The globe. (Huntingdon, Pa.) 1856-1877, December 17, 1862, Image 1
TERMS OF THE GLOBE 'Per annam In advance, Six months Three months 50 A foliar° to nail) n dikcontinuauce at the expiration at the term subscribed for alit be consniared a new engage. went. TERMS OF ARVERIZSISC 1 insertion. 2 do. 3 do. Pour Hues or lens, $ 25 $ 3714......$ :U Joe square, (12 lines.) ...... .... 50 05 110 rwo squares 2 CO rhree Nowt es 1 50 2 .", 3 I 0 Over three week end less then three months, 25 cents per eitti.ire fur each ilpiel Lion. 3 .I),3llths. 6 mollihs. 12 months. ix flues or 1e55....... .1 50 $.900 .5 00 -- .. . . ....... Sue unuare 3 00... 5 00 7 00 rwo mmarel, 5 00. b 00 10 00 fliree Squires 7 On 10 00.... ..... 15 00 Four aquareg 4 00 13 00 on 00 (Ulla column, 12 00 10 00... ... .....20 00 One column, "0 00 ”0 40. ......5) 00 ' Profeeluional and 1111,111,8 Cain, not eClVelling f-11r lille, one year 03 04 Admlnintratom' and FA,ClltUrte NOileeN, $1 75 Advertisement+ not m irked nit!, tire 'lumber of mser tlone desired. will 'be coil tin 0,1 till for bid an d c h arge d ~_ C3rclimr to thus term.- Otobe. HUNTINGDON, PA, Friday, December 12, 1862. #—g.goo 3 c? , o NOTICE. 'We have not the time nor the ineli pation; to dun personally. a large num- Wr of persons who have unsettled ac counts upon our book; of several years standing. We shall, therefore, from day to day, without respect to persons, plltee into thi, hands of a Justice for collection, all accounts of over two years standing. All those who wish to save expense, will do well to give us a call. k§§kkikii§ Animal Report of the Commander-in- Chief. HEADQUARTERS OF TEIE ARMY, Washington, Nov. 25, 18q2. J l Hon. E. AL Stanton, Secretary of Wizr compliance, with your ()r -iders, I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when, in .compliance with the President's order ,ofJuly 11th, I assumed command of ,the Army as General-in-Chivf. The first thing to which toy atten sion was called on my arrival here, was the condition of the army at Har rison's Landing on the James River. I immediately visited General McClel lan's headquarters for consultation.— I left Washington on the 24th, and re turned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain it' there was a possibility of an advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Lan ,dingl and, if not, to form souse plan of uniting the armies of Gen. McClellan and General Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia, And on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of rein forcements that could then be sent to rmy of the Poloist On the day of my arrival at Ilarri- SID'S Landing, General McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least fifty thousand additional troops. I informed him that thisnpmher could not possibly be sent, that I was not au thorized to promise him over twenty thousand, and that Icould not well see how even that number could safely be withdrawn from other places. He took the night for com.idcring the mat ter, and informed toe the next morning that - he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional twenty thousand. Bat immediately on my return to Washington, he telegraphed that he would reqaire thirty-five thou sand, a force which it was al aost im possible to send without leating Balti more and Washington almost defence less. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the Army of the Po tomac to some position where it could unite with that of General Pope and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. After full consultation with my offi cers, I attempted to form this junction on the Rappahannock, by bringing geelellan'a inrces to Aequia Creek.— Accordingly, on the 3 , ith July, 1 tele graphed to send away his sie74 as quickly as possible. proparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the withdrawal of his army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the ti ansfer to Acqu'a creek might be made as rapidly us possible, I authorized General McClellan to as- Some control of all the vessels on the James River and Chesapeake Bay. of which there was then a vast fleet-- The Quartermaster General was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured. On the sth I received a protest from General McClellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing, a copy of which is annexed, marked Exhibit No. 1, with my reply on the 6th, marked Exhibit No. 2. On the Ist of August I ordered Gen. Burnside to immediately embark his Troops at Newport News. transfer them to Aequia Creek, and take posi tion opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness. and reached Aequia Creek on the night pf the 3d. His troops were immedi ately landed, and the transports sent back to Gen.. McClellan. At this time, I received information that the enemy was preparing a largo force to drive back General Pope, and attack either Washington or Balti more. The information was so direct and reliable, that I could not doubt its correctness. This gave me serious un easiness for the safety of the Capital and Maryland, and I repeatedly urged upon General McClellan the necessity of promptly moving his army so as to form a junction with that of General Pope. Tho evacuation of Harrison's Landing, however, was not commene. ed till the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered. Greatly