BEAVER ARGUS.

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BEAVER ARGUS.

Wednesday, June 24th, 1863.

D. L. IMBRIE, Editor & Proprietor.

TERMS—ONE DOLLAR and FIFTY CENTS per annum, IN ADVANCE; otherwise Two Dollars will be charged. No paper discontinued until all arrearages are settled.

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NEW-YORK TRIBUNE. 1863.

THE NEW-YORK TRIBUNE, first issued in 1841, in its twenty-second year, has obtained both a larger and a more widely diffused circulation than any other newspaper ever published in America. Though it has suffered, in common with other journals, from the volunteering and departure of tens of thousands of its patrons to serve in the War for the Union, its circulation on this 5th of December, 1862 is as follows:

Daily	60,125
Semi-Weekly	17,250
Weekly	148,000
Aggregate	215,375

Pre-eminently a journal of News and of Literature, THE TRIBUNE has political convictions which are well characterized by the single word REPUBLICAN. It is Republican in its hearty adhesion to the great truth that "God has made of one blood all nations of men" —Republican in its assertion of the equal and inalienable rights of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—Republican in its steadfast earnest, defiant hostility to every scheme and effort of the Slave Power, from the Annexation of Texas to the great Rebellion, to grasp the empire of the New World and wield the resources of our country for its own aggrandizement—Republican in its antagonism to the despots of the Old World, who fondly hail in the perils and calamities suddenly thrust upon us by their American counterpart the overthrow and ruin of the Model Republic—Republican in its hope and trust, its faith and effort, that this atrocious Rebellion must result in the signal overthrow of its plotters, and the firm establishment of equal rights and equal laws throughout the whole extent of our country, wherein Liberty and Union shall indeed be "one and inseparable" henceforth and forever.

THE TRIBUNE devotes attention in calmer times, and to some extent in these, to Education, Temperance, Agriculture, Inventions, and whatever else may minister to the spiritual and material progress and well-being of mankind; but for the present its energies and its columns are mainly devoted to the invigoration and success of the War for the Union. Its special correspondents accompany every considerable army and report every important incident of that great struggle which we trust to result in the signal and conclusive triumph of the National arms and in the restoration of Peace and Thrift to our distracted, bleeding country. We believe that not otherwise can a fuller or more accurate view of the progress and character of this momentous conflict be obtained than through the regular perusal of our columns. And we earnestly solicit the co-operation of all friends of the National cause, which we regard and uphold as that of Universal Humanity, to aid us in extending its circulation.

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[WRITTEN FOR THE ARGUS.]

DOES THE BIBLE SANCTION SUCH A PRINCIPLE?

III.

We quote again from the Bishop "We come next to the proof that Slavery was sanctioned by the Deity, in the case of Abraham, whose three hundred and eighteen bond-servants, born in his own house (Gen. 14 c 14 v), are mentioned along with those bought with his own money, as proper subjects for circumcision (Gen. 17 c 12 v). His wife Sarah had also an Egyptian slave named Hager who fled from severity. And "the Angel of the Lord" commanded the fugitive to return to her mistress and submit herself (Gen. 14. 9.) If philanthropists of age who profess to believe the Bible had been willing to take the counsel of that angel for their guide, it would have preserved peace and welfare of the Union.

Will the reader please turn to and read these passages (Gen. 14. 14): "And when Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, he armed his trained servants, born in his own house, three hundred and eighteen, and pursued after them unto Dan." The word servant is not used in the Hebrew, but is supplied by the translators. The Bishop says they were "bond servants," but the text says no such thing. It is silent as to what they were—whether servants, slaves, soldiers, or hired men. Until we can determine what is referred to, the text is not proof to sustain the proposition, "negro slavery is right."

"He that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you; every male child in your generations, he that is born in the house, or bought with money of any stranger, which is not of thy seed." (Gen. 17, 12.) Do these texts state that Abraham had servants, "bought with his own money?" Most certainly not; the proposition is, "negro slavery is right;" these texts are offered to support it. Do they do it? Do they ever bear in that direction? But if Abraham had slaves, is there one word of approval? No, not even an intimation of it. The case is simply this: Does the Bible record of a fact make that fact right? Who will dare take that position? No, one. Until that is proven, the texts are irrelevant. The Bishop says Sarah had an Egyptian slave. The text says she was Sarah's "hand-maid." Are the terms synonymous? Webster says a handmaid is "a maid that waits at hand, a female servant or attendant." Slave, he defines thus: "A person who is wholly subject to the will of another." If hand-maid and slave were synonyms the text might be proof. As it is, it is not.

