## INAUGURAL-ADDRESS

## PRESIDENT HARRISON:

Called from a retirement which I had supposed was to continue for the residue of my life, to fill the Chief Executive office of this great and free nation, I appear before you, ellow citizens, to take the oaths which the Constitution prescribes as a necessary qualification for the performance of its duties .-And in obedience to a custom coeval with our Government, and what I believe to be your expectations, I proceed to present to you a summary of the principles which will govern me in the discharge of the duties which I shall be called upon to perform.
It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in

an early period of that celebrated Republic. that a most striking contrast was observable in the conduct of candidates for offices of power and trust, before, and after obtaining them—they seldom carry out in the latter case the pledges and promises made in the former. However much the world may have improved, in many respects, in the lanse of upwards of two thousand years since the remark was made by the virtuous and indignant Roman, I fear that a strict examination of the annals of some of the modern elective Governments would develope similar instan-

ces of violated confidence.

Although the fiat of the People has gone forth, proclaiming me the Chief Magistrate of this glorious Union, nothing upon their part remaining to be done, it may be thought that a motive may exist to keep up, the delusion under which they may be supposed to have acted in relation to my principles and opinions; and perhaps there may be some in this assembly who have come here either prepared to condemn those I shall now deliver, upon another, than upon their own reserved or, approving them, to doubt the sincerity rights. with which they are uttered. But a lapse of Who fears. The outline of principles to govern, and measures to be adopted by an Administhe intention to betray. However strong may be my present purpose to realize the simple representative Democracy, or Republic report, 1 to well understand the infirmities of human nature and the dangerous sed by a single individual, predictions were termitations to which I shall be accounted.

temptations to which I shall be exposed, made that, at no very remote period, the gofrom the magnitude of the power which it vernment would terminate in virtual monhas been the pleasure of the People to com- archy. It would not become me to say that mit to my hands, not to place my chief dependence upon the aid of that Almighty power which has hitherto protected me, and en the direction to a favorable issue other important but still greatly inferior trusts, has direction, it is I conceive, strictly that direction, it is I conceive, strictly proper that I should take this accession to heretofore confided to me by my country.

The broad foundation upon which our Constitution rests, being the people—a en of my determination to arrest the probreath of theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modify it—it can and restore the government to its pristine be assigned to none of the great divisions of health and vigor, as far as this can be effectgovernment but to that of Democracy. If ed by any legitimate exercise of the power such is its theory, those who are called up placed in my hands.... on to administer it must recognize, as its leading principle, the duty of shaping the measures so as to produce the greatest good the evils which have been so extensively tution of the United States is the instrument containing this grant of power to the ual American citizen, which in his compact with the others, he has never surrendered, those noble feelings which belong to the ings. It was proper, therefore, to provide Some of them, indeed, he is unable to sur--render, being in the language of our system, unalienable

The boosted privilege of a Roman citizen and which at times was the subject of the she has entrusted the management of her er himself bound by the most solemn sancmockery of all, or of banishment from home, foreign relations, the execution of her laws, it is and navies, it is saigle tyrant, or hated aristocracy, but of a period so short as to prevent his forget as single tyrant, or hated aristocracy, but of the accountable agent, not the rest. I consider the veto power, therethe result of investigation under rules pre-under no circumstances, will I consent to tion, where their will has been probably dis-scribed by the Constitution itself. These serve a second term. precious privileges, and those scarcely less But if there is danger to public liberty to prevent the effects of combinations violaimportant, of giving expression to his from the acknowledged defects of the continence to the rights of minorities. In referspeaking, unrestrained but by the liability nance of the executive power in the same observe that, I consider it the right and pricipation in all the advantages which flow from a misconstruction of that instrument points of the Constitution, arising from the ence secured by an assurance of perfect imfrom the Government, the acknowledged as it regards the powers actually given. I general grant of power to Congress to carry munity, in exercising this sacred privilege property of all, the American citizen decannot conceive that, by a fair construction into effect the powers expressly given. man. He claims them because he is himto constitute the President a part of the leyself a Man, fashioned by the same Almighty islative power. It cannot be claimed from stances; in acts of the legislative, executive, sated for his services out of their pockets. self a Man, fashioned by the same Almighty hand as the rest of his species, and entitled the power to recommend, since, although and judicial branches of the Government, become the pliant instrument of Executive aggregate people of the U. States, as mean-

