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The Globe.

HUNTINGDON, PA.

Friday, December 12, 1862.

NOTICE.

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Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, Nov. 25, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

SIR:—In compliance with your orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when, in compliance with the President's order of July 11th, I assumed command of the Army as General-in-Chief.

The first thing to which my attention was called on my arrival here, was the condition of the army at Harrison's Landing on the James River. I immediately visited General McClellan's headquarters for consultation.—I left Washington on the 24th, and returned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if there was a possibility of an advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing; and, if not, to form some plan of uniting the armies of Gen. McClellan and General Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia, and on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of reinforcements that could then be sent to the Army of the Potomac

On the day of my arrival at Harrison's Landing, General McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least fifty thousand additional troops. I informed him that this number could not possibly be sent, that I was not authorized to promise him over twenty thousand, and that I could not well see how even that number could safely be withdrawn from other places. He took the night for considering the matter, and informed me the next morning that he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional twenty thousand. But immediately on my return to Washington, he telegraphed that he would require thirty-five thousand, a force which it was almost impossible to send without leaving Baltimore and Washington almost defenceless. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the Army of the Potomac to a new position where it could unite with that of General Pope and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy.

After full consultation with my officers, I attempted to form this junction on the Rappahannock, by bringing McClellan's forces to Acquia Creek.—Accordingly, on the 30th July, I telegraphed to send away his *sick* as quickly as possible, preparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the withdrawal of his entire army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the transfer to Acquia creek might be made as rapidly as possible, I authorized General McClellan to assume control of all the vessels on the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet.—The Quartermaster General was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured.

On the 5th I received a protest from General McClellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing, a copy of which is annexed, marked Exhibit No. 1, with my reply on the 6th, marked Exhibit No. 2.

On the 1st of August I ordered Gen. Burnside to immediately embark his troops at Newport News, transfer them to Acquia Creek, and take position opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness, and reached Acquia Creek on the night of the 3d. His troops were immediately landed, and the transports sent back to Gen. McClellan.

At this time, I received information that the enemy was preparing a large force to drive back General Pope, and attack either Washington or Baltimore. The information was so direct and reliable, that I could not doubt its correctness. This gave me serious uneasiness for the safety of the Capital and Maryland, and I repeatedly urged upon General McClellan the necessity of promptly moving his army so as to form a junction with that of General Pope. The evacuation of Harrison's Landing, however, was not commenced till the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered.

Greatly discouraged at the prospect of timely aid from that quarter, I authorized General Pope to order the main forces of General Cox, in Western Virginia, with all possible despatch by railroad, to join him via Washington.

To facilitate the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, and to gain time by a demonstration against the enemy, Gen. Pope pushed his forces across the Rappahannock, occupied Culpeper, and threatened Gordonsville. Jackson's and Ewell's forces were hurried to the Rapidan, and on the 9th of August encountered Banks's corps at Cedar Mountain. A hard fought battle ensued, and on the arrival of reinforcements from the corps of McDowell and Sigel, the enemy fell back upon the Rapidan and Gordonsville.

On the 15th, our cavalry surprised a party of the enemy near Louisa Court House, and captured important despatches, showing that Lee was moving, by forced marches, the main body of the rebel army to attack Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the Army of the Potomac. On the 16th, I telegraphed General Pope not to cross the Rapidan, and advised him to take position in rear of the Rappahannock, where he could be more easily reinforced. He commenced this movement on the 17th, and by the morning of the 18th had most of his forces behind that river prepared to hold its passes as long as possible.

He had been reinforced by King's division, and a part of Burnside's corps under General Reno, from Fredericksburg. I also directed General Burnside to occupy Richard's and Barrett's fords, which were between him and General Pope's main army. The enemy made several attempts to cross at different points on the Rappahannock, but was always repulsed, and our troops succeeded in holding the line of the river for eight days. It was hoped that during that time sufficient forces from the Army of the Potomac would reach Acquia Creek to enable us to prevent any further advance of Lee, and eventually with the combined armies to drive him back upon Richmond. On the morning of the 24th he made a flank movement, and crossed a portion of his forces at Waterloo bridge, about twelve miles above the Rappahannock railroad station. Pope directed an attack upon the forces which had crossed the river, hoping to cut them off, but the enemy escaped with no great loss.—The annexed telegram from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 3, dated the 25th, gives his views of the condition of affairs at that date.

