

TERMS OF PUBLICATION.
\$2 00 per annum, in advance—
\$2 50, if not paid within the year.
No subscription taken for a less term than six months, and no discontinuance permitted until all arrears are paid. A failure to notify a discontinuance at the expiration of a term, will be considered a new engagement.
Advertisements—\$1 00 per square for the three first insertions, and twenty five cents for every subsequent one.

American Volunteer.

BY G. SANDERSON & E. CORNMAN.
"OUR COUNTRY—RIGHT OR WRONG."
[AT TWO DOLLARS PER ANNUM.]
W hole No. 1328. Carlisle, Pa. Thursday January 9, 1840. New Series—Vol. 4, No. 30.

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DR. WM. EVANS' SOOTHING SYRUP, FOR CHILDREN TEETHING.
To Mothers and Nurses.
The passage of the teeth through the gums produces troublesome and dangerous symptoms. It is known by mothers that there is great irritation in the mouth and gums during this process. The gums swell, the secretion of the saliva is increased, the child is seized with frequent and sudden fits of crying, watching, starting in its sleep, and spasms of peculiar parts; the child shrieks with extreme violence, and thrusts its fingers into its mouth. The most violent spasms are not speedily allayed, spasmodic convulsions universally supervene, and soon cause the dissolution of the infant. If mothers who have their little babes afflicted with these distressing symptoms would apply the celebrated American Soothing Syrup, which has preserved hundreds of infants when thought past recovery, from being suddenly attacked with that fatal malady convulsions.
This infallible remedy has preserved hundreds when thought past recovery. As soon as the Syrup is rubbed on the gums, the child will recover. This preparation is so innocent, so efficacious, and so pleasant, that no child will refuse to let its gums be rubbed with it.—When infants are at the age of four months, though there is no eruption of teeth, one little of the Syrup should be used on the gums to open the pores. Parents should never be without the Syrup in the nursery where there are young children, for if a child wakes in the night with pain in the gums, the Syrup immediately gives ease, by opening the pores and healing the gums; thereby preventing Convulsions, Fevers, &c.
Beware of Counterfeits.
Be particular in purchasing to see that the label of this medicine contains a notice of its entry according to Act of Congress.—And be likewise particular in obtaining them at 100 Chatham st., New York, or from the regular agents,
HAMILTON & GRIER, Carlisle.

DR. WM. EVANS' CAMOMILE PILLS.
A severe case of Piles cured at 100 Chatham street.—Mr. Dan'l Spinning of Shrewsbury, Eden Town, New Jersey, was severely afflicted with Piles for more than 20 years. Had had recourse to medicines almost every description, also the advice of several eminent Physicians, but never found the slightest relief from any source whatsoever, until he called on Dr. Evans, at 100 Chatham street, N. Y., and procured a course of medicine from him, which he found immediate relief, and subsequently a perfect cure.
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MESSAGE FROM THE President of the United States, TO BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS, AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH CONGRESS. (Concluded.)
The continued agitation of the question relative to the best mode of keeping and disbursing the public money, still injuriously affects the business of the country. The suspension of specie payments in 1837, rendered the use of deposit banks, as prescribed by the act of 1836, a source of rather embarrassment than aid, and of necessity placed the custody of most of the public money afterwards collected in charge of the public officers. The new securities for its safety, which this required, were a principal cause of my convening an extra session of Congress; but in consequence of a disagreement between the two Houses, neither then, nor at any subsequent period, has there been any legislation on the subject. The effort made at the last session to obtain the authority of Congress to punish the use of public money for private purposes as a crime, a measure attended under other Governments with signal advantage, was also unsuccessful, from diversities of opinion in that body, notwithstanding the anxiety doubtless felt by it to afford every practicable security. The result of this is still to leave the custody of the public money without those safeguards which have been for several years earnestly desired by the Executive; and as the remedy is only to be found in the action of the Legislature, it imposes on me the duty of again submitting to you the propriety of passing a law, providing for the safe keeping of the public money, and especially to ask that its use for private purposes, by any officers entrusted with it, may be declared to be a felony, punishable with penalties proportioned to the magnitude of the offence.
These circumstances, added to known defects in the existing laws, and unusual derangement in the general operations of trade, have, during the last three years, much increased the difficulties attendant on the collection, keeping, and disbursement of the revenue, and called forth corresponding exertions from those having them in charge.— Happily these have been successful beyond expectation. Vast sums have been collected and disbursed by the several Departments with unexpected cheapness and ease; transfers have been readily made; and defalcations have been far less than might have been anticipated, from the absence of adequate legal restraints. Since the officers of the Treasury and Post Office Departments were charged with the custody of most of the public moneys received by them, there have been collected sixty-six millions of dollars, and, excluding the case of the late collector at New York, the aggregate amount of losses sustained in the collection cannot, it is believed, exceed sixty thousand dollars. The defalcation of the late collector at that city, of the extent and circumstances of which Congress has been fully informed, ran through all the modes of keeping the public money that have been hitherto in use, and was distinguished by an aggravated disregard of duty, that broke through the restraints of every system, and cannot, therefore, be usefully referred to as a test of the comparative safety of either. Additional information will also be furnished by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, in reply to a call made upon that officer by the House of Representatives at the last session, requiring detailed information on the subject of defaults by public officers or agents under each Administration, from 1789 to 1837. This document will be submitted to you in a few days. The general results, (independent of the Post Office, which is kept separately, and will be stated by itself,) so far as they bear upon this subject, are, that the losses which have been, & are likely to be, sustained by any class of agents, have been—the greatest by public officers, as required in the resolution, their depreciated paper received for public dues; that the next largest have been by disbursing officers, and the least by collectors and receivers. If the losses on duty bonds be included, they alone will be threefold those by both collectors and receivers. Our whole experience, therefore, furnishes the strongest evidence that the desired legislation of Congress is alone wanting to insure in those operations the highest degree of security and facility. Such also appears to have been the experience of other nations. From the results of inquiries made by the Secretary of the Treasury in regard to the practice among them, I am enabled to state that in twenty-two out of twenty-seven foreign Governments, from which undoubted information has been obtained, the public moneys are kept in charge of public officers. This concurrence of opinion in favor of that system is perhaps as great as exists on any question of internal administration.
In the modes of business and official restraints on disbursing officers, no legal check was produced by the suspension of specie payments. The report last referred to will be found to contain also much useful information in relation to this subject.
I have therefore assigned to Congress my reasons for believing that the establishment of an independent National Treasury, as contemplated by the Constitution, is necessary to the safe action of the Federal Government. The suspension of specie payments in 1837, by the banks having the custody of the public money, showed in so alarming a degree our dependence on those institutions for the performance of duties required by law, that I then recommended the entire dissolution of that connection. This recommendation has been subjected, as I desired it should be, to severe scrutiny and animated discussion; and I allow myself to believe that, notwithstanding the natural diversities of opinion which may be anticipated

