Semi-Weekly Globe.

WM. LEWIS, Editor and Proprietor.

TERMS.—"The Globe" is published twice a week at $1.50 a year—75 cents for six months—50 cents for three months—*in advance.*

HUNTINGDON, PA.

Thursday afternoon, August 15, 1861.

The People's Party Convention.

This Convention met at the Court House on Tuesday afternoon last.—Several townships were not represented by regularly elected delegates—the party in such townships declining to act as a party at the present time. The Convention however, was composed of good men of the party,—men who had determined to meet the Democracy half way, and to move together, shoulder to shoulder, in one solid column in the support of our Government. The Democracy cannot refuse to accept the offer of the People's party; indeed we do not believe there is a Democrat in the county who is not ready to bury for the time, all party feeling in the selection of competent men to fill all offices to be filled this fall.

We have not room to-day to give the entire proceedings of the Convention, but shall do so in our next. The following is the resolution of the Convention proposing a union of parties:

Resolved: That as it is necessary that officers should be chosen to carry on our local government, we, the representatives of the party hitherto dominant in this county, respectfully propose, in the spirit of the preceding resolutions, to our Democratic brethren to unite in forming a *Union Ticket* for the county offices; and to this end that a committee be hereby appointed by this Convention.

On motion, a committee of 15 members of the present Convention be appointed to meet and confer with a committee of like number appointed by the Democratic Party, who are favorable to a vigorous prosecution of the war, and the course pursued by the General Government, in its efforts to suppress the present rebellion instituted by the disunionists of the South, on Tuesday, the 27th of the present month, at 2 o'clock, for the purpose of forming a Union County Ticket, to be supported at the ensuing election, with power to place in nomination a full ticket, provided no such union can be effected. The following persons were appointed said committee:

Dr. H. Orlady, Gen. S. Miles Green, Geo. W. Johnstom Jacob Miller, Sam. Wigton, Dr. C. W. Moore, David Clarkson, Samuel Peightal, Sam'l McVitty, John Griffith, Jacob Baker, James Entrekin, Thos. E. Orbison, John Logan, George Leas.

The Democratic County Committee will no doubt order a County Convention or Mass Meeting in Huntingdon on Monday, 26th instant, when a committee will be appointed to meet the committee named above. We hope the very best feeling will continue to exist with the loyal people of both parties.

THE PAY OF OUR ARMY.—No question is oftener asked than what is the compensation paid to the rank and file of the volunteer and regular army of the United States? As the recent acts of Congress have modified the terms of enlistment and of pay, we give a statement as follows: All volunteers are hereafter to be mustered into the service for "during the war," except volunteers in the regular army, whose term of enlistment is to be for three years. The pay of both volunteers and regular army is the same, and the bounties are the same to each. All non-commissioned officers and privates receive $13 per month regular pay, with rations and clothing extra. They may commute for clothing, receiving $3,50 per month in lieu of clothing in kind, and they may commute for rations when not received in kind, at the cost. Every volunteer receives fifty cents, in lieu of subsistence, for every twenty miles of travel from his place of enrollment to the place of muster; and when honorably discharged, an allowance at the same rate from the place of his discharge to the place of his enrollment. His transportation is in all cases paid by the Government. In addition to these regular items of pay, every volunteer, if he shall have served for a period of two years, or during the war, if sooner ended, is entitled to receive the sum of one hundred dollars bounty. Any volunteer who may be wounded in the service is entitled to pension or bounty land; and the widow or heirs of such as die or are killed in the service, receive the sum of $100, in addition to all arrears of pay and allowance.

☞ Capt. Geo. F. McCabe's company of Zouaves left on Tuesday night, to join their regiment at Philadelphia. The company was full. We shall be greatly disappointed if McCabe and his "boys" fail to make their mark before they return home.

☞ The President has appointed the last Thursday in September, as a day of humiliation, prayer and fasting for all the people of the nation.

☞ Capt. R. P. Hamilton is back again, and is receiving men to fill up his company of cavalry already accepted.

☞ The Government will exercise the most vigorous measures to prevent the publication of despatches or letters relating to past, present or future movements of troops in the neighborhood of Washington.

☞ The civil list for next week is continued, and the Jurors need not attend.

The Latest News.

GREAT BATTLE IN MISSOURI.

FULL DETAILS OF THE BATTLE.

General Lyon Fell at the Head of His Column.

