

TERMS OF THE GLOBE.

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THE GUBERNATORIAL CANVASS.

SPEECH OF SENATOR BIGLER, At Clarion, on the 8th of September, in reply to the address of the Hon. David Wilmot, delivered at Philadelphia, on the 24th August.

After giving a brief history of the democratic party, showing how eminently wise and successful its policy had been in the past, and how it had uniformly, in all exigencies, in war or peace, stood by the true interests of the country, and had advanced its growth and prosperity, and elevated the dignity and prowess of the nation, claiming for that party a higher degree of purity, wisdom, and patriotism than were possessed by any similar association of men in modern times; and having also paid a handsome compliment to the character and qualifications of General Paeker and his associates on the democratic ticket, he proceeded as follows:

Judge Wilmot, the republican candidate, has evinced his entire willingness to make his views known to the people, and seems quite unhappy that the State committee would not agree that the democratic candidate should waste his time with him in personal controversy, and still more displeased that the committee should have suggested that the discussion of the slavery question is not essential in a gubernatorial contest.

Now let us consider the doctrines of these quotations for a few minutes. In the first he says we have "no right to meddle with slavery in the States where it already exists," but that "the Territories are the common property of the Union, and we have the common right to control them."

Of course, I agree that we have no right to interfere with slavery in the States, but, "owing to the Dred Scott decision," how does Mr. Wilmot propose to reach the institution in the Territories? What becomes of the "common right" of the State to control its existence? How can that right be brought to bear? That decision defines the constitution to mean that Congress has no right to legislate on the subject for the Territories; that a congressional interdiction against its extension is unconstitutional, and Mr. Wilmot agrees that that decision is law.

Now, this is the point to which I wish your special attention. Though acknowledging in his own peculiar phrase the binding effects of the decision of the Supreme Court, Mr. Wilmot is very careful to conceal the influence of that decision upon his position and arguments: he has not told the people frankly that, by virtue of the decision he so reluctantly recognizes as binding, slavery in a Territory is almost as completely out of the reach of the people or the government of a free State as it is in the State of Virginia.

He dare not be explicit on this point; for he would thereby illustrate the utter impracticability of his doctrines on the subject. Indeed, his whole theory goes to pieces at this point, and he must necessarily conceal as much as possible the effects of this decision, or the deceptive character of his speeches would become so transparent that he would be obliged to abandon the discussion entirely.

Bowing to the Dred Scott decision as matter of law, it will not do to say that "Pennsylvania has no more right to legislate for Virginia on the subject of slavery than Virginia has to legislate for Pennsylvania on the subject of public schools." Mr. Wilmot cannot stop at this point; he must and does virtually agree by that "how" that neither Pennsylvania nor Virginia has any right to legislate for Kansas or Nebraska on either subject, and they have no power to interfere for or against the institutions of the Territories directly or indirectly.

The citizens of each may go to Kansas, and when bona fide residents they can give effect to their will. He or I can do this; but as citizens of this State we cannot influence the question in either Kansas or Virginia. Pious to the Dred Scott decision, the republican party contended for the power of Congress over the subject in the Territories; but that decision has settled the question against them, and has closed the last channel through which the free States could reach the question. It has swept away the entire stock in trade of the republican agitators—the Missouri line, the Wilmot proviso, and every other scheme of congressional interference. They have no occasion longer to seek even the election of anti-slavery men to Congress, for that body cannot touch the question. Their long-cherished business of agitation is, therefore, gone—gone forever.

Wherein, then, is the fitness of Mr. Wilmot's inflammatory addresses about slavery to the exclusion of every other topic? Having no power over the subject, it cannot be of vital practical importance in Pennsylvania, unless, indeed, Mr. W., in his feverish sensitiveness, has allowed himself to conclude that some "dough-faced democrat," in obedience to "the slave powers," is about to propose to re-establish the institution in this State. Until this be done the question cannot be so practical as he alleges. But is it not singular that Mr. Wilmot should seek to agitate the public mind in behalf of measures which have been declared unconstitutional and to which decision he agrees? What can he accomplish by such effort? Though he could convince a majority of the people that the measures would work practical good to the country, the constitution, until changed, is an insurmountable barrier to their adoption.