led on all subjects involving such important considerations, it has secured in its favor as a general concurrence of public sentiment as could be expected on one of such magnitude. Recent events have also continued to develop new objections to such a connection. Seldom is any bank, under the existing system and practice, able to meet, on demand, all its liabilities for deposits and notes in circulation. It maintains specie payments, and transacts a profitable business, only by the confidence of the public in its solvency; and whenever this is destroyed, the demands of its depositors and noteholders—pressed more rapidly than it can make collections from its debtors—force it to stop payment. This loss of confidence with its consequences occurred in 1837, and afforded the apology of the banks for their suspension. The public then acquiesced in the validity of the excuse; and while the State Legislatures did not exact from them their forfeited charters, Congress, in accordance with the recommendation of the Executive, allowed them time to pay over the public money they held, although compelled to issue Treasury notes to supply the deficiency thus created.
It now appears that there are other motives than a want of public confidence under which the banks seek to justify themselves in a refusal to meet their obligations. Scarcely were the country and Government relieved, in a degree, from the difficulties occasioned by the general suspension of 1837, when a partial one, occurring within thirty months of the former, produced new and serious embarrassments, though it had no palliation in such circumstances as were alleged in justification of that which had previously taken place. There was nothing in the condition of the country to endanger a well managed banking institution; commerce was denuded by no foreign war; every branch of manufacturing industry was crowned with rich rewards; and the more than usual abundance of our harvests, after supplying our domestic wants, had left our granaries and store houses filled with a surplus for exportation. It is in the midst of this, that an irredeemable and depreciated paper currency is entailed upon the people by a large portion of the banks. They are not driven to it by the exhibition of a loss of public confidence, or of a sudden pressure from their depositors or note-holders, but they excuse themselves by alleging that the current of business, and exchange with foreign countries, which draws the precious metals from their vaults, would require, in order to meet it, a larger curtailment of their loans to a comparatively small portion of the community, than it will be convenient for them to bear, or perhaps safe for the banks to exact. The plea has ceased to be one of necessity. Convenience and policy are now deemed sufficient to warrant these institutions in disregarding their solemn obligations. Such conduct is not merely an injury to individual creditors, but it is a wrong to the whole community, from whose liberality they hold most valuable privileges—whose rights they violate, whose business they derange, and the value of whose property they render unstable and insecure. It must be evident that this new ground for bank suspensions, in reference to which their action is not only disconnected with, but wholly independent of, that of the public, gives a character to their suspensions more alarming than any which they exhibited before, and greatly increases the impropriety of relying on the banks in the transactions of the Government.
A large and highly respectable portion of our banking institutions are, it affords me unfeigned pleasure to state, exempted from all blame on account of this second delinquency. They have, to their great credit, not only continued to meet their engagements, but have even repudiated the grounds of suspension now resorted to. It is only by such a course that the confidence and good will of the community can be preserved, and, in the sequel, the best interests of the institutions themselves promoted.
New dangers to the banks are also daily disclosed from the extension of that system of extravagant credit of which they are the pillars. Formerly our foreign commerce was principally founded on an exchange of commodities, including the precious metals, and leaving in its transactions but little foreign debt. Such is not now the case. Aided by the facilities afforded by the banks, mere credit has become too commonly the basis of trade. Many of the banks themselves, not content with largely stimulating this system, while they impair the stability of the mercantile community; they have become borrowers instead of lenders; they establish their agencies abroad; they deal largely in stocks and merchandise; they encourage the issue of State securities until the foreign market is glutted with them; and, unsatisfied with the legitimate use of their own capital and the exercise of their lawful privileges, they raise, by large loans, additional means for every variety of speculation. The disasters attendant on this deviation from the former course of business in this country, are now shared alike by banks and individuals; to an extent of which there is perhaps no previous example in the annals of our country. So long as a willingness of the foreign lender, and a sufficient export of our productions to meet any necessary partial payments, leave the flow of credit undisturbed, all appears to be prosperous; but as soon as it is checked by any hesitation abroad, or by an inability to make payment there in our productions, the evils of the system are disclosed. The paper currency which might serve for domestic purposes, is useless to pay the debt due in Europe. Gold and silver are therefore drawn in, in exchange for their notes, from the banks. To keep up their supply of coin, these institutions are obliged to call upon their own debtors, who pay them principally in their own notes, which are as unavailable to them as they are to the merchants to meet the foreign demand. The calls of the banks, therefore, in such emergencies, of necessity, exceed that demand, and produce a corres-

