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HUNTINGDON, PA,
Friday, December 12, 1862.
#—g.goo 3 c? , o
NOTICE.
'We have not the time nor the ineli
pation; to dun personally. a large num-
Wr of persons who have unsettled ac
counts upon our book; of several years
standing. We shall, therefore, from
day to day, without respect to persons,
plltee into thi, hands of a Justice for
collection, all accounts of over two
years standing. All those who wish
to save expense, will do well to give
us a call.
k§§kkikii§
Animal Report of the Commander-in-
Chief.
HEADQUARTERS OF TEIE ARMY,
Washington, Nov. 25, 18q2. J l
Hon. E. AL Stanton, Secretary of Wizr
compliance, with your ()r
-iders, I have the honor to submit the
following report of military operations
since the 23d of July last, when, in
.compliance with the President's order
,ofJuly 11th, I assumed command of
,the Army as General-in-Chivf.
The first thing to which toy atten
sion was called on my arrival here,
was the condition of the army at Har
rison's Landing on the James River.
I immediately visited General McClel
lan's headquarters for consultation.—
I left Washington on the 24th, and re
turned on the 27th. The main object
of this consultation was to ascertain it'
there was a possibility of an advance
upon Richmond from Harrison's Lan
,dingl and, if not, to form souse plan of
uniting the armies of Gen. McClellan
and General Pope on some other line.
Not being familiar with the position
and numbers of the troops in Virginia,
And on the coast, I took the President's
estimate of the largest number of rein
forcements that could then be sent to
rmy of the Poloist
On the day of my arrival at Ilarri-
SID'S Landing, General McClellan was
of opinion that he would require at
least fifty thousand additional troops.
I informed him that thisnpmher could
not possibly be sent, that I was not au
thorized to promise him over twenty
thousand, and that Icould not well see
how even that number could safely be
withdrawn from other places. He
took the night for com.idcring the mat
ter, and informed toe the next morning
that - he would make the attempt upon
Richmond with the additional twenty
thousand. Bat immediately on my
return to Washington, he telegraphed
that he would reqaire thirty-five thou
sand, a force which it was al aost im
possible to send without leating Balti
more and Washington almost defence
less. The only alternative now left
was to withdraw the Army of the Po
tomac to some position where it could
unite with that of General Pope and
cover Washington at the same time
that it operated against the enemy.
After full consultation with my offi
cers, I attempted to form this junction
on the Rappahannock, by bringing
geelellan'a inrces to Aequia Creek.—
Accordingly, on the 3 , ith July, 1 tele
graphed to send away his sie74 as
quickly as possible. proparatory to a
movement of his troops. This was
preliminary to the withdrawal of his
army, which was ordered by
telegraph on the 3d of August. In
order that the ti ansfer to Acqu'a creek
might be made as rapidly us possible,
I authorized General McClellan to as-
Some control of all the vessels on the
James River and Chesapeake Bay. of
which there was then a vast fleet--
The Quartermaster General was also
requested to send to that point all the
transports that could be procured.
On the sth I received a protest
from General McClellan, dated the
4th, against the removal of the army
from Harrison's Landing, a copy of
which is annexed, marked Exhibit No.
1, with my reply on the 6th, marked
Exhibit No. 2.
On the Ist of August I ordered Gen.
Burnside to immediately embark his
Troops at Newport News. transfer
them to Aequia Creek, and take posi
tion opposite Fredericksburg. This
officer moved with great promptness.
and reached Aequia Creek on the night
pf the 3d. His troops were immedi
ately landed, and the transports sent
back to Gen.. McClellan.
At this time, I received information
that the enemy was preparing a largo
force to drive back General Pope, and
attack either Washington or Balti
more. The information was so direct
and reliable, that I could not doubt its
correctness. This gave me serious un
easiness for the safety of the Capital
and Maryland, and I repeatedly urged
upon General McClellan the necessity
of promptly moving his army so as to
form a junction with that of General
Pope. Tho evacuation of Harrison's
Landing, however, was not commene.
ed till the 14th, eleven days after it
was ordered.
Greatly discouraged at the prospect
of timely aid from that quarter, I au
thorized General Popo to order the
Main forces of General Cox, in West
ern Virginia, with all possible despatch
by railroad, to join him via Washing
ton• •
To facilitate tho withdrawal of the
Army of the Potomac from the Penin
sula, and to gain time by a demonstra
ti9n against the enemy, Gem Pcipe
Ell
WILLIAM LEWIS, Editor and Proprietor.