The assumption is, Abraham held slaves; then, therefore, it is right for men to hold negroes as slaves now.—If the position is correct, it follows as a matter of course, because Abraham married Hagar, a man may marry two wives. He married his slave, therefore a man may marry his slave now; and as we have no white slaves, he may marry his negro slave. Are not these fair, logical consequences from the Bishop's reasoning.

When Hagar had left Abram, the angel of the Lord directed her to return. From this it is inferred that the relation existing between Sarah and Hagar was that of mistress and slave. When it can be proven that that relation was that of mistress and slave, it will sustain the proposition, and not until then. To prove that relation is the trouble. Sarah was childless, and, desired offspring; she gave Abram Hagar as his wife. Would she probably give him a slave, or that female next to herself. Which is probable? The probability is that she went away voluntarily, and returned at will. As might have been expected, family discord was the result; and Abram determines to remove Hagar; and she was provided for and sent away. Are these transactions those of slavery? Let the counterpart of this be found in negro slavery. If Hagar was a slave, then her son must have been also. Was Ishmael a slave?

We quote again from the same author: "The third proof that slavery was authorised by the Almighty, occurs in the last of the Ten Commandments delivered from Mount Sinia, and universally acknowledged by Jews and Christians, to be the Moral Law:—"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man servant, nor his maid servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's."—(Ex. 20. 17.) Here it is evident the principal of property, anything that is thy neighbor's, runs through whole. I am quite aware, indeed, of the prejudice which many good people entertain against the idea of property in a human being, and shall consider it, in due time, amongst the objections. I am equally aware that the wives of our day may take umbrage at the law which places in the same sentence with, not the slave, man, and his horse and the cattle. But the truth is none the less certain. The husband has a real property in the wife, because he is bound to her life to cherish and maintain her. The character of property is doubtless modified by its design.—But whatever, whether person or thing, the law appropriates to an individual, becomes his property. This is the law against covetousness, and also against slavery. "Thou shalt not covet anything that is thy neighbor's;" thus guarding every man's right to himself, and his property, by making not only the act of taking away a sin, but even that state of mind which would tempt to such an act. Whoever made human beings slaves, or held them as slaves, without coveting them? Why do they take from them their time, their labor, their liberty, their right of self-protection and improvement, their right to acquire property, to worship according to conscience, to search the scriptures, to live with their families, and their right to their own bodies? Answer; they covet them all. Why do they take them if they do not desire them? They seize and hold them, simply because they had rather the fee, simple proprietorship of their bodies and minds themselves than that the rightful owners should hold it. They covet them for purposes of gain, convenience, personal ease, lust of dominion, of sensual gratification, of pride and ostentation. They break the Tenth Commandment by day and by night, and pluck down upon their heads the plagues written in the Book.

If this text proves that servants were the property of their masters, it proves too much, for it proves that a man's wife is his property. Indeed, this is assumed. A proposition that requires such an assumption to support it, should, by honest men, be abandoned. Are wife and property synonymous? This text is a part of a legal code, a compound of universal rules, where we should expect to find, if anywhere, the conjunction of things that belong together. Further, an examination of all the places in which servants are included among beasts, chattels, &c., will show that where there is an inventory of mere property, servants are not included, or if included it is in such a way as to show that they are not regarded in the light of property. (Eccl. 2, 7, 8.) But where the design is to show, not merely the result, but the greatness of any personage, that he is a man of distinction, and sway, a ruler, a prince—his servants are spoken of as well as his property. See Josh. 22, 8. Gen. 34. 23. Job 42, 12. Job 1, 35. Gen. 24, 35.

Important Correspondence with President Lincoln.

ALBANY, May 19, 1863.

To his Excellency the President of the United States:

The undersigned, officers of a public meeting held at the city of Albany on the 16th day of May instant, herewith transmit to your Excellency a copy of the resolutions adopted at the said meeting, and respectfully request your earnest consideration of them. They deem it proper on their personal responsibility to state that the meeting was one of the most respectable as to numbers and character, and one of the most earnest in the support of the Union, ever held in this city.

Yours, with great regard,

ERASTUS CORNING, President.
ELI PERRY, Vice President.
PETER GANSEVOORT, Vice Pres'nt.
PETER MONTEATH, Vice President.
SAM'L. A. GIBBS, Vice President.
JOHN NIBLACK, Vice President.
H. W. M'CLELLAN, Vice President.
L. W. ROGERS, Vice President.
WM. SEYMOUR, Vice President.
JERE. OSBORN, Vice President.
WM. S. PADDOCK, Vice President.
J. B. SANDERS, Vice President.
EDWARD MULCAHY, Vice Pres'nt.
D. V. RADCLIFFE, Vice President.
WM A. RICE, Secretary.
EDWARD NEWCOMB, Secretary.
R. W. PECKHAM, JR., Secretary.
M. A. NOLAN, Secretary.
J. R. NESSEL, Secretary.
C. W. WEEKS, Secretary.