ponding curtailment of their accommodations and of the currency, at the very moment when the state of trade renders it most inconvenient to be borne. The intensity of this pressure on the community is in proportion to the previous liberality of credit and consequent expansion of the currency; forced sales of property are made at the time when the means of purchasing are most reduced, and the worst calamities to individuals are only at last averted, by an open violation of their obligations by the banks, a refusal to pay specie for their notes, and an imposition upon the community of a fluctuating and depreciated currency.
These consequences are inherent in the present system. They are not influenced by the banks being large or small, created by National or State Governments. They are the results of the irresistible laws of trade and credit. In the recent events which have so strikingly illustrated the certain effects of these laws, we have seen the bank of the largest capital in the Union, established under a National charter, and lately strengthened, as we were authoritatively informed, by exchanging that for a State charter, with new and unusual privileges—in a condition too, as it was said, of entire soundness and great prosperity—not merely unable to resist these effects, but the first to yield to them.
Nor is it to be overlooked that there exists a chain of necessary dependence among these institutions which obliges them, to a great extent, to follow the course of others, notwithstanding its injustice to their own immediate creditors, or injury to the particular community in which they are placed. This dependence of a bank, which is in proportion to the extent of its debts for circulation and deposits, is not merely on others in its own vicinity, but on all those which connect it with the centre of trade. Distant banks may fail, without seriously affecting those in our principal commercial cities; but the failure of the latter is felt at the extremities of the Union. The suspension at New York, in 1837, was everywhere, with very few exceptions, followed, as soon as it was known that recently at Philadelphia immediately affected the banks of the South and West in a similar manner. This dependence of our whole banking system on the institutions in a few large cities, is not found in the laws of their organization, but in those of trade and exchange. The banks at that centre to which currency flows, and where it is required in payments for merchandise, hold the power of controlling those in regions where it comes, while the latter possess no means of restraining them; so that the value of individual property, and the prosperity of trade, through the whole interior of the country, are made to depend on the good or bad management of the banking institutions in the great seats of trade on the seaboard.
But this chain of dependence does not stop here. It does not terminate at Philadelphia or New York. It reaches across the ocean, and ends in London, the centre of the credit system. The same laws of trade, which give to the banks in our principal cities power over the whole banking system of the United States, subject the former, in their turn, to the money power in Great Britain. It is not denied that the suspension of the New York banks in 1837, which was followed in quick succession throughout the Union, was produced by an application of that power, and it is now alleged, in extenuation of the present condition of so large a portion of our banks, that their embarrassments have arisen from the same cause.
From this influence they cannot now entirely escape, for it has its origin in the credit currencies of the two countries; it is strengthened by the current of trade and exchange, which centres in London, and is rendered almost irresistible by the large debts contracted there by our merchants, our banks and our states. It is thus that an introduction of a new bank into the most distant of our villages, places the business of that village within the influence of the money power in England. It is thus that every new debt which we contract in that country, seriously affects our own currency, and extends over the pursuits of our citizens its powerful influence. We cannot escape from this by making new banks, great or small, state or National. The same chain which binds those now existing to the centre of this system of paper credit, must equally fetter every similar institution we create. It is only by the extent to which this system has been pushed of late, that we have been made fully aware of its irresistible tendency to subject our own banks and currency to a vast controlling power in a foreign land; and it adds a new argument to those which illustrate their precarious situation. Endangered in the first place by their own mismanagement, and again by the conduct of every institution which connects them with the centre of trade in our own country they are yet subjected, beyond all this, to the effect, of whatever measure, policy, necessity, or caprice may induce those who control the credits of England to resort to. I mean not to comment upon these measures present or past, and much less to discourage the prosecution of fair commercial dealing between the two countries, based on reciprocal benefits, but it having now been made manifest that the power of inflicting these and similar injuries, is by the irresistible law of a credit currency and credit trade, equally capable of extending their consequences through all the ramifications of our banking system, and by that means indirectly obtaining, particularly when our banks are used as depositories of the public moneys, a dangerous political influence in the United States, I have deemed it my duty to bring the subject to your notice and ask for your serious consideration.
Is an argument required beyond the exposition of these facts, to show the impropriety of using our banking institutions as depositories of the public moneys? Can we venture not only to encounter the risk of their individual and mutual mismanagement, but, at the same time, to place our foreign and do-