VOL, XVIII
pushed his forces across the Rappahan
nock, occupied Culpeper, and threaten
ed Gordonsville. Jackson's and Ew
ell's force:, Were hurried to the Rapi
dan, and on the 9th or.A.ugust encoun
tered Bank's I- at Cedar Mountain.
A hard /ought battle ensued, and on
the arrival or reintbreements from the
corps of McDowell and Sigel, the ene
my tell back upon the Rapidan and
Gordonsville.
On the 15th, our cavalry surprised
part:.• of the enemy near Louisa
Court 'louse, and captured important
despatches, showing that Lee was mo
ving, by forced marehes, the main
body of the rebel army to attack Pope
befbre a junction could be formed ba
tween him and the Army of the Poto
mac. On the 16th, I telegraphed
General Pope not to cross the Rapi
dan, and advised bin] to take position
in rear of the Rappahannock, where he
could be more easily reinforced. Re
cotnnteneed this movement on the
lith. and by the morning of the 18th
had most of his forces behhid that riv
er prepared to hold its passes as long
as possible,
Ile had been reinforced by King's
division. and a part of Burnside's corps
under General Reno. from Fredericks
burg. I also directed General Burn
side to occupy Richard's and Barrett's
tbrds, which were between him and
General Pope's main army. The ene
my made several attempts to
cross at different points on the Rap
pahannock, but was always re.
pulsed, and our troops succeeded in
holdirg the line of the river for eight
days. It was hoped that during that
time sufficient forces from the Army
of the Potomac would reach Aequia
Creek to enable us to prevent any fur
ther advance of Leo, and eventually
with the combined armies to drive hint
back upon Richmond. On the morn
ing of the 24th he made a flank move
ment, and crossed a portion of his for
ces at Waterloo bridge, about twelve
miles above the Rappahannock rail
road station. Pope directed an attack
upon the forces which bad crossed the
river, hoping to cut them off, but the
enemy escaped with no great loss.—
The annexed telegram from General
Pope, marked Exhibit No. 3, dated the
25th. gives his views of the condition
of affairs at that date.
The enemy, however, had not fallen
back, as he supposed, but, - on being re
pulsed at Waterloo Bridge. had moves;
further up the river, and, entered th,k
valley which lies — treMzen- th4.l. Vane
- Ridge anti Bull Run Mountains.
The object of this movement was ev
idently to get in Pope's rear, and cut
off his supplies front Washington.—
Anticipating this danger, I had tele
graphed to General Pope on the 23d,
" By no means expose your railroad
communication with Alexandria. It
is of the utmost importance in send
ing you supplies and reinforcements."
On the 26th I telegraphed, "If possi
ble to attack the enemy in dank, do
so; but the mail object now is to as
certain his pn,•iti,r..`'
Prom this time to the 30th I had no
communication with General Pope,
the teleraph lines being cut at Ket
tle Rdn u part of .I:Lek-,on's corps,
water Ewell, \Odell had marehed
around Pope's right, uud attacked his
rear.
Finding it doubtful whether we
could hold the Rappahannock long en
ough to effect the junction of the two
armies, I had directed a part of the
Penlmmla Races to land at Alexandria,
and move out by railroad as rapidly
as possible, As soon as 1 heard that
the enemy had turned General Pope's
right flank, and forced him to change
him front, I ordered the remainder of
the Army of the Potomac to Alexan
dria, and directed General Burnside
to prepare to evacuate Fredericksburg
and Acquia Creek. I determined,
hoteeve•, to hold this position as long
as poi,sible for a base of future opera
tions.
General Pope's dispositions at this
juncture were well planned. The
corps of McDowell and Sigel, and the
Pennsylvania Reserves under Rey
nolds, were pushed forward to Gaines
ville. Reno and Kearney were direc
ted up3n Greenwich, while Hooker's
division was sent against Ewell along
the railroad. Unfortunately, howev
er, the movement was too late, as a
large detachment of Lee's army was
already east of Thoroughfare Gap.
Hooker encountered the enemy near
Kettle Thin, and a sharp engagement
ensued. This gallant division drove
Ewell a distance of five miles, the ene
my leaving their dead and many of
their wounded on the field. AB Mc-
Dowell, Sigel and Reynolds had reach
ed their positions, there was every
prospect that. Jackson would be de
stroyed before reinforcements could
come to his relief. On the evening of
the 27th, General Pope ordered Gen.
