American Volunteer.

BY JOHN B. BRATTON. "OUR COUNTRY—MAY IT ALWAYS BE RIGHT—BUT RIGHT OR WRONG, OUR COUNTRY." AT $2 00 PER ANNUM.

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OFFICIAL DESPATCH.

BATTLE OF

Molino del Rey.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. SCOTT.

(Duplicate.)

No. 34.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY.
National Palace of Mexico, Sept. 18, 1847.

SIR: At the end of another series of arduous and brilliant operations, of more than forty-eight hours continuance, this glorious army hoisted, on the morning of the 14th, the colors of the United States on the walls of this palace.

The victory of the 8th, at the Molinos del Rey, was followed by daring reconnoissances on the part of our distinguished engineers—Capt. Lee, Lieuts. Beauregard, Stevens, and Tower—Major Smith, senior, being sick, and Capt. Mason third in rank, wounded. Their operations were directed principally to the south—towards the gates of the Piedad San Angel, (Nino Perdido) San Antonio, and the Paseo de la Viga.

This city stands on a slight swell of ground near the centre of an irregular basin, and is girdled with a ditch in its greater extent—a navigable canal of great breadth and depth—very difficult to bridge in the presence of an enemy, and serving at once for drainage, custom house purposes, and military defence—leaving eight entrenches or arches—each of which we found defended by a system of strong works that seemed to require nothing but some men and guns to be impregnable.

Outside and within the cross-fires of those gates, we found to the south other obstacles but little less formidable. All the approaches near the city are over elevated causeways, cut in many places (to oppose us) and flanked, on both sides, by ditches also unusual dimensions. The numerous cross-roads are flanked, in like manner, having bridges at the intersections, recently broken. The meadows thus checkered, are moreover, in many spots, under water or marshy; for it will be remembered, we were in the midst of the wet season, though with less rain than usual, and we could not wait for the fall of the neighboring lakes and the consequent drainage of the wet grounds at the edge of the city—the lowest in the whole basin.

After a close personal survey of the southern gates, covered by Pillow's division and Riley's Brigade, of Twiggs'—with four times our numbers concentrated in our immediate front—I determined on the 11th, to avoid that net work of obstacles, and to seek, by a sudden inversion, to the southwest and west, less unfavorable approaches.

To economize the lives of our gallant officers and men, as well as to insure success, it became indispensible that this resolution should be long masked from the enemy, and again that our new movement, when discovered, should be taken for a feint, and the old as indicating our true and ultimate point of attack.

Accordingly, on the spot, the 11th, I ordered Quitman's division from Coyoacan, to join Pillow by *daylight*, before the southern gates, and then that the two major generals, with their divisions, should by *night*, proceed (two miles) to join me at Tacubaya, where I was quartered with Worth's division.—Twiggs', with Riley's Brigade and Capt. Taylor and Steptoe's field batteries—the latter 12 pounders—was left in front of those gates—to manuvre, to threaten, or to make false attacks, in order to occupy and deceive the enemy. Twiggs' other brigade (Smith's) was left at supporting distance, in the rear at San Angel, till the morning of the 13th, and also to support our general depot at Miscoacc. The stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th and down to the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for the enemy to recover from the effects of his delusion.

The first step in the new movement was to carry Chapultepec, a natural and insolate mound, of great elevation, strongly fortified at its base, on its acclivities and heights. Besides a numerous garrison, here was the military college of the Republic, with a large number of sub-lieutenants and other students. Those works were within direct gun shot of the village of Tacubaya, and until carried, we could not approach the city on the west without making a circuit too wide and too hazardous.

In the course of the same night, that of the 11th, heavy batteries within easy ranges were established. No. 1, on our right, under command of Capt. Drum, 4th artillery, relieved late next day, for some hours, by Lieut Andrews of the 3d, and No. 2, commanded by Lieut. Hagner, ordnance, both supported by Quitman's division. Nos. 3 and 4, on the opposite side, supported by Pillow's division were commanded, the former by Capt. Brooks and Lieut. S. S. Anderson, 2d artillery, alternately, and the latter by Lieutenant Stone, ordnance. The batteries were traced, by Capt. Huger and Capt. Lee, engineer, and constructed by them, with the able assistance of the young officers of their corps and the artillery.

To prepare for an assault, it was foreseen that the play of the batteries might run into the second day; but recent captures had not only trebled our siege pieces, but also our ammunition, and we knew that we should greatly augment both, by carrying the place. I was therefore, in no haste in ordering an assault before the works were well crippled by our missiles.

The bombardment and cannonade, under the command of Capt. Huger, were commenced early in the morning of the 12th. Before nightfall, which necessarily stopped our batteries, we had preceived that a good impression had been made on the castle and its outworks, and that a large body of the enemy had remained outside towards the city, from an early hour to avoid our fire and to be on hand, on its cessation, in order to reinforce the garrison against an assault. The same outside force was discovered the next morning after our batteries had re opened upon the castle, by which we again reduced its garrison to the *minimum* needed for the guns.