mestic policy entirely under the control of a foreign moneyed interest? To do so is to impair the independence of our Government, as the present credit system has already impaired the independence of our banks. It is to submit all its important operations, whether of peace or war, to be controlled or thwarted at first by our own banks, and then by a power abroad greater than themselves. I cannot bring myself to depict the humiliation to which this Government and people might be sooner or later reduced, if the means for defending their rights are to be made dependent upon those who may have the most powerful of motives to impair them.
Nor is it only in reference to the effect of this state of things on the independence of our Government or of our banks, that the subject presents itself for consideration; it is to be viewed also in its relations to the general trade of our country. The time is not long past when a deficiency of foreign crops was thought to afford a profitable market for the surplus of our industry; but now we await with feverish anxiety the news of the English harvest, not so much from motives of commendable sympathy, but fearful lest its anticipated failure should narrow the field of credit there. Does not this speak volumes to the patriot? Can a system be beneficent, wise, or just, which creates greater anxiety for interests dependant on foreign credit, than for the general prosperity of our own country, and the profitable exportation of the surplus produce of our labor?
The circumstances to which I have thus adverted appear to me to afford weighty reasons, developed by late events, to be added to those which I have on former occasions offered, when submitting to you better knowledge and discernment the propriety of separating the custody of the public money from banking institutions. Nor has any thing occurred to lessen, in my opinion, the force of what has been heretofore urged. The only ground on which that custody can be directed by the banks, is the profitable use which they may make of the money. Such use would be regarded in individuals as a breach of trust, or a crime of great magnitude, and yet it may be reasonably doubted whether, in the former than in the latter. The practice of permitting the public money to be used by its keepers as here, is believed to be peculiar to this country, and to exist scarcely anywhere else. To procure it here, improper influences are applied to; unwise connections are established between the Government and vast numbers of powerful State institutions; other motives than the public good are brought to bear both on the Executive and Legislative departments, and selfish combinations, leading to special legislation are formed. It is made the interest of banking institutions & their stockholders throughout the Union to use their exertions for the increase of taxation and the accumulation of a surplus revenue; and, while an excuse is afforded, the means are furnished for those excessive issues which lead to extravagant trading and speculation, and are the forerunners of a vast debt abroad, and a suspension of the banks at home.
Impressed, therefore, as I am, with the propriety of the funds of the Government being withdrawn from the private use of either banks or individuals, and the public money kept by duly appointed public agents; and believing as I do, that such also is the judgment which discussion, reflection and experience have produced on the public mind, I leave the subject with you. It is, at all events, essential to the interests of the community, and the business of the Government, that a decision should be made.
Most of the arguments that dissuade us from employing banks in the custody and disbursement of the public money apply, with equal force to the receipt of their notes for public dues. The difference is only in form. In one instance the Government is a creditor for its deposits, and in the other for the notes it holds. They afford the same opportunity for using the public moneys, and equally lead to all the evils attendant upon it, since a bank can as safely extend its discounts on a deposit of its notes in the hands of a public officer, as on one made in its own vaults. On the other hand it would give to the government no greater security; for, in case of failure, the claim of the noteholder would be no better than that of a depositor.
I am aware that the danger of inconvenience to the public and unreasonable pressure upon sound banks have been urged as objections to requiring the payment of the revenue in gold and silver. These objections have been greatly exaggerated. Even the best estimates we may safely fix the amount of specie in the country at eighty-five millions of dollars, and the portion of that which would be employed at any one time in the receipts and disbursements of the Government, even if the proposed change were made at once, would not, it is now, after fuller investigation, believed, exceed four or five millions. If the change were gradual, several years would elapse before that sum would be required, with annual opportunities, in the mean time, to alter the law, should experience prove it to be oppressive or inconvenient. The portions of the community on whose business the change would immediately operate, are comparatively small, nor is it believed that its effect would be in the least unjust or injurious to them.
In the payment of duties, which constitute by far the greater portion of the revenue, a very large proportion is derived from foreign commission houses and agents of foreign manufacturers, who sell the goods consigned to them generally at auction, and after paying the duties out of the avails, remit the rest abroad in specie or its equivalent. That the amount of duties should, in such cases, be also retained in specie, can hardly be made a matter of complaint. Our own importing merchants, by whom the residue of the duties is paid, are not only peculiarly interested in maintaining a sound currency, which the measure in question will especially pro-