Porter to be at Bristoc's Station by
daylight on the morning of the 28th,
with Morrell, and also directed hint
to communicate to Banks the order to
move forward to Warrenton Junction.
All trains were ordered this side of Ce
dar Run, mid to be protected by a re
giment of infantry and a section of ar
tillery. For some unexplained reas
ons, Porter did not comply with this
order, and his corps was not in the bat
tles of the 28th and 29th.
Ilei»tzleman'g corps pressed forward
to Manassas on the Mortiing of the
28th, and forced Jackson to retreat
across Bull Run, by the Centreville
turnpike. McDowell bad succeeded
iu cheking Lee at Thoroughtitre Gap,
but, the latter took the road from
llopeville to Newmarket, and hasten
ed to the relictof Jackson, who was al
ready-in rapid retreat. A portion or
McDowell's corps encountered the re
treating column on the afternoon of
tlje Dith; 'Mar the Warrenton turn
pike, and a severe but successful en
gagement ensued. Jackson was again
attacked on the 29th. near the old bat
tle ground of July, 1861. Knowin ,,
that Longstreet was not distant, he
made a roost desperate stand. The
fight continued nearly all day, and
was terminated only by darkness.—
We had gained considerable ground,
but nothing , was decided when the bat
tle was closed. It was renewed the
next morning, and, after another day's
hard fighting, our forces fell back ho
hind Bull Run, the enemy mit attempt
ing any pursuit.
Two days later, however, he threiv
a considerable force between Chantil
ly and Germantown, to turn Pope's
right. Hooker dislodged them after a
short but severe engagement, in which
Brigadier Generals Kearney and Ste
vens, two of our very best officers,
were killed. Pope's army had been re
inforced by the corps of Franklin and
Sumner, and no thither apprehensions
were felt for its safety.
Durin g the operations of the previ
ous week, of which we received very
fitvorable but not reliable accounts,
every effort was made to push forward
supplies and reinforcements to Gener
al Pope's army. The troops from the
Peninsula were ordered not to wait
for transportation, but to march im
mediately to the field of battle. Some
of the corps moved with becoming ac
tivity, but the delays of others were
neither creditable nor exousable.
Our losses in those battles were very
heavy, both in Me and materials, but
as no official reports have been receiv
ed, except a brief sketch from General
Pope, marked Exhibit No. 4, I have
no means of ascertaining their extent.
General Pope was transferred to an
other department before the reports
of his subordinates could be received ;
probably they will soon be-handed in.
Most of the troops actually engaged in
these battles fought with great brave
ry, but some of them could not be
brought into action at all. Many
thousands straggled from their com
mands, and it is said that not a few
voluntarily surrendered td the enemy,
so as to be paroled prisoners of war.
In order to reorganize the different
corps, got the stragglers back into
their ranks, and to supply deficiencies
of ammunition, clothing, &c., caused
by recent losses, General Pope requeNt
ed and received directions to bring his
army within the defences of Washing
ton, which were then under the pain
:nand of General McClellan. -- This
movement was executed on the night
of the 3d without loss. General Pope,
being now second in command of the
united forces, applied to be relieved,
and was transferred to another depart
ment.
Although this short and active cam
paign was, from causes already referr
ed to, less successful than we had rea
son to expect, it has accomplished the
great
,and important object of covering
the capital till troops could be collect
ed for its defence. Had the Army of
the Potomac arrived a few days earli
er, the rebel army could have been ea
sily defeated, arid, perhaps, destroyed:
Seeing an attack upon Washington
would now be futile, Lee pushed his
main army across the Potomac for a
raid into ..Nfaryland and Pennsylvania.
General McClellan was directed - to
pursue him with all the troops that
were not required for the deflinee of
Washington. Several corps were im
mediately out in observation at Darn
estown, .Rockville and Leesboro', and
most of his army was in motion by the
sth of September. A portion of it en
tered Frederick on the 12th. -
this campaign was to be carried
on within the Department commanded
by Major General Wool, I directed
General McClellan to assume control
of all the troops-within his reach with
out regard to department lines. The
garrisons of Winchester and Martins
burg had been withdrawn to Harper's
Ferry, and the commanding officer of
that post had been advised by my chief
of staff to mainly confine his defence
in case he was attacked by superior
forces to the position of Maryland
Heights, which could have been held a
long time against overwhelming num
bers. To withdraw him entirely from
that position with the great body of
Lee's threes between him and our ar
my. would not only expose the garri
son to capture, but all the artillery and
stores collected at that place must ei
ther be destroyed or loft to the enemy.
