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NEW-YORK TRIBUNE, 1863.

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The Tribune devotes attention in culture, tips, and to some extent in literature, Education, Temperance, Agriculture, Inventions, and whatever else may minister to the spiritual and material progress and well-being of mankind.

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BEAVER ARGUS



NOTICE TO ADVERTISERS.

Advertisements inserted at the rate of 75 cents per square—each subsequent insertion 25 cents.

SLAVERY DEFINED.

To determine what Slavery is, we must separate it from its appendages. A constituent element is one thing; a relation another, an appendage another.

I. Political disability, tithers minors, and some who are not free-holders, are slaves.

II. Ineligibility to office, then all females are slaves.

III. Privation of one's oath in law.—Then the free people of Ohio, and in every scheme and effort of the Slave Power, from the Annexation of Texas, to the great Rebellion, to grasp the empire of our country for its own aggrandizement—Republican in its antagonism to the rights of the colored man, who finally hail in the words and edicts suddenly thrust upon us by their American counterparts the overthrow and ruin of the Model Republic—Republican in its hope and trust, its faith and effort, that this atrocious Rebellion must result in the signal overthrow of its plotters, and the firm establishment of equal rights and equal laws throughout the whole extent of our country, wherein Liberty and Union, shall indeed be "one and inseparable" league, forth and forever.

IV. Apprenticeship. The rights and duties of master and apprentice are correlative and reciprocal. The master's obligations to the apprentice is the cause of his claim upon him; and the claim of the apprentice upon the master is indispensable from his obligation to the master. The doctrine that an apprentice for value received is at the bottom of apprenticeship. The rights of the apprentice are secured, and his interests promoted equal with those of his master. Indeed, the law of apprenticeship, while it is just to the master, is benevolent to the apprentice.

V. Liability for crimes of the claims of government on criminals. Must not be punished because they are criminals. True, the criminal works for the government without pay, and will be may. He does the government. A century's work would not pay its debts on him, no matter how long he works for it, he is a public debtor, and will die, because laws make non pay debts, shall those be made to pay who owe nothing? Besides, the law makes no criminal property. It restrains his liberty; it makes him pay something, a more penalty in the pounds of his labor, than he can get. Are children, born in prison, government property? Besides, can property be guilty?—are chattels punished?

VI. Restrictions upon Freedom. Children are restrained by parents, wards by guardians, pupils by teachers, patients by physicians, corporations by charters, and legislators by constitutions. Embargoes, tariffs, quarantines, imposts, vetoes, and acts of corporation, keep men from doing as they please. Are these restrictions slavery? If they are slavery, civilized society is a sum of slaves, a government of LAW the climax, and its Executive a King among slaveholders.

VII. Voluntary or compulsive service. A jurymen is impelled against his will, and so is a man. A sheriff, orders his posse—bystanders must turn in. Neither love nor must can buy off the compulsion. Men are compelled to remove nuisances, pay fines and taxes, support their families, and return to the right as the law rights, however much against their wills. Are they, therefore, slaves? To confound slavery with involuntary service, or servitude, as is often done, is absurd. Slavery is a condition. Many of the foregoing conditions, and relations are appendages of slavery, and many of them inseparable from it. But no one, nor all them together, constitute its intrinsic, unchanging element.

What, then, is Slavery? It is robbing Men to articles of Property, making free agents goods and chattels, converting persons into things, sinking intelligence, accountability, immortality, and personal inalienable ownership into mere merchandise. A slave is one held in this condition. Slavery is the conditions itself. Slaveholding is keeping men in this condition, subject to these liabilities, whether the holder personally regards the slave in this light or not. Slaveholding is trafficking in human wares. A slave is a mere tool for another use and benefit. His limbs are another's property. If he say my feet, my hands, my body, myself, they are figures of speech. To use himself for his own good, is illegal, or a crime. To keep what he earns, is stealing. This is slavery.

The law of South Carolina describes slavery in the following language:—"Slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken, reputed and adjudged in law as chattels, personal, in the hands of their owners, possessors, and their executors, administrators and assigns, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever."

The law of Louisiana declares—"A slave is one who is in the power of his master to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry and labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything, but what must belong to his master."

An act of the State of Maryland declares slaves to be property in these words:—"In case the personal property of a ward shall consist of spe-

cial articles, such as slaves, working beasts, animals of all kinds, stock, furniture, plate, books, the Court, if it shall deem it advantageous for the ward, may, at any time, pass an order for the sale thereof."

This is American Slavery. The sacred and infinite distinction between a person and a thing, it tramples under foot a distinction alike the centre and circumference of God's moral government,—the crowning distinction of the universe, transcending all others as the source, the test, and the measurement of their value.

A Thrilling Episode of the War.