to be expected, however, from the defect of the whole. tive branch. And not only as regards the There is, it is true, this difference between tive branch. And not only as regards the latter also. It is, however, consolatory to latter also. It is, however, consolatory to latter also. It is, however, consolatory to latter from the letter or spirit of the Letter or departure from the letter or spirit of the Judiciary is final in such a case, Constitution, have ultimately received the sanction of a majority of the people. And the fact, that many of our statesmen, most distinguished for talent and patriotism, have been, at one time or other of the Executive, by the Executive authorizer, on both sides of each of the most warmly disputed questions, forces upon us the incongruity in our system of the Legislative, by the Executive authorized it is obvious that they did not the present the should not intended to make him the source of legislative, was not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should of the Executive is applied, it may be overable to not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should on the preservation of which they had so zealously contention for which they had so zealously contention, and, in particular, that he should never be looked to for schemes of finance. It would be very strange, indeed, that the suggestions of policy. The alternative then, is, to destroy or keep down a beautive the result to which they looked to for schemes of finance. It would be very strange, indeed, that the suggestions of policy. Without detail the suggestions of policy. It would be very strange, indeed, that the should never be looked to for schemes of finance. It would be very strange, indeed, that the should passion by creating and this seems to be the corner stone with some happened and the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should not intended to make him the sour

signed to others. Limited as are the powers which have been granted, still enough been always observable that men are less jealous of encroachments of one department

When the Constitution of the United a few months will confirm or dispel their States first came from the hands of the Convention which formed it, many of the sternest republicans of the day were alarmed at and measures to be adopted by an Administration not yet began, will soon be exchanged the extent of the power which had been for immutable history, and I shall stand either exonerated by my countrymen, or classed with the mass of those who promised that they might deceive, and flattered with the instantiant that they might deceive, and flattered with the instantiant to be in began with their ideas of the day were another at the power which had been assigned to the Executive branch.—

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> proper that I should take this occasion to repeat the assurances I have heretofore giv-

to the greatest number. But, with these complained of, and the correctives which broad admissions, if we would compare the may be applied. Some of the former are sovereignty acknowledged to exist in the unquestionably to be found in the defects of mass of our people with the power claimed the Constitution; others, in my judgment, by other sovereignties, even by those which are attributable to a misconstruction of some have been considered most purely democratic, we shall find a most essential difference.

All others lay claim to power limited only by their own will. The majority of the Presidency. The sagacious had been considered most provided to the Presidency. by their own will. The majority of our ci- mind of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamentizens on the contrary, possess a sovereignty ted this error, and attempts have been made, with an amount of power precisely equal to hitherto without success, to apply the amenthat which has been granted to them by the datory power of the States to its correction. parties of the national compact, and nothing beyond. We admit of no government by divine right—believing that, so far as power quently in mine, it would be useless, and climate, and, consequently, of prois concerned, the beneficient Creator has perhaps invitious to enumerate the evils of made no distinction amongst men, that all are upon an equality, and that the only legislation of the power from the governed. The Constitution may have been the of power from the governed of the continuous and the power from the governed of the continuous to enumerate the evils of the population of its various sections, and which from the same causes must or without cause, does, for all mischievous or without cause, does, does, for all mischievous several departments composing the Govern-however, as a general remark, that Repubment. On an examination of that instru-lies can commit no greater error than to ament it will be found to contain declarations dopt or continue any features in their sysper to entrust to their agents, and that which their affairs. And, surely, nothing is more they could not have granted, not being pos-likely to produce such a state of mind than rupting, nothing more destructive of all trolled by local interests and sectional feelcharacter of a devoted republican patriot.