The only feasible plan was for him to
hold his position until Gen. McClellan
could relieve him, or open a communi
cation so that he could evacuate it in
safety. These views were communi
cated both to Genl. McClellan and to
Colonel Miles.
The left of General McClellan's army
pursued a part of the enemy's forces
to South Mountain, where, on the 14th,
he made a stand. A severe battle en
sued, the enemy being defeated and
driven from his position with heavy
loss. Lee'ssarrify then fell hack behind
Antietam creek, a few miles above its
mouth, and took a position admirably
suited for defence. Our army attack
ed him on the 16th, and a hotly-con
tested battle was fought on that and
the ensuing day, which resulted in the
defeat of the rebel forces. On the
night of the 17th our troops slept on
the field which they had so bravely
won. On the 18th neither party re
newed the attack, and in the night of
the 18th and 19th General Lee with
drew his army to the south side of the
Potomac.
Our loss in the several battles on
South ➢fountain and at Antietam was
1,7-12 killed, 8,066 wounded, and 913
missing, making a total of 1121.
General McClellan estimates the ene
my's loss at nearly 30,000; but their
own accounts give their loss at about
14,000 in killed and wounded.
On the approach of the enemy to
Harper's perry, the officer in command
on Maryland Heights destroyed his ar
tillery and abandoned his post. and on
HUNTINGDON, PA., WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1862
-PERSEVERE.-
the 15th Colonel Miles surrendered
Harper's Ferry with only a slight re
sistance, and within hearing of the
guns of General McCle'lan's army.—
As this whole matter has been investi
gated and reported upon by a military
commission, it is unnecessary for me
to discuss the disgraceful surrender of
the post and army under Col. Miles'
command.
General MeClellate preliminary re
port of his operations in Maryland, in
cluding the battles of South Mountain
and Antietam, is submitted herewith,
marked Exhibit No. 4. No reports of
his subordinate officers have been sub
mitted.
Prom the 17th of September till the
Dith of October General McClellan's.
main army remained on the north
bank of the Potomac in the vicinity of
Shnrpsburg and Harpet's Ferry. The
long inactivity of so large an arwy in
the face of a defeated foe, and during
the most fitvorable eeason for rapid
movements end a vigorous campaign,
was a matter of great disappointment
and regret. Your letter of the 27th,
and my reply of the 2Sth of October,
in regard to the alleged causes of this
unfortunate delay, I slbmit herewith,
marked Exhibit - No. 5.
In reply to the telegraphic order of
the 6th of October, quoted in my letter
of the 2Sth, above ref Tred to, General
McClellan approved of the plan of
crossing the Potomac :7cuth of the Blue
Ridge, and said that he could cross at
Harper's Ferry, and advance upon
Winchester. He, however, did not
begin to cross until the 25th of Octo
ber, and then Berlin. His passage
occupied several days, and was com
pleted about the 3d of November.—
What caused him to change his views,
or what was his plan of campaigning,
I em ignorant, for about this time he
ceased to communicate with me in re
gard to his operations, sending his re
port directly to the President.
On the sth instant 1 received the
written order of the PresiMmt reliev
ing Gen. McClellan. and placing Genl.
Burnside in the command of the Army
of the Potomac. This order was trans
mitted by a special messenger, who
delivered it to General McClellan at
Rectortown, on the 7i h.
The above concludes that portion of
General flitllock's report which relates
to the r•perations of Army of the
Potomac:
The
MeClellapi and
llalleck on the su'oject of leaving the
Peninsula. .111 - cChollaVs despatch was
by telegraph and in cypher, that of
Ilalleck, in reply, w•as in manuscript:
[Exuairr No. 1. Copy in cypher.]
131:nut - Ira., August 4, 1802..
Major G,nr,.al lialleck, Commander
in Chief :—Ycrir telegram of last eve
ning is received. 1 most coalbss that
it has caused me the greatest pain
ever experienced, for I ant convinced
that the order to draw this army to
Acquis creek will prove disc-ti roes in
the extreme to our cause. I fear it
will be a fittal blow. Several lots are
necessary- to complete the preparations
for so important a movement tt., this,
and while they are in progress I beg
that careful consideYation be given to
my statement. This army is now in
excellent discipline and condition.—
We hold a debouche on both banks of
the James river, so that we are free to
act in any direction, and with the as
sistance of the gunboats, I consider our
communications as now secure. We
are now twenty-five miles from Rich
mond. and are not likely to meet the
enemy in force sufficient to fight a
battle until we have reached fifteen to
eighteen miles, which brings us prac
tically within ten miles of Richmood.