Eight Thousand Federal Troops Against Twenty-Five Thousand in the Field.

REBEL GENERALS PRICE AND McCULLOUGH KILLED.

Rebel Tents and Baggage Wagons Destroyed.

Gen. Seigel Secures the Specie of the Springfield Bank.

GENERAL SEIGEL REINFORCED AND SAFE.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 13.

The following official report was read to-night by Gen. Scott:—

HEAD QUERTERS, WESTERN DEP'T., ST. LOUIS, August 13, 1891.

To Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:—Gen. Lyon, in three columns, under command of himself, Seigel, and Sturgiss attacked the enemy at six and a half o'clock, on the morning of the tenth (10th) inst., about 9 miles south-east of Springfield.

The engagement was severe. Our loss is about five hundred killed and wounded.

General Lyon was killed in a charge at the head of his column. Our force was eight thousand (8,000) including two thousand home guards.

The muster roll reported to have been taken from the enemy gives their force at twenty-three thousand, including regiments from Louisiana, Tennessee and Mississippi, with the Texan Rangers and Cherokee half breed.

This statement is corroborated by the prisoners taken.

Their loss is reported to be heavy, including Generals McCullough and Price.

Their tents and wagons were destroyed in the action.

Gen. Seigel lost one gun on the field and retreated to Springfield, whence at three o'clock on the morning of the eleventh, he continued his retreat upon Rolla bringing off his baggage trains and two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in specie from the Springfield bank.

Signed, J. C. FREMONT,
Maj. Gen. Commanding.

The Latest.

ST. LOUIS, Aug. 13.

The despatch contains the same intelligence as that conveyed by Gen. Fremont, with the exception that the sum of money brought by Gen. Siegel from the Springfield Bank is placed at twenty-five thousand dollars.

The following is a verbatim report of the special messenger to Gen. Fremont:

Early on Saturday morning Gen. Lyon marched out of Springfield and came up with the enemy at Davis Creek on Green's Prairie, four miles southeast of Springfield, where they had taken a strong position.

General Lyon fired the first gun at twenty minutes past six o'clock when the battle immediately commenced. A severe cannonading was kept up for two or three hours, when the fire of Totten's artillery proving severe for the enemy, they gradually fell back towards their encampment on Wilson's creek.

Lyon's cavalry on the left flank, and Siegle's artillery on the right, then began a terrific assault, and spread slaughter and dismay in the ranks of the rebels, pursuing them to the camp.

The shell from Totten's artillery set fire to their tents and baggage wagons, which were all destroyed.

A Louisiana and a Mississippi Regiment seemed to suffer most and were almost annihilated.

Some time in the afternoon, while Gen. Lyon was leading his column, his horse was shot from under him. He immediately mounted another, and as he turned round to his men, waving his hat and cheering them on to victory, he was struck in the small of his back and fell dead on the ground.

The command then devolved on Gen. Seigel, and the pursuit was continued until nightfall when our little army rested for the night in the enemys encampment.

On Sunday morning Gen Seigel fearing the enemy might recover and attempt to cut his command from Springfield, fell back on that city where the home guards were stationed. Then fearing that the great numbers of the enemy might induce them to get between him and Rolla, Gen. Seigel concluded to fall back on Rolla with his prisoners and baggage trains and meet reinforcements.

At the time of the departure of the messenger the enemy had not been seen, and it is probable that General Siegel had not been disturbed on his march. Ninety rebels were captured, including a Colonel of distinction, the messenger not remembering his name. The sword and horse of General McCullough were among the trophies of the field of battle.

Reinforcements for Gen. Siegel were on the way to Rolla, and the army may be considered safe.

From Gen. Banks' Column.

Route of Rebel Cavalry at Lovettsville.

SANDY HOOK, Md., Aug. 12—The New York Nineteenth Volunteers is now commanded by Maj. Ledlie, Col. Clark still being under arrest, and Lieut Col. Seward having obtained leave of absence on account of sickness.