Resolutions adopted at the meeting held in Albany, N. Y. on the 16th day of May, 1863.

Resolved, That the Democrats of New York point to their uniform course of action during the two years of civil war through which we have passed, to the alacrity which they have evinced in filling the ranks of the army, to their contributions and sacrifices, as the evidence of their patriotism and devotion to the cause of our imperiled country. Never in the history of civil wars has a Government been sustained with such ample resources of means and men as the people have voluntarily placed in the hands of this Administration.

Resolved, That, as Democrats we are determined to maintain this patriotic attitude, and, despite of adverse and disheartening circumstances, to devote all our energies to sustain the cause of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to bring back the restoration of all the States under the safeguards of the Constitution.

Resolved, That while we will not consent to be misapprehended upon these points, we are determined not to be misunderstood in regard to others not less essential. We demand that the Administration shall be true to the Constitution; shall recognize and maintain the rights of the States and the liberties of the citizen; shall everywhere, outside of the lines of necessary military occupation and the scenes of insurrection exert all its powers to maintain the supremacy of the civil over military law.

Resolved, That, in view of these principles, we denounce the recent assumption of a military commander to seize and try a citizen of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of that general.

Resolved, That this assumption of power by a military tribunal, if successfully asserted, not only abrogates the rights of the people to assemble and discuss the affairs of government, the liberty of speech and of the press, the right of trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the privilege of *habeas corpus*, but it strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law, and the authority of the State and Federal Constitutions.

Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States—the supreme law of the land—has defined the crime of treason against the United States to consist "only in levying war against them, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," and has provided that "no person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." And it further provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;" and further, that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime was committed.

Resolved, That these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his protection in time of civil commotion. They were secured substantially to the English people after years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our Constitution at the close of revolution. There stood the test of seventy-six years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances which show that, while they constitute the foundation of all free government, they are the elements of the enduring stability of the republic.

Resolved, That in adopting the language of Daniel Webster, we declare, "It is the ancient and undoubted prerogative of this people to canvass public measures and the merits of public men." "It is a home bred right," a fireside privilege. It has been enjoyed in every house, cottage, and cabin in the nation. It is as undoubted as the right of breathing the air or walking on the earth. Belonging to private life as a right, it belongs to public life as a duty, and it is the last duty which those whose representatives we are, shall find us to abandon. Aiming at all times to be courteous and temperate in its use, except when the right itself is questioned, we shall place ourselves in the extreme boundary of our own right, and bid defiance to any arm that would move us from our ground "This high constitutional privilege we shall defend and exercise in all places—in time of peace, in time of war, and at all times. Living, we shall assert it; and should we leave no other inheritance to our children, by the blessing of God we will leave them the inheritance of free principles and the example of a manly, independent, and constitutional defence of them."

Resolved, That in the election of Governor Seymour, the people of this State, by an emphatic majority, declared their condemnation of the system of arbitrary arrests and their determination to stand by the Constitution. That the revival of this lawless system can have but one result: to divide and distract the North, and destroy its confidence in the purposes of the Administration. That we deprecate it as an element of confusion at home, of weakness to our armies in the field, and as calculated to lower the estimate of American character, and magnify the apparent peril of our cause abroad. And that, regarding the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio as aimed at the rights of every citizen of the North we denounce it as against the spirit of our laws and Constitution, and most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a "cruel and unusual punishment" upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the Constitution, and to restore him to the liberty of which he has been deprived.

Resolved, That the president, vice-presidents, and secretary of this meeting be requested to transmit a copy of these resolutions to his Excellency the President of United States, with the assurance of this meeting of their hearty and earnest desire to support the Government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the existing rebellion.

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1863.

Hon Erastus Corning and others:

GENTLEMEN:—Your letter of May 19, inclosing the resolutions of a public meeting held in Albany, New York, on the 16th of the same month, was received several days ago.

The resolutions, as I understand them, are resolvable into two propositions—first, the expression of a purpose to sustain the cause of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to support the Administration in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and secondly, a declaration of censure upon the Administration for supposed unconstitutional action, such as the making of military arrests. And, from the two propositions, a third is deduced, which is that the gentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on doing their part to maintain our common Government and country, despite the folly or wickedness, as they may conceive, of any Administration. This position is eminently patriotic, and as such, I thank the meeting, and congratulate the nation for it. My own purpose is the same; so that the meeting and myself have a common object, and can have no difference, except in the choice of means or measures for effecting that object.