discouraged at the prospect of timely aid from that quarter, I au thorized General Popo to order the Main forces of General Cox, in West ern Virginia, with all possible despatch by railroad, to join him via Washing ton• • To facilitate tho withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Penin sula, and to gain time by a demonstra ti9n against the enemy, Gem Pcipe Ell WILLIAM LEWIS, Editor and Proprietor. VOL, XVIII pushed his forces across the Rappahan nock, occupied Culpeper, and threaten ed Gordonsville. Jackson's and Ew ell's force:, Were hurried to the Rapi dan, and on the 9th or.A.ugust encoun tered Bank's I- at Cedar Mountain. A hard /ought battle ensued, and on the arrival or reintbreements from the corps of McDowell and Sigel, the ene my tell back upon the Rapidan and Gordonsville. On the 15th, our cavalry surprised part:.• of the enemy near Louisa Court 'louse, and captured important despatches, showing that Lee was mo ving, by forced marehes, the main body of the rebel army to attack Pope befbre a junction could be formed ba tween him and the Army of the Poto mac. On the 16th, I telegraphed General Pope not to cross the Rapi dan, and advised bin] to take position in rear of the Rappahannock, where he could be more easily reinforced. Re cotnnteneed this movement on the lith. and by the morning of the 18th had most of his forces behhid that riv er prepared to hold its passes as long as possible, Ile had been reinforced by King's division. and a part of Burnside's corps under General Reno. from Fredericks burg. I also directed General Burn side to occupy Richard's and Barrett's tbrds, which were between him and General Pope's main army. The ene my made several attempts to cross at different points on the Rap pahannock, but was always re. pulsed, and our troops succeeded in holdirg the line of the river for eight days. It was hoped that during that time sufficient forces from the Army of the Potomac would reach Aequia Creek to enable us to prevent any fur ther advance of Leo, and eventually with the combined armies to drive hint back upon Richmond. On the morn ing of the 24th he made a flank move ment, and crossed a portion of his for ces at Waterloo bridge, about twelve miles above the Rappahannock rail road station. Pope directed an attack upon the forces which bad crossed the river, hoping to cut them off, but the enemy escaped with no great loss.— The annexed telegram from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 3, dated the 25th. gives his views of the condition of affairs at that date. The enemy, however, had not fallen back, as he supposed, but, - on being re pulsed at Waterloo Bridge. had moves; further up the river, and, entered th,k valley which lies — treMzen- th4.l. Vane - Ridge anti Bull Run Mountains. The object of this movement was ev idently to get in Pope's rear, and cut off his supplies front Washington.— Anticipating this danger, I had tele graphed to General Pope on the 23d, " By no means expose your railroad communication with Alexandria. It is of the utmost importance in send ing you supplies and reinforcements." On the 26th I telegraphed, "If possi ble to attack the enemy in dank, do so; but the mail object now is to as certain his pn,•iti,r..`' Prom this time to the 30th I had no communication with General Pope, the teleraph lines being cut at Ket tle Rdn u part of .I:Lek-,on's corps, water Ewell, \Odell had marehed around Pope's right, uud attacked his rear. Finding it doubtful whether we could hold the Rappahannock long en ough to effect the junction of the two armies, I had directed a part of the Penlmmla Races to land at Alexandria, and move out by railroad as rapidly as possible, As soon as 1 heard that the enemy had turned General Pope's right flank, and forced him to change him front, I ordered the remainder of the Army of the Potomac to Alexan dria, and directed General Burnside to prepare to evacuate Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. I determined, hoteeve•, to hold this position as long as poi,sible for a base of future opera tions. General Pope's dispositions at this juncture were well planned. The corps of McDowell and Sigel, and the Pennsylvania Reserves under Rey nolds, were pushed forward to Gaines ville. Reno and Kearney were direc ted up3n Greenwich, while Hooker's division was sent against Ewell along the railroad. Unfortunately, howev er, the movement was too late, as a large detachment of Lee's army was already east of Thoroughfare Gap. Hooker encountered the enemy near Kettle Thin, and a sharp engagement ensued. This gallant division drove Ewell a distance of five miles, the ene my leaving their dead and many of their wounded on the field. AB Mc- Dowell, Sigel and Reynolds had reach ed their positions, there was every prospect that. Jackson would be de stroyed before reinforcements could come to his relief. On the evening of the 27th, General Pope ordered Gen. Porter to be at Bristoc's Station by daylight on the morning of the 28th, with Morrell, and also directed hint to communicate to Banks the order to move forward to Warrenton Junction. All trains were ordered this side of Ce dar Run, mid to be protected by a re giment of infantry and a section of ar tillery. For some unexplained reas ons, Porter did not comply with this