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REASONS

OF
HON. WILLIAM A. WALLACE,
OF CLEARFIELD,
FOR HIS VOTE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION.

IN SENATE, MARCH, 1864.

Mr. WALLACE said: I vote against this bill upon principle, as well as for form, and desire to assign the following reasons for my vote with regard to the first amendment:

This is no ordinary step. It is not one of those acts of legislation that may be repealed at our next session, if it prove unwise or injurious, but it is a change of the organic law, which, if effected, cannot be repealed save by the act of two successive Legislatures, and a vote of the people, and even this cannot be done until five years subsequent to its adoption. Such are the provisions of the Constitution. Beside this, it is in substance a repeal of the well considered provisions of the Constitution of 1838 upon the subject of the right of suffrage, and essentially a change and a modification of the invaluable safeguards that the wisdom of ages has thrown round the elective franchise. The time of its proposition, too, is objectionable. We are in the midst of great public commotion; the minds of men are in a continual whirl of excitement and agitation; and the hour is unpropitious for that calm, untroubled judgment that should preside over our deliberations in the settlement of the questions of this magnitude.

Whatever may have been my sentiments and opinions upon this amendment when it was before this body at last session, the lessons of the past year have taught me to fear the consequences of its adoption, and driven me to an investigation of its merits. In our own State we have seen the military used by its controlling power to decide the contest for power and place, and unjust discrimination made in favor of one party against another. The soldier whose independence of action and peculiar party views rendered him incapable of control, was permitted to remain on duty, whilst he who was willing to be subservient, or was already possessed of the essential requisite, was sent home to aid in the election. Of the result we have no right to complain. The means made use of, and the unblushing avowal of them, are to my mind alike fearful and portentous.

We have seen the dearest rights of a free and patriotic people in the States of Maryland, Delaware and Kentucky ruthlessly invaded by the Executive, the bayonet of the soldier used to control the ballot of the freeman, and the will of the people made to yield to the power of force. In each of those States the ballot-box has been trampled in the dust, and the millions of power have been elevated to place to do the bidding of their masters.

So, too, in the rebellious States, we have seen the rebel and the patriot united in the same degree; and they who have never raised the hand of rebellion, or sympathized with its acts, must lowly abase themselves, or be deprived of the right of suffrage. Those who have committed no crime, who have been guilty of no act of rebellion, must subscribe to a slavish oath, must degrade their manhood, and lose the franchise at the feet of power, or be disfranchised. As a condition precedent to the pardon of a rebel, this might well be done; but as a pre-requisite to the right of suffrage by a "loyal" man, it is the sheerest tyranny. It may be done in Louisiana or in Tennessee. If the agitator of the Constitution be insufficient to protect the lover of the Union there, may we not justly fear its power here.

The abstract proposition embodied in this amendment appears to many minds at first blush a reasonable and a just one. It requires an inquiry into and some examination of our elective and criminal system to demonstrate to such minds the utter impossibility of guarding the ballot-box in the army, outside of the Commonwealth, from foul and loathsome fraud. If, therefore, it is impossible to protect this right of suffrage from fraud at a distance from the Commonwealth, surely its exercise cannot be advocated with propriety.

The elective franchise within the State is guaranteed to the qualified elector under a well considered and most carefully guarded system of law. The place of election is fixed by law; an enrollment of voters is made by sworn officers; lists of voters are published in advance of the election; the right of challenge at the polls is protected; peace officers command the place of election to protect and defend the right; a highly penal code of statutes, consisting of no less than twenty different sections, prescribes the punishment for interference with the ballot, for fraudulently exercising the right, or for frauds committed by the election officers; oaths of the most binding character are administered to the officers holding the election, and they must all be citizens of the Commonwealth and qualified electors.

