

The Columbian.

BLOOMSBURG, PA.

FRIDAY MORNING, AUGUST 9, 1907.

THE COLUMBIAN has the largest circulation in Columbia and adjoining counties...

THE CHAWWORTH COUNTY SYSTEM.

Many years ago, in Crawford County in this State, in consequence of dissatisfaction with the action of nominating Conventions...

What we desire to do at present is to call attention to this subject without expressing formal or final opinion upon it.

The plan consists in the following points: 1. That at the primary elections the voters shall vote directly for the candidates...

2. That a Return Judge shall be appointed in each district who shall carry a return of the votes given in his district...

3. That the Return Judges shall count up the votes returned for candidates for each office, and publish the result, and the candidates who have the greatest number of votes in each case shall be the nominees of the party.

4. In case of nominations of district candidates (that is for offices where more than one county is to be in the selection, the Return Judges are to select conferees to meet conferees from the other counties of the district in order to make or perfect a nomination.

5. The selection of delegates to State Conventions may be made by Return Judges, including the choice of conferees to make a district appointment, or be provided for in some other manner.

There are, no doubt, both advantages and disadvantages in this plan as compared with the plan of regular County Conventions, and we propose to point them out in future articles.

It has been objected to the Crawford County plan that it affords an opportunity for fraud in counting and returning the votes polled. But we do not think this objection has great force against the proposition to apply the plan in this county.

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FACTS FOR THE GERMAN.

When Judge Williams was nominated for the judicial office of the Supreme Bench by the "narrow-minded blockheads," assembled at Williamsport, it was deemed a matter of surprise that no Pennsylvanian could be found by the Radicals worthy of being placed at the head of their ticket.

The nomination of Judge Williams for the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania, by the Radical Republicans, is another acknowledgment on the part of the stultid Dutch elements of the superiority of New England men.

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COLD BLOODED MURDER.

Great consternation and excitement prevailed in our community last week caused by the discovery that a terrible murder had been committed almost within a stone's throw of town.

A young woman by name of Catharine Devaney came here from New York on Thursday last week and applied at the house of John M'Kelvey for a week's board.

She inquired after persons by the name of Ward, Livingston, the Sugar Leaf Mines, and after a young man named Neal Devaney, a cousin of the Wards, and a boarder at her house.

Mrs. M'Kelvey replied that she knew the parties and that Neal Devaney was to be married in a few days. Catharine seemed anxious to unobscure herself of a secret, and finding a friendly sympathizer in Mrs. M'Kelvey, she proceeded to relate her story.

She was, she said, the wife of Neal Devaney. They were married a few months or perhaps a year ago in Ireland. She had earned about \$12 while living out at service with which they paid their passage to America, having little if any money left upon their arrival at New York.

Neal said he would be "all right" if he could reach his friends at Hazleton, and Catharine was left at service in New York until her husband should be prepared to send for her. Believing that persons in want of domestics would more readily employ one who was not married, she found in her blood that she had committed a crime of parallel atrocity.

There was no wrong to be blotted out, no revenge to gratify, no jealousy to fire the brain—she merely sought to free the man who had been sacrificed to another crime and her life must be sacrificed.

Mr. and Mrs. M'Kelvey and Patrick Bomer are entitled to great credit for their persevering efforts to secure the arrest of Devaney.

The denial of Congress through a resolution which will redress to a person whose property or liberty was illegally taken under a military order, is made of discharging obligations which, however convenient is not reconcilable with the principles of the Constitution.

In 1861, on the facts disclosed by this record, one citizen of Illinois committed a trespass upon the rights of another, for which the laws of Illinois then gave, and now give, a right of action. Since that time Congress has said that the action shall not be maintained.

It is a remarkable fact that in two cases—the two which involve the constitutional acts of the late President Lincoln, and the attempt of a Jacobin Congress to legalize the usurpation of the President—the decisions have been rendered by Jurists who sympathized and acted with the political party of that President, and who were among the number of his warmest personal friends.

One of them (Mr. Justice Davis, of the U. S. Supreme Court) was a Judge of his own appointing; the other (Mr. Justice Lawrence of the Illinois Supreme Court) was elevated to the bench by the decision of his political partisans.