Pillow and Quitman had been in position since early in the night of the 11th. Maj. Gen. Worth was now ordered to hold his division in reserve, near the foundry, to support Pillow; and Brigadier Gen. Smith, of Twiggs' had just arrived with his brigade from Piedad, (two miles,) to support Quitman.—Twiggs' guns, before the southern gates, again reminded us, as the day before, that he with Riley's brigade, and Taylor's and Steptoe's batteries, was in activity, threatening the Southern gates, and there holding a great part of the Mexican army on the defensive.

Worth's division furnished Pillow's attack with an assaulting party of some 250 volunteer officers and men, under Capt. McKenzie, of the 2nd artillery, and Twiggs' division, supplied a similar one, commanded by Capt. Casey, 2d infantry, to Quitman.—Each of those little columns was furnished with scaling ladders.

The signal I had appointed for the attack was the momentary cessation of fire on the part of our heavy batteries. About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, judging that the time had arrived by the effect of the missiles we had thrown, I sent an aid-de-camp to Pillow and another to Quitman, with notice that the concerted signal was about to be given. Both columns now advanced with an alacrity that gave assurance of prompt success. The batteries seizing opportunites, threw shot and shell upon the enemy over our men, with good effect, particularly at every attempt to reinforce the works from without to meet our assault.

Maj. Gen. Pillow's approach, on the west side, lay through an opengrove filled with sharp shooters, who were speedily dislodged; when being up in front of the attack, and emerging into open space, at the foot of a rocky acclivity, that gallant leader was struck down by an agonizing wound. The immediate command devolved on Brig. Gen. Cadwalader, in the absence of the senior brigadier (Pierce) of the same division, an invalid since the events of Aug. 19. On a previous call of Pillow, Worth had just sent him a reinforcement—Col. Clark's Brigade.

The broken acclivity was still to be ascended, and a strong redoubt; midway, to be carried, before reaching the castle on the heights. The advance of our brave men led by brave officers, though necessarily slow, was unwavering; over rocks chasms; and mines; and under the hottest fire of cannon and musketry. The redoubt now yielded to resistless valor; and the shout which followed announced to the castle the fate that impended. The enemy were steadily driven from shelter to shelter. The retreat allowed no time to fire a single mine, without the certainty of blowing up friend and foe. Those who at a distance attempted to apply matches to the long trains, were shot down by our men. There was death below as well as above ground. At length the ditch and wall of the main work were reached; the scaling-ladders were brought up and planted by the storming parties; some of the daring spirits first in the assult were cast down—killed or wounded; but a lodgement was soon made; streams of heroes followed; all opposition was overcome, and several of our regimental colors flung out from the upper walls; amidst long continued shouts of victory, which sent dismay into the capital. No scene could have been more animating or glorious.

Maj. Gen. Quitman nobly supported by Brigadier Generals Shields and P. F. Smith his other officers and men, was up with the part assigned him. Simultaneously with the movement on the west, he had gallantly approached the southeast of the same works over a causeway with outs and batteries, and defended by an army strongly posted outside, to the east of the works. Those formidable obstacles Quitman had to force with little shelter for his troops or space for manœuvring. Deep ditches, flanking the causeway, made it difficult to cross on either side into the adjoining meadows, and these again were intersected by other ditches. Smith and his brigade had been early thrown out to make a sweep to the right, in order to present a front against the enemy's line, (outside,) and to turn two intervening batteries, near the foot of Chapultepec. The first of these, furnished by Twiggs' division, was commanded in succession by Capt. Casey, 2d infantry, and Capt. Paul, 7th infantry; after Casey had been severely wounded; and the 2d under Maj. Twiggs, marine corps, killed and then Capt. Miller, 2d Penna. volunteers. The storming party now commanded by Capt. Paul, seconed by Capt. Roberts of the rifles, Lieut. Stewart, and others of the same regiment, Smith's brigade, carried the two batteries in the road, took some guns, with many prisoners, and drove the enemy posted behind in support. The New York and South Carolina volunteers, (Shields' brigade) and the 2d Penna. volunteers, all on the left of Quitman's line, together with portions of his storming parties, crossed the meadows in front, under a heavy fire, and entered the outer enclosure of Chapultepec just in time to join in the final assult from the west.

