The Democratic Watchman.

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The Muse.

For the Watchman.

LINES ON A LOCK OF HAIR.

BY JOHN P. MITCHELL.

In Arabian tale I have found
The magic that dwells in a curl;
How the limbs of a giant were bound,
In the soft, silken tress of a girl,

Those romantic old days are all o'er,
Like shadows we saw them depart;
But, with magical touch, as of yore,
A curl has its power on the heart.

Its dominion increases with age,
Its magic grows stronger with time;
It unfolds to the vision a page
To delight us while 'mem'ry bells' chime.

Fairest lady, I treasure thy tress
As Moslems the tomb of their god;
Fond mem'ries 'twill ever refresh
Till my heart lieth low in the sod.

As the scenes o'er the magical glass
Which wizards are said to possess,
Soft over my spirit will pass
Brightest thoughts as I gaze on thy tress.

When the heart's warm pulsations are cold,
When Death all its tendrils has torn,
Still, with all the warm beauty of old,
Will shine ever the tress thou hast worn

While I live I will guard it with care,
To tell of bright days that have flown,
To tinge bright the clouds of despair,
While I wander, in darkness, alone

May we meet in the future, above,
Where curls are not longer than life,
Where the angels, in purity, love,
And fond hearts are not sundered by strife

HOWARD, PA., Nov. 25th, 1863.

Miscellaneous.

THE CONSCRIPTION ACT

THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA DECIDES THE CONSCRIPTION ACT TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HENRY S. KNEEDLER, vs. DAVID M. LANE, et al, FRANCES B. SMITH, vs. same, WM. F. NICKELS, vs. same. } Three bills in equity. And on a motion in each case for a special injunction.

OPINION OF JUDGE WOODWARD.

On the 3d day of March, 1863, the Congress of the United States passed an Act for "enrolling and calling out the National forces, and for other purposes," which is commonly called the Conscription law. The plaintiffs, who are citizens in Pennsylvania, have set forth the act fully in their bills and they complain that they had been drafted into the military service of the Government in pursuance of said enactment, but that the defendants, who are engaged in executing the act, have violated the rights and are about to invade the personal liberty of the plaintiffs, and thereupon they invoke the equitable interposition of this Court to enjoin the defendants against a further execution of the said Act.

For the jurisdiction of this Court to set aside an act of Congress as unconstitutional and to grant the relief prayed for, I refer myself to the views of the Chief Justice in the opinion he has just delivered in these cases, and I come at once to the constitutional question.

The Act begins with a preamble which recites the existing insurrection and rebellion against the authorities of the United States, the duty of the Government to suppress insurrection and rebellion, to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, and to preserve the public tranquility, and declare that for these high purposes a military force is indispensible "to raise and support which all persons ought willingly to contribute," and that no service is more praiseworthy and honorably than the maintenance of the Constitution and Union, and then goes on to provide for the enrolling of all the able-bodied male citizens of the United States and persons of foreign birth, who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of forty-one and fifty-five years, and these able-bodied citizens and foreigners, with certain exceptions afterward enumerated are declared "the national forces," and made liable to perform military duty when called out by the President

The Act divides the country into military districts, corresponding with the Congressional districts, provides for provost marshals and enrolling boards and regulates the details of such drafts as the President shall order to be made from the national forces so enrolled. The payment of $300 excuses any drafted person, so that it is, in fact, a law providing for a compulsory draft or conscription of such citizens as are unwilling or unable to purchase exemption at the stipulated price. It is the first instance, in our history, of legislation forcing a great public burthen on the poor. Our State legislation, which exempts men who are not worth more than $300 from paying their debts is in striking contrast with this Conscription law, which devolves upon such such men the the burthen which belong to the whole "national forces," and to which "all persons ought willingly to contribute."—This, however, is an objection to the spirit of the enactment rather than to its constitutionality.

The description of persons to be enrolled able-bodied citizens, between twenty and forty-five years of age, is substantially the description of the militia as defined in our Pennsylvania statutes and probably in the statutes of all the States. The national forces, then, mean the militia of the States—certainly include the militia of Pennsylvania. This expression, "national forces," is modern language, when so applied. It is not found in our Constitutions, either State or Federal, and if used in commentaries on the Constitution, and in history, it will generally be found applied to our land and naval forces in actual service—to what may be called our standing army. It is a total misnomer when applied to the militia, for the militia is a State institution. The General Government has no militia. The State militia, always highly esteemed as one of the bulwarks of our liberties, are recognized in the Federal Constitution, and it is not in the power of Congres to obliterate them or to merge them into "national forces."

