&tiz&U 0 fUttiuhcPM? A NATIONAL PAPER, PUBLISHED WEDNESDAYS AND SATURDAYS JOHN FENNO, No. 34 , NORTH FJFTH.STREET, PHILADELPHIA [No. 12 r of Vol. IV..] FOR THE GAZETTE. No. VTI. ' I "'HE remaining obje&ion to the Proclama- JL tion of neutrality, fuiil to be discussed, is *hit it wai out of trtnc and unnecefiary. To givee«lmir to this objeflion it is ?fkt'd— why did n<»t the Proclamation appear when the war comrostrictf the Minjfter of the Frenth Republic ? why did it volunteer a declaration rot required of it by any «f the b=llig-rent parties ? 'iy> moil of these questions falid an Avers have already appeared in the public prints. Little more can be done than to repeat & enforce them. Austria a;;d Prufliaare not maritime powers. Contraventions of neutrality as again II them were not likely to take place to any extent, or in a shape that would attra& their notice. It woild therefore have been "useless, if not ridicu lous, to have made a formal declaration on tfye fubjeel, while they were the only parties oppo sed to France. But the reverse of this is the cafe with regard to Spain, Holland and' England. These are ail commercial maritime nations. It was to be cx pe&ed, that their 'attention would b« immedi ately drawn towards the United States, with sen sibility and even with jealousy. It was to be feared, that some of our citizcns might be tempted by the profpeit of gain to go into measures, which would injure them and coni ,mit the peace of the country. Attacks by some of these powers upon the poflefiions of France ju America were to be looked for as a matter of .course. While the views of the United State* as to that particular, were problematical, they would naturally consider us as a power that might become their enemy. This they would have been the more apt to do, on account ©f 'thofe - public demenilrations of attachment to the cause of France, of which there has been so great a display. Jealousy, every body knows, Specially if ftiarpened by resentment, is apt to lead to ill treatment ; ill treatment to hoftil r . In proportion to the probability of our being regarded with-a fui'picious and cOnsequently an unfriendly eye, by the powers at war with -.Fiance ; in proportion to the danger of inapru &o*K.teA being committed by any of our citizens, which might occaiion a rupture with them— the policy on the pare o the government, of removing all doubt, as to its own difpofiiion, of deciding the condition of the United States, in tjie view of the parties concerned, be came obvious and urgent. Were the United States now what, if we do lot raftily throw aw-ty the advantages we pof fefH» they may expe& to hi in fifteen or twen ty years; there would have been more room for fn insinuation which hag been thrown out— namely, that they to have feairod to themselves some advantage, as the cotifiderkci- i on of their neutrality y an idea however of which the juilice and magnanimity cannot be com mended. But in their present situation, with their present (Irength and relources, an attempt of that kind tould htive ohly served to display pretentions at once excdFive and unprincipled. } The chance of obtaining any collateral advan tage, if itkh a chance there was, by leaving'a doubt upon our intentions, as to. peace or war, could not wifely have been put for.a single in stant in competition wirh the tendency of a con trary coiuludt to secure our peace. T'ie conducivenefs of the declaration of neu trality to that end was not the only recommend ation to the adoption of the mcaiure. It was of Yg'reM importance that our own citizens fliould uiid>:rftand, as' soon as poflible, the opinion ■fohkb the government entertained of the na ture of our relations to the warring parties and of the propriety or exptdiency of our taking a tide or remaining neliter. The arrangements •of our merchants could not but be very different ly afte&ad, by the one hypothetic, or the other ; and it would neceflarily have been very de trimental and perplexing to them to have been left in unceitainty. It is not requisite to fay how much our agriculture an-J other intereflt would have been likely to have buffered, by erti barrafcmenta to our merchants. The idea of its having been incumbent on the tgovernment to delay the measure for the com ing of the Minister of the French Republic, is as absurd as it is humiliating. Did the ex ecutive stand in need of tht logic of a foreign a gent to enlighten it as to the duties or interests of the nation ? or was it baand toaflc his con tent to a'ftep which appealed to itfelf confident with the former and conducive to the latter ? The i'enfc bf our treaties was to be learnt from tfoe-trcitiesthemfelves. It