of gold, it becomes insatiable. It is the ed. Such a one was afforded by the Execwas to him a shield only against a petty pro-vincial ruler, whilst the proud democrat of his growth, and strengthens with the decli-stitution. Athens could console himself under a sen-tence of death, for a supposed violation of is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit ing his constituents in every section, State, the national faith, which no one understood, the service of that officer at least to whom and sub-division of the Union, must considhis assembled countrymen. Far different is the principal—the servant, not the master fore, given by the Constitution to the Execute power of our sovereignty. It can inter- Until an amendment to the constitution can utive of the United States, solely as a confere with no one's faith, prescribe forms of be effected, public opinion may secure the servative power. To be used only, 1st, to worship for no one states, inflict no desired object. I give my aid to it, by re-protect the Constitution from violation. 2dly punishment but after well ascertained guilt, newing the pledge heretofore given, that the People from the effects of hasty legisla-

does not appear to me to be in a usurpation, by the Government, of power not granted by the People, but by the accumulation, in one of the Departments, of the Departments of the Department of the Departments of the Departments of the Department of the Departmen contive. If we would search for the motives with the central head, and with each other, troduced, a minister, or a member of the citizen of any other member. But there is still an under current at work, and enlightened assembly which framed the by which, if not seasonably checked, the of Constitutional principle, the Sovereign is if concentrated in one of the Departments. Constitution, for the adoption of a provision. Worst apprehensions of our anti-federal particle of the departments of one might become the citizen of any-oth-triots will be realized. And not only will, and then submitted it to Parlia- er, and successively of the whole. The lines, mocratic principle, that the majority should the State authorities be overshadowed by ment for their advice and consent. Now, govern, we must reject the idea that they the great increase of power in the Execugovern, we must reject the idea that they the great increase of power in the Executive very reverse is the case here, not only citizens of one State from those of another, anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinitive Department of the General Govern-with regard to the principle, but the forms seem to be so distinctly drawn as to leave ary course of legislation. They knew too ment, but the character of that Government, prescribed by the Constitution. The prinwell the high degree of intelligence which if not its designation, be essentially and ra-existed among the People, and the enlight-ence character of the State Legislatures, This state of things has been in part ef-

> ures which the circumstances of the country power on the President. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six Presidents permitted them to make? It exclusively metallic, however well inten-

able action of the legislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occur- that any one should doubt that the entire necessary toleration of usury, it is an exclugeneral, of the liberal feelings of the People, some umpire, from whose situation and mode When this corrupting passion once takes of appointment more independence and freeossession of the human mind, like the love dom from such influences might be expect-

regarded or not well understood; and, Sdly,

and ascertain whether the predictions of the but encouraged.

and, of course that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturing the meas-

still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed,
however, as a general remark, that RepubAnd that acts of this character might be passed, under an express grant by the words of the public money, a reference to their citizens are to be found, who under a settled of the Constitution, and, therefore, not withof power granted, and of power withheld.—
The latter is also susceptible of division in the coreate or increase the love of power into power which the majority had the right to grant, but which they did not think proper to entrust to their agents, and that which be, and however largely partaking in the bursements of the public revenues, and I guards of a camp—that their sufferings seknow the importance which has been attach- cure tranquility and safety within. Are sessed by themselves. In other words, there the long continuance of an officer in an officer it was impossible to expect that bodies so ed by men of great abilities and patriotism there any of their countrymen who would are certain rights possessed by each individ- of high trust. Nothing can be more correctionally not sometimes be continued by the divorce, as it is called, of the Treas-subject them to greater sacrifices, to any ury from the banking institutions. It is not other humiliations than those essentially nethe divorce which is complained of, but the cessary to the security of the object for which unhallowed union of the Treasury with the they were thus separated from their fellow the General Government, but exclusively Executive Department which has created citizens? Are their rights alone not to be under the guardianship of the local authorisuch extensive alarm. To this danger to guarantied by the application of those great they be productive of no other consequences. such extensive alarm. To this danger to guarantied by the application of those great than bitterness, alienation, discord; and interests by the influence given to the Executive are founded. We are told by the greatest through the instrumentality of the federal of British orators and statesmen, that at the commencement of the war of the Revolution, which appertain to our country, that of union, is by the may be at my command. which may be at my command. " It was certainly a great error in the framers of the Constitution, not to have made utive. He should at least have been remo- ized by any agency of mine.

branch of the Legislature. I have deter-

warmly disputed questions, forces upon us the inference that the errors, if errors there tends the inference that the errors, if errors there tends to be an incongruity in our system to be an incongruity in our system the inference that the errors, if errors there tends to be an incongruity in our system that they did not clearly see the mode of its accomplishment. The General Government has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the States. As far as any opien warfaire may nather than the influence of any sinister or unpatriotic motive.