Unless there is more magic in a name than has ever been supposed, this conscript law was intended to act upon the State militia, and our question is, therefore, whether Congress has power to impress or draft the militia of the State. I cannot preceive what objection can be taken to this statement of the question, for surely it will not be argued that calling the militia national forces makes them something else than the militia. If Congress did not mean to draft the militia under this law, where did they expect to find the national forces?

"All able-bodied white male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five years, residing in this State, and not exempted by the laws of the United States," with certain specified exceptions, constitute our militia. Will it be said that the conscript law was not intended to operate on these? I think it will not. Then if it does touch, and was framed and designed to draft this very class of citizens, no possible objection can be taken to the above statement of the question we have to decide.

I, therefore, repeat the question with great confidence in its accuracy, has Congress the constitutional power to impress or draft into the military service of the United States the militiamen of Pennsylvania.

This question has to be answered by the Constitution of the United States, because that instrument, framed by deputies of the people of the States and ratified and put into effect by the States themselves in their respective corporate capacities, delegates to Congress all the powers that body can exercise. These delegations are either express or such implications as are essential to the execution of expressly delegated powers.

There are but three provisions in the Constitution of the United States that can be appealed to in support of this legislation. In ordinary editions they stand numbered as clauses 13, 16, and 17 of the VIII section of Art. 1. of the Constitution:

"13. Congress shall have power to raise and support armies, but no appropriations of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

"16. Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and repel invasion.

"17. Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

"To raise armies"—these are large words! what do they mean? There could be no limitation upon the number or size of the armies to be raised for all possible contingencies could not be foreseen; but our question has not reference to numbers or size, but to the *mode* of raising armies.—The framers of the Constitution, and the States who adopted it, derived their ideas of government principally from the example of Great Britain—certainly not from any of the more imperial and despotic governments of the earth. What they meant to make was a more free Constitution than that of Great *Britain*—taking that as a model in some things—but enlarging the basis of popular rights in all respects that would be consistent with order and stability. They knew that the British army had generally been recruited by voluntary enlistments stimulated by wages and bounties, and that the few instances of impressments and forced conscriptions of land forces had met with the disfavor of the English nation and had led to preventive statutes. In 1704, and again in 1707, conscription bills were attempted in Parliament but laid aside as unconstitutional. During the American Revolution a statute, 19 Geo. III C. 10, permitted the impressment of "idle and disorderly persons not following any lawful trade or having some substance sufficient for their subsistence," and this was as far as English legislation had gone when our Federal Constitution was planned. Assuredly the framers of our Constitution did not intend to subject the people of the States to a system of conscription which was applied in the mother country only to paupers and vagabonds. On the contrary, I infer that the power conferred on Congress was the power to raise armies by the ordinary English mode of voluntary enlistments.

The people were justly jealous of standing armies. Hence, they took away most of the war power from the Executive, where under monarchical forms, it generally resides, and vested it in the legislative department, in one branch of which the States have equal representation, and in the other branch of which the people of the States are directly represented according to their numbers To these representatives of the States and the people this power of originating war was committed, but even in their hands it was restrained by the limitation of biennial appropriations for the support of the armies they might raise. Of course, no army could be raised or supported which did not command popular approbation, and it was rightly considered that voluntary enlistments would never be wanting to recruit the ranks of such an army. The war power, existing only for the protection of the people, and left, as far as it was possible to leave it, in their own hands, was incapable of being used without their consent, and, therefore, could never languish for enlistments. They would be ready enough to recruit the ranks of any army they deemed necessary to their safety.—Thus the theory of the Constitution placed this great power, like other governmental powers, directly upon the consent of the governed.

The theory itself was founded on free and fair elections—which are the fundamental postulate of the Constitution. If the patronage and power of the Government shall ever be employed to control popular elections, the nominal representatives of the people may cease to be their real representatives, and the armies which may be raised may not so command public confidence as to attract the necessary recruits, and then conscript laws and other extra constitutional expedients may become necessary to fill the ranks. But governmental interference with popular elections will be subversion of the Constitution, and no constitutional argument can assume such a possibility.