order, and his corps was not in the bat tles of the 28th and 29th. Ilei»tzleman'g corps pressed forward to Manassas on the Mortiing of the 28th, and forced Jackson to retreat across Bull Run, by the Centreville turnpike. McDowell bad succeeded iu cheking Lee at Thoroughtitre Gap, but, the latter took the road from llopeville to Newmarket, and hasten ed to the relictof Jackson, who was al ready-in rapid retreat. A portion or McDowell's corps encountered the re treating column on the afternoon of tlje Dith; 'Mar the Warrenton turn pike, and a severe but successful en gagement ensued. Jackson was again attacked on the 29th. near the old bat tle ground of July, 1861. Knowin ,, that Longstreet was not distant, he made a roost desperate stand. The fight continued nearly all day, and was terminated only by darkness.— We had gained considerable ground, but nothing , was decided when the bat tle was closed. It was renewed the next morning, and, after another day's hard fighting, our forces fell back ho hind Bull Run, the enemy mit attempt ing any pursuit. Two days later, however, he threiv a considerable force between Chantil ly and Germantown, to turn Pope's right. Hooker dislodged them after a short but severe engagement, in which Brigadier Generals Kearney and Ste vens, two of our very best officers, were killed. Pope's army had been re inforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and no thither apprehensions were felt for its safety. Durin g the operations of the previ ous week, of which we received very fitvorable but not reliable accounts, every effort was made to push forward supplies and reinforcements to Gener al Pope's army. The troops from the Peninsula were ordered not to wait for transportation, but to march im mediately to the field of battle. Some of the corps moved with becoming ac tivity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor exousable. Our losses in those battles were very heavy, both in Me and materials, but as no official reports have been receiv ed, except a brief sketch from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 4, I have no means of ascertaining their extent. General Pope was transferred to an other department before the reports of his subordinates could be received ; probably they will soon be-handed in. Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great brave ry, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousands straggled from their com mands, and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered td the enemy, so as to be paroled prisoners of war. In order to reorganize the different corps, got the stragglers back into their ranks, and to supply deficiencies of ammunition, clothing, &c., caused by recent losses, General Pope requeNt ed and received directions to bring his army within the defences of Washing ton, which were then under the pain :nand of General McClellan. -- This movement was executed on the night of the 3d without loss. General Pope, being now second in command of the united forces, applied to be relieved, and was transferred to another depart ment. Although this short and active cam paign was, from causes already referr ed to, less successful than we had rea son to expect, it has accomplished the great ,and important object of covering the capital till troops could be collect ed for its defence. Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earli er, the rebel army could have been ea sily defeated, arid, perhaps, destroyed: Seeing an attack upon Washington would now be futile, Lee pushed his main army across the Potomac for a raid into ..Nfaryland and Pennsylvania. General McClellan was directed - to pursue him with all the troops that were not required for the deflinee of Washington. Several corps were im mediately out in observation at Darn estown, .Rockville and Leesboro', and most of his army was in motion by the sth of September. A portion of it en tered Frederick on the 12th. - this campaign was to be carried on within the Department commanded by Major General Wool, I directed General McClellan to assume control of all the troops-within his reach with out regard to department lines. The garrisons of Winchester and Martins burg had been withdrawn to Harper's Ferry, and the commanding officer of that post had been advised by my chief of staff to mainly confine his defence in case he was attacked by superior forces to the position of Maryland Heights, which could have been held a long time against overwhelming num bers. To withdraw him entirely from that position with the great body of Lee's threes between him and our ar my. would not only expose the garri son to capture, but all the artillery and stores collected at that place must ei ther be destroyed or loft to the enemy. The only feasible plan was for him to hold his position until Gen. McClellan could relieve him, or open a communi cation so that he could evacuate it in safety. These views were communi cated both to Genl. McClellan and to Colonel Miles. The left of General McClellan's army pursued a part of the enemy's forces to South Mountain, where, on the 14th, he made a stand. A severe battle en sued, the enemy being defeated and driven from his position with heavy loss. Lee'ssarrify then fell hack behind Antietam creek, a few miles above its mouth, and took a position admirably suited