DR. HUNT'S BOTANIC PILLS, INTERESTING & APPLICABLE TO THE AFFLICTED WITH Diseases of the Stomach, or Nerves;
Such a Dyspepsia, either Chronic or Casual, under the worst symptoms of restlessness; Lowness of Spirits, and General Emaciation; Constipation, whether of the Lungs or Liver; Liver Affections; Jaundice; both Bilialy & Spasmodic; Costiveness; Worms of every variety; Rheumatism; whether Acute or Chronic; together with Gout, Sciatica, Pains in the Head, Neck, Limbs, and Sides; Typhus Fever, Scarlet Fever, Putrid Sore Throat, Fever & Ague, Spasmodic Palpitation of the Heart and Arteries, Nervous Irritability, Nervous Weakness, Hysterics, Tic Douloureux, Cramps; Female Obstructions, Heartburn, Headache, Gough Cough, Common or Hoarse, and the Dry or the Whooping; Asthma, Gravel, and Dropsy.
The Blood has hitherto been considered by Empirics and others, as the great regulator of the human system, and such is the devotedness of the adherents to that erroneous doctrine, that they content themselves with the simple possession of this fallacious opinion, without enquiring into the primary sources from whence Life, Health, and Vigor emanate, and, vice versa, into the sources from whence disease and death. Not so with Dr. Hunt, whose extensive research and practical experience so eminently qualify him for the profession of which he has been one of the most useful members. He contends—and a moment's reflection will convince any reasoning mind of the correctness of his views—that the stomach, liver, and the associated organs are the primary and great regulators of health, and that the blood in very many instances is dependent on these organs, and that unless medicine reaches the source of the disease, the superficial remedies usually prescribed, serve but to fill up to cover the ravages of deep-rooted maladies.— Under these convictions, at the expense of years of close application, the doctor has discovered a medicine whose searching powers are irresistible, and in prescribing, is, with a knowledge of its being a radical cure in the various diseases already enumerated, even if applied in the most critical cases, but he does not pretend to ascribe to

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I have therefore assigned to Congress my reasons for believing that the establishment of an independent National Treasury, as contemplated by the Constitution, is necessary to the safe action of the Federal Government. The suspension of specie payments in 1837, by the banks having the custody of the public money, showed in so alarming a degree our dependence on those institutions for the performance of duties required by law, that I then recommended the entire dissolution of that connection. This recommendation has been subjected, as I desired it should be, to severe scrutiny and animated discussion; and I allow myself to believe that, notwithstanding the natural diversities of opinion which may be anticipated