Besides Major Gens. Pillow and Quitman, Brig. Gens. Shields, Smith, and Cadwalader, the following are the officers and corps most distinguished in those brilliant operations:—The voltiguer regiment, in two detachments, commanded by Col. Andrews and Lieut. Col. Jonstone—the latter mostly in the lead, accompanied by Major Cadwell; Capts. Barnard and Biddle, of the same regiment—the former the first to plant a regimental color, and the latter among the first in the assult;—the storming party in Worth's division, under Capt. Mackenzie, 2d artillery, with Lieut. Seldon, 8th infantry, early on the ladder and badly wounded; Lieut. Armistead, 6th infantry, the first to leap into the ditch to plant a ladder; Lieut. Rogers, of the 4th, and J. P. Smith of the 5th infantry—both mortally wounded; the 9th infantry, under Col. Ransom, who was killed while gallantly leading that gallant regiment; the 15th infantry under Lieut. Col. Howard and Major Woods, with Capt. Chase, whose company gallantly carried the redoubt midway up the acclivity:—Col. Clark's brigade, (Worth's division) consisting of the 5th, 8th, and part of the 6th regiments of infantry, commanded, respectively, by Capt. Chapman, Maj. Montgomery and Lieut. Edward Johnson—the latter specially noticed, with Lieuts. Longstreets (badly wounded—advancing—colors in hand)—Picket and Merchant—the last three of the 8th infantry; portions of the New York, South Carlina, and 2d Penna. volunteers, which delayed with their division (Quitman's) by the hot engagement below, arrived just in time to participate in the assult of the height—particularly a detachment under Lieut. Reid, New York volunteers, consisting of a company of the same, with one of marines; and another detachment, a portion of the storming party, (Twiggs' division, serving with Quitman) under Lieut. Steele, 2d infantry—after the fall of Lieut. Grantt, 7th infantry.

In this connexion, it is but just to recall the decisive effect of the heavy batteries; Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, commanded by those excellent officers—Capt. Drum, 4th artillery; assisted by Lieuts. Benjamin and Porter, of his company; Capt. Brooks and Lieut. Anderson, 2d artillery, assisted by Lieut. Russell; 4th infantry, a volunteer; Lieuts. Hagner and Stone, of the ordnance; and Lieut. Andrews, 3d artillery—the whole superintended by Capt. Huger, chief of ordnance with this army—an officer distinguished by every kind of merit. The mountain howitzer battery, under Lieut Reno, of the ordnance, deserves also to be particularly mentioned. Attached to the voltiguers, it followed the movements of that regiment and again won applause.

In adding to the list of individuals of conspicuous merit, I must limit myself to a few of the many names which might be enumerated:—Capt. Hooker, assistant adjutant general, who won special applause successively, in the staff of Pillow and Cadwalader; Lieut. Lovell, 4th artillery, (wounded) chief of Quitman's staff; Captain Page, assistant adjutant general wounded, and Lieut. Hammond, 3d artillery, both of Shields' staff, and Lieut. Van Dorn, 7th infantry, aid-de-camp to Brig. Gen. Smith.

These operations all occurred on the west, southeast, and heights of Chapultepec. To the north, and at the base of the mound, inaccessible on that side, the 11th infantry, under Lieut. Col. Herbet, the 14th under Col. Trousdale, and Capt. Magruder's field battery, 1st artillery—one section advanced under Lieut. Jackson—all of Pillow's division—had at the same time, some spirited affairs against superior numbers, driving the enemy from a battery in the road and capturing a gun. In these the officers and corps named gained praise. Col. Trousdale, the commander, though twice wounded, continued on duty till the heights were carried.

Early in the morning of the 13th I repeated the orders of the night before to Major General Worth, to be with his division at hand, to support the movement of Major General Pillow from our left. The latter seems soon to have called for that entire division, standing momentarily in reserve, and Worth sent him Col. Clarke's brigade. The call, if not unnecessary, was at least, from the circumstances, unknown to me at the time; for, soon observing that a very large body of the enemy, in the road in front of Major general Quitman's right, was receiving reinforcements from the city—less than a mile and a half to the east—I sent instructions to Worth, on our opposite flank, to turn Chapultepec with his division, and to proceed, cautiously, by the road at its northern base, in order, if not met by very superior numbers, to threaten or to attack, in rear, that body of the enemy. The movement, it was also believed, could not fail to distract and to intimidate the enemy generally.

Worth promptly advanced with his remaining brigade—Col. Garland's—Lieut. Col. C. F. Smith's light battalion, Lieut. Col. Duncan's field battery—all of his division—and three squadrons of dragoons, under Major Sumner, which I had just ordered up to join in the movement.

Having turned the forces on the west, and arriving opposite to the north centre of Chapultepec, Worth came up with the troops in the road, under Colonel Trousdale, and aided by a flank movement of a part of Garland's brigade in taking the one gun breastwork, then under the fire of Lieut. Jackson's section of Capt. Magruder's field battery. Continuing to advance, this division passed Chapultepec, attacking the right of the enemy's line, resting on that road, about the moment of the general retreat consequent upon the capture of the formidable castle and its outworks.

Arriving some minutes later, and mounting the top of the castle, the whole field to the east, lay plainly under my view.