Our largest lint) of land transporta
tion would be from this point twenty
live miles, but with the aid of the gun
boats we can supply the army by wa
ter during its advance, certainly • to
within twelve miles of' nichtnond. At
Acquia creek we would be seventy-live
miles from Richmond, with land trans
portation all the way. Front here to
Fort Monroe is a maven of about sev
enty miles ; for I regard it as impracti
cable to withdraw this army and its
material except by litnd. Tho result
of this movement would then be to
march one hundred and forty miles to
reach a point now only twenty-five
miles distant, and to deprive ourselves
entirely of the powerful aids of the
gunboats and water transportation.—
Add to this the certain demoralization
of this army which would ensue, the
terrible depressing effect upon the
people of the North, and the strong
probability that it would influence for
eign powers to recognize our adversa
ries; and these appear to me sufficient
reasons to make it my imperative du
ty to urge, in the strongest terms of
our language, that this order may be
rescinded, and that far from recalling
this army, it be promptly reinforced to
enable it to reassume the offensive.—
It may be said that there are no rein
forcements available. I point to Gen.
Eurnside's forces—to that of General
Pope, not necessary to maintain a
stria defence in front of Washington
and Harper's Ferry—to those portions
of the Army of the West not required
for a strict defence there. Here di
rectly in front of this army is the heart
of the rebellion. It is here that all our
resources should be collected to strike
the blow which will determine the fate
of the nation. All points of secondary
importance elsewhere should bo aban
doned, and every available man brought
here. A decided victory here, and the
military strength of the rebellion is
crushed. It matters not what, partial
reverses wo meet with elsewhere—
hero is the true defence of Washington.
It is here, do the banks of the James
river, that the fate of' the Union
be decided. Clear in my convictions
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of right, strong in the consciousness
that I have ever been, and still am, ae- I
tuated solely by love of my country,
knowing that no ambitious selfish mo
tives have influenced me from the
commencement of this war, I do now,
whatl never did in my life before, en
treat that this order may bo rescinded.
If my counsel does not prevail, I will,
with a said heart, obey your orders to
the utmost of my powers, devoting to
the movement, one of the utmost d;fli
catty, whatever skill I may possess,
whatever the result may be ; and may
God grant that I am mistaken in my
forebodings. I shall at least have the
internal satisfaction that I have writ
ten and spoken frankly, and have
sought to do the host in my power to
arrest disaster from my country.
GEL) ItGE B. MeCLEILL AN, •
Major General.
. Official copy.
Headquarters Army, Washington,
D. C., November 23, 1 .N2.
[Exmnrr No. 2.]
W.l.sufNoToN, August 6, 1862.
Major General McClellan, Command
ing, &c., Berkley, Va.—Gel - feral :—Your
telegram of yesterday was received
this morning, and I immediately tele
graphed a brief reply, promising to
write you more fully by mail.
You, General, could not have been
more pained at receiving my order
than I was at the necessity of issuing
it. I was advised by high officers, in
whose judgment I had greatconfidence,
to make the order immediately on my
arrival here, but, I determined not to
do so until I could learn your wishes
from a personal interview, and even
after that interview, I tried every
means in my power to avoid with
drawing your army, and delayed my
decision as long as I dared to delay it.
I assure you, Getieral, it was not a
hasty and inconsiderate act, but ono
that caused me :Imre anxious thought
than any other of my life. But after
a full and mature'consideration of all
the pros and cons, I was reluctantly
forced to the conclusion that the order
must be issued. There was to my
mind no alternative.
Allow me to allude to a few of the
facts of the case. You and your offi
cers, at the interview, estimated the
enemy's three in and around Richmond
at two hundred thousand men. Since
then, you and others report that they
have received, and arc receiving, large
reinforcements from the South. GOD.
Pope's r my, how covering Washing
ton, is only tarty thousand men.
Your effective three is only about
ninety thousand; you are thirty miles
from Richmond, and General Pope
eighty or ninety, with the enemy di
rectly between you, ready to fall with
his superior numbers upon one or the
other, as he may elect. Neither can
reinflaree the other iu Cabe of such an
attack.