This regiment keeps watch on both sides of the Potomac from Sandy Hook to Berlin. Last Wednesday news reached Major Ledlie that a force of upwards of one hundred rebel cavalry were at Lovettsville, Loudoun county, where they were *pressing and oppressing* the Union inhabitants. Detachments amounting to one hundred men, under command of Captain Kennedy, of company B, accompanied by Captain Stevens, of company F, and Surgeon T. Durcon, crossed the river at the Rock Ferry at one o'clock on Thursday morning, and after a difficult march of seven miles reached Lovettsville about daylight. Ascertaining that the rebels had left, they retraced their route two miles towards the river, in hopes that the rebels would follow them as soon as the latter discovered the weakness of Captain Kennedy's force

Here, with the Union men, they formed an ambush, where they laid concealed until 2 o'clock, P. M., when ascertaining that the rebels had not returned, they continued on their return. When about three miles from the river they were overtaken by a boy with the information that 130 of Stewart's rebel cavalry had reoccupied the town. Tired, worn out, and almost shoeless and very hungry, the brave fellows with a shout at once voted unanimously to return and attack the rebels. Starting at a double quick, they gained sight of the town, and, under cover of a cornfield, gained sight of the cavalry about thirty rods distant. Resting for a few minutes, they heard the rebel captain give the order to mount, and, believing that they had been discovered, and were about to be charged upon, Capt. Kennedy charged on the town at a double quick, firing two volleys as they ran.

The enemy, after firing a few harmless shots, made their way, concealed by the houses, out of the opposite side of the town, but not until they had one lieutenant killed and five men wounded, as was ascertained from a person who came into town soon afterwards.

The inhabitants of Loudon county are generally Unionists, and were grateful to be freed from the oppression of the rebels.

Captain Bowman, of the 28th New York, stationed between Berlin and the Point of Rocks, heard the firing at Lovettsville, and started with his company, running three miles, to aid Capt. Kennedy, but was too late to participate in the rout.

From Gen. Banks' Column.

SANDY HOOK, Aug. 13.

On Saturday night, Sergeant Tomkins, of Company A, Second cavalry, was sent out in charge of a picket, and it was observed that he took with him his entire equipments. After he stationed the first picket he disappeared, and has not since been heard from. It is stated here that Tomkins' father and brothers are officers in the confederate army. There is but little doubt expressed that he has also cast his lot among the rebels.

Four refugees from Martinsburg were brought into camp by Colonel Geary's picket this morning.

It was reported yesterday that the notorious McDonald, with eighteen rebel cavalry, was in Martinsburg pressing men into the rebel service. Several Unionists refusing were imprisoned. The refugees left to avoid being pressed into the rebel army. The refugees from Martinsburg have no knowledge of any large bodies of rebels in that section. The six prisoners taken at the Point of Rocks were sent hence to-day, under a guard, supposed for Fort McHenry.

Various reports are in circulation in the camps that the rebel militia are collecting at numerous points in Upper Virginia, that a regiment was at Shepherdstown on Sunday, and that the encampment was visible from the Maryland Heights.

Great activity prevails at the headquarters.

The Maryland Secessionists continue to be brought in for prowling along the lines, and some of the arrests have been important.

No attack is anticipated at present from the enemy.

The work on the Harper's Ferry bridge is progressing, and it will soon be passable.

The weather is rainy and the temperature cool. The general health is good.

THE BATTLE AT BULL RUN.

General McDowell's Official Report.

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. N. E. VIRGINIA, ARLINGTON, Va., August 4, 1861.

Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Virginia. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.

In my communication to you of the 20th ult., I stated it as my intention to move that afternoon, and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnoissance to justify our future movements. Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passage across the streem to dispense with this reconnoissance, and it was decided to move without delay. It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a few miles on the evening of the 20th so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in the morning, and making but one move.

On the evening of the 20th ult., my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles to the southwest.—Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge running north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction was along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge, through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossing from northwest to southeast. The first division (Tyler's) was stationed on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge, two brigades on the same road, and a mile and a half in advance, to the west of the ridge, and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run, at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo. The second division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville. The third division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the Old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast, about a mile and a half from the village.—The fifth division (Miles') was on the road with the third division, and between it and Centreville. A map which is herewith marked A. will show these positions better than I can describe them.

On Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days' rations in their haversacks. On Saturday orders were issued for the available force to march. As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ult., my personal reconnoissance of the road to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th, at Blackburn's Ford, showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired. Our information was that the stone bridge, over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the west of Centreville, was defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abattis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position.—Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was undefended. It was, therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major General Patterson.

Brigadier General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub run, turn to the right and north, and move around to the upper ford, and there turn south, and get behind the enemy. Colonel Hentzelman's division was to follow Hunter's as far as the turning off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's division, the Fifth division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.

I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, along this ridge, fearing that whilst we should be in force to the front, and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road; for if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.