There are two routes from Chapultepec to the capital—the one on the right entering the same gate, Belen, with the road from the south, *via* Piedu; and the other obliquing to the left, to intersect the great western, or San Cosme road, in a suburb outside of the gate of San Cosme.

Each of these routes (as elevated causeway) presents a double roadway on the side of an aqueduct of strong masonry, and great height, resting on open arches and massive pillars, which, together, afford fine points both for attack and defence. The sideways of both aqueducts are, moreover, defended by many strong breastworks at the gates, and before reaching them. As we had expected, we found the four tracks unusually dry and solid for the season.

Worth and Quitman were prompt in pursuing the retreating enemy—the former by the San Cosme aqueduct, and the latter along that of Belen. Each had now advanced some hundred yards.

Deeming it all-important to profit by our successes, and the consequent dismay of the enemy, which could not be otherwise than general, I hastened to despatch from Chapultepec—first Clarke's brigade, and then Cadwalader's, to the support of Worth; and gave orders that, the necessary heavy guns should follow. Pierce's brigade was, at the same time, sent to Quitman, and, in the course of the afternoon, I caused some additional siege pices to be added to his train. Then, after designating the 15th infantry, under Lieut. Col. Howard—Morgan, the Colonel, had been disabled by a wound at Churubusco—as the garrison of Chapultepec, and giving directions for the care of the prisoners of war, the captured ordnance and ordnance stores, I proceeded to join the advance of Worth, within the suburb, and beyond the turn at the junction of the aqueduct with the great highway from the west to the gate of San Cosme.

At this junction of roads, we first passed one of those formidable systems of city defences, spoken of above, and had not a gun!—a strong proof—1. That the enemy had expected us to fail in the attack upon Chapultepec, even if it meant any thing more than a feint. 2. That, in either case, we designed, in his belief, to return and double our forces against the Southern gates—a delusion kept up by the active demonstrations of Twiggs and the forces posted on that side; and 3. That advancing rapidly from the reduction of Chapultepec, the enemy had not time to shift guns—our previous captures had left him, comparatively, but few—from the Southern gates.

Within those disgarnished works, I found our troops engaged in a street fight against the enemy posted in gardens, at windows and on house tops—all flat, with parapets. Worth ordered forward the mountain howitzers of Cadwalader's brigade, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers, with pick axes and crow bars, to force windows and doors, or to burrow through walls. The assailants were soon in an equality of position fatal to the enemy. By 8 o'clock in the evening, Worth had carried two batteries in this suburb. According to my instructions, he here posted guards and sentinels, and placed his troops under shelter for the night. There was but one more obstacle—the San Cosme gate (custom house) between him and the great square in front of the cathedral and palace—the heart of the city; and that barrier, it was known, could not, by daylight, resist our siege guns thirty minutes.

I had gone back to the foot of Chapultepec, the point from which the two aqueducts begin to diverge, some hours earlier, in order to be near that new depot, and in easy communication with Quitman and Twiggs as well as with Worth.

From this point I ordered all detachments and stragglers to their respective corps, then in advance; sent to Quitman additional siege guns, ammunition, entrenching tools; directed Twiggs' remaining brigade, Riley's, from Piedad, to support Worth, and Captain Steptoe's field battery; also at Piedad, to rejoin Quitman's division.

I had been, from the first, well aware that the western, or San Cosme, was the less difficult route to the centre and conquest of the capital; and, therefore, intended that Quitman should only manœuvre and threaten the Belen or southwestern gate, in order to favor the main attack by Worth—knowing that the strong defences at the Belen were directly under the guns of the much stronger fortress, called the *citidel*, just within. Both of these defences of the enemy were also within easy supporting distance from the San Angel (or *Nino Perdino*) and San Antonio gates. Hence the greater support, in numbers, given to Worth's movement as the *main* attack.

Those views I repeatedly, in the course of the day, communicated to Maj. Gen. Quitman; but, being in hot pursuit—gallant himself, and ably supported by Brig. Generals Shields and Smith—Shield's badly wounded before Chapultepec, and refusing to retire—as well as by all the officers and men of the column—Quitman continued to press forward, under flank and direct fires; carried an intermediate battery of two guns; and then the gate before two o'clock in the afternoon, but not without proportionate loss, increased by his steady maintenance of that position.

Here, of the heavy battery—4th artillery—Capt. Drum and Lieut. Benjamin were mortally wounded, and Lieut. Porter, its third in rank, slightly. The loss of those two most distinguished officers the army will long mourn. Lieuts. J. B. Moragne and Wm. Canty, of the South Carolina Volunteers, also of high merit, fell on the same occasion—besides many of bravest non-commissioned officers and men—particularly in Capt. Drum's veteran company. I cannot, in this place, give names or numbers; but full returns of the killed and wounded of all corps, in their recent operations, will accompany this report.