The enemy, however, had not fallen back, as he supposed, but, on being repulsed at Waterloo Bridge, had moved further up the river, and entered the valley which lies between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains.

The object of this movement was evidently to get in Pope's rear, and cut off his supplies from Washington.—Anticipating this danger, I had telegraphed to General Pope on the 23d, "By no means expose your railroad communication with Alexandria. It is of the utmost importance in sending you supplies and reinforcements." On the 26th I telegraphed, "If possible to attack the enemy in flank, do so; but the main object now is to ascertain his position."

From this time to the 30th I had no communication with General Pope, the telegraph lines being cut at Kettle Run by a part of Jackson's corps, under Ewell, which had marched around Pope's right, and attacked his rear.

Finding it doubtful whether we could hold the Rappahannock long enough to effect the junction of the two armies, I had directed a part of the Peninsula forces to land at Alexandria, and move out by railroad as rapidly as possible. As soon as I heard that the enemy had turned General Pope's right flank, and forced him to change his front, I ordered the remainder of the Army of the Potomac to Alexandria, and directed General Burnside to prepare to evacuate Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. I determined, however, to hold this position as long as possible for a base of future operations.

General Pope's dispositions at this juncture were well planned. The corps of McDowell and Sigel, and the Pennsylvania Reserves under Reynolds, were pushed forward to Gainesville. Reno and Kearney were directed upon Greenwich, while Hooker's division was sent against Ewell along the railroad. Unfortunately, however, the movement was too late, as a large detachment of Lee's army was already east of Thoroughfare Gap.

Hooker encountered the enemy near Kettle Run, and a sharp engagement ensued. This gallant division drove Ewell a distance of five miles, the enemy leaving their dead and many of their wounded on the field. As McDowell, Sigel and Reynolds had reached their positions, there was every prospect that Jackson would be destroyed before reinforcements could come to his relief. On the evening of the 27th, General Pope ordered Gen. Porter to be at Bristoe's Station by daylight on the morning of the 28th, with Morrell, and also directed him to communicate to Banks the order to move forward to Warrenton Junction. All trains were ordered this side of Cedar Run, and to be protected by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. For some unexplained reasons, Porter did not comply with this order, and his corps was not in the battles of the 28th and 29th.

Heintzleman's corps pressed forward to Manassas on the morning of the 28th, and forced Jackson to retreat across Bull Run, by the Centreville turnpike. McDowell had succeeded in checking Lee at Thoroughfare Gap, but the latter took the road from Hopeville to Newmarket, and hastened to the relief of Jackson, who was already in rapid retreat. A portion of McDowell's corps encountered the retreating column on the afternoon of the 28th, near the Warrenton turnpike, and a severe but successful engagement ensued. Jackson was again attacked on the 29th, near the old battle ground of July, 1861. Knowing that Longstreet was not distant, he made a most desperate stand. The fight continued nearly all day, and was terminated only by darkness.—We had gained considerable ground, but nothing was decided when the battle was closed. It was renewed the next morning, and, after another day's hard fighting, our forces fell back behind Bull Run, the enemy not attempting any pursuit.

Two days later, however, he threw a considerable force between Chantilly and Germantown, to turn Pope's right. Hooker dislodged them after a short but severe engagement, in which Brigadier Generals Kearney and Stevens, two of our very best officers, were killed. Pope's army had been reinforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and no further apprehensions were felt for its safety.

During the operations of the previous week, of which we received very favorable but not reliable accounts, every effort was made to push forward supplies and reinforcements to General Pope's army. The troops from the Peninsula were ordered not to wait for transportation, but to march immediately to the field of battle. Some of the corps moved with becoming activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor excusable.

Our losses in those battles were very heavy, both in life and materials, but as no official reports have been received, except a brief sketch from General Pope, marked Exhibit No. 4, I have no means of ascertaining their extent. General Pope was transferred to another department before the reports of his subordinates could be received; probably they will soon be handed in. Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousands straggled from their commands, and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to be paroled prisoners of war.