Supposing that the people are always to be fairly represented in the halls of Congress, I maintain that it is grievous injustice to them to legislate on the assumption that any war honestly waged for constitutional objects will not always have such sympathy and support from the people as will secure all necessary enlistments. Equally unjust to their intelligence is it to suppose that they meant to confer on their servants the power to impress them into a war which they could not approve.

When to these considerations we add the ability of a great country, like ours, to stimulate and reward enlistments, both at home and abroad, by bounties, pensions and homesteads, as well as by political patronage in countless forms, we see how little necessity or warrant there is for implying a grant of the imperial power of conscription.

There is nothing in the history of the Constitution nor in those excellent contemporaneous papers called the Federalist, to justify the opinion that this vast power lies wrapped up in the few plain words of the 13th clause, whilst the subsequent clauses, concerning the militia, absolutely forbid it.

If the very improbable case be supposable, that enlistments into the Federal armies might become so numerous in a particular State as sensibly to impair its own proper military power, is it not much more improbable that the States meant to confer upon the General Government the power to deprive them, at its own pleasure, altogether of the militia, by forced levies? Yet this might easily happen if the power of conscription be conceded to Congress. There are no limitations expressed—nothing to compel Congress to observe quotas and proportions as among the several States—nothing to prevent their raising armies wholly from one State, taking every able-bodied citizen out of it to the endangering, if not utter undoing of all its domestic interests.

And besides, if we concede this dangerous power to the language of the thirteenth clause, we destroy the force and effect of the words of the sixteenth and seventeenth clauses. We make the instrument self-destructive, which is violative of all canons of construction. Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in clauses sixteen and seventeen, and therefore I argue Congress has not the power to draft them. Is an express rule of the Constitution to give way to an implied one? If the thirteenth clause confers power to draft the militia, the words of the sixteenth and seventeenth clauses are the idlest that were ever written. But if the eighteenth conferred only the power to enlist volunteers, then the subsequent clauses become very intelligible—stand well with the thirteenth, and add essentially to the martial faculties of the Federal Government.—Look at those clauses. The militia are to be called forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasions, to be organized, armed and disciplined by the State, but according to the laws of Congress, such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States are to be governed by the President but officered by the respective States. Now this Conscription law recites an "existing insurrection and rebellion" as the ground and reason, not for calling forth the militia under the above provisions, but for *drafting* them into the military service of the United States. The very case has occurred in which the Constitution says the militia shall be called out under State officers, but Congress says they shall be drafted, in contempt of State authority. General Washington and the men of his day, did not so read the Constitution, when in suppressing the whisky insurrection in this State they paid the most scrupulous regard to the rights and powers of the State. Under pressure of a foreign war, a Conscript Bill was reported in Congress in 1814, but it did not pass, and if it had, it would have been no precedent for this law, because we are dealing with an insurrection, and insurrections are specially provided for in the Constitution. If to support a foreign war Congress may draft the militia, which I do not admit, the power of draft to suppress insurrections is not to be implied, since another mode of suppressing insurrections is expressly provided. When a State is called on for its quota of militia, it may determine, by lot, who of the whole number of its enrolled militia shall answer the call, and thus State drafts are quite regular, but a Congressional draft to *suppress insurrection* is an innovation that has no warrant in the history or text of the Constitution. Either such a law, or the Constitution, must be set aside. They cannot stand together.

And, happily, no ill consequences can flow from adhering to the Constitution, for the standing army of the federal government, recruited by enlistments in the ordinary way, with the State militia, called forth according to the Constitution, are a force quite sufficient to subdue any rebellion that is capable of being subdued by force of arms. Such a formidable force, wisely wielded, in connection with a paternal and patriotic administration of all other constitutional powers, will never fail to put down refractory malcontents, and preserve peace and good order among the American people. This conscript law, therefore, not sanctioned by the Constitution, is not adapted to the exigencies of the times, nor likely to have success as a war measure.

In its political bearings, even more than in its military aspects, it is subversive of the Constitution and of the rights of citizens that depend upon State authority. A few thoughts will make this plain. It is impossible to study our State and Federal Constitutions, without seeing how manifestly the one was designed to guard and maintain the personal and social rights of the citizen—the other to take care of his external relations.