Quitman, within the city—adding several new defences to the position he had won, and sheltering his corps as well as practicable—now awaited the return of daylight under the guns of the formidable citadel, yet to be subdued.

At about 4 o'oclck next morning, (Sept. 14,) a deputation of the *ayuntamiento* (city council) waited upon me to report that the federal government and the army of Mexico had fled from the capital some three hours before, and to demand terms of capitulation in favor of the church, the citizens, and the municipal authorities. I promptly replied, that I would sign no capitulation; that the city had been virtually in our possession from the time of the lodgments effected by Worth and Quitman the day before; that I regretted the silent escape of the Mexican army; that I should levy upon the city a moderate contribution, for special purposes; and that the American army should come under no terms, not *self*-imposed—such only as its own honor, the dignity of the U. States, and the spirit of the age, should, in my opinion, imperiously demand and impose.

For the terms, so imposed, I refer the department to subsequent General Orders, Nos. 287 and 289, (paragraphs 7, 8 and 9, of the latter,) copies of which are herewith enclosed.

At the termination of the interview with the city deputation, I communicated, about daylight, orders to Worth and Quitman to advance slowly and cautiously (to guard against trenchery) towards the heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding points. Quitman proceeded to the great *plaza* or square, planted guards, and hoisted the colors of the United States on the national palace—containing the halls of Congress and Executive apartments of federal Mexico. In this grateful service, Quitman might have been anticipated by Worth, but for my express orders, halting the latter at the head of the *Alameda*, (a green park) within three squares of that goal of general ambition. The capital, however, was not taken by any one or two corps; but, by the talent, the science, the gallantry, the prowess of this entire army. In the glorious conquest, *all* had contributed—early and powerfully—the killed, the wounded, and *fit for duty*—at Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, Contreras, San Antonio, Churubusco, (three battles,) the Molinos del Rey, and Chapultepec—as much as those who fought at the gates of Belen and San Cosme.

Soon after we had entered, and were in the act of occupying the city, a fire was opened upon us from the flat roofs of the houses, from windows and corners of streets, by some 2000 convicts liberated the night before by the flying government—joined by, perhaps, as many Mexican soldiers, who had disbanded themselves and thrown off their uniforms.—This unlawful war lasted more than twenty four hours, in spite of the exertions of the municipal authorities, and was not put down until we had lost many men, including several officers, killed or wounded, and had punished the miscreants. Their objects were, to gratify national hatred; and in the general alarm and confusion to plunder wealthy inhabitants—particularly the deserted houses. But families are now generally returning; business of every kind has been resumed, and the city is already tranquil and cheerful, under the admirable conduct (with exceptions very few and trifling) of our gallant troops.

This army has been more disgusted than surprised that, by some sinister process on the part of certain individuals at home, its numbers have been, generally, almost trebled in our public papers—beginning at Washington.

Leaving, as we all feared, inadequate garrisons at Vera Cruz, Perote, and Puebla—with much larger hospitals; and being obliged, most reluctantly, from the same cause (general paucity of numbers) to abandon Jalapa, we marched [August 7–10] from Puebla with only 10,738, rank and file. This number includes the garrison of Jalapa, and the 2429 men brought up by Brig. Gen. Pierce. August 6.

At Contreras, Churubusco, &c., [August 20,] we had but 8497 men engaged—after deducting the garrison of San Augustin, (our general depot,) the intermediate sick and the dead; at the Molinos del Rey (September 8) but three brigades, with some cavalry and artillery—making in all 3251 men—were in the battle; in the two days—Sept. 12 & 13—our whole operating force, after deducting, again the recent killed, wounded and sick, together with the garrison of Miscoac (the general depot) and that of Tacubaya, was but 7180; and finally, after deducting the new garrison at Chapultepec, with the killed and wounded of the two days, we took possession (Sept. 14) of this great capital with less than 6000! And I reassert, upon accumulated and unquestionable evidence, that in not one of those conflicts, was this army opposed by fewer than three and a half times its numbers—in several of them by a yet greater excess.

I recapitulate our losses since we arrived in the basin of Mexico.

August, 19, 20.—Killed 137, including 14 officers. Wounded, 337, including 62 officers. Missing, (probably killed) 38 rank and file. Total 1052.

September 8th.—Killed 116, including 9 officers. Wounded, 665, including 49 officers. Missing 18 rank and file. Total 789.

September 12, 13, 14.—Killed 130, including 10 officers. Wounded, 703, including 68 officers. Missing, 37 rank and file. Total 869.

Grand total of losses 2703, including 333 officers.

On the other hand this small force has beaten on the same occasions, in view of their capital, the whole Mexican army, of (at the beginning) thirty odd thousand men—posted always in chosen positions, behind entrenchments, or more formidable defences of nature and art; killed or wounded, of that number, more than 7000 officers and men; taken 3730 prisoners, one seventh officers, including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been presidents of this republic; captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shot, shells, powder, &c. &c.