for defence. Our army attack ed him on the 16th, and a hotly-con tested battle was fought on that and the ensuing day, which resulted in the defeat of the rebel forces. On the night of the 17th our troops slept on the field which they had so bravely won. On the 18th neither party re newed the attack, and in the night of the 18th and 19th General Lee with drew his army to the south side of the Potomac. Our loss in the several battles on South ➢fountain and at Antietam was 1,7-12 killed, 8,066 wounded, and 913 missing, making a total of 1121. General McClellan estimates the ene my's loss at nearly 30,000; but their own accounts give their loss at about 14,000 in killed and wounded. On the approach of the enemy to Harper's perry, the officer in command on Maryland Heights destroyed his ar tillery and abandoned his post. and on HUNTINGDON, PA., WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1862 -PERSEVERE.- the 15th Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry with only a slight re sistance, and within hearing of the guns of General McCle'lan's army.— As this whole matter has been investi gated and reported upon by a military commission, it is unnecessary for me to discuss the disgraceful surrender of the post and army under Col. Miles' command. General MeClellate preliminary re port of his operations in Maryland, in cluding the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, is submitted herewith, marked Exhibit No. 4. No reports of his subordinate officers have been sub mitted. Prom the 17th of September till the Dith of October General McClellan's. main army remained on the north bank of the Potomac in the vicinity of Shnrpsburg and Harpet's Ferry. The long inactivity of so large an arwy in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most fitvorable eeason for rapid movements end a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret. Your letter of the 27th, and my reply of the 2Sth of October, in regard to the alleged causes of this unfortunate delay, I slbmit herewith, marked Exhibit - No. 5. In reply to the telegraphic order of the 6th of October, quoted in my letter of the 2Sth, above ref Tred to, General McClellan approved of the plan of crossing the Potomac :7cuth of the Blue Ridge, and said that he could cross at Harper's Ferry, and advance upon Winchester. He, however, did not begin to cross until the 25th of Octo ber, and then Berlin. His passage occupied several days, and was com pleted about the 3d of November.— What caused him to change his views, or what was his plan of campaigning, I em ignorant, for about this time he ceased to communicate with me in re gard to his operations, sending his re port directly to the President. On the sth instant 1 received the written order of the PresiMmt reliev ing Gen. McClellan. and placing Genl. Burnside in the command of the Army of the Potomac. This order was trans mitted by a special messenger, who delivered it to General McClellan at Rectortown, on the 7i h. The above concludes that portion of General flitllock's report which relates to the r•perations of Army of the Potomac: The MeClellapi and llalleck on the su'oject of leaving the Peninsula. .111 - cChollaVs despatch was by telegraph and in cypher, that of Ilalleck, in reply, w•as in manuscript: [Exuairr No. 1. Copy in cypher.] 131:nut - Ira., August 4, 1802.. Major G,nr,.al lialleck, Commander in Chief :—Ycrir telegram of last eve ning is received. 1 most coalbss that it has caused me the greatest pain ever experienced, for I ant convinced that the order to draw this army to Acquis creek will prove disc-ti roes in the extreme to our cause. I fear it will be a fittal blow. Several lots are necessary- to complete the preparations for so important a movement tt., this, and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideYation be given to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition.— We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and with the as sistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure. We are now twenty-five miles from Rich mond. and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us prac tically within ten miles of Richmood. Our largest lint) of land transporta tion would be from this point twenty live miles, but with the aid of the gun boats we can supply the army by wa ter during its advance, certainly • to within twelve miles of' nichtnond. At Acquia creek we would be seventy-live miles from Richmond, with land trans portation all the way. Front here to Fort Monroe is a maven of about sev enty miles ; for I regard it as impracti cable to withdraw this army and its material except by litnd. Tho result of this movement would then be to march one hundred and forty miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation.— Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence for eign powers to recognize our adversa ries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative du ty to urge, in the strongest terms of our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it be promptly reinforced to enable it to reassume the offensive.