But the great danger to our institutions of the Constitution, and the productive of great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the Union. At the period of the formation of the Constitution, the principle does not discord between the different members which ciple certainly assigns to the only body constituted by the Constitution (the legislative the privileges which that character confers, ened character of the State Legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence: that the fected by causes inherent in the Constitutwo bodies elected by them would be wor- tion, and in part by the never-failing ten- be ascribed to them. The Senate, in rela- same person, at the same time, act as the cithy representatives of such constituents, dency of political power-to increase itself. tion to Revenue bills, have the right to pro-By making the President the sole distribu- pose amendments, and so has the Executive, fore positively precluded from any intertor of all the patronage of the Government, the framers of the Constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a periodic field in the framers of the constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a periodic field in the framers of the constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a periodic field in the framers of the constitution of the framers of the field framers And it is preposterous to suppose that a riod it would become a formidable instru- pose amendments in the existing revenue zens of other States his advice as to their thought could for a moment have been entered the free operations of the law that the state Governments of triffing importance their defective or injurious operation. But Capital, in the centre of the country, could at first, it had, early in Mr. Jefferson's adbetter understand the waits and wishes of ministration, become so powerful as to crevenue should be left where the Constitution

At may be observed, however, that organthe people than their own immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year from the potent influence it might exert in tatives of the People. For similar reasons,

There is another ground for the adoption archy, in contra-distinction to Despotism is are daily adding to their hoards, and the of the veto principle which had probably more influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. I refer to the stamp a monarchial character on our Govsecurity which it gives to the just and equit- ernment, but the control of the public finan- try for generosity and nobleness of feeling

the most stupid men in England spoke of 'their American subjects." Are, there, indeed, citizens of any of our States who have dreamed of their subjects in the District of Columbia? Such dreams can never be real-

The people of the District of Columbia are not the subjects of the people of the States, mined never to remove a Secretary of the but free American citizens. Being in the Treasury without communicating all the circle latter condition when the Constitution was cumstances attending such removal to both formed, no words used in that instrument become us to disparage the State GovernHouses of Congress. The influence of the could have been intended to deprive them ments, nor to discourage them from making.

Executive in controlling the freedom of the of that character. If there is any thing in contrary it is our duty to ancourage them. the elective franchise through the medium the great principle of unalienable rights, so of the public officers, can be effectually emphatically insisted upon in the Declarachecked by renewing the prohibition pub-lished by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their in-terference in elections further than giving render of their liberties, and become the for injury to others, and that of a full partic hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less vilege of the Prople to decide disputed their own votes and their own votes are also and their own votes and their own votes are also and their own votes are also and their own votes are also are also and their own votes are also former fellow citizens. If this be true, and acter and credit of the whole country. The munity, in exercising this sacred privilege it will scarcely be denied by any one who resources of the country are abundant, the of freemen under the dictates of their own has a correct idea of his own rights as an A-caterprise and activity of our people proverrives from no charter granted by his fellow any or either of its provisions would be found And I believe, with Mr. Madison, "that unbiassed judgments." Never, with my con- merican citizen, the grant to Congress of exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columsated for his services out of their pockets, bin, can be interpreted, so far as respects the spective Governments, each acting within to a full share of the blessings with which enjoined as a duty upon him it is a privi accompanied by indications in different will.

There is no part of the means placed in the controlling power necessary to afford a different will.

There is no part of the means placed in the controlling power necessary to afford a different will be to be and only a different will be to be a different will be a di

From the National Intelligencer, Extra, March 4 | sonal liberty secured to the citizen. As was that any portion of these is not included in exhibit made of the operations of each of its the experience of other countries, that gol- ment as well as all the other authorities of Departments, of the powers which they res- den shackles, by whomsoever or by what- our country within their appropriate orbits. language, and the necessarily sententious It may be said, indeed, that the Constitumapner in which the Constitution is written ton has given to the Executive the power shich they coccurred between them, or the iron bonds of despotism. The presses as the powers which they respectively claim mapner in which the Constitution is writting non-singular to annul the acts of the legislative body by of power which it has actually granted, or was intended to grant. This is more particularly the case in relation to that part of the Legislature.—