Nurture, education, property, home, wife and children, servants, administration of goods and chattels after death, and a graveyard in which to sleep the sleep of death, these are among the objects of State solicitude, for the protection of which the State provides civil authorities and back of them the *posse comitatus* and the military to make civil administration effectual.—Now if the principles be admitted that Congress may take away tho State militia, who does not see the ultimate and final security of every man's domestic and personal rights is endangered. To the extent delegated in the Constitution nobody questions the right of Congress to control the State militia, but if the extent to which this enactment goes, the States will be reduced to the condition of mere counties of a great Commonwealth, and the citizen of the State must look to the federal Government for the enforcement of all his domestic rights as well as for the regulation of his external relations.

The citizens of the States need protection from foreign foes and Indian Tribes—peaceful intercourse and commerce with all the world—a standard of values and of weights and measures that shall be common to all the States, and a postal system that shall be co-extensive with interstate trade and commerce.

To adjust and maintain these external relations of the citizen, are high duties which the Constitution has committed to the Federal government and furnished it with all the necessary functionaries, and with power to levy and collect taxes from the people of the States, to raise and support armies, to provide a navy, and to call forth the militia to execute the law.

Thus is the American citizen amply provided, by means of Constitutions that are written, with protection for all his rights natural and artificial, domestic and foreign; but as the war power of the General government is in his ultimate security for his external, so is the militia his ultimate security for his internal or domestic rights.

Could the State Government strike at the war power of the Federal Government without endangering every man's rights? In view of the existing rebellion, no one would hesitate how to answer this question, and yet it is not equally apparent that when the Federal government usurps a power over the State militia which was never delegated every man's domestic rights [and they are those which touch him most closely] are equally endangered.

The great vice of the conscript law is that it is founded on an assumption that Congress may take away not the State rights of the citizen, but the security and foundation of his State rights, and how long is civil liberty expected to last after the securites of civil liberty are destroyed? The Constitution of the United States committed the liberty of the citizen in part to the Federal Government, and expressly reserved to the States, and the people of the States, all it did not delegate. It gave the general Government a standing army, but left to the State their militia. Its purposes in all this balancing of powers were wise and good but this legislation disregards these distinctions, and upturns the whole system of government when it converts the State militia into "national forces" and claims to use and govern them as such.

Times of rebellion, above all others, are the times when we should stick to our fundamental law, lest we drift into anarchy on one hand or into despotism on the other. The great sin of the present rebellion consists in violating the Constitution whereby every man's civil rights are exposed to sacrifice. Unless the Government be kept on the foundation of the Constitution, we imitate the sin of the rebels, and thereby encourage them, whilst we weaken and discourage the friends of constitutional order and government. The plaintiffs in these bills have good right, I think, as citizens of Pennsylvania, to complain of the act in question, not only on the ground I have indicated, but on other to which I will briefly allude.

The 12th section provides that the drafted persons shall receive ten days's notice of the rendezvous at which he is to report for duty, and the 13th section enacts "that if he fails to report himself in pursuance of such notice, without furnishing a substitute or paying the required sum therefore, he shall be deemed a deserter, and shall be arrested by the Provost Marshal, and sent to the nearest military post for trial by court martial." The only qualification to which this provision is subject is, that upon proper showing that he is not able to do military duty the board of enrollment may relieve him from the draft.

One of the complainants, Kneedler, has set forth the notice that was served on him in pursuance of this section, and by which he was informed that unless he appeared on a certain day he would be "deemed a deserter, and be subject to the penalty prescribed therefor, by the rules and articles of war." I believe the penalty of desertion by the military code is any corporeal punishment a court-martial may choose to inflict, even to that of being put to death.

Can a citizen be made a deserter before he has become a soldier? Has Congress the constitutional power to authorize provost marshals, after drawing the name of a freeman from the wheel and serving him a ten day's notice, to seize and drag him before a court-martial for trial under military law? This question touches the foundation of personal liberty.

In June 1215, the Barrons of England and their retainers, "a numerous host, encamped upon the grassy plain of Runnymede," wrung from King John that Great Charter which declared, among other securities of the rights and liberties of Englishmen, that "no freemen shall be arrested, or imprisoned, or deprived of his freehold, or his liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or in any manner harmed; nor will (the King) proceed against him, nor send any one against him by force of armes, unless according to the sentence of his peers, (which includes trial by jury) or the common law of England. Here was laid the stong foundation of the liberties of the race to which we belong. And yet not here for Magna Charta *created* no rights, but only reasserted those which existed long before at common law. It was for the most part, says Lord Coke, merely declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Far back of the Magna Charta, in the customs and maxims of our Saxon ancestry, those principles of liberty lay scattered which were gathered together in that immortal document, which four hundred years afterwards were again re-asserted in two other great declaratory statutes, "The Petition of Rights" and "The Bill of Rights," and which were transplanted into our Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights to our State Constitution and the Amendments to our Federal Constitution, and which have thus become the heritage of these plaintiffs. Says the 5th Article of these Amendments:

"No person shall be held to auswer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."