— It may be said that there are no rein forcements available. I point to Gen. Eurnside's forces—to that of General Pope, not necessary to maintain a stria defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry—to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defence there. Here di rectly in front of this army is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should bo aban doned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what, partial reverses wo meet with elsewhere— hero is the true defence of Washington. It is here, do the banks of the James river, that the fate of' the Union be decided. Clear in my convictions .. ~...',...,./ .:',. :Y:. ~.... ..., '...ki., ..., ~,'::. • :,. ..,.._ .. . „ ~ . :::, ..:::-. . 4 110 : . 4 i',...'.11:- . ~....,., ( , ...., ',‘,':, ',.,... ~.,., ......... -v. /CA. v.- of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, ae- I tuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious selfish mo tives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, whatl never did in my life before, en treat that this order may bo rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a said heart, obey your orders to the utmost of my powers, devoting to the movement, one of the utmost d;fli catty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be ; and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have writ ten and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the host in my power to arrest disaster from my country. GEL) ItGE B. MeCLEILL AN, • Major General. . Official copy. Headquarters Army, Washington, D. C., November 23, 1 .N2. [Exmnrr No. 2.] W.l.sufNoToN, August 6, 1862. Major General McClellan, Command ing, &c., Berkley, Va.—Gel - feral :—Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately tele graphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, General, could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had greatconfidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but, I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview, and even after that interview, I tried every means in my power to avoid with drawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, Getieral, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but ono that caused me :Imre anxious thought than any other of my life. But after a full and mature'consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no alternative. Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your offi cers, at the interview, estimated the enemy's three in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have received, and arc receiving, large reinforcements from the South. GOD. Pope's r my, how covering Washing ton, is only tarty thousand men. Your effective three is only about ninety thousand; you are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy di rectly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can reinflaree the other iu Cabe of such an attack. If General Pope's army be diminish ed to reinforce you, Washington, Ma ryland and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy: should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potormic is split into two parts, with the entire force of the ene my directly between them. They can not be united by land without expos ing both to destruction ; and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military im possibility. The only alternative is to send the force on the peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericks. burg, where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged.-- You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, "which is now in excellent discipline and condi tion." I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a now and by no means distant basis Will demor alize an army in .9xeellent unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am sat isfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Han over Court House to your present po sition was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in efilmting it. A new base on the Rappahannock, at -Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a reinforcement Of forty or fif ty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change with such advan tages will, I think, if properly repre sented to our army, encourage, rather than demoralize your troops. More over, yourself suggested that a junc tion might be effected at Yorktowp, but that a flank march across the Pen insula would be more hazardous than to retire to Fortress Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericksburg is; besides, the latter is between RicTimminfl and Wash ington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy. The political effect of the withdraw al may at first be unftivoiable; but I think the public aro beginning to un derstand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate frag ments. But you will reply, why not rein *bre() me hero, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position ? To do this, you said, at our inter view that you required fifty thousand additional troops. I told you it waS impassible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have " semi° chance " of success with twenty thou - and. But you afterwards telegraphed to me that you would require thirty ' five thousand, as the enenly was being TERMS, $1,50 a year in advance: hugely reinforced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reason abl it was utterly impossible to fill it, until now troops could be enlis ted and