the instrument which treats of the Legislature.—

the power which have occurred between them, or despotism. The presses in the powers which have occurred between them, or despotism. The presses in the powers which have occurred between them, or despotism. The presses in the powers which the increasary employment of the Government should never be used to clear the whole Government should never be used to clear the medicines, or either of them. We could be used in the necessary employment of the Government should never be used to clear the medicines, or either of them. We could be used in the necessary employment of the Government should never be used to clear the medicines, or either of them. We could despot the medicines, or either of them. We could despot the medicines, or either of them. We could despot the medicines, or either of them. We could despot to variable necessary employment of the Government should never be used to clear the medicines, or either of them. We could despot to variable necessary employment of the Governm tion, are much more so; for no such nation Upon another occasion I have given my can long exist without the careful culture of confident hopes of its advocates, have been opinion, at some length, upon the impropri-those feelings of confidence and affection realized. The great dread of the former cty of Executive interference in the legisla- which are the effective bonds of union bethose feelings of confidence and affection seems to have been, that the reserved powers of the States would be observed by those of the Federal Government, and a consolident to communicate information, and aufound ineffectual. Men, blinded by their dated power established, leaving to the States thorizing him to recommend measures, was passions, have been known to adopt mea-

no room for misunderstanding. The citizens of each State unite in their persons all

screatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often laboring with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interest, duty, and affection—

To assist or control Congress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto ized associations of citizens, requiring comsubsequently of all its members, is mainly to be attributed. And it is owing to the absence of that spirit that the Helvetic confedresidents—and two of them were members of the convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummating the labors of that august body than any other person. But if its control the whole revenibilis were never returned to Congress by either of the Presidents above referred to, upon the ground of their heinst inexpedient. upon the ground of their being inexpedient, to see that the laws are executed, and it gent fellow citizens, by their industry and servable as to promise any thing but haror not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the People, the veto was applicated upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution, or because errors had been committed from a too basty enactment.

There is another crown for the red promise any time out harmony in the same and the produced that is the one. If there is one measure better calculated than another to produced the produced that state of things so much deprecated upon that species of mixed Government, which in modern Europe, is termed Months are delibered than another to produced.

There is another crown for the selection of the most approved writers are delibered than another to produced. Some the content will the produced than another to produced the produced than another to produce the state of things so much deprecated in the independence and safety from the produced than another to produced the produced than another to produce the produce that state of things so much deprecated the independence and safety from the produced than another to produce the produced than another to produce the produce the produce that the produce the p foreign aggression which it secured, these sagacious people respected the institutions of each other, however repugnant to their own principles and prejudices.

Our Confederacy, fellow-citizens, can only be preserved by the same forbearance.-Our citizens must be content with the exercise of the powers with which the Constitution clothes them. The attempt of those of one State to control the domestic institutions of another, can only result in feelings the terms and principles governing a common copartnership. There a fund of power is to be exercised under the direction of the joint councils of the allied-members, but that which has been reserved by the individual members is intangible by the common government or the individual members composing it. To attempt it finds no support in the principles of our Constitution. Inshould be our constant and earnest endeavor mutually to cultivate a spirit of concord and harmony among the various parts of our Confederacy. Experience has abundantly taught us that the agitation by citizens of one part of the Union of a subject not confidence to far the most important, since it is the only true and sure guaranty of all others. In consequence of the embarrassed state

of business and the currency, some of the States may meet with difficulty in their financial-concerns. However deeply we may regret any thing imprudent or excessive in the engagements into which States have entered for purposes of their own, it does not become us to disparage the State Governcontrary, it is our duty to encourage them, to the extent of our constitutional authority, to apply their best means and cheerfully to make all necessary sacrifices and submit to all necessary burdens to fulfil their engagebial, and we may well hope that wise legis-lation and prudent administration, by the reits own sphere, will restore former prosperi-

Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty possessed by the People of the U. States possessed by the People of the U. States of the constructed grant of power to the Go and the restricted grant of power to the Go and the control of the purposes, than the control of the grant of the Congress should be adapted to the maxim which for an adapted of the control of the purposes, than the control of the grant of the control of the grant of the control of t Unpleasant and even dangerous as colli-