We were shown this morning a daguerrotype, which was the means of saving the life of one of our soldiers at the recent battle of the Rappahannock, under the following singular circumstances: Mr. James Garrabrant, a member of Company D, Thirtieth Regiment, while fighting, saw a daggered type fall from the pocket of a dead rebel. Impelled by curiosity, he picked it up, and placed it in the breast pocket of his blouse.

Soon he was struck by a bullet and fell. His brother, who was near him, picked him up, supposing him to be killed. Upon examination, the ball was found to have pierced his clothing, gone through the front of the daguerrotype, shivered the glass, and indented deeply the metal plate upon which the likeness was which, however, it failed to penetrate, thus saving the young man's life, as it lay right over his heart. The wooden back of the picture was shivered to splinters by the concussion. [The ball was shown us with the picture, fitting neatly into the indentation of the plate.]

There can be no doubt that the force of the ball was destroyed by the gradual yielding of the soft copper plate. Had the material been more rigid the ball would probably have gone through. The likeness, that of a young and not unattractive looking female; and it may well be imagined that our gallant soldier prizes the counterfeited presentment of the goddess, as the savior of his life. Garrabrant, who is a young man of most exemplary character, has sent the picture home to his mother, who resides in his city, and who doubtless will also cherish it as a precious memento.—Newark Mercury.

The Havana Daily of the 27th ult., received by the Creole, states that it is in possession of information through an authorized source confirming the accounts of the occupation of Puebla by the French, and gives the following details which it calls official.

On the 16th the French troops who had opened a parallel 150 metres from the fort of Tolucahuacan, opened an artillery fire which dismounted all the guns of the fort. The besieged defended themselves with valour. The next day the parallels were advanced to a short distance from the works.

The Mexican Gen. Mendoza appeared in Gen. Forey's camp and asked him to permit the Mexican troops to retire from Puebla with their arms and part of their artillery; and on this condition the place would surrender. Gen. Forey promptly refused to accept the offer. At five o'clock the banner of a flag of truce presented a letter from Gen. Ortega, stating that he would surrender unconditionally, with all his troops. Thereupon the place was occupied by a portion of the French forces, and on the 19th Gen. Forey himself entered Puebla.

On the 20th, Gen. Bazaine, at the head of a corps consisting of two divisions, commenced the march upon the City of Mexico.

THE HUMAN EYE.—The language of the eye is very hard to counterfeit. You can read in the eyes of your companion, while you talk, whether your argument hits him, though his tongue will not confess it. There is a look by which a man shows he is going to say a good thing, and a look when he has said it. Vain and forgotten are all the fine offices of hospitality, if there be no holiday in the eye. How many furtive invitations are avowed by the eye though dissembled by the lips. A man comes away from a company; he has heard an important remark, but if in sympathy with the society, he is cognizant of such a stream of life as has been flowing to him through the eyes. There are eyes which give no animation into them than blue berries; others are liquid and deep wells; that men might fall into; and others are oppressive and devouring, and take too much notice. There are asking eyes, and asserting eyes, and prowling eyes, and eyes full of faith—some of good and some of sinister omen.—Emerson.

INSURANCE.—Nothing renders legitimate government so insecure as ignorance among the people. It is this which yields them an easy prey to the seductive wiles of designing demagogues. Well educated people, with enlarged reasoning powers to comprehend the true ground of authority, and the obligation of obedience to the laws, are not liable to be victims of prejudice and false alarms; and by the exercise of enlightened reason, will detect and expose the insidious plans of wicked and designing men.

Last Speech of Senator Douglas.

(Delivered at Chicago, May 1, 1861.)

MR. CHAIRMAN.—I thank you for the kind terms in which you have been pleased to welcome me. I thank the committee and citizens of Chicago for this grand and imposing reception. I beg you to believe that I will not do you nor myself the injustice to believe this magnificent ovation is personal homage to myself. I rejoice to know that it expresses your devotion to the Constitution, the Union and flag of our country. [Cheers.]

I will not conceal gratification at the unexpected test which this vast audience presents to me. I have no political differences or party questions which I have to settle. I have no personal animosities to settle. I have no personal animosities to settle. I have no personal animosities to settle.

What cause, what cause do disunionists give for breaking up the best government which the sun of heaven ever shed its rays? They are dissatisfied with the result of a Presidential election. Did they never get beaten before? Are we to resort to the sword whenever we get defeated at the ballot-box? I understand that the voice of the people expressed in the mode appointed by the Constitution, must command the obedience of every citizen. They assume, on the election of a particular candidate, that their rights are not safe in the Union. Why evidence do they present of this? Why do they any man to show any act which it is based upon? What act has he committed to do so far as the constitution is concerned?