organized, which would re quire several weeks. To keep your array l❑ its present position until it could to so reinforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September aro almost fatal to willies who live on that part of J times river, and oven after you got the reinforcements asked for, you ad mitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries, before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduc tion of those fortifications would not require considerable Lime, perhaps as much As those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time General Pope's forces would be opposed to the heavy blows of the en duly without the slightest hopo of as sistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahan nook, I must remark that a large num ber of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, 710 W advise its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not •de sire to know, by whose advice or for what reasons, the Army of the Poto mac was separated into parts, with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. I find tho forces divided, and I wish to reunite ;them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else, had presented a better one, I certainly should have adopted it; but all your plans require rein forcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for reinforcements, but is it not so easy to give them, when you have no disposa ble tro . ops, at your command. ' I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will" give me credit for having consid . ercd the mutter, althouglr I may have arrived at different conclusions from Very respectfully, your obedient rant, H. W. HALLECK, Uvneral-in-ebitsf. Official copy: T. C. lik:lll;Aret. Atljt. General. Tho remainder of the retort of Gen. lialleck consists in a review of opera tions in the West and Southwest.— The other exhibits are the ffalleck letter, which has been published, and the letter of Secretory- Stanton, to which it was a reply. Also, a die. patch 'from General Pope, relative to liis operations in the battles between the Potomac and the Rappahannock. ANECDOTE OF A T EACTIED.-SOLDICR.— The following anecdote of a teacher soldier, was related by Prof. Wicker shorn in his lecture on "Awakening Mind." The incident narrated occur red at the battle of Fair Oaks. We would have given it a place in our report at the time had our columns allowed it—it is too good to be lost: A rebel battery, handled in a mas terly manner, was mowing our men down, and it seemed impossible 'to drive it from its position. ' The Gene ral, seeing thi', rode up to the Captain of a Lancaster county company.— " Captain, I want seine ono who will go out between these armies and shoot the officer in command of that battery." " Why, General, it's certain death to attempt it I" " I know it; but you see how that fire is decimating our ranks. Is there no man willing to 'sacrifice himself ?" "I'll see," replied the cap tain, as he turned to hiS pompany.— " Boys, who of you is willing to go out between these armies, and shoot yon der officer ?" A young man stepped out of the ranks—" I'll go." lle went, seemingly to certain death. Crawling along, ho finally reached a slight 'elevation behind which he was partially sheltered. There was a crack of his rifle, but the ball missed its mark. Again—steady aim—a puff of smoke ! The officer is seen to throw up his arms. His gunners spring to catch hint as he falls. The battery is forced to abandon its posi tion. The brave soldier returns tin harmed. "And," said the Professor in a burst of enthusiasm," I would have searched the army through, but I would have taken that young man by the hand and said to was bravely done!'" Ho was a teacher front this county. I, will give, you his name—George K. Swope !—Lancaster (Pa.) Express: Hear an Irish Patriot, " Let the politicians who have bccn us ing us long enough, stay at home if they will, but let us go and fight the battles of the nation, and when we come home, a grateful nation will extend to us sufficient to meet our wants.' I have always been a Democrat. I was going to 'say that I am still; but I will not allow any politics to interfere with the discharge of my du, ty. I take the KNO TV _NOTHING BY THE BAND AS A BROTHER if he carries the musket of sword along side of me in this 'contest. Ido not care where the man comes from, or what may be his shade of politics, whether 'he is a REPUBLICAN, an ABOLITION -IST, qr Something else—it is a perfect Matter 'of indYerence to me. I. only want to 'say that I know no man bid as he' Xs:Charges his duty to that jiag ; and, as I said in BaltiMore, men were never dalled upon in this world to perform so 'sacred a duty as you are, my countrymen, not only for your own sake, but for the - Whole 'country with its, coming genera tions of men."