If General Pope's army be diminish
ed to reinforce you, Washington, Ma
ryland and Pennsylvania would be
left uncovered and exposed. If your
force be reduced to strengthen Pope
you would be too weak to even hold
the position you now occupy: should
the enemy turn round and attack you
in full force. In other words, the old
army of the Potormic is split into two
parts, with the entire force of the ene
my directly between them. They can
not be united by land without expos
ing both to destruction ; and yet they
must be united. To send Pope's forces
by water to the peninsula is, under
present circumstances, a military im
possibility. The only alternative is to
send the force on the peninsula to
some point by water, say Fredericks.
burg, where the two armies can be
united.
Let me now allude to some of the
objections which you have urged.--
You say that to withdraw from the
present position will cause the certain
demoralization of the army, "which is
now in excellent discipline and condi
tion." I cannot understand why a
simple change of position to a now and
by no means distant basis Will demor
alize an army in .9xeellent
unless the officers themselves assist in
that demoralization, which I am sat
isfied they will not. Your change of
front from your extreme right at Han
over Court House to your present po
sition was over thirty miles, but I have
not heard that it demoralized your
troops, notwithstanding the severe
losses they sustained in efilmting it.
A new base on the Rappahannock,
at -Fredericksburg, brings you within
about sixty miles of Richmond, and
secures a reinforcement Of forty or fif
ty thousand fresh and disciplined
troops. The change with such advan
tages will, I think, if properly repre
sented to our army, encourage, rather
than demoralize your troops. More
over, yourself suggested that a junc
tion might be effected at Yorktowp,
but that a flank march across the Pen
insula would be more hazardous than
to retire to Fortress Monroe. You will
remember that Yorktown is two or
three miles further from Richmond
than Fredericksburg is; besides, the
latter is between RicTimminfl and Wash
ington, and covers Washington from
any attack by the enemy.
The political effect of the withdraw
al may at first be unftivoiable; but I
think the public aro beginning to un
derstand its necessity, and that they
will have much more confidence in a
united army than in its separate frag
ments.
But you will reply, why not rein
*bre() me hero, so that I can strike
Richmond from my present position ?
To do this, you said, at our inter
view that you required fifty thousand
additional troops. I told you it waS
impassible to give you so many. You
finally thought you would have " semi°
chance " of success with twenty thou -
and. But you afterwards telegraphed
to me that you would require thirty
' five thousand, as the enenly was being
TERMS, $1,50 a year in advance:
hugely reinforced. If your estimate
of the enemy's strength was correct,
your requisition was perfectly reason
abl it was utterly impossible to
fill it, until now troops could be enlis
ted and organized, which would re
quire several weeks. To keep your
array l❑ its present position until it
could to so reinforced, would almost
destroy it in that climate. The months
of August and September aro almost
fatal to willies who live on that part
of J times river, and oven after you got
the reinforcements asked for, you ad
mitted that you must reduce Fort
Darling and the river batteries, before
you could advance on Richmond. It
is by no means certain that the reduc
tion of those fortifications would not
require considerable Lime, perhaps as
much As those at Yorktown. This
delay might not only be fatal to the
health of your army, but in the mean
time General Pope's forces would be
opposed to the heavy blows of the en
duly without the slightest hopo of as
sistance from you. In regard to the
demoralizing effect of a withdrawal
from the Peninsula to the Rappahan
nook, I must remark that a large num
ber of your highest officers, indeed a
majority of those opinions have been
reported to me, are decidedly in favor
of the movement. Even several of
those who originally advocated the
line of the Peninsula, 710 W advise its
abandonment.
I have not inquired, and do not •de
sire to know, by whose advice or for
what reasons, the Army of the Poto
mac was separated into parts, with
the enemy between them. I must
take things as I find them. I find tho
forces divided, and I wish to reunite
;them. Only one feasible plan has
been presented for doing this. If you
or any one else, had presented a better
one, I certainly should have adopted
it; but all your plans require rein
forcements, which it is impossible to
give you. It is very easy to ask for
reinforcements, but is it not so easy to
give them, when you have no disposa
ble tro . ops, at your command. '
I have written very plainly, as I
understand the case, and I hope you
will" give me credit for having consid
. ercd the mutter, althouglr I may have
arrived at different conclusions from
Very respectfully, your obedient
rant, H. W. HALLECK,
Uvneral-in-ebitsf.
Official copy:
T. C. lik:lll;Aret. Atljt. General.
Tho remainder of the retort of Gen.
lialleck consists in a review of opera
tions in the West and Southwest.—
The other exhibits are the ffalleck
letter, which has been published, and
the letter of Secretory- Stanton, to
which it was a reply. Also, a die.
patch 'from General Pope, relative to
liis operations in the battles between
the Potomac and the Rappahannock.