Now, can you designate in advance a place for the holding of elections in the army? Can you there exercise the purifying rights of challenge? Can you devise a system of guards and checks by which you can prevent frauds? You may answer that frauds have been perpetrated within the State. True, they have; gross and glaring outrages upon the purity of the ballot-box have been committed within the Commonwealth. They who commit them are amenable to your laws, and can be, and have been, punished for their offenses. The fact of their commission here, in defiance of all the penalties surrounding them, proves that they can be and will be committed in the army. They can be punished here; in the army they cannot be punished with impunity. And I affirm that the most learned and ingenious legal mind, not excepting the most learned and able chairman of the Judiciary Committee

cannot devise a code of law that will efficiently or even partially protect the purity of the ballot-box, if it be carried to the army, outside of the Commonwealth. You cannot punish frauds committed by non-residents, beyond your territorial limits; and the passage of this amendment throws wide the door, and invites fraud to enter. An outraged people and an outraged soldiery will learn too late that the right of suffrage, their priceless jewel, "the weapon of a freeman," has been by you debased, and made the synonym of force, fraud and wrong. The constitutional qualifications can be, and they will be, disregarded; and those who are not voters at home will be invited to aid in drowning the voice of the citizen. Your carefully prepared system of checks and oaths will be thrust aside or broken through whenever they obstruct the wishes of designing men. Returns will be suppressed before they reach the borders of the State, and false and forged returns will be manufactured; and by them the man who bids highest, or is most subservient to the will of the controlling power, will be declared elected.

I speak by the record when I say that these things will occur and that you cannot guard against them. The frauds of 1861 are still fresh in our minds and upon the pages of your criminal reports; and among the records of your courts are to be found repeated evidences of the truth of this fact.

The case of Halseman vs Remo, reported in 5th Wright, 396, is but one of those cases of outrageous frauds perpetrated over the head of an innocent soldiery. There the fact was clearly developed that the alleged returns from three entire companies were forgeries. They were counted in the return and they decided the election. A certificate was based upon them, and the highest court of the Commonwealth was powerless to deprive the fraudulently elected officer of his place. One of the syllabi of that case is as follows:—

"Where the return judges included the soldiers' vote and issued certificates of election to those who were thereby elected members of common council, and it was evident that some of the returns were forgeries, and that through them several of the candidates had improperly obtained certificates of their election, the courts cannot for that reason summarily interfere with and annul those certificates in the absence of proof that the return judges acted fraudulently, but the case must be tried by the forms of a 'contested election' before the tribunal appointed by law, and not by the ordinary forms of legal or equitable process before the usual judicial tribunal."

The wholesale frauds committed in the election of sheriff of Philadelphia, as developed in the case of Thompson vs Dewing, and particularly the return of the Schimmelpenninck regiment will also be remembered. A formal return of upwards of one thousand votes was regularly filed in the office of the prothonotary, having come by course of mail to his hand. Those votes were cast almost solely for the Republican candidate. They were produced before the board of return judges and were thrown out because it appeared that only two companies of the entire regiment were recruited in Philadelphia; that the regiment was not at the place named on the day of the election, that no vote whatever was had in the regiment, and that the entire return was a base and palpable forgery. To the credit of the soldiers it is to be said, that none of these instances of outrageous fraud were traceable to his act. They were all committed by the mercenary politician who lay in wait in the purlieus of the camp, seeking his opportunity to cheat both soldier and citizen out of the fair and equal election provided for by law.

Frauds like these, persisted in and successful through the meshes of the law, tend to move men to violence to resist them; and when it is seen that fraud and force are the controlling power, and honesty and justice submerged, riotous resistance and bloodshed usurp the place of law and order.

You cannot punish frauds committed out of the Commonwealth; beyond the borders of the State your laws are powerless. The vilest outrage upon the rights of a free people, if perpetrated outside the jurisdiction of your courts, must go unpunished, and the ruffian who committed it may come here and mingle with you, unwhipped of justice.

Show me the way in which you will control these frauds and punish the perpetrators of them, and you will show me a new system of laws and a power never before vested in the courts of the Commonwealth. The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."

The case of the Commonwealth versus Kunsman, reported in 5 Wright 429, decides and conclusively settles this very point. "By common law, crimes and misdemeanors are cognizable and punishable exclusively within the jurisdiction where they are committed."

An unnaturalized foreigner who fraudulently votes at a company election, held outside of Pennsylvania, by virtue of the act of July 24, 1839, relating to elections in the militia or volunteers in actual service, cannot be indicted and punished in this State for such offence. The courts of quarter sessions have no jurisdiction over such a case.