I thank you again for this magnificent demonstration. By it you show you have laid aside party strife. Illinois has a proud position. United, firm, determined never to permit the Government to be destroyed. [Prolonged cheering.]

A COMMAND FOR GEN. FREMONT ASKED.—A committee from New York organized in Dr. Cheever's Church and induced by such men as Horace Greeley, George O'Connell, William Calverly, and Daniel S. Dickinson, are at Washington to request the Government to give a command to Gen. Fremont at some point where he can rally around him the colored men of the country. On Saturday at 10 o'clock, they were presented by Senator Sumner to the President, with whom they declared that he would gladly receive into the service ten thousand colored troops; expressed his determination to protect all who enlisted, and said that he looked to their for essential service in finishing the war. He believed that the command of a hundred scope for the highest ambition, and he would with all his heart offer it to Gen. Fremont.

WITNESS THREE.—Shortly before he died, Patrick Henry, laying his hand on the Bible, said: "Here is a book worth more than all others, yet it is sad, uninteresting, never to have read it, until lately, with proper attention."

When the shades of death were gathering around Sir Walter Scott, he said to the watcher, "Bring the Book."

"What book?" asked Lockhart, son-in-law.

"There is but one book," said the dying man. "With such testimony as to the value of the Sacred Scriptures, reiterated by the great and good, in all ages, it is a sealed book to many."

HUSBAND AND WIFE.—Addison has left on record the following important sentence: "Two persons who have chosen each other out of all the species, with design to be each other's mutual comfort and entertainment, have in the very action bound themselves to the good humored, affable, joyful, forgiving and patient, with respect to each other's frailties and imperfections, to the end of their lives."

SIMPLICITY.—The greatest men are men of simple manners. Parade, show, and a profusion of compliments are the artificers of little minds, made use of to swell them into an appearance of consequence which nature has denied them.

McClellan's Record.

The Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War have unanimously reported as follows on the military testimony brought before them:—

1. That with 195,000 men, Gen. McClellan, in December, 1861, refused to advance on the enemy at Manassas, 70,000 strong, though the roads and the weather both favored this movement, and he was urged to do it by the President.

2. That Gen. McClellan allowed the Potomac to be blockaded, though entreated by the President to raise the blockade, and assured by the navy that four thousand troops would free the river.

3. That General McClellan refused to properly organize his army at the same time, through the Generals under him represented it to be of the utmost importance, and the President solicited it.

4. That no provision was made to properly man the fortifications at Washington.

5. That Gen. McClellan neglected to obey two orders of the President in January and February, 1862, to move on Manassas, in consequence of which the enemy were enabled to evacuate that place without the loss of a man or pound of material.

6. That before Gen. McClellan left Washington by way of the James River to advance on Richmond, he promised the President that 55,000 men should be left to protect the capital, yet left but 19,000 and those poorly disciplined and without knowledge of artillery.

7. That Gen. McClellan rested with his entire force a month before Yorktown, though the President told him it was indispensable that should at once strike a blow, and there were but 12,000 troops to defend the place when he reached it.

8. That after Yorktown was evacuated Gen. McClellan made no definite arrangements for the pursuit of the enemy, remaining biased behind, and that the Williamsburg battle was in consequence fought in confusion and at a disadvantage.

9. That after the victory was won, Gen. McClellan refused to allow pursuit, though the concurrent testimony of our Generals and the rebels themselves is that Richmond might have been taken without difficulty in removing his army from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, fifty miles distant.

10. That Gen. Casey's undisciplined troops were put in advance, insubordinate at Seven Pines, against the remonstrances of Gen. Casey and Keyes, and were consequently overwhelmed by the enemy, with prodigious slaughter.

11. The next day this error was rectified by the victory of Sumner at Fair Oaks, after which our army could have gone at once into Richmond the second opportunity of the campaign, but Gen. McClellan refused to allow this.

12. That Gen. McClellan continued to try to get new troops from Washington, when he knew that Jackson was threatening it, and when the number there was much less than he had himself stated was necessary for its defense.

13. That at Gaines' Mills, 27,000 of our troops were compelled to fight 65,000 of the enemy, because General McClellan refused to concentrate his army.

14. That on the retreat to the James River, Gen. McClellan printed an order to destroy all his baggage, tents and equipment, and only failed to issue it at the remonstrance of his officers.

15. That the seven days' battles were all fought in the absence of Gen. McClellan, by fixing the positions and then immediately leaving the field.

16. That after the battle of Malvern Hill, all the officers testify that Richmond might have been entered (the third time); Gen. McClellan a gain fell back.

17. That at Harrison's Landing no effort was made for the first twenty-four hours, to organize the army or defend its position, and that only a storm which prevented the enemy's approach saved it from surrender.

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