Would it not be wiser to accept the philosophy of the trite saying, "It is useless to cry over spilt milk?" When the election is over he will need the benefit of some such reflection, for I think his chances are better to become the successor of Judge Bullock than of Gov. Pollock.

motives and conduct. He certainly could have shown those who abused myself and others last spring for agreeing to a modification of the tariff, when we had no power left to resist it, that they were unreasonable in that complaint, or are now mistaken in their support of the distinguished advocate of "British free trade." But let that pass; we will leave the distinguished advocate of free trade in the embrace of the protectionists, and the protectionists under the leadership of the distinguished free-trader. The new alliance only furnishes another verification of the homely adage that political necessity makes strange bed-fellows.

But to the speech, and I will give you its best sentiment first, so that his friends may not complain. It reads as follows: "I hold that under the constitution of the United States we have no right to meddle directly with the question of slavery in the States where it already exists; it is a State right, and can only be controlled by the laws, and we in Pennsylvania have no more right to legislate for Virginia upon the subject of slavery than Virginia has to legislate for Pennsylvania on the subject of public schools. But in the Territories the question is different. The Territories are the common property of the Union, and we have the common right to control them."

Then again, speaking of slavery, he says: "The question is no mere abstraction, nor is it simply a question of right and wrong, a question of morals; it is a question of vital practical importance, which lies at the foundation of every right and duty of us as free men."

Touching the Dred Scott decision, he remarks: "And as I am on this point, I wish to say that I bow to the Dred Scott decision as a matter of law. I raise no arm against the law, and would never advise any one to do so; but there is no law on earth which can bind my reason or my conscience. I can and will think and vote for what I believe right."

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I do not mean to say that the candidates for governor may not properly allude to the subject of slavery; but Mr. Wilmot insists that measures which have been declared unconstitutional shall be recognized issues in the gubernatorial contest, and continues to discuss these measures as though they could be made available to the country, and insists that the people should take one side or the other. He says slavery is the only question involved, and has, so far, declined to speak on State questions at all.

He says that Virginia has the same right to interfere with our public schools that Pennsylvania has with slavery in Virginia, and that is true; but did it not occur to his mind, at the same time, that it would be a most singular, if not ludicrous spectacle, to witness a candidate for governor in Virginia resting his claims to popular favor solely on his views about public schools in Pennsylvania, and confining his discussions to that topic alone? Why, the people of the Old Dominion would get a straight-jacket for any man who might attempt to play such a trick before high Heaven. And what would Pennsylvanians think of such impudent interference? They would most certainly invite the Virginia aspirant to take care of his slaves, and leave the public schools to them. Mr. W. would be sure to do this; and yet he talked for hours about Virginia negroes, and said not one word about Pennsylvania schools, so determined does he seem to rest his claims on questions belonging to other States, and over which his has no control.

Perhaps his friends can explain all this; but I think I can safely assure them of one thing—if he does not get more votes in States where his address would be appropriate than in his own, he will be badly beaten. He will be almost convinced that he has not only been speaking for other States, but running for governor somewhere else than at home.

Mr. Wilmot's prompt recognition of the binding effect of the Dred Scott decision has certainly surprised and disappointed some of his fanatical adherents. But they should notice that he dare not raise his voice against the constitution when asking to be permitted to take an oath to support it. That he has yielded reluctantly, and with exceeding bad grace, is evident from the low terms in which he impugns the motives of the Court. He says "it is easy enough for the Executive to find corrupt judges to carry out corrupt designs."

This is coarse, exceedingly coarse, scarcely allowable in a common place politician, and utterly inadmissible in a candidate for governor. Very many who intend to vote for the author of the base allegation will despise his foul aspersions. Even they will not agree that it is becoming in David Wilmot to warn the country against the corruptions of James Buchanan and Roger B. Taney. But in his anger at courts, he has gone out of his way still further to make an onslaught upon the integrity of the supreme court of his own State, and broadly alleges that its decisions are often contradictory, and it is common talk among the bar that a decision must be revived every five years to have binding effect. The courts should take warning, for failing to be governor, as this gentleman certainly will, he may still retain the office of judicial censorian.