Judge Read, of the Supreme Court, in delivering his concurring opinion in this case, says:

"There are, therefore, insuperable objections to any criminal courts in this State taking cognizance of any of the statutory offences created and punished by the act of 2d July, 1839, when committed, as in the present case beyond our jurisdiction."

I am aware that great and grievous frauds upon the elective franchise have been perpetrated at the last general election, under the cover of alleged elections by the volunteers, but they must go unpunished, because our courts cannot try offences committed outside of their jurisdictional limits. The same arguments would apply if the Legislature had given similar privileges, under similar penalties, to other classes of citizens temporarily residing in other States or countries, for the power of the Legislature is just as great in one case as in the other, and no greater.

In our Constitutional Convention of 1838, whilst the provision requiring a residence of ten days within the district as a qualification to the right to vote was under consideration, its adoption was urged and was finally carried because it was one of the most efficient protections of the purity of the ballot, and the shrewdest guarantee against the commission of fraud. During the discussion Mr. Forward, of Allegheny, said:

"Whenever the people see your elections carried by fraud, then will there be an end of all confidence, and in a short time will there be an end of free government. A few corrupt votes may make the majority in your whole State Government—aye, sir, ten corrupt votes may turn the scales in your Senate, your House of Representatives and your Executive government. Ten corrupt votes on one side, may give a majority in the Senate—a majority in the House and a majority for the Governor of the State. Then, if there is this chance of fraud, will the people be contented, if there is a certainty of fraud in your elections? Will the people submit to it? It seemed to him that they would not; and that the best, the surest and the safest way of preserving peace and order and content in the public mind on this subject, was to place such restrictions upon this right as would ensure the purity of your elections."

Since the foundation of the colony, all of our successive Constitutions have become more and more distinct and careful upon the subject of the right of suffrage, and it has been the prime object of the framers of all of them to define the right so clearly and surround it with such eminently proper qualifications, as to preserve it from being abused and perverted.

The act of July 2, 1839, specially extended to elections by the soldiery all of the sections of our general laws that imposed penalties and provided checks for the protection of the elective franchise within the State. Frauds, forgeries and illegal voting committed in the army were to be punished as if they had been perpetrated here. In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Kuntzman, the validity of this provision has been tested, and the Supreme Court decided it to be utterly impotent, and they distinctly declare that none of those offences, if committed outside of the State, can be punished by our judicial tribunals.

Can you, by your act in Pennsylvania, extend the jurisdiction of your courts to Tennessee or Virginia? Can your courts in Pennsylvania punish the man who steals a horse in South Carolina? Can you devise a more perfect system of checks and penalties than those which surround the ballot-box at home? This has been the work of generations; it has grown with the growth of the Commonwealth, and it may well be said to be a thoroughly digested code. The system, by the fiat of an irreversible law, is brushed out of existence, whenever you cross the borders of your State, and the purity of the elective franchise in the army is entrusted to the tender mercies of political tricksters, mercenary adventurers and minions of power. Legislate as you may, your network is the merest gossamer, and will be broken with impunity whenever the caprice or the interests of designing men require it.

The provisions of the bill to regulate these elections, recently reported and found upon our files, does not attempt to create a new code of penalties and checks, but briefly re-enacts the old one. As I have shown, these provisions have been decided to be powerless outside of the Commonwealth. The two propositions are, in effect, to allow the army to control the State; and, in doing so, to dispense with the safeguards that might secure an honest election.

To this I will never consent, and I thus place upon record my solemn protest and my vote against the measure.

Another reason upon which I base my opposition to this amendment is founded in the views I entertain of the structure and character of our Government. In my judgment this step is contrary to the genius of our institutions, and tends directly to the loss of liberty. The right of the people to choose their rulers and of the citizen to aid, through the elective franchise, in the making of the laws he is to obey, are great cardinal principles of the Government; they are the strata upon which rests our political rights; they are the foundation of the edifice that protects our lives, our liberty and our property. In order to the intelligent exercise of this high privilege, freedom of discussion, freedom of action, the controlled investigation of the sentiments, opinions and character of the candidates, in a word, everything that may enable the voter to make up an impartial and unbiased judgment, are indispensable.