Of that enemy, once so formidable in numbers, appointments, artillery, &c., twenty-odd thousand have disbandoned themselves in despair, leaving, as is known, not more than three fragments—the largest about 2500—now wandering in different directions, without magazines or a military chest, and living *at free quarters* upon their own people.

General Santa Anna, himself a fugitive, is believed to be on the point of resigning the chief magistracy, and escaping to neutral Guatemala. A new President, no doubt, will soon be declared, and the federal Congress is expected to reassemble at Queretaro, 125 miles north of this, on the Zacatecas road some time in October. I have seen and given safe conduct through this city to several of its members.—The government will find itself without resources; no army, no arsenals, no magazines, and but little revenue, internal or external. Still, such is the obstinacy, or rather infatuation of this people, that it is very doubtful whether the new authorities will dare sue for peace on the terms which, in the recent negotiations, were made known by our minister.

* * * * * * *

In conclusion, I beg to enumerate, once more, with due commendation and thanks, the distinguished staff officers, general and personal, who, in our last operations in front of the enemy, accompanied me, and communicated orders to every point and through every danger, Lieut. Col. Hitchcock, acting inspector general; Major Turnbull and Lieut. Hardcastle, topographical engineers; Major Kirby, chief paymaster; Capt. Irwin, chief quartermaster; Capt. Grayson, chief commissary; Capt. H. L. Scott, chief in the adjutant general's department; Lieut. Williams, aid-de-camp; Lieut. Lay, military secretary, and Major J. P. Gaines, Kentucky cavalry, volunteer aid-de-camp. Capt. Lee, engineer, so constantly distinguished, also bore important orders from me (Sept. 13) until he fainted from a wound and the loss of two nights sleep at the batteries. Lieuts. Beauregard, Stevens, and Tower, all wounded, were employed with the divisions, and Lieuts. G. W. Smith and G. B. McClellan with the company of sappers and miners. These five lieutenants of engineers, like their captain, won the admiration of all about them. The ordnance officers, Captain Huger, Lieuts. Hagner, Stone, and Reno; were highly effective, and distinguished at the several batteries; and I must add that Capt. McKinstry, assistant quartermaster, at the close of the operations, executed several important commissions for me as a special volunteer.

Surgeon General Lawson, and the medical staff generally, were skilful and untiring in and out of fire, in ministering to the numerous wounded.

To illustrate the operations in this basin, I enclose two beautiful drawings, prepared under the directions of Major Turnbull, mostly from actual survey.

I have the honor to be, sir with high respect, your most obedient servant, WINFIELD SCOTT.

The Hon. WILLIAM L. MARCY, Secretary of War.

HOW TO BE HAPPY.—A genius in the West, gives the following as his opinion of what constitutes perfect bliss:

Be content as long as your mouth is full and your body warm, remember the poor, kiss the pretty girls, don't rob your neighbor's hen roost, never pick an editor's pocket, nor entertain an idea that he is going to treat, kick dull care to the deuce, black your own boots, sew on your own buttons, and be sure to take a paper.

☞ Douglass Jerrold, the Editor of the London Daily News, puts the financial condition of England in a nut shell as follows:

"If the emperor of Russia chose to sell out the stock he holds in the British funds, he could drain the Bank of all its gold; we are absolutely at his mercy. Such a state of things is disgraceful to our national character."

SPEECH OF VICE PRESIDENT DALLAS,

Delivered before a large meeting of the Democratic citizens of Pittsburg—September 18, 1847.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: I had hoped that I might be excused on the occasion of my present tour into the western part of my native State, from making any public speeches whatever. For upwards of forty years, my sentiments, and sympathies, and political acts have been with the democracy of Pennsylvania in all their trials, their difficulties, and their successes. My sentiments upon all the important questions which claimed their attention have therefore become known to all who are conversant with the politics of our State and our country. I am, however, called upon to speak to you upon important subjects, now claiming the attention of the country; and do not feel that I have a right to refuse. I might truly urge as an excuse for not making any public addresses, the fact, that this tour has been undertaken solely and exclusively with a view to pay a family visit; but, having come into your vicinity, and the citizens of Pittsburg having kindly extended to me an invitation to visit their city, to partake of their generous hospitality, witness the state of circumstances surrounding them, I with pleasure comply with the present call upon me.