Fearing to repudiate the decision of the Supreme Court in express terms, many of Mr. Wilmot's school of politicians are industriously engaged in efforts to destroy the confidence of the public in its integrity. As a means of doing this, they are in the habit of expatiating on the extraordinary circumstance that the ordinance of 1787 should have been declared unconstitutional at the end of sixty years after its adoption, and the Missouri compromise so declared after having stood for nearly forty years. They certainly know that the ordinance of 1787 did not derive its authority from the present constitution—that it was the work of the Congress of the Old Confederation, and was granted by the States, and was merely perpetuated under the present constitution as a measure which the States had agreed to.

This item of history they prefer to suppress, so that the action of the court may seem the more strange. They know, too, that the Missouri compromise was an arbitrary arrangement between the North and the South forced by an exigency that endangered the peace of the country, and that its constitutional authority, though constantly denied by many wise statesmen, had not been directly tested prior to the late decision.

The history of the renowned proviso is rewritten in this speech, and Mr. W. has manifested special delight in exhibiting what he considers the inconsistencies of the democratic party on this subject, and more especially those of General Cass, Hon. Richard Brodhead, and myself. He alleges in substance that, if the General had voted before he reflected, he would have gone for the proviso, and that Mr. Brodhead had said he would vote for it if offered to the proper bill, and that I had been very careful to record my name in the affirmative, when a similar sentiment passed the State legislature. The course of General Cass and Brodhead needs no explanation or defence at my hands.

Their sentiments are too well known to the country to be successfully misrepresented. And, indeed, admitting all that Mr. W. alleges, I do not see that he makes out any man's destruction. The wisest men in the nation have often been wrong in their first impressions as to the expediency of suddenly proposed measures, and to be mistaken on a constitutional question is no uncommon thing among able lawyers. As to the Pennsylvania resolution, it certainly did not receive that consideration to which it was entitled. I do not believe it was under consideration in the Senate exceeding one half hour before it passed finally. For myself, I knew but little about it until it came from the House of Representatives the day it passed the Senate, and had only thought of it as an abstract sentiment against the acquisition of territory, with the view to the extension of slavery, and as affecting the question of peace with Mexico. As a proposition involving the rights of the States and the powers of Congress, I had at that time given it

no thought. Reflection upon these things soon after, and long before I knew that Mr. Wilmot intended to press the principle as admissible when applied to territory which had been long previously acquired by the common blood and treasure of all the States, without any such original condition, convinced my mind that its practical operation would be unjust to the slaveholding States, and I discarded its doctrine entirely. Four years after the advent of the proviso, when the democratic nominee for governor, I certainly was not charged with a want of sympathy for the South. The reverse was the constant allegation of my political enemies. The execution of the fugitive slave law and the doctrine of non-intervention were topics in that contest, and I advocated the affirmative of both on all occasions. Mr. Wilmot himself publicly dissented from my views on these points at a meeting in his own town, where we stood face to face. But it is of little moment whether I have been consistent or not. I trust I may always be more ambitious to be right, and never vain enough to pretend to great wisdom or foresight. If I did not mistake the meaning of the proviso, when first proposed, I certainly misunderstood its author, for I thought him a democrat, and he has turned out to be anything else. But has Mr. W. relieved his position by what he has said on this point? If it even be true that certain democrats inclined to favor the proviso before they had discovered the wrong, he was not thereby warranted in sustaining it when the injustice of its practical workings had become apparent by discussion, and especially since it has been shown to be unconstitutional.

But this candidate and his party are great inconsistencies. They are in the habit of arraigning Mr. Buchanan, Judge Douglas, and other democratic office-holders, on the charge of inconsistency, because at one time they sustained the policy of settling the slave controversy by a geographical division and have since embraced the policy of referring the question to the people of the Territories, to be settled as they may deem best. There is very little sense and less patriotism in such criticisms. The whole history of the subject shows that the controversy, at the different periods when the excitement attained to a dangerous height, was treated as a subject of compromise, implying at once the concession of principle and peculiar views. Statesmen and patriots felt required to yield much in the way of opinion, to secure the peace of the country. Mr. Buchanan favored the Missouri line so long as the policy of settling the question by territorial division was maintained; and Mr. Douglas, in 1848, proposed to extend the parallel of that line to the Pacific ocean as a final adjustment of the dangerous feud. But the very men who now, and since 1854, have not ceased to bewail the abandonment of this policy, were united in their opposition to its extension and perpetuity on that occasion. They repudiated it, scouted and reviled it. Another mode of settlement became absolutely necessary to save the country from civil war, and that of non-intervention, as now found in the Kansas law, was wisely adopted in 1850; and is maintained by the statesmen I have named. What inconsistency is there in such action? And what is to be said for the sincerity of those who continued to denounce the Missouri line up to the time of its repeal—that party who in Connecticut burnt James Lanman in effigy for voting for it, and Isaac Toucy near the same spot for voting to repeal it, and who labored to reject the principle in 1848. They are not in a condition to talk about consistency. Having so conspired against this mode of adjustment, and secured its overthrow, they now have Mr. Wilmot engaged in a clumsy imitation of Mark Anthony with the dead body of Caesar by toting the lifeless remains of this unconstitutional measure from place to place over the State giving utterance to his deep grief in pathetic appeals to the passions and prejudices of the people, to draw down their vengeance on the destroyers of this once favorite scheme.