In order to reorganize the different corps, get the stragglers back into their ranks, and to supply deficiencies of ammunition, clothing, &c., caused by recent losses, General Pope requested and received directions to bring his army within the defences of Washington, which were then under the command of General McClellan. This movement was executed on the night of the 3d without loss. General Pope, being now second in command of the united forces, applied to be relieved, and was transferred to another department.

Although this short and active campaign was, from causes already referred to, less successful than we had reason to expect, it has accomplished the great and important object of covering the capital till troops could be collected for its defence. Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earlier, the rebel army could have been easily defeated, and, perhaps, destroyed.

Seeing an attack upon Washington would now be futile, Lee pushed his main army across the Potomac for a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. General McClellan was directed to pursue him with all the troops that were not required for the defence of Washington. Several corps were immediately out in observation at Darnestown, Rockville and Leesboro', and most of his army was in motion by the 5th of September. A portion of it entered Frederick on the 12th.

As this campaign was to be carried on within the Department commanded by Major General Wool, I directed General McClellan to assume control of all the troops within his reach without regard to department lines. The garrisons of Winchester and Martinsburg had been withdrawn to Harper's Ferry, and the commanding officer of that post had been advised by my chief of staff to mainly confine his defence in case he was attacked by superior forces to the position of Maryland Heights, which could have been held a long time against overwhelming numbers. To withdraw him entirely from that position with the great body of Lee's forces between him and our army, would not only expose the garrison to capture, but all the artillery and stores collected at that place must either be destroyed or left to the enemy. The only feasible plan was for him to hold his position until Gen. McClellan could relieve him, or open a communication so that he could evacuate it in safety. These views were communicated both to Genl. McClellan and to Colonel Miles.

The left of General McClellan's army pursued a part of the enemy's forces to South Mountain, where, on the 14th, he made a stand. A severe battle ensued, the enemy being defeated and driven from his position with heavy loss. Lee's army then fell back behind Antietam creek, a few miles above its mouth, and took a position admirably suited for defence. Our army attacked him on the 16th, and a hotly-contested battle was fought on that and the ensuing day, which resulted in the defeat of the rebel forces. On the night of the 17th our troops slept on the field which they had so bravely won. On the 18th neither party renewed the attack, and in the night of the 18th and 19th General Lee withdrew his army to the south side of the Potomac.

Our loss in the several battles on South Mountain and at Antietam was 1,742 killed, 8,066 wounded, and 913 missing, making a total of 10,721.—General McClellan estimates the enemy's loss at nearly 30,000; but their own accounts give their loss at about 14,000 in killed and wounded.

On the approach of the enemy to Harper's Ferry, the officer in command on Maryland Heights destroyed his artillery and abandoned his post, and on the 15th Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry with only a slight resistance, and within hearing of the guns of General McClellan's army.—As this whole matter has been investigated and reported upon by a military commission, it is unnecessary for me to discuss the disgraceful surrender of the post and army under Col. Miles' command.

General McClellan's preliminary report of his operations in Maryland, including the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, is submitted herewith, marked Exhibit No. 4. No reports of his subordinate officers have been submitted.

From the 17th of September till the 26th of October General McClellan's main army remained on the north bank of the Potomac in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Harper's Ferry. The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret. Your letter of the 27th, and my reply of the 28th of October, in regard to the alleged causes of this unfortunate delay, I submit herewith, marked Exhibit No. 5.

In reply to the telegraphic order of the 6th of October, quoted in my letter of the 28th, above referred to, General McClellan approved of the plan of crossing the Potomac south of the Blue Ridge, and said that he could cross at Harper's Ferry, and advance upon Winchester. He, however, did not begin to cross until the 25th of October, and then at Berlin. His passage occupied several days, and was completed about the 3d of November.—What caused him to change his views, or what was his plan of campaigning, I am ignorant, for about this time he ceased to communicate with me in regard to his operations, sending his report directly to the President.

On the 5th instant I received the written order of the President relieving Gen. McClellan, and placing Genl. Burnside in the command of the Army of the Potomac. This order was transmitted by a special messenger, who delivered it to General McClellan at Rectortown, on the 7th.