—[Fipoeeh of Gonorql Corcoran et Philada. THE G - 2_lO3E3X'- 7 JOB PRINTING , OVTIOB. THE ",GLORE JOB OFFICE_'_' isk tho Zoog complefo , of uriy iq the country, Ind amens the most ample facilities for prbt4tlY execntint ;be but style, every veflety of Job Printing, such LAND. BILLS, _ PROGRAMMES, • - CARDS, CIRCU.I.AR4 BILL TICKRTB LAXiELS, &C., &C., ScC NO. 28. CALL'ASB Z.Z..OLLYB OPiaHONE OZ WOOS, AT LEWIS' Iloolc, STATIONERY & 4USIC 5T013.4, Mr, Beokford and the Dichosa of Gordon, The memoirs of Mr. Beckford, pub lished after' his death, convey an Lulea dote representing his whimsical char acter as not unsusceptible of having, certain " method in, it," and that to 14 very fair purpose. "I once," said he "shut myself up at Fonthill to be out of the way, of,n lady—an ungallant tlflng to any lady on earth but her with tvliom kVoccur ! red. You must well remember the late Duchess of Gordon, as she was the con tinual talk of the town for her curious mercenary ways,, and mode of entrap. ping men with her brood of daughters, I could have served no other lady so, •I hope—l never enjoyed-so much., At that time everybody talked „of. :Mr, Beekford's enormous wealth; 'every. thing about me was exaggerated pro. portionately. I was in consequence a capital bait for the Dueliesssb' she thought; I thought very, differently.--.. She had been told that even a dreg ken nel at Fonthill was a palace—my Muse a Potosi. What more on earth 'could be desired by a managing mother, for a dati6hter ? I might have been aged and imbecile—no matter, such is fash:_ ion's philosophy. I got a hint froth, town Uhler intention to surprise me with her bard face at Fonthill—a sight I Could gladly dispense with. I:re solved to giVe her a useful lesson.— Foothill was pu't in order for her re, coption with everything I could "de. vise to receive her magnificently not. only to receive her butto turn thetable 'upon her for the presumption she. bad that I was to become the plaything of her purposes., The splendor of reception miisiliave stimulated her in her object. I signed that it should operate - in.-this manner. I know her little thought so. My arrangement being made, I ordered my major-domo to say, on the Duchess's arrival, that_ it wn unfortunate—everything being arran• god for her Grace's reception, Mr.Beelt. ford 'had shut himself up on a sudden, a way ho had at times, and that it was imire than hiti place was worth to die. curb him, as his master only appeared when' he pleased; forbidding interrup. tion, even if - the .King;-came to Font. hilt. "I had : lust received- alarge loVof books—nothing could be more Oppor tune. J. had theta ,remoVed:to the relflisnf clizi taken posseB - The Duchess conducted her Self with wonderful equanimity, and seemed much , surprised and gratified at Nyliat she saw and the mode of her reception—just as I desired she should be, quite on tiptoe to have Me fin n son-in-law. When she got uff in' thQ morning, her first question was, !r),(t you think. Mr. Becklbrd will be visible to day ?' "I cannot inform your Grae.Mr. Beckford's'movements aro so very nn certain—it is possible. Would your Grace take an airing in the park walk in the gardens r "Everything which Ponthill could supply was male the mo,st'of, whetting her appetite t 9 her purpOse still •more. My master of the ceremonies to' the Duchess did not know what: to make of his master, the Duchess, or his own position. Perhaps Mr. Beckford 'will be visible to-morrow,' was theDuchetis's daily consolation. To morrow and to ' morrow came and went—no Mr. Beck ford. I read on, determined not. to see her: Was it not serving a woman of such a coarse nature quite right?" She remained seven or eight days, magnificently- entertained, and then went away without seeing him:. ,She was very angry,.and said of him her Ina things too scandalous. to have. escaped any - woman's - hps betdier own. Think of such vengeance 7— such a woman as the Duchess was, who, never suffered anything to stand in thv way of her objects ?—Book of days. A TREATISE, ON IIO3K-ICEEPINiI, embracing an ilus• lyticul comparlaon between the Single and Double Entrk Systems; showing wherein they agree and :whetelts they differ, and wherein the latter Is enperior to Ilia, former. by a plain, practical elucidation of both 'palmy; to which is added a variety of business calculations Of Interest, Iniscount, Equations, Average or Accdants, &o. Also, business forma of Orders, Drafts, Notes, Billy of Exchange, Sc. By T. If. POLLOCK, Principal of the Lancaster Mercantile College." This book will not be out of plaod in the hands ofany man. It has just . been given to the public-by our friend Mr. Pollock, who is well known tie the citizens of this county. The book is for sale at Lewis' Book Store. VARIETY ENVELOPES.-0010/4411• Co's Union Variety Packages are for sa.le . at Lewis! Book' Store. They make a very handsome presoiat fol. all ages. The jewelry is of a better:qual ity than can be secured in any other package or in any other way for the same money. The buyer of an envel ope can get any article of jewelry ha or she may select from specimens. Call and see for yoUrsolf. - Price 50 eta. ,ems The National Tax-liaw bodying the organic sections; the gen eral and specific prwisions; provisions for the appointmenti, - an4 governance of collector; assessors and their assis tants; alphabotical schednle-list Oars : tidies taxed, with rates, oto., eta. For'salo at Lewis' Book Store vA. English and German Almanacs for 1863, are for sale at Lewin' 13oo1i Store. Dm. Now is THE TIME TO BUY Lloyd's new Map of the State of Virginia.— Only 25 cents. For sale at W. Lewis' Book Store. tgy, An assortment of Card graphs at Lewis' Book §,tore. ! ' nts..Fine Cigars and Tobacco tor sale at Lewis' Book Store. - ' ' DIATUEB for 1863, are for sale at W. Loivib Book store. BILL ar,A.Div,