ANECDOTE OF A T EACTIED.-SOLDICR.—
The following anecdote of a teacher
soldier, was related by Prof. Wicker
shorn in his lecture on "Awakening
Mind." The incident narrated occur
red at the battle of Fair Oaks. We
would have given it a place in our
report at the time had our columns
allowed it—it is too good to be lost:
A rebel battery, handled in a mas
terly manner, was mowing our men
down, and it seemed impossible 'to
drive it from its position. ' The Gene
ral, seeing thi', rode up to the Captain
of a Lancaster county company.—
" Captain, I want seine ono who will
go out between these armies and shoot
the officer in command of that battery."
" Why, General, it's certain death to
attempt it I" " I know it; but you see
how that fire is decimating our ranks.
Is there no man willing to 'sacrifice
himself ?" "I'll see," replied the cap
tain, as he turned to hiS pompany.—
" Boys, who of you is willing to go out
between these armies, and shoot yon
der officer ?" A young man stepped
out of the ranks—" I'll go."
lle went, seemingly to certain death.
Crawling along, ho finally reached a
slight 'elevation behind which he was
partially sheltered. There was a
crack of his rifle, but the ball missed
its mark. Again—steady aim—a puff
of smoke ! The officer is seen to
throw up his arms. His gunners
spring to catch hint as he falls. The
battery is forced to abandon its posi
tion. The brave soldier returns tin
harmed. "And," said the Professor
in a burst of enthusiasm," I would
have searched the army through, but
I would have taken that young man
by the hand and said to was
bravely done!'" Ho was a teacher
front this county. I, will give, you his
name—George K. Swope !—Lancaster
(Pa.) Express:
Hear an Irish Patriot,
" Let the politicians who have bccn us
ing us long enough, stay at home if they
will, but let us go and fight the battles of
the nation, and when we come home, a
grateful nation will extend to us sufficient
to meet our wants.' I have always been
a Democrat. I was going to 'say that I
am still; but I will not allow any politics
to interfere with the discharge of my du,
ty. I take the KNO TV _NOTHING
BY THE BAND AS A BROTHER
if he carries the musket of sword along
side of me in this 'contest. Ido not care
where the man comes from, or what may
be his shade of politics, whether 'he is a
REPUBLICAN, an ABOLITION
-IST, qr Something else—it is a perfect
Matter 'of indYerence to me. I. only
want to 'say that I know no man bid as
he' Xs:Charges his duty to that jiag ; and,
as I said in BaltiMore, men were never
dalled upon in this world to perform so
'sacred a duty as you are, my countrymen,
not only for your own sake, but for the
- Whole 'country with its, coming genera
tions of men."—[Fipoeeh of Gonorql
Corcoran et Philada.
THE G - 2_lO3E3X'- 7
JOB PRINTING , OVTIOB.
THE ",GLORE JOB OFFICE_'_' isk
tho Zoog complefo , of uriy iq the country, Ind
amens the most ample facilities for prbt4tlY execntint
;be but style, every veflety of Job Printing, such
LAND. BILLS, _
PROGRAMMES,
• -
CARDS,
CIRCU.I.AR4
BILL TICKRTB
LAXiELS, &C., &C., ScC
NO. 28.
CALL'ASB Z.Z..OLLYB OPiaHONE OZ WOOS,
AT LEWIS' Iloolc, STATIONERY & 4USIC 5T013.4,
Mr, Beokford and the Dichosa of
Gordon,
The memoirs of Mr. Beckford, pub
lished after' his death, convey an Lulea
dote representing his whimsical char
acter as not unsusceptible of having,
certain " method in, it," and that to 14
very fair purpose.
"I once," said he "shut myself up
at Fonthill to be out of the way, of,n
lady—an ungallant tlflng to any lady
on earth but her with tvliom kVoccur !
red. You must well remember the late
Duchess of Gordon, as she was the con
tinual talk of the town for her curious
mercenary ways,, and mode of entrap.
ping men with her brood of daughters,
I could have served no other lady so, •I
hope—l never enjoyed-so much., At
that time everybody talked „of. :Mr,
Beekford's enormous wealth; 'every.
thing about me was exaggerated pro.
portionately. I was in consequence a
capital bait for the Dueliesssb' she
thought; I thought very, differently.--..