The above concludes that portion of General Halleck's report which relates to the operations of the Army of the Potomac

The following are the despatches which passed between McClellan and Halleck on the subject of leaving the Peninsula. McClellan's despatch was by telegraph and in cypher, that of Halleck, in reply, was in manuscript: [EXHIBIT No. 1. Copy in cypher.]

BERKLEY, Va., August 4, 1862.

Major General Halleck, Commander in Chief:—Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to draw this army to Acquia creek will prove disastrous in the extreme to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration be given to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition.—We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure. We are now twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond.

Our largest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Acquia creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy miles; for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material except by land. The result of this movement would then be to march one hundred and forty miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation.—Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, in the strongest terms of our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it be promptly reinforced to enable it to reassume the offensive.—It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Gen. Burnside's forces—to that of General Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry—to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defence there. Here directly in front of this army is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we meet with elsewhere—here is the true defence of Washington.

It is here, on the banks of the James river, that the fate of the Union should be decided. Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your orders to the utmost of my powers, devoting to the movement, one of the utmost difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be; and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster from my country.

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Major General.

Official copy.

Headquarters Army, Washington, D. C., November 23, 1862.

[EXHIBIT No. 2.]

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862.

Major General McClellan, Commanding, &c., Berkley, Va.—General:—Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail.

You, General, could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview, and even after that interview, I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after a full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no alternative.

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your officers, at the interview, estimated the enemy's force in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have received, and are receiving, large reinforcements from the South. Gen. Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only forty thousand men.

Your effective force is only about ninety thousand; you are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can reinforce the other in case of such an attack.

If General Pope's army be diminished to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the force on the peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united.

Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged.—You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, "which is now in excellent discipline and condition." I cannot understand why a *simple change of position to a new and* by no means distant basis will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your present position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it.

A new base on the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a reinforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change with such advantages will, I think, if properly represented to our army, encourage, rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the Peninsula would be more hazardous than to retire to Fortress Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericksburg is; besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy.

The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments.

But you will reply, why not reinforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said, at our interview that you required fifty thousand additional troops. I told you it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have "some chance" of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed to me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely reinforced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable, but it was utterly impossible to fill it, until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reinforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river, and even after you got the reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries, before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of those fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the meantime General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment.

I have not inquired, and do not desire to know, by whose advice or for what reasons, the Army of the Potomac was separated into parts, with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to reunite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else, had presented a better one, I certainly should have adopted it; but all your plans require reinforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to *ask* for reinforcements, but is it not so easy to *give* them, when you have no disposable troops at your command.

I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having considered the matter, although I may have arrived at different conclusions from your own.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, Asst. Adjt. General.

The remainder of the report of Gen. Halleck consists in a review of operations in the West and Southwest.—

The other exhibits are the Halleck letter, which has been published, and the letter of Secretary Stanton, to which it was a reply. Also, a dispatch from General Pope, relative to his operations in the battles between the Potomac and the Rappahannock.

ANECDOTE OF A TEACHER-SOLDIER.—The following anecdote of a teacher soldier, was related by Prof. Wickersham in his lecture on "Awakening Mind." The incident narrated occurred at the battle of Fair Oaks. We would have given it a place in our report at the time had our columns allowed it—it is too good to be lost:

A rebel battery, handled in a masterly manner, was mowing our men down, and it seemed impossible to drive it from its position. The General, seeing this, rode up to the Captain of a Lancaster county company.—"Captain, I want some one who will go out between these armies and shoot the officer in command of that battery." "Why, General, it's certain death to attempt it!" "I know it; but you see how that fire is decimating our ranks. Is there no man willing to sacrifice himself?" "I'll see," replied the captain, as he turned to his company.—"Boys, who of you is willing to go out between these armies, and shoot yonder officer?" A young man stepped out of the ranks—"I'll go."