I have understood that the corporate seal of the city of Pittsburg is made up of the coat-of-arms of the celebrated Earl of Chatham, who has been known as the most distinguished and ardent friend of the American cause, in the time of our first struggle for independence. But there has been suggested to my mind, on coming to your city, what I conceive to be a more appropriate coat-of-arms than that—derived from the pursuits, the character for industry, and the business habits of the people, together with the great sources of their wealth and continued prosperity.—When distant as much as twelve miles from your city, I could distinguish a dark and almost fixed cloud of coal smoke. I have since heard that many of you are much interested in efforts to overcome this dark cloud resting over your otherwise beautiful city; and that your government have been considering the propriety of adopting some plan in order to effect this object. I have heard this; and I have seriously thought whether it would be proper to adopt such a plan. In this immense volume of coal smoke, rising as it were to heaven, and striking the view of the beholder at so great a distance—what is indicated? What does it mean? It at once informs the mind of the rising prosperity, and wealth, and importance of the "Iron City," and indicates the two great sources whence that wealth and importance are derived. It points, also, to the most appropriate things which may be woven into a new coat-of-arms for your city. These great sources of wealth are coal and iron. In the formation of a new coat-of-arms, suppose you were to adopt for its supporters two columns of smoke. Let its crest also be a cloud of smoke; and the base on which to rest the columns may be of coal and iron ore—the latter in the process of being smelted; and the supporters and the crest of your coat-of-arms would thus be truly indicated, and would most aptly represent the causes of all this life, and activity, and business; of this wonderful perfection in the mechanic arts; of the beauty and excellence of your fabrics; and of the scene of prosperity, unexcelled in this western world. This mighty volume ought not to be destroyed. It ought still to remain opened before you, to remind your citizens, and all who may visit you, of the sources of your greatness; and the extent to which you are prepared to go, in order to maintain your exalted position.

I am pleased to see, here, all the evidences of highly civilized life—comfort, intelligence, and the greatest degree of perfection in all the mechanic arts; with edifices that would do honor to any city in the country. The great city of Philadelphia, the commercial emporium of the State, does not boast of a truly grand a structure as this, for the purposes for which it was appropriated; and in addition to this, there were manufacturing establishments second to few in the country; and numerous private residences, embracing all the essential requisites of convenience, elegance, taste, and beauty. I cannot but be delighted at all these evidences of prosperity; and am truly rejoiced to find none of the evidences of that *ruin* which had by many been so confidently predicted; but *everything to excite in the mind sentiments of pleasure and admiration:*

But there are many topics upon which you are no doubt anxious to hear some remarks. I have no secrets to keep from the American people in relation to any subject claiming their attention. Holding a prominent station in the government; it is of course expected of me that I will state frankly my views on all subjects which their servants may be called upon to act; and I do this cheerfully; without regard to whether they shall be generally accepted by those who hear me, or not. They are the honest convictions of my own mind. If they shall square with the sentiments of those who hear me, I will be pleased: if not, we must continue to disagree; and I impeach not the honesty of purpose of those who differ in opinion from the great democratic party; with which I act.

I have heretofore given expression to my sentiments upon the subject of the great change that has taken place in our revenue laws, known as the tariff. On this subject one may speak without limit; and to present my views on this point, would only be to repeat what has already been said. There is one idea; however, that may be advanced, which has not, perhaps, been presented as often as it should have been. Many persons suppose that the late tariff act is not calculated to effect that good which would have resulted from that of 1842. The tariff of 1846 differs, it is true, from that of 1842, but in what? By a reduction of the rate of duties on some articles; a change in others, fixing upon them a higher rate; an abandonment of the system of specific duties; and also that of minimum duties. It also provides for a different mode of collecting the duties on imports.—Here, then, is the difference between the two laws. There is a change. This nobody will deny. But it is still a tariff; and thus gives a denial to the protections which have been set up by some, that the tariff of 1846 is a free-trade law. Every duty imposed upon articles of importation is in contravention of the laws of the free trade, and goes to protect the manufacturer of similar articles in our country; and, so far as it goes, is a direct tax upon the consumer of that article, for the benefit of the producer. So long, therefore, as the people of the country shall prefer to support their government by a resort to taxes upon imported articles, in preference to a direct tax, they go to sustain their own manufactures, to the exact extent of the amount of duties collected, whether that amount shall be $36,000,000, or only $30,000,000. This tariff is not one according with any just idea of free trade; but is positively, to the extent of the duties accruing under it, a restriction upon commerce.