From the nature of an army, from its very life giving principle, none of these can be obtained by the soldier. He is incapable of volition; his freedom of action and of speech are controlled by his superiors, and one can readily understand how destructive of discipline political discussion, honest difference of opinion, warily expressed and truthful, yet harsh comment, upon the character of a candidate, possibly his superior officer, would necessarily be.

The articles of war forbid the soldier to censure or condemn the acts or the policy of the President, and they only have per-

mission to discuss them to approve them. Political documents, newspapers or supplies of tickets can only go to the army by leave of the President or his appointees, and no act of ours, or amendment of our Constitution, can divest him of the right to use his own pleasure in his control.

The position needs no elaborate recapitulation of facts on high-strung argument for its support. I confidently appeal to the dispassionate judgment of the unbiased voter and to the experience of every intelligent soldier, for its truth. The very elements that fit a man for the proper discharge of his duties as a citizen, are those which in his position as a soldier are, and necessarily must be, denied to him.

By the articles of war all the troops mustered into the service and under the pay of the United States, are subject to the provisions of and amenable to the penalties provided in those articles. And each of them, volunteer as well as militia, are sworn to "obey and obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States." If the troops now in the service of the United States, as volunteers or drafted men from the several States, were raised and mustered in under the provision of the Constitution for disciplining and organizing the militia, were offered by the State, in accordance therewith, and their term of service as in 1813-14, was limited (as it then was by the act of Congress of 1795) to three months, or even to any period not exceeding one year, the character of their service would not appear to unfit them for the duties of the citizen. And the act of Assembly of 1813-14 recognized their duty as citizens of the State to aid in the support of the General Government, they were taken from their abodes, their homes and their usual habits of thought for but a brief period, and naturally would feel that their true position was that of a citizen and not of a soldier. The Legislature, too, in limiting the right of suffrage to the election of the officers of the State, palpably expressed the idea of citizenship, and demonstrated the jealousy of the power of the commander-in-chief, when, however, as now, men are taken from the States, not as militia, but under the provisions of the clause giving power to raise and support armies, are mustered in for a period of three years, and many re-enlisted for the same time, are sworn to obey the President and the officers he may appoint over them under the army regulations, and are officered mainly by the United States, they become in reality a great standing army, and all the dangers to free institutions, that experience teaches, flow from the existence of such armies, are to be feared. Is it not in all its constituent parts, a standing army? In its organization, its mode of discipline, its subjection to the Executive, and its time of service, in what does it differ from our recognized standing army? And if the present policy is to govern the nation, who can doubt the necessity for its existence for years after the rebellion shall have been crushed. If all our volunteer soldiers viewed the pursuits of peace as their field labor and preserved their relations to the community, the result might not follow; but we all know of the wild pursuit of our officers of position in the regular army, and who can fail to perceive in the re-enlistment of whole regiments of our soldiers, the evidence of their love for the professions of arms, and a palpable demonstration of their preference for that mode of life. The motive of this re-enlistment, whether patriotism, fame or gain, (I trust it is the former,) is however unimportant; we have the fact and are to deal with it as practical men.

The world of the soldier, considered as such, is embraced in the simple sentence: command and obey. He swears obedience to his superior, and punishment follows the violation of his oath. He becomes a mere machine in the hands of his officers, and within the sphere of his duties; he dares neither think nor act independently. Man is a creature of habit and of circumstance; he readily acquires the first habit of the soldiers' education, the habit of obedience to orders, and just in proportion as he learns to obey, he unlearns the habit of self reliance as he progresses to the status of the trained and intelligent soldier, he sinks the characteristics and habits of thought of the individual.

"The freeman obeys law, the soldier obeys orders." The highest attainments of a citizen of a republic, considered with reference to the sphere of his duty, as such, are implicit reliance and the enlightened control of himself, and these qualities applied to the realities of life, and conscientiously exercised in the management of his own affairs, constitute the essence of republican self-government.