led on all subjects involving such important considerations, it has secured in its favor as a general concurrence of public sentiment as could be expected on one of such magnitude. Recent events have also continued to develop new objections to such a connection. Seldom is any bank, under the existing system and practice, able to meet, on demand, all its liabilities for deposits and notes in circulation. It maintains specie payments, and transacts a profitable business, only by the confidence of the public in its solvency; and whenever this is destroyed, the demands of its depositors and noteholders—pressed more rapidly than it can make collections from its debtors—force it to stop payment. This loss of confidence with its consequences occurred in 1837, and afforded the apology of the banks for their suspension. The public then acquiesced in the validity of the excuse; and while the State Legislatures did not exact from them their forfeited charters, Congress, in accordance with the recommendation of the Executive, allowed them time to pay over the public money they held, although compelled to issue Treasury notes to supply the deficiency thus created.
It now appears that there are other motives than a want of public confidence under which the banks seek to justify themselves in a refusal to meet their obligations. Scarcely were the country and Government relieved, in a degree, from the difficulties occasioned by the general suspension of 1837, when a partial one, occurring within thirty months of the former, produced new and serious embarrassments, though it had no palliation in such circumstances as were alleged in justification of that which had previously taken place. There was nothing in the condition of the country to endanger a well managed banking institution; commerce was denuded by no foreign war; every branch of manufacturing industry was crowned with rich rewards; and the more than usual abundance of our harvests, after supplying our domestic wants, had left our granaries and store houses filled with a surplus for exportation. It is in the midst of this, that an irredeemable and depreciated paper currency is entailed upon the people by a large portion of the banks. They are not driven to it by the exhibition of a loss of public confidence, or of a sudden pressure from their depositors or note-holders, but they excuse themselves by alleging that the current of business, and exchange with foreign countries, which draws the precious metals from their vaults, would require, in order to meet it, a larger curtailment of their loans to a comparatively small portion of the community, than it will be convenient for them to bear, or perhaps safe for the banks to exact. The plea has ceased to be one of necessity. Convenience and policy are now deemed sufficient to warrant these institutions in disregarding their solemn obligations. Such conduct is not merely an injury to individual creditors, but it is a wrong to the whole community, from whose liberality they hold most valuable privileges—whose rights they violate, whose business they derange, and the value of whose property they render unstable and insecure. It must be evident that this new ground for bank suspensions, in reference to which their action is not only disconnected with, but wholly independent of, that of the public, gives a character to their suspensions more alarming than any which they exhibited before, and greatly increases the impropriety of relying on the banks in the transactions of the Government.
A large and highly respectable portion of our banking institutions are, it affords me unfeigned pleasure to state, exempted from all blame on account of this second delinquency. They have, to their great credit, not only continued to meet their engagements, but have even repudiated the grounds of suspension now resorted to. It is only by such a course that the confidence and good will of the community can be preserved, and, in the sequel, the best interests of the institutions themselves promoted.
New dangers to the banks are also daily disclosed from the extension of that system of extravagant credit of which they are the pillars. Formerly our foreign commerce was principally founded on an exchange of commodities, including the precious metals, and leaving in its transactions but little foreign debt. Such is not now the case. Aided by the facilities afforded by the banks, mere credit has become too commonly the basis of trade. Many of the banks themselves, not content with largely stimulating this system, while they impair the stability of the mercantile community; they have become borrowers instead of lenders; they establish their agencies abroad; they deal largely in stocks and merchandise; they encourage the issue of State securities until the foreign market is glutted with them; and, unsatisfied with the legitimate use of their own capital and the exercise of their lawful privileges, they raise, by large loans, additional means for every variety of speculation. The disasters attendant on this deviation from the former course of business in this country, are now shared alike by banks and individuals; to an extent of which there is perhaps no previous example in the annals of our country. So long as a willingness of the foreign lender, and a sufficient export of our productions to meet any necessary partial payments, leave the flow of credit undisturbed, all appears to be prosperous; but as soon as it is checked by any hesitation abroad, or by an inability to make payment there in our productions, the evils of the system are disclosed. The paper currency which might serve for domestic purposes, is useless to pay the debt due in Europe. Gold and silver are therefore drawn in, in exchange for their notes, from the banks. To keep up their supply of coin, these institutions are obliged to call upon their own debtors, who pay them principally in their own notes, which are as unavailable to them as they are to the merchants to meet the foreign demand. The calls of the banks, therefore, in such emergencies, of necessity, exceed that demand, and produce a corres-