What is the scope of this exception? The land or naval forces mean the regular military organization of the Government—the standing army and navy—into which citizens are introduced by military education from boyhood or by enlistments, and become, by their own consent, subject to the military code, and liable to be tried and punished without any of the forms or safeguards of military law. In like manner the militia when duly called out and placed in "actual service" are subject to the rules and articles of war, all their common law rights of personal freedom being for the time suspended. But when are militiamen in actual service? When they have been notified of a draft? Judge Story, in speaking of the authority of Congress over the militia, says —"The question when the authority of Congress over the militia becomes exclusive, must essentially depend upon the fact when they are to be deemed in the actual service of the United States. There is a clear distinction between calling forth the militia and their being in actual service.—These are not contemporaneous acts nor necessarily identical in their constitutional leanings. The President is not Commander-in-Chief of the militia except when in actual service, and not merely when they are ordered into service. *They are subject to martial law only when in actual service, and not merely when they are called forth before they have obeyed the call.* The acts of 1795, and other acts on the subject manifestly contemplate and recognize this distinction. To bring the militia within the meaning of being in the actual service there must be an obedience to the call, and some acts of organization, mustering, rendezvous, or marching done in obedience to the call in the public service.—*Story's Con. Law*, vol. 3, sec. 1208.)

If it be suggested that this plain rule of common sense and constitutional law is not violated by the Conscription act because it applies to the "national forces," I reply as before, that this is only a new name for the militia, and that the constitutional rights of a citizen are not to be sacrificed to an unconstitutional name. When Judge Strong was endeavoring to mark with so much distinctness the time at which the common law rights of the citizen ceased, and his liability to military rule began—the time, in a word, when he became a soldier, why did it not occur to his fertile mind that Congress could render this distinction valueless and unmeaning by a nomenclature—by calling the militia "national forces?" It is not difficult to conceive how such a suggestion would have fared had it occurred or been made to him. But is difficult in the presence of the grave issues of the present day, to treat so frivolous a suggestion with the dignity and forbearance the occasion demands. I have shown what rights of personal liberty these plaintiffs inherited from a remote ancestry, and how they are guaranteed to them by our constitutions, and at what time they are to give place to martial law; and surely if a wheel set in motion by Congress, can crush and grind those rights out of existence, without regard to the limitations of the Constitution, some weightier reason should be found for it than the misnomer which the act so studiously applies to the militia—some reason that deserves to stand instead of Magna Charta, our Constitution and all our traditional freedom.

The only general reason that I have ever heard suggested, and which is applicable against all the views advanced in this opinion, is called military necessity. The country is involved in a great civil war which can be brought to an honorable close only by an energetic use of all our resources, and no restraint should be tolerated, in such circumstances, save only those which Christian civilization has imposed on all warfare. Whatever is according to the Constitution, the argument claims may be done, of course whatever is over and beyond the Constitution is justified as military necessity, and of that the President and Congress are exclusive and final judges.

The amount of the argument is that the exigencies of the times justify the substitution of martial law for the Constitution.—But what is martial law? Blackstone and Sir Mathew Hale tell us "it is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as law." The unrestrained will of one or a number of men, then, is the rule which the argument substitutes for the Constitution. It is of no consequence that the will thus set up for supreme law is that of men whom a majority of the people have chosen because, according to our system, the majority can only choose men to administer the Constitution as it is written. Majorties as a power recognized by law, have no more right to establish a despotism than a minority would have, But may majorities or minorities set aside the Constitution under the pressure of rebellion and insurrection. As the Constitution anticipates and provides for such calamities, it is a reproach to its wisdom to say that it is a reproach to such emergencies. No man has any historical right to cast this reproach upon it. No current experience proves it. It never can be proved except by an unsuccessful use of the legitimate powers of the Constution against rebellion, and then the thing proved will be that the instrument needs amendment which its machinery is flexible enough to allow. Even such a melancholy demonstration would do no more than point out necessary amendments—it would not surrender the people to the arbitrary will of anybody.—Presidents and Congressmen are only servants of the people, to do their will, not as that will may be expressed under passion or excitement, but as it stands recorded in the Constitution. It is the Constitution, indeed, which makes them Presidents and Congressmen. They have no more power to set up their will against the Constitution, than so many private citizens would have. Outside of that they are only private citizens.