On Kansas affairs Mr. Wilmot becomes quite belligerent, and hurls vindictive aspersions upon the national administration. He talks as though he did not know that the odious test laws enacted by the first legislature had been repealed by the last; that his party friends in Kansas are daily availing themselves of these bogus laws; that Mr. Robinson, the Topeka governor, had petitioned Mr. Stanton, when acting governor to confer the appointment of commissioner to acknowledge deeds on his friend by virtue of the territorial laws. He seems determined to give the version of affairs that will best suit his purpose. Having presented a startling picture of the wrongs and outrages which according to his story, have been wantonly inflicted upon the free-State party of that unhappy Territory, he makes the following sweeping declaration:

"I affirm that the administration knows all about these outrages, and yet they uphold them. They sustain the Missouri usurpation; and they do not just, because they are the slaves of the slave power who created them and uphold them."

This is terrific, indeed, coming from a candidate for governor, but Mr. Wilmot's language is tame and feeble compared with the sparkling rhetoric of Col. Keitt, of South Carolina, on the other side of the question. The Colonel, in his letter dated at White Sulphur Springs, imputes to the administration altogether different action and purpose. He alleges that its first act was to appoint a governor to "to debauch Kansas from allegiance to the South and deliver her into the hands of free-soil fanatics," and that "to say that the cause of the South was lost in Kansas prior to the appointment of Walker is to palliate fraud by falsehood." Here is a wide difference between big doctors. But the southerner seems to have the best of the contest. Indeed the best attempts of Wilmot and his school of orators to show the subservency of the administration to the slave power fall far below the most ordinary efforts of Col. Keitt, the Charleston Mercury, and the New Orleans Delta, to demonstrate its free-soil tendencies and its treachery to the South. With such fires in front and rear, who will say that Col. Keitt may not reasonably imagine the fantas-

tics to be hereafter played by "shivering cabinets" and "convulsive administrations?" Then, again, Mr. Wilmot and his party seem to be in great tribulation lest the slave power should deprive some of the citizens of Kansas of the opportunity of raising their voices against the institution of the ballot-box—lest some be deprived of that high and sacred prerogative, the right of suffrage. They descend eloquently on the sacredness of this right, and hurl destructive anathemas on the heads of all who shall attempt to restrict or usurp this proud function of American freemen. The people, and the whole people, must be heard. Now, this is all very well, and they cannot go further on this point than will the democracy; but does not this sickly concern for the rights of the people come with exceeding bad grace from Mr. Wilmot and his party, who, in the convention that nominated Col. Fremont, laid it down as a principle that not only a portion, but all the citizens of Kansas, should be deprived of the right of saying whether they should have slavery or not? They claimed that right for Congress, and virtually held that, though nine-tenths of the people might desire slavery, the interdiction of Congress should be conclusive. It was no half-way business with them. It is part of their faith to deprive all the people of the sacred opportunity which they falsely allege the democracy are attempting to take from some. They execrate the interference of Missouri in the settlement of the slavery question in Kansas, and yet, according to their own doctrine, not only Missouri, but Massachusetts and all the North and South, are invited to interfere through their representatives in Congress. The practical effect of their doctrine being that the power to decide the question for Kansas is to be found everywhere else in the United States except in that and the other Territories—that the people of the States who do not go to Kansas shall have a voice on the subject, but those who do, shall not. How absurd, then, their affected distress, lest by design or accident some citizen of Kansas may be deprived of the opportunity of giving effect to his will on the subject. Why even now Mr. Wilmot and his party will not say that they will be content with the decision of the people, and admit Kansas as a State, unless that decision be against slavery. They will agree to take her into the Union when she obeys their dictation, and not till then. It was in this connexion, in the contest of last fall, that we ridiculed their pretensions to exclusive friendship for freedom in Kansas, whilst holding that the people should not be free to select their own institutions. We claimed that the democracy were more the friends of "free Kansas," because they wished to have her people perfectly free to select all their domestic institutions, they holding that Kansas should not come into the Union unless she adopted their views, and the democracy maintaining that she should come in, no matter how she might decide as to slavery. The question in the presidential issue was not whether she should be free or slave, but simply whether her own bona fide citizens should be permitted to decide for themselves. That question was affirmed by the people at the polls, and Mr. Buchanan and his advisers, in my judgment, are honestly endeavoring to carry out that decision, in good faith, regardless of denunciation from the North or South, and so performing their whole duty to the country.