She had been told that even a dreg ken
nel at Fonthill was a palace—my Muse
a Potosi. What more on earth 'could
be desired by a managing mother, for
a dati6hter ? I might have been aged
and imbecile—no matter, such is fash:_
ion's philosophy. I got a hint froth,
town Uhler intention to surprise me
with her bard face at Fonthill—a sight
I Could gladly dispense with. I:re
solved to giVe her a useful lesson.—
Foothill was pu't in order for her re,
coption with everything I could "de.
vise to receive her magnificently not.
only to receive her butto turn thetable
'upon her for the presumption she. bad
that I was to become the plaything of
her purposes.,
The splendor of reception miisiliave
stimulated her in her object. I
signed that it should operate - in.-this
manner. I know her little
thought so. My arrangement being
made, I ordered my major-domo to say,
on the Duchess's arrival, that_ it wn
unfortunate—everything being arran•
god for her Grace's reception, Mr.Beelt.
ford 'had shut himself up on a sudden,
a way ho had at times, and that it was
imire than hiti place was worth to die.
curb him, as his master only appeared
when' he pleased; forbidding interrup.
tion, even if - the .King;-came to Font.
hilt. "I had : lust received- alarge loVof
books—nothing could be more Oppor
tune. J. had theta ,remoVed:to the
relflisnf clizi taken posseB
- The Duchess conducted her Self
with wonderful equanimity, and
seemed much , surprised and gratified
at Nyliat she saw and the mode of her
reception—just as I desired she should
be, quite on tiptoe to have Me fin n
son-in-law. When she got uff in' thQ
morning, her first question was, !r),(t
you think. Mr. Becklbrd will be visible
to day ?'
"I cannot inform your Grae.Mr.
Beckford's'movements aro so very nn
certain—it is possible. Would your
Grace take an airing in the park
walk in the gardens r
"Everything which Ponthill could
supply was male the mo,st'of, whetting
her appetite t 9 her purpOse still •more.
My master of the ceremonies to' the
Duchess did not know what: to make
of his master, the Duchess, or his own
position. Perhaps Mr. Beckford 'will
be visible to-morrow,' was theDuchetis's
daily consolation. To morrow and to
' morrow came and went—no Mr. Beck
ford. I read on, determined not. to
see her: Was it not serving a woman
of such a coarse nature quite right?"
She remained seven or eight days,
magnificently- entertained, and then
went away without seeing him:. ,She
was very angry,.and said of him
her Ina things too scandalous. to have.
escaped any - woman's - hps betdier own.
Think of such vengeance 7—
such a woman as the Duchess was, who,
never suffered anything to stand in thv
way of her objects ?—Book of days.
A TREATISE, ON IIO3K-ICEEPINiI, embracing an ilus•
lyticul comparlaon between the Single and Double Entrk
Systems; showing wherein they agree and :whetelts
they differ, and wherein the latter Is enperior to Ilia,
former. by a plain, practical elucidation of both 'palmy;
to which is added a variety of business calculations Of
Interest, Iniscount, Equations, Average or Accdants, &o.
Also, business forma of Orders, Drafts, Notes, Billy of
Exchange, Sc. By T. If. POLLOCK, Principal of the
Lancaster Mercantile College."
This book will not be out of plaod in
the hands ofany man. It has just
.
been given to the public-by our friend
Mr. Pollock, who is well known tie
the citizens of this county. The book
is for sale at Lewis' Book Store.
VARIETY ENVELOPES.-0010/4411•
Co's Union Variety Packages are
for sa.le . at Lewis! Book' Store. They
make a very handsome presoiat fol. all
ages. The jewelry is of a better:qual
ity than can be secured in any other
package or in any other way for the
same money. The buyer of an envel
ope can get any article of jewelry ha
or she may select from specimens.
Call and see for yoUrsolf. - Price 50 eta.
,ems The National Tax-liaw
bodying the organic sections; the gen
eral and specific prwisions; provisions
for the appointmenti, - an4 governance
of collector; assessors and their assis
tants; alphabotical schednle-list Oars :
tidies taxed, with rates, oto., eta.
For'salo at Lewis' Book Store
vA. English and German Almanacs
for 1863, are for sale at Lewin' 13oo1i
Store.
Dm. Now is THE TIME TO BUY Lloyd's
new Map of the State of Virginia.—
Only 25 cents. For sale at W. Lewis'
Book Store.
tgy, An assortment of Card
graphs at Lewis' Book §,tore. ! '
nts..Fine Cigars and Tobacco tor
sale at Lewis' Book Store. - ' '
DIATUEB for 1863, are for sale at W.
Loivib Book store.
BILL ar,A.Div,