If it were practicable, the citizen soldier, fitted for the exercise of all those high duties, by nature and by education qualified for the position of a freeman, the equal of each and of all of us in intellect and in devotion to his country, if he were able to preserve his individuality in the army, and to remain uncontrolled by its influences, should be vested with this right, but such men know, and to them I willingly submit the decision of the question, whether those are fitted for these important obligations, who, at the inception of their career, take the vow of obedience to a superior; who, by the very nature of their duties, are isolated from the community and unacquainted with its necessities; who from the unbroken routine of soldierly obedience, have lost the control of their individuality, and who, by sheer force of habit, have learned to look upward to men for the line of conduct they are to pursue, instead of judging for themselves, or exchanging opinions with those who, by nature, are no more elevated than they.

In the State and the republic, elections

are essentially popular in their character. The voice of the majority of the people, as expressed through legal and constitutional forms at the ballot-box, is the controlling power, and to that will, thus expressed, all bow in submission. To this feature in our institutions, we as a nation point with just pride; we esteem it, as does the world, a vindication of the purity of the ballot-box and a triumphant evidence of the capacity of men for self-government. In the civil policy the will of a majority of individuals, each of whom is the equal of his fellow is the controlling power; in the army the will of one man guides and controls the volition of all. The importance of the preservation of the former as an essential element of our national existence, and the manifest tendency of the measure now under discussion to endanger it, are, in my judgment, equally apparent. Under our Constitution the Executive of the nation is the Commander-in-chief of our army, and is possessed of almost unlimited control over both officers and soldiers. They swear to obey him; his will is their will; in his hands lie the power of promotion and of comparative degradation; rank and emolument are in the sunshine of his favor; poverty and refusal of grade are in the frown of his displeasure. In our army all the soldiers may become officers. In this respect they differ from most armies of the old world; yet this very fact, whilst it prompts the soldier to deeds of daring, makes him but the more solicitous for the good will of his superiors, and urges him to seek promotion through the only avenue that open before him—implicit obedience and courage in battle.

The officer, too, who sees his grade, sees no reason why he should not go still higher; and as position in society and increased pay follow elevation in rank, all the selfish motives that operate upon the human mind, and compel it to energetic action, urge him to improve his standing with his superiors; and it may happen, in the pursuit of this object in military life, as not unfrequently happens in civil life, the man is willing to degrade himself for the attainment of the object of his desires. The desire of the inferior to ingratiate himself with his superiors, in whose hands rest favor and fortune, is as fixed a principle in the mind of man as is any other of the baser reasons for human action. If to elevation of position and supreme command, the leader unites skill in strategy, sagacity in council, and courage in battle, he becomes in the eye of his soldiery a standard of perfection, and their devotion to him becomes a species of man-worship. All remember the devotion of the soldiers of the great Napoleon to their idol. Of what weight would individual opinion be, just and proper though it were, if thrown in the scale against such a leader? The brave and unimpaired soldier of the Commonwealth of England, through the forms of an election, elevated their idol to the lord protector of the realm, where he exercised more despotic sway than ever did the unhappy Charles. That army created and paid by the commons of England, and commanded by their generals, at the behest of their commander, dispersed the very body that made them, and left the people powerless in the hands of despotism; and yet that army was raised according to law, its supplies were voted according to law, and the people fondly hoped it would preserve to them the liberties it afterwards destroyed. The army of the Commonwealth of Rome, composed of the noblest and best of her citizens, pandered to the ambition of Caesar, their leader, and aided him in sapping the foundation of the Republic, and enslaving the people.

It is in time of war, particularly, that the strength of the Executive, commander-in-chief, is magnified, and danger results from his superabundance of power. This is thus graphically portrayed by Mr. Madison in his fourth letter over the signature of Helvidius: "War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war a physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will which is to direct it. In war the public treasures are to be unlocked; and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them. In war the honors and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast, ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the design and duty of peace."

"Hence it has grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war; hence it is the practice of all States, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of its influence. If a free people be a wise people also, they will not forget that the danger of surprise can never be so great as when the advocates for the prerogative of war can sheathe it in a symbol of peace."

And Mr. Hamilton, in the 25th number of the *Federalist*, says: "As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands, of which the people are most likely to be jealous, than in those of which they are least likely to be so. For it is a truth which the experience of all ages has attested that the people are commonly most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion."