He went, seemingly to certain death. Crawling along, he finally reached a slight elevation behind which he was partially sheltered. There was a crack of his rifle, but the ball missed its mark. Again—steady aim—a puff of smoke! The officer is seen to throw up his arms. His gunners spring to catch him as he falls. The battery is forced to abandon its position. The brave soldier returns unharmed. "And," said the Professor in a burst of enthusiasm, "I would have searched the army through, but I would have taken that young man by the hand and said to him, 'It was bravely done!'" He was a teacher from this county. I will give you his name—George K. Swope!—*Lancaster (Pa.) Express.*

Hear an Irish Patriot.

"Let the politicians who have been using us long enough, stay at home if they will, but let us go and fight the battles of the nation, and when we come home, a grateful nation will extend to us sufficient to meet our wants. I have always been a Democrat. I was going to say that I am still; but I will not allow any politics to interfere with the discharge of my duty. I take the KNOW NOTHING BY THE HAND AS A BROTHER if he carries the musket or sword alongside of me in this contest. I do not care where the man comes from, or what may be his shade of politics, whether he is a REPUBLICAN, an ABOLITIONIST, or something else—it is a perfect matter of indifference to me. I only want to say that I know no man but as he discharges his duty to that flag; and, as I said in Baltimore, men were never called upon in this world to perform so sacred a duty as you are, my countrymen, not only for your own sake, but for the whole country with its coming generations of men."—[Speech of General Corcoran at Philada.

Mr. Beckford and the Duchess of Gordon.

The memoirs of Mr. Beckford, published after his death, convey an anecdote representing his whimsical character as not unsusceptible of having a certain "method in it," and that to a very fair purpose.

"I once," said he "shut myself up at Fonthill to be out of the way of a lady—an ungallant thing to any lady on earth but her with whom it occurred. You must well remember the late Duchess of Gordon, as she was the continual talk of the town for her curious mercenary ways, and mode of entrapping men with her brood of daughters. I could have served no other lady so, I hope—I never enjoyed so much. At that time everybody talked of Mr. Beckford's enormous wealth; everything about me was exaggerated proportionately. I was in consequence a capital bait for the Duchess—so she thought; I thought very differently.—She had been told that even a dog kennel at Fonthill was a palace—my house a Potosi. What more on earth could be desired by a managing mother for a daughter? I might have been aged and imbecile—no matter, such is fashion's philosophy. I got a hint from town of her intention to surprise me with her hard face at Fonthill—a sight I could gladly dispense with. I resolved to give her a useful lesson.—Fonthill was put in order for her reception with everything I could devise to receive her magnificently—not only to receive her but to turn the table upon her for the presumption she had that I was to become the plaything of her purposes.

The splendor of reception must have stimulated her in her object. I designed that it should operate in this manner. I know her aim—she little thought so. My arrangement being made, I ordered my *major-domo* to say, on the Duchess's arrival, that it was unfortunate—everything being arranged for her Grace's reception, Mr. Beckford had shut himself up on a sudden, a way he had at times, and that it was more than his place was worth to disturb him, as his master only appeared when he pleased; forbidding interruption, even if the King came to Fonthill. I had just received a large lot of books—nothing could be more opportune. I had them removed to the rooms of which I had taken possession. The Duchess conducted herself with wonderful equanimity, and seemed much surprised and gratified at what she saw and the mode of her reception—just as I desired she should be, quite on tiptoe to have me for a son-in-law. When she got up in the morning, her first question was, 'Do you think Mr. Beckford will be visible to day?'

"I cannot inform your Grace—Mr. Beckford's movements are so very uncertain—it is possible. Would your Grace take an airing in the park—a walk in the gardens?"

"Everything which Fonthill could supply was made the most of, whetting her appetite to her purpose still more. My master of the ceremonies to the Duchess did not know what to make of his master, the Duchess, or his own position. 'Perhaps Mr. Beckford will be visible to-morrow,' was the Duchess's daily consolation. To morrow and to-morrow came and went—no Mr. Beckford. I read on, determined not to see her. Was it not serving a woman of such a coarse nature quite right?"

She remained seven or eight days, magnificently entertained, and then went away without seeing him. She was very angry, and said of him in her rage things too scandalous to have escaped any woman's lips but her own. Think of such a woman's vengeance—such a woman as the Duchess was, who never suffered anything to stand in the way of her objects?—*Book of days.*

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