. On their return one of the officers discovered and pursued a deserter to the house of his father, at the door of which he was met by the deserter, with a shot gun, which was discharged at the officer, wounding him critically. He was then fallen upon and beaten by the deserter, whose father and brother, as well as the female members of the family, stood by, encouraging him to kill the officer, who was finally rescued by his companions, who had come in search of him, and the men were all taken as prisoners to the provost marshal at Norwich. The wounded officer lies in a critical situation, but chances are that he will recover.—*Chenango [N. Y.] Union.*

A TERRIBLE SCENE.—A gentleman who has returned from the battle-field of December 16th, near Nashville, whither he went in quest of the body of a slain brother, describes to the Chicago *Post* the scene as one of unmitigated loathing and horror. The rebel dead still lie upon the field unburied, and in all the ghastliness of death as it fell upon them in the shock and carnage of battle. In some places where charges were made and repulsed, the poor wretches lie in heaps, one upon the other, as they had fallen in the agony of death. The excuse given for not burying them, was that the living were too busy in chasing the men under Hood to stop to care for the dead.