When war is once commenced by a nation it is in the power of the executive to protract and continue it so long as he can obtain the means necessary for his purpose, and there was not full of danger to the free institutions of the country engaged in it. Each year of its continuance serves to con-

tralize the power of the Executive, and to render the army more subservient to his will. Danger is not alone to be apprehended from sudden and violent attempts at the accomplishment of the object, but the great lesson taught upon this subject by the history of the past, is that wars of this character in republics contribute largely to increase the power of civil government, and from the very nature of the war tends to place the control of all the citizens, and the management of all the business affairs of the nation, in the hands of the administration. Of the truth of this lesson, the history of our country in the past three years is another startling evidence. By gradual and easy transitions, the mind of man can be accustomed to almost any change, and by slowly and imperceptibly changing his habits of life and modes of thought, he can be made to glidingly but surely from the highest developments of an advancing humanity into the very depths of political abasement. It is here the danger of our liberties is to be found; from the habit of peace we are gradually acquiring the new and dangerous habit of war; from dependence upon our own resources and judgment, we are gradually acquiring the habit of accepting, without question, the judgment of our rulers and obeying their dictation; we are now about to vest the right of controlling our institutions in the hands of those who have acquired the habit of obedience, and thereby lost the habit of self reliance and individuality. "All those who seek to destroy the liberties of a nation, ought to know that war is the surest and shortest means to accomplish it. This is the first axiom of the sciences."

Inasmuch, then, as the individual member of the State should be possessed of independence of action and implicit self-reliance in order to fully fit him for the intelligent exercise of the elective franchise, and as the structure of the army and its discipline inevitably tends to unite the minds of all its members in submission to the will of one man, and thereby would prevent the elections of the nation from being "free and equal," I am unwilling to extend the provisions of the Constitution as is contemplated by this amendment.

I am not without authority and precedent to sustain me in this conclusion.

In commenting upon that clause of the Federal Constitution which makes the President commander-in-chief of the army and of the militia, Mr. Madison says: "Those who are to conduct a war, cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws."

In our own State the act of Assembly evinces a jealousy of interference by the military with the freedom of election. The ninety-fifth section of the act of 2d July, 1839, provides that "no body of troops in the army of the United States, or of this Commonwealth, shall be present, either armed or unarmed, at any place of election within this Commonwealth, during the time of such election."

A similar provision exists in the laws of many other of the States, and of England. The army of the Roman Empire, trained in the school of the soldier, and vested with the privilege of election, did the will of its leaders and, regardless of the will of the people, raised to the imperial purple whomsoever their fancy dictated. The man who gained the affections of the soldiery, however limited his qualifications, or base his character, at their beck became the emperor of the world, and a single changed caprice his throne would topple in the dust.

The soldiers of the republic of France, vested with the right of suffrage at the command of their leader, voted in our own day to sustain the second of December, and overthrow the constitution they were sworn to support, and the same soldiery voted to create Louis Napoleon emperor of the French, destroying by their ballots, within six years, the liberties of the people, and the very institutions that they had sworn to support and defend with their bayonet.

In the recent address emanating from the Chase committee at Washington and circulated among the members of the Ohio Legislature, utterance is given to the sentiments of the opponents of Mr. Lincoln, upon the question, in very plain language, I quote from the address:

"If President Lincoln in defiance of the teachings of Jackson, in violation of the great principle which underlies our democratic institutions, and in the face of the solemn warnings of history, can now so wield his patronage as to secure his election for a second term, who so blind as not to see that four years hence he will have less difficulty in securing his election for a third term? For with an army of more than half a million citizen soldiers under his command, and an annual patronage of a thousand millions of money, can he, if he has one-half the brain attributed to him by his friends, have himself elected from term to term during his natural life?"

"If the military necessity supplies a reason now for his nomination, and the extraordinary patronage occasioned by the war furnishes the means of his election, as a matter of course, his interest in perpetuating the war as a means of perpetuating his power."

In the face of the impressive lessons of the past, in the face of the inevitable tendency of the army to centralization, one class of persons gravely tell us it is expedient to risk the consequences of the adoption of the amendment, and another class assert there is no danger; our rulers are honest; they will not betray us.

For those who sacrifice expediency and are willing to plead principle thereby, we can only pray that the relentless logic