ponding curtailment of their accommodations and of the currency, at the very moment when the state of trade renders it most inconvenient to be borne. The intensity of this pressure on the community is in proportion to the previous liberality of credit and consequent expansion of the currency; forced sales of property are made at the time when the means of purchasing are most reduced, and the worst calamities to individuals are only at last averted, by an open violation of their obligations by the banks, a refusal to pay specie for their notes, and an imposition upon the community of a fluctuating and depreciated currency.
These consequences are inherent in the present system. They are not influenced by the banks being large or small, created by National or State Governments. They are the results of the irresistible laws of trade and credit. In the recent events which have so strikingly illustrated the certain effects of these laws, we have seen the bank of the largest capital in the Union, established under a National charter, and lately strengthened, as we were authoritatively informed, by exchanging that for a State charter, with new and unusual privileges—in a condition too, as it was said, of entire soundness and great prosperity—not merely unable to resist these effects, but the first to yield to them.
Nor is it to be overlooked that there exists a chain of necessary dependence among these institutions which obliges them, to a great extent, to follow the course of others, notwithstanding its injustice to their own immediate creditors, or injury to the particular community in which they are placed. This dependence of a bank, which is in proportion to the extent of its debts for circulation and deposits, is not merely on others in its own vicinity, but on all those which connect it with the centre of trade. Distant banks may fail, without seriously affecting those in our principal commercial cities; but the failure of the latter is felt at the extremities of the Union. The suspension at New York, in 1837, was everywhere, with very few exceptions, followed, as soon as it was known that recently at Philadelphia immediately affected the banks of the South and West in a similar manner. This dependence of our whole banking system on the institutions in a few large cities, is not found in the laws of their organization, but in those of trade and exchange. The banks at that centre to which currency flows, and where it is required in payments for merchandise, hold the power of controlling those in regions where it comes, while the latter possess no means of restraining them; so that the value of individual property, and the prosperity of trade, through the whole interior of the country, are made to depend on the good or bad management of the banking institutions in the great seats of trade on the seaboard.
But this chain of dependence does not stop here. It does not terminate at Philadelphia or New York. It reaches across the ocean, and ends in London, the centre of the credit system. The same laws of trade, which give to the banks in our principal cities power over the whole banking system of the United States, subject the former, in their turn, to the money power in Great Britain. It is not denied that the suspension of the New York banks in 1837, which was followed in quick succession throughout the Union, was produced by an application of that power, and it is now alleged, in extenuation of the present condition of so large a portion of our banks, that their embarrassments have arisen from the same cause.
From this influence they cannot now entirely escape, for it has its origin in the credit currencies of the two countries; it is strengthened by the current of trade and exchange, which centres in London, and is rendered almost irresistible by the large debts contracted there by our merchants, our banks and our states. It is thus that an introduction of a new bank into the most distant of our villages, places the business of that village within the influence of the money power in England. It is thus that every new debt which we contract in that country, seriously affects our own currency, and extends over the pursuits of our citizens its powerful influence. We cannot escape from this by making new banks, great or small, state or National. The same chain which binds those now existing to the centre of this system of paper credit, must equally fetter every similar institution we create. It is only by the extent to which this system has been pushed of late, that we have been made fully aware of its irresistible tendency to subject our own banks and currency to a vast controlling power in a foreign land; and it adds a new argument to those which illustrate their precarious situation. Endangered in the first place by their own mismanagement, and again by the conduct of every institution which connects them with the centre of trade in our own country they are yet subjected, beyond all this, to the effect, of whatever measure, policy, necessity, or caprice may induce those who control the credits of England to resort to. I mean not to comment upon these measures present or past, and much less to discourage the prosecution of fair commercial dealing between the two countries, based on reciprocal benefits, but it having now been made manifest that the power of inflicting these and similar injuries, is by the irresistible law of a credit currency and credit trade, equally capable of extending their consequences through all the ramifications of our banking system, and by that means indirectly obtaining, particularly when our banks are used as depositories of the public moneys, a dangerous political influence in the United States, I have deemed it my duty to bring the subject to your notice and ask for your serious consideration.
Is an argument required beyond the exposition of these facts, to show the impropriety of using our banking institutions as depositories of the public moneys? Can we venture not only to encounter the risk of their individual and mutual mismanagement, but, at the same time, to place our foreign and do-