The fourth division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front further than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in the rear of Centreville.

The divisions were ordered to march at half past two o'clock A. M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There was delay in the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were in consequence between two and three hours behind the time appointed—a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road, and we having the obtuse angle on our side.

General Tyler commenced with his artillery at half past six A. M., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve in case we should have to send any troops back to reinforce Miles' division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford, at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force; and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aid-de-camp was sent to Brigadier General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley's Spring south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile further large rolling fields extend down in Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the valley of a small water course, a tributary of Bull Run.

Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached this open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery, and following it up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades, of Tyler's division, to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road, down which our troops had marched from Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farmhouse on it. Behind this hill the enemy had, early in the day, some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.

The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the centre and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island battery of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston Rickett's battery, which did such effective service, and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded—our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession, from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abattis across the road, to allow our reinforcement (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.

The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had been fighting since half past ten o'clock in the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was nine and a half miles; and, though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were, therefore, without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it, had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.

It was at this time that the enemy's reinforcements came to his aid from the railroad train, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army. They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite the one with the house on it, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.

Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to fall in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Col. Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they intermingled, and all organization was lost.

Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Col. Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.

By referring to the general order it will be seen that, while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.

At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed. After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, on the march, under the orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defence across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in person the command of this part of the army, I caused such disposition of the forces which had been added to by the First and Second New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve, before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub run, and owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.

By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted—division and brigade commanders and staff—to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so, as the position of Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left. On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.

At—o'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax station leaving by the cars took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aid-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court House till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn out soldiers were not left behind.

I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing. From the latter, it will be seen that our killed amounted to nineteen officers and four hundred and sixty-two non commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to sixty-four officers and nine hundred and forty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under one thousand. The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington, many of the Zouaves to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at six hundred and sixteen, was yesterday reduced to one hundred and seventy-four. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.

Of course, nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag of truce, admitted eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much under the true number.

The officer commanding the 11th New York Zouaves, and Col. Heintzelman, say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many of those reported among the casualties, have absented themselves since their return, and have gone to New York. Among the missing reported, many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.

The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march; and who acted on his own ground, on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were, of necessity, out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success, if they did not attain it.

As my position may warrant, even if it does not call, for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle.—When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July, Monday. Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations.—But the regiments, owing I was told to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to Gen. Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster General, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ult., and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ult. When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.

I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than 6½ miles further to Centreville—in all a march of 12½ miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot; caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of light marching order.

We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth division (Miles and Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brigade, of Tyler's division, on the left of the road, near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated, I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could, which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have to do with the enemy forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major General Butler, and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by Gen. Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, but known to all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of this railroad rolling stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond to other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy *en masse* ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to, I cannot say—certainly much more than we attacked them with.

I could not, as I have said, more early push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces, were three months volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers, and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. But in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.

In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.

In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to the events of the 21st ult. that the general order for the battle to which I referred was, with slight modifications, literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged; and that up to late in the afternoon every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting—that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication and interviews between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston.—And could we have fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is everything to show how we could have continued successful, even against the odds with which we contended.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRWIN MCDOWELL,
Brig. General Commanding.

The Wounded of the Battle of Bull Run.

PHILADELPHIA, August 14.—A published list of the wounded prisoners at Richmond and Centreville, foots up a total of five hundred and nineteen, of which twenty-four had died of their wounds; at Centreville two hundred and twenty-five, of which twenty had died.

OUR CORRESPONDENCE.

UNION TOWNSHIP, Aug. 13, 1861.

MR. LEWIS:—After a short silence, I will again endeavor to give you a few items from this township.

Farmers are somewhat behind with their work, owing to the wet weather this week. On Friday of last week, we had quite a heavy rain accompanied with thunder and lightning, which caused considerable damage, to both public and private property. Nearly all the bridges over the small streams were swept away, and the roads in many places were left impassable.—A barn belonging to Samuel Grove, situated on a farm a mile from Mill Creek, was struck by the lightning, and was completely destroyed with all its contents. The barn contained about four hundred dozen of rye, ninety dozen of wheat, and two windmills, belonging to Charles Geissinger; also some hay, oats, two plows, and a few other articles, the property of Henry Greenawalt, were also destroyed. The loss will fall heavily on both of them.

The corn presents a very fine appearance; oats also look promising.

Yours, &c.,

FARM BOY.