And here I ought to close this paper, and would close it, if there were no apprehension that more injurious consequences than any merely personal to myself might follow the censures systematically cast upon me for doing what, in my view of duty, I could not forbear. The resolutions promise to support me in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and I have not knowingly employed, nor shall knowingly employ, any other. But the meeting, by their resolutions, assert and argue that certain military arrests, and proceedings following them, for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are not. The resolutions quote from the Constitution the definition of treason, and and also the limiting safeguards and guarantees therein provided for the citizen on trial for treason, and on his being held to answer for capital or otherwise infamous crimes, and in criminal prosecutions, his right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.

They proceed to resolve "that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more *especially* for his protection in times of civil commotion." And, apparently to demonstrate the proposition, the resolutions proceed: "They were secured substantially to the English people *after* years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our Constitution at the *close* of the revolution." Would not the demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said that these safeguards had been adopted and applied *during* the civil wars and *during* our revolution, instead of *after* the one one and at the *close* of the other? I, too, am devotedly for them *after* civil war and *before* civil war, and at all times, "except when, in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may require," their suspension. The resolutions proceed to tell us that these safeguards "have stood the test of seventy-six years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances which show, that while they constitute the foundation of all free government, they are the the elements of the enduring stability of the Republic." No one denies that they have so stood the test up to the beginning of the present rebellion, if we except a certain occurrence at New Orleans; nor does any one question that they will stand the same test much longer after the rebellion closes. But these provisions of the Constitution have no application to the case we have in hand, because the arrests complained of were not made for treason—that is, not for *the* treason defined in the Constitution, and upon the conviction of which the punishment is death; nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings following, in any constitutional or legal sense "criminal prosecutions."

The arrests were made on totally different grounds, and the proceedings following accorded with the grounds of the arrests. Let us consider the real case with which we are dealing, and apply to it the parts of the Constitution plainly made for such cases.

Prior to my installation here it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the national Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and, accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The rebellion thus began soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties.—The insurgents had been preparing for it more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well pondered reliance with them that in their own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution and law, all together, the Government would, in great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of "liberty of speech," "liberty of the press," and "*habeas corpus*," they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself, the *habeas corpus* might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases; and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be, at least, of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's programme, so soon as by open hostilities their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this in quiet times, and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace bands of horse thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison in numbers have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member now ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet, again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

Ours is a case of rebellion—so called by the resolutions before me—in fact, a clear, flagrant and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is *the* provision which specially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the Constitution, that ordinary courts of justice are inadequate to "cases of rebellion,"—attests their purpose that, in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. *Habeas corpus* does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is allowed by the Constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and held who cannot be proved to be guilty of defined crime, "when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." This is precisely our present case—a case of rebellion, wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts, and arrests in cases of rebellion, do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fall in no great length of time. In the latter case, arrests are made, not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man, who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his government is discussed, cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more, if he talks ambiguously—talks for his country with "buts" and "ifs" and "ands." Of how little value the constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on *habeas corpus* were the writ allowed to operate. In view and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

By the third resolution the meeting indicate their opinion that military arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion actually exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities where rebellion or insurrection does not actually exist. They insist that such arrests shall not be made "outside of the lines of necessary military occupation, and the scenes of insurrection." Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there is any such constitutional distinction. I concede that the class of arrests complained of, can be constitutional only when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them; and I insist that in such cases they are constitutional *wherever* the public safety does require them; as well in places to which they may prevent the rebellion extending, as in those where it may be already prevailing; as well where they may restrain mischievous interference with the raising and supplying of armies to suppress the rebellion, as where the rebellion may actually be; as well where they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they would prevent mutiny in the army; equally constitutional at all places where they will conduce to the public safety, as against the dangers of rebellion or invasion. Take the particular case mentioned by the meeting. It is asserted in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried "for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the general."—Now, if there be no mistake about this; if this assertion is the truth, and the whole truth; if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong.—But the arrest, as I understood, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect to prevent the raising of troops; to encourage desertions from the army; and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it.—He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the commanding general but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and gave the military constitution jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence.

I understood the meeting, whose resolutions I am considering, to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptible Government too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.

If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not, in application in all respects the same, in case of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction; and I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury and *habeas corpus* throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as "Democrats."—Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than