Mr. Wilmot talks very positively about what is going on in the Territory. Of course he knows; but I spent some weeks there this summer, and found it difficult to obtain accurate information. That wrongs have been committed on both sides is clear; but the idea of Mr. W., that his peculiar order have been uniformly right on all the issues that have disturbed the quiet of the Territory, is absurd. No unbiased mind will come to such a conclusion. It is not, however, any purpose to go into a history of Kansas affairs, or give my views at length as to the policy of the administration at this time; but I can assure Mr. Wilmot that the only impracticable politicians I met in the Territory were of his own school—the leaders of the Topeka rebellion. They seem determined to rule or ruin. It was no uncommon thing to hear them say that if the convention, to meet in this month, should adopt the Topeka constitution, word for word, they who made it originally would reject it at the polls. But I hope and believe that, through the agency of the present able and patriotic executive of the Territory, Mr. Walker, the bitter feuds dividing the people of that Territory will be happily settled, and Kansas be brought into the Union on principles perfectly consistent with the organic act. In this effort Gov. Walker will be sustained by the great mass of the people, whom I found to be moderate, practicable, and patriotic in their views. For myself, I have believed that the spirit of the compromises of 1850, as in the organic law of Kansas, contemplated the decision of the question of slavery in the Territory by some direct action of the people, prior to application for admission as a State; otherwise the question would come back to Congress in the same shape in which it was when referred to the people, unaccompanied by any expression of popular will. That expression should, and I have no doubt will, be had without any official interference as to what it should be; and when so had, deciding the question of slavery as the people wish, I shall, for one, assist to throw wide open the portals of the Union, and welcome Kansas as a State, slavery or no slavery. But I shall not vote to admit her on the Topeka constitution, because the movement was not of the people but of a party; was not by authority of law but in violation of law, and therefore revolutionary. Nor am I at all inclined to indulge the rebellious spirit of those in the Territory who seem determined to set the laws at defiance. If they will not act save in their own way, and Kansas becomes a slave State by the voice of those who do not, the responsibility must rest upon them.

But I have been wandering from my text, and neglecting the republican candidate for governor. I wish to make one more extract from his speech, and then I shall have done. It is one of his best gems, and reads as follows:

"With respect to the labor question, it is alleged by the democracy that we have no sympathy for free white labor;

that all our tears are exhausted on the black man. Now I leave the civility of the South to the noble office of *Free laborer*. God has laid a heavy hand on them, and seeks not to press the curse harder upon them. The charity will have all the glory of horse-whipping women and riding their babies. Democracy may trample on rights under foot, if they please, but I tell you that the interests of all humanity are one. God has so ordered it, that no man can do deliberate and systematic wrong to other men; no man can be a tyrant or a despot without staining his own soul, and without becoming a beast and a demon."