mestic policy entirely under the control of a foreign moneyed interest? To do so is to impair the independence of our Government, as the present credit system has already impaired the independence of our banks. It is to submit all its important operations, whether of peace or war, to be controlled or thwarted at first by our own banks, and then by a power abroad greater than themselves. I cannot bring myself to depict the humiliation to which this Government and people might be sooner or later reduced, if the means for defending their rights are to be made dependent upon those who may have the most powerful of motives to impair them.
Nor is it only in reference to the effect of this state of things on the independence of our Government or of our banks, that the subject presents itself for consideration; it is to be viewed also in its relations to the general trade of our country. The time is not long past when a deficiency of foreign crops was thought to afford a profitable market for the surplus of our industry; but now we await with feverish anxiety the news of the English harvest, not so much from motives of commendable sympathy, but fearful lest its anticipated failure should narrow the field of credit there. Does not this speak volumes to the patriot? Can a system be beneficent, wise, or just, which creates greater anxiety for interests dependant on foreign credit, than for the general prosperity of our own country, and the profitable exportation of the surplus produce of our labor?
The circumstances to which I have thus adverted appear to me to afford weighty reasons, developed by late events, to be added to those which I have on former occasions offered, when submitting to you better knowledge and discernment the propriety of separating the custody of the public money from banking institutions. Nor has any thing occurred to lessen, in my opinion, the force of what has been heretofore urged. The only ground on which that custody can be directed by the banks, is the profitable use which they may make of the money. Such use would be regarded in individuals as a breach of trust, or a crime of great magnitude, and yet it may be reasonably doubted whether, in the former than in the latter. The practice of permitting the public money to be used by its keepers as here, is believed to be peculiar to this country, and to exist scarcely anywhere else. To procure it here, improper influences are applied to; unwise connections are established between the Government and vast numbers of powerful State institutions; other motives than the public good are brought to bear both on the Executive and Legislative departments, and selfish combinations, leading to special legislation are formed. It is made the interest of banking institutions & their stockholders throughout the Union to use their exertions for the increase of taxation and the accumulation of a surplus revenue; and, while an excuse is afforded, the means are furnished for those excessive issues which lead to extravagant trading and speculation, and are the forerunners of a vast debt abroad, and a suspension of the banks at home.
Impressed, therefore, as I am, with the propriety of the funds of the Government being withdrawn from the private use of either banks or individuals, and the public money kept by duly appointed public agents; and believing as I do, that such also is the judgment which discussion, reflection and experience have produced on the public mind, I leave the subject with you. It is, at all events, essential to the interests of the community, and the business of the Government, that a decision should be made.
Most of the arguments that dissuade us from employing banks in the custody and disbursement of the public money apply, with equal force to the receipt of their notes for public dues. The difference is only in form. In one instance the Government is a creditor for its deposits, and in the other for the notes it holds. They afford the same opportunity for using the public moneys, and equally lead to all the evils attendant upon it, since a bank can as safely extend its discounts on a deposit of its notes in the hands of a public officer, as on one made in its own vaults. On the other hand it would give to the government no greater security; for, in case of failure, the claim of the noteholder would be no better than that of a depositor.
I am aware that the danger of inconvenience to the public and unreasonable pressure upon sound banks have been urged as objections to requiring the payment of the revenue in gold and silver. These objections have been greatly exaggerated. Even the best estimates we may safely fix the amount of specie in the country at eighty-five millions of dollars, and the portion of that which would be employed at any one time in the receipts and disbursements of the Government, even if the proposed change were made at once, would not, it is now, after fuller investigation, believed, exceed four or five millions. If the change were gradual, several years would elapse before that sum would be required, with annual opportunities, in the mean time, to alter the law, should experience prove it to be oppressive or inconvenient. The portions of the community on whose business the change would immediately operate, are comparatively small, nor is it believed that its effect would be in the least unjust or injurious to them.
In the payment of duties, which constitute by far the greater portion of the revenue, a very large proportion is derived from foreign commission houses and agents of foreign manufacturers, who sell the goods consigned to them generally at auction, and after paying the duties out of the avails, remit the rest abroad in specie or its equivalent. That the amount of duties should, in such cases, be also retained in specie, can hardly be made a matter of complaint. Our own importing merchants, by whom the residue of the duties is paid, are not only peculiarly interested in maintaining a sound currency, which the measure in question will especially pro-

DR. HUNT'S BOTANIC PILLS, INTERESTING & APPLICABLE TO THE AFFLICTED WITH Diseases of the Stomach, or Nerves;
Such a Dyspepsia, either Chronic or Casual, under the worst symptoms of restlessness; Lowness of Spirits, and General Emaciation; Constipation, whether of the Lungs or Liver; Liver Affections; Jaundice; both Bilialy & Spasmodic; Costiveness; Worms of every variety; Rheumatism; whether Acute or Chronic; together with Gout, Sciatica, Pains in the Head, Neck, Limbs, and Sides; Typhus Fever, Scarlet Fever, Putrid Sore Throat, Fever & Ague, Spasmodic Palpitation of the Heart and Arteries, Nervous Irritability, Nervous Weakness, Hysterics, Tic Douloureux, Cramps; Female Obstructions, Heartburn, Headache, Gough Cough, Common or Hoarse, and the Dry or the Whooping; Asthma, Gravel, and Dropsy.
The Blood has hitherto been considered by Empirics and others, as the great regulator of the human system, and such is the devotedness of the adherents to that erroneous doctrine, that they content themselves with the simple possession of this fallacious opinion, without enquiring into the primary sources from whence Life, Health, and Vigor emanate, and, vice versa, into the sources from whence disease and death. Not so with Dr. Hunt, whose extensive research and practical experience so eminently qualify him for the profession of which he has been one of the most useful members. He contends—and a moment's reflection will convince any reasoning mind of the correctness of his views—that the stomach, liver, and the associated organs are the primary and great regulators of health, and that the blood in very many instances is dependent on these organs, and that unless medicine reaches the source of the disease, the superficial remedies usually prescribed, serve but to fill up to cover the ravages of deep-rooted maladies.— Under these convictions, at the expense of years of close application, the doctor has discovered a medicine whose searching powers are irresistible, and in prescribing, is, with a knowledge of its being a radical cure in the various diseases already enumerated, even if applied in the most critical cases, but he does not pretend to ascribe to

MESSAGE FROM THE President of the United States, TO BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS, AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH CONGRESS. (Concluded.)
The continued agitation of the question relative to the best mode of keeping and disbursing the public money, still injuriously affects the business of the country. The suspension of specie payments in 1837, rendered the use of deposit banks, as prescribed by the act of 1836, a source of rather embarrassment than aid, and of necessity placed the custody of most of the public money afterwards collected in charge of the public officers. The new securities for its safety, which this required, were a principal cause of my convening an extra session of Congress; but in consequence of a disagreement between the two Houses, neither then, nor at any subsequent period, has there been any legislation on