I do not, therefore, feel the force of the argument drawn from the distressing circumstances of the time. Bad as they are we make them worse by substituting arbitrary power for the constitutional rule, but if we made them better and not worse, the judicial mind ought not to be expected to approve the substitution, for it can recognize no violation of the Constitution, as a legitimate vindication of the Constitution.—To place ourselves under a despotic sway in order to bring back rebels to the Constitution we have given up, is a porcedure that perplexes the student of political science, and will quite confound the historian of our times.

MODERN ECONOMY OF TIME.—The Scientific American thus shows how time has been economized by the application of machinery:

One man can can spin more cotton yarn now than four hundred men could have done in the same time in 1769, when Arkwright, the best cotton spinner, took out his first patent.

One man can make as much flower in a day now, as a hundred and fifty could a century ago.

One woman can now make as much lace in a day as a hundred women could a hundred years ago.

It now requires only as many days to refine sugar as it did months thirty years ago.

It once required six months to put quicksilver on glass—now it needs only forty minutes.

The engine of a first rate iron-clad frigate will perform as much work as forty-two thousand horses.

☞ "Billy how did you lose your finger?"

"Easy enough."

"I suppose you did, but how?"

"I guess you'd lost yourn, if it had been where mine was."

"That is not answering my question sir."

Well, if you must know. I had to cut it off or steal the trap."

300,000 MORE.

Uncle Abe wants "300,000 more" by the 5th of January—see the proclamation.

"Why should we mourn conscripted friends,
Or shake at draft's alarms?
Tis but the voice that Ab'ram sends
To make us shoulder arms!"

☞ A friend of a soldier, who was suffering from a painful wound, said to him the other day:

"Well, Tom, do you feel like going back to the army when your wound is well?"

"No—not unless I could go as a nigger or a Brigadier General."

☞ The Frankfort Commonwealth, Gov. Bramlette's organ, says:

"We may as well tell Mr. Stanton that he cannot recruit negroes in Kentucky; the people and the autorities will not permit it. The unconditional Union men and the authorities will never submit to the outrage."

CHRIST was crucified as a Preacher of Peace, and for one thousand eight hundred and sixty three years, the world cried out, shame! But it is almost as great a crime to preach peace to-day as it was one thousand eight hundred and sixty three years ago.—*Ex.*

☞ Gen. Rosecrans may be condemned by the administration that makes and unmakes Generals, but he will ever be held in grateful remembrance by the people who make and unmake administrations.—*Prentice.*

☞ It has been thought that people are degenerating because they don't live as long as the days of Methusalah. But nobody can afford to live long at the current prices.

☞ "Why don't you ask your sweetheart to marry you?"

"I have asked her?"

"What did she say?"

"Oh! I have the refusal of her."

A Republican paper says "the Democrats have received such a licking that they cannot survive." It does not follow. Lazarus survived after the dogs *licked* him.

☞ Mrs. Partington hearing that a young man had set up for himself, "Poor fellow," said she, "has he no friends that will set up for him part of the time?" and she sighed to be young again.

☞ A Dancing Master was taken up lately in New York for robbing a fellow-boarder. He said he commenced by cheating a printer, and after that everything rascally came easy to him.

☞ One of the Ohio regiments went into the fight at Chickamauga without a field officer. They were all in Ohio electioneering for Brough.

And this is called *war!*

WHITE paper is again "going up" on account of an increased demand for shoddy, necessiated by the last call for "300,000 more.—*Ex.*

A clergyman in New York has sued his aunt for $7000 for hitting him in the back with a stone because he couldn't pay his board.

The State of Maryland produces this year but 5,00 hogsheads of tobacco, which is 45,000 less than the usual product.

☞ How we printers lie, as our devil said when he got up too late for breakfast.

☞ Laugh while you may—a merry heart never grows old.

The men bear arms in war, the ladies bear theirs in peace.

That man has no strength who doesn't respect woman's weakness.

Cotton is 4 cents a pound in gold at Wilmington, and 62 in Bermuda.

There are people no clothes can fit; their very skins hang loose about them.

Expensive at this time—coffee.

Still unsettled—Gold.

☞ Cold—The weather.