In this State, of all others in the Union, the subject of excises of internal duties imposed upon merchandise had claimed, perhaps the greatest share of the attention of the people; for the citizens of Pennsylvania had probably most deeply felt the effects of such a system. The matter had been first brought to their more direct consideration as long since as 1794, when an excise was laid upon whiskey. The result of the law imposing this tax is well known.—The tendency of such laws had been most fully and fearlessly presented to the minds of the people, and the subject was thoroughly understood by them.—They had been appealed to by every consideration connected with the interest of the country to support that system; and they had listened attentively to these appeals. But the interests of the State were deemed of too great moment to be quietly relinquished; and they were contended for until the evil was overcome. To some extent, the appeal thus made was wrong. The people believed, and they still continue to believe, that the more constitutional and the least obnoxious mode of providing for the wants of the general government, is not by internal excises, but by duties laid upon foreign goods. So long as this shall continue to be the policy favored by the people, commerce must continue to be restricted to some extent; and the assertion that our government is a government of free trade, is therefore emphatically denied by the very laws which are framed for its continuance. And, so long as this system shall be continued, commerce must, of necessity, be restricted to the extent of the duties imposed on foreign goods for the support of the government. By means of this system, our manufactures will continue to enjoy protection to the amount of every cent of the revenue from foreign goods, which compete with those of our manufacture, whether that amount shall be large or small. I have thought it not amiss to make these few remarks upon this topic, though an apology for having dwelt upon it is, perhaps, due to you, from the free and full discussions which you undoubtedly have often heard and participated in; and I therefore pass to another subject, confident that your own common-sense views of the correctness of the present policy will lead to its approval.

Much is said, of late, in relation to the manner of conducting the present war with Mexico. The subject is one which rightfully claims the attention of our whole country. We are at war with a sister republic, with a Christian people, whose faith, from its antiquity alone, is entitled to our deference and respect. However we may differ in relation to the question of the war itself, every good citizen must desire that it should be brought to a close as speedily as possible; compatible with the honor and the interests of our country, and the rights of her citizens. But while remarks are made condemning the manner in which the war has been brought about, and thus far conducted, it would seem that the whole subject has not received that attention which its importance demanded. It would be well at least to know and ponder well upon all the causes which led to it, and all the results which have thus far followed it, before sentence of condemnation is pronounced.—And what were the causes which led to this war? Some contend that the annexation of Texas was the immediate cause of the war; while others think that this was but a remote cause. The true causes are numerous, but the principal ones may be briefly enumerated. They were—an unjustifiable capture of property of American citizens, withholding from them their just dues, and violating their rights, without even offer of redress; insults almost innumerable upon the flag of our country; and a direct trespass upon our soil, and slaughter of our countrymen.—Texas had been annexed to our Union. She had been a sovereign and independent nation. On entering our confederacy, we were bound to protect her. When, therefore, her soil was threatened with invasion, our government sought to find the most effectual means by which to overcome the meditated evil. The brave, magnanimous, patriotic, and long-tried soldier, old ZACHARY TAYLOR, was directed to take such a position in the territory of Texas as would best enable him to protect her citizens. Occupying a position upon the river Nueces, he soon ascertained that another position was more desirable in order to effect the object. He therefore at once suggested and recommended to the Executive the occupation of a post on the Rio Grande. This admirable and sagacious recommendation was at once complied with, and he took a position in accordance with his own views of the work intrusted to him; and upon whom could the administration have more implicitly relied, in a similar emergency, than upon this old and tried patriot and soldier? This was his first movement. And none have forgotten the ever-memorable 8th and 9th of May, 1846, when he was the hero of two battles, equalling, in their leading features, the most brilliant achievements of the revolutionary war.

No one then doubted that the position of General Taylor was within the limits of Texas; and while upon the Nueces, no one accused the government of the United State with the design of making war upon Mexico. But subsequent developements proved that the advance of General Taylor upon the Rio Grande was not only proper, but actually called for by the most honorable and politic consideration. After these two great battles; when some property of the Mexican general, Arista, was examined, it was found that he was in the possession of positive orders from his government to make war upon the people of the United States; and his conduct, for some time previous to those battles; proved that he was engaged in carrying into effect the orders of his government. This single fact affords a sufficient answer to all those who charge upon the present administration the act of beginning this war. And how has the war been conducted? Just as all our wars have been conducted heretofore, and as they always should be—*relying upon the volunteers of our country—those who feel that their interests are at stake—for the defence of the country.*

So long as our fellow-citizens shall sanction our present policy, all our wars must be conducted in a similar manner. We never can be, we never ought to be, prepared for war. Our people want neither large armies nor fleets, except when their rights of a people are assailed, their soil invaded, or their countrymen slaughtered by a foreign foe; and in all cases of sudden invasion, the constitution has wisely vested in the Chief Magistrate the power to prevent aggression, and even to assert our rights. Let us see, then, how this war has been conducted:—With all the difficulties incident to campaigns in an unsettled and hostile country, with but a handful of regular soldiers, and the preparations to be made for equipping, and supporting, and qualifying for service a large volunteer force; we have in less than eighteen months advanced to the capital of Mexico; we have taken several of her most important cities; we have conquered nearly two-thirds of her territory.

The manner in which the war has been conducted, is only fairly to be judged by the results which have taken place since its commencement, and which may yet take place; and therefore whatever may be said respecting mistakes that have been made, let us look at the results, and we will find that all those who have been most immediately connected with it, are entitled to the highest applause;