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IN HER TRUNK WERE FOUND LETTERS WRITTEN FOR DEVANEY BY PERSONS HERE WHO TESTIFY TO HAVING WRITTEN THEM AT HIS REQUEST, IN WHICH HE ADDRESSES HER AS HIS SISTER, AND AMONG OTHERS, ONE REQUESTING HER TO MEET HIM AT EASTON, WHICH EXACTLY CORROBORATES HER STATEMENT TO MRS. M'KELVEY WHICH WAS TESTIFIED BY THE LATTER BEFORE THE TRUNK WAS OPENED.

Devaney's clothing, was brought to town by an officer and blood was found upon his coat, vest, hat and handkerchief. He accounted for this by saying that his nose had been bleeding. He also stated that he found the check near the depot, and denied being married or having ever before seen the woman who was murdered. He was taken to the country jail on Saturday.

Devaney is a young man, apparently about twenty years of age, and it is difficult to believe that such terrible depravity can exist in one so young; yet the facts are so established that there is no shadow of doubt. When we reflect upon the young and confiding wife giving up her hard-earned wages, and leaving friends and native land for the man who had won her affections, and toiling among strangers until a home could be provided for her, and at last, with a love such as a woman's heart only can know, willing to forgive the wrong he had done her and to confide in him still, the conviction forces itself upon the mind that if he is found guilty, he will be permitted to sway the judgment here.

It is under a like sense of obligation to justice and to the supreme law of the land that Judge Lawrence decides the indemnity acts passed by Congress to shield officers from the legal consequences of acts of usurpation, to be unconstitutional and void. He employs on this point language which it is worth while to repeat, and which it is worth while to repeat, and which it is worth while to repeat.

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REFERENCE TO HIS RANK, AS RIGHTFULLY AS BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. HE MIGHT BE AFRAID TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT UNDER ORDERS FROM HIS SUPERIOR, BUT IF IT EXIST AT ALL IT BELONGS TO HIM AS WELL AS TO THE PRESIDENT.

This theory then, pushed to its logical results, is this. That whenever the government is engaged in suppressing a rebellion in Florida, or waging war on the frontiers of Maine, martial law may be enforced in Illinois, where there is neither war nor public emergency, and where the courts are daily administering justice; and every citizen in the State shall hold his liberty and property at the whim and discretion of the military officer in command.

The proposition thus stated in its make up may well startle us when we remember how liable we are to be involved in war. But it is not true, for it is utterly at variance with the whole theory of the acts of the constitution, and its most solemn prohibitions.

The act of President Lincoln in arbitrarily seizing a citizen of Illinois, no matter on what pretext, is denounced by Mr. Justice Lawrence as "usurpation." A Lincoln usurper! The word is a harsh one. Judge Lawrence, in respect for the better qualities of his friend—the late President—feels called on to apologize for its use, but to observe, in the same connection, that "neither our honor for his memory, nor our confidence in his honesty, can be permitted to sway our judgment here."

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DEMOCRATIC TICKET.

FOR JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT, GEORGE SHARSWOOD, OF PHILADELPHIA.

FOR ASSEMBLY, THOMAS CHALFANT, MONTGOMERY COUNTY.

FOR SHERIFF, MORDECAI MILLARD, CENTRE TOWNSHIP.

FOR TREASURER, JACOB YOHE, MIFFLIN TOWNSHIP.

FOR COMMISSIONER, DAVID YEAGER, LOCUST TOWNSHIP.

FOR JURY COMMISSIONER, THOS. J. WELLS, JR., MT. PLEASANT TOWNSHIP.

FOR AUDITOR, JACOB HARRIS, HELMICK TOWNSHIP.

Market Report.

Philadelphia Markets.

MARRIED.

DIED.

SPECIAL NOTICES.

ACROSTIC.

THE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK.

BERNARD STOHNER.

FRUIT & CONFECTIONERY STORE.

FRUIT & CONFECTIONERY STORE.

PAXTON & HARMAN.

MANUFACTURERS AGENTS.

SUPER-PHOSPHATE OF LIME.

NEW ADVERTISEMENTS.

TEACHERS WANTED.

TEACHERS WANTED.

SHERIFF'S SALES.

By virtue of sundry writs of Vendition Expensa and of Vendition Lipecta, issued out of the Court of Common Pleas...

At the same time and place, a certain lot of piece of ground, situated in the town of Bloomsburg, in Columbia County, Pennsylvania...

Two lots, the one being fifty feet in width and four hundred feet in length, and the other being seventy-five feet in width, and four hundred feet in length...

At the same time and place, a certain lot of piece of ground, situated in the town of Bloomsburg, in Columbia County, Pennsylvania...

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