How idle, if not unmanly, it is for a man who uses language of this character, on a question entirely beyond the reach of those to whom it is addressed, to become indignant and denounce the democratic press as "debased," "venal," "corrupt," and "in the pay of the slave power," because it has designated him as an "abolitionist," a "wild, impracticable theorist." What else could he expect? What else could a tenth telling press say? Does not the whole tenor of his address justify this conclusion? Is it not "wild theorism" to excite the minds of the people day after day, about great evils, without telling them how a remedy can be applied, and whilst confessing that they have no right to interfere for or against such evils in the States, and acknowledge the binding effects of a definition of the constitution, which shows that they cannot be reached in the Territories? Is it not abolitionism to describe the institution of negro slavery as so odious that it should not be tolerated in any civilized country—as involving that measure of tyranny and oppression, that no man can practice it "without staining his own soul," without "becoming a beast and a demon"? Is it not vile demagogism thus to inflame the passions and prejudices of the people of one section of our country against the institutions of another to subvert the ends of party? Mr. Wilmot must conclude that his sickly recognition of the rights of the State and his ungracious bow to the decision of the Supreme Court, will protect him in the use of such offensive language as the foregoing. The use of such foul aspersions can in no way improve the morals or politics of the country, its institutions or its customs; can do no good to North or South, to white or black race.

It is no my habit to deal harshly with the character or actions of public men, but I should do justice to my feelings were I not to say that much of Mr. Wilmot's address, whether considered as a declaration of principles or as a specimen of logic or literature, falls far below what his friends had reason to expect. It can rank but little above common-place anti-slavery rant, as wanting in method, and useful suggestion, as in the ordinary graces of even partisan discussion.—Is it possible that the republican party cannot maintain their principles without resorting to such dangerous incendiaries? Uncharitable censure of the South seems to be their only source of partisan capital. Assuming respect for the constitutional rights of the slaveholding States, they are sure to discourse in such way as to lead the fanatical abolitionists to believe that in some way or other, at no distant day through their agency the institution is to be uprooted everywhere. It was by such means in the last presidential election that they gained over to Fremont, Garrison, Parker, Beecher, and all that school of fanatics. Unable to devise a practicable scheme to improve the condition of the black man, they persist in the work of agitation as their most fruitful means of political power. They know that they could do but little to improve the condition of the black man, through the whole subject was under their untrammelled control. Suppose all legal difficulties to be removed, and the subject placed within their reach by emancipation on the part of the South, conditioned that the negroes be properly cared for; what then? To what country could they remove the slaves so that they might escape the dreaded "kicks," and be where none would "horsewhip the women and sell their babies?" How could they be clothed and fed, and how elevated in the scale of moral being? Would they be brought North to compete with our present laboring population? I am sure the free States would never agree to that. But suppose they should, would that insure an improvement in the physical and mental condition of the slave? With what new political and social dignities would the black man be clothed, so that they might live easier and happier, and attain to a higher degree of civilization and christianity? Who will stand up for equality for them in the North?

Let us have these questions answered, and have a practical scheme for the elevation of the negro, or less of the agitation. The continuance of these criminations between the North and South may readily disturb the peace of thirty millions of white people; but in no way can it relieve whatever hardship there may be in the condition of the three or four millions of slaves now in our country. Nor is it just or patriotic to allege national sin against our country because of the condition of the African, when the authors of such aspersions cannot point to the spot on earth or name the period in history in which the condition of the curly-haired negro was better than at present in the United States—when and where he enjoyed greater physical comforts, or attained a higher degree of mental cultivation, or embraced better ideas of Christianity. His own country is "one of slaves and masters," and the ancestors of those we have here were slaves of the lowest class when taken from their own country. To restore those now in the United States to that original condition, were such a thing possible, would be an outrage upon humanity and civilization. If, then, the condition of the black man has been really improved by iron his low estate among us, wherein consists the national sin that so constantly besets the consciences of these political doctors?

THE CAMEL EXPERIMENTS.—An interesting report has been received by the War Department from Mr. Beale, Superintendent of the wagon road expedition from Fort Defiance.

The camel experiment is pronounced successful. These animals carried seven hundred pounds burden, principally provender for mules, and were much less jaded than the mules. They eat little except bushes, preferring them to grass. Mr. B. conceives it easier to manage a train of twenty than one of five mules. Their temper, tractability, capacity for bearing burthens, and going without water, while they live on food upon which other animals would starve, render them valuable for transportation on the prairies. Every unshod animal reached El Paso lame but the camels, not one of which even exhibited fatigue.

There is a lawyer in Huntingdon county, Pennsylvania, known no less for eccentricity than his legal lore. Many anecdotes are told of him. A man once went to him to be qualified for some petty office. Said he, "hold up your hand, I'll swear you, but all creation couldn't qualify you."

The proportion of females to males, in Lewistown, is about six to one.

The best bite we ever had when went fishing, was the bite we took along.