was not difficult to proßour.te before hand,' that we had a greater interest in fhc preiervation of peace, than in a -11 y advantages with which France might tempt oar participation in the war. Commercial pr:- vikges were all that (he could offer of reai value in our estimation, and a mrte blanche on thread would have been an inadequate recom pence lor renouncing peace and committing to the chances of so preca rious and perilous a war. Besides, if the privi leges which might have been caupetitd were pot Saturday* July 27, 1793- founded in a real permanent mutual inter <:(l— of whit value would be the tj ez\y tfeat ftlould concede them ? not th. ralciihrinn, such cafe, to be npr>b a speedy refußiptirati A>! ■ them, with perhaps a quarrel as the preKxt ? on the other hand may we not trull,' th-attoai mercial privileges, which are truly founded in mutual inUretf will grow out of that irtterrft ; without the nectffity ul giving a premium lor them at the expence ol our peace ? To what putpofe then was the executive to have waited for the arrival of the miniftcr ! was it to give opportunity to contention* discus fions—to intriguing machinations—to die cla mor* of a faction vDaa to a foreign intcreft ? Whether the declaration of neutrality iflued upon or without the requisition of any of the belligerent po.wcrs, can only be known to their rcfpe&ive ministers and to the proper offi cers of our government. But if it be *ue that it iflued without any such requiiition, it is an additional indication of the wildom of the mea sure. It is of much importance to the end of preserv ing peace, that the belligerent powers (houid be thoroughly convinced of the finceri-ty of our intentions to observe the neutrality we profefs ; and it cannot fail to have weight in producing this conviction that the declaration of it was'a spontaneous adl— not stimulated by any requisi tion cn the part of either of them—-proceeding purely from our own view of our duty and iu tereft. It was not surely neceflary for the govern ment to wait forfuch a requisition; while there were advantages and no disadvantage* in antid-j pating it. The benefit of an early notification to our merchants, conspired with the considera tion just mentioned, to recommend the course which was pursued. If in addition to the reft, the early manifefta tion of the views of the government has had a ny effedt in fixing the public opinion on the fub jc&, and in counteracting the success of the ef fort- which it was to be forefeen would be made to disunite it, this alone wojild be a great re commendation of the policy of having fuffered no delay to intervene. What has been already fa id in this and in pre ceding papers affords a full answer to the sug gestion, that the Proclamation-was unnecefiary. It would .be a wade of time to add asy tiling more. But there has been a critrcifm several times repeated, whicamay deserve a moment's atten tion. It has been urged, that the Proclamation ought to have contained some reference to our treaties, and that the generally of the promise to observe a conduct "friendly and impartial to wa ds the belligerent powers oughc to have been qualified with exprefltons equivalent to these—" as far as may conjjjl ivitb the treaties of the United States** The infrrtion 6f such a clause would hare in tirely defeated the objedt of the Proclamation, by rendnring the intention of the government e q./ivo«al. That objedl wasto assure the powers at war and our own citizens, that in the opinion of the executive it was confident with the duty and interest of the nation to observe a neutrali ty in the war, and that it was intended to pur ine a condudl co responding with that opinion. Words equivalent to those contended for would .have rendered the other part of the declaration nugatory ; by leaving it uncertain •whether tin executive did or did not believe a JlateoJ neutrality to be conjtjlent ■with our treaties. Neither foreign powers nor our own citizens would have been a ble to have drawn any conclusion from the Proclamation, and both would have had a right to consider ic as a mere equivocation. By not inserting any such ambiguous sxpref liqns, the Proclamation was fufceptjble of an intelligible and proper conftrudion. While it denoted on the on*; hand, that in the judgment of the executive, there was nothing in our trea ties obliging us to become in the xvdr, it > left it to be utpe&cd on the other—that all sti pulations compatible with neutrality* according to the laws and usages of nations, would be en forced. It follows, that the Proclamation was in this particular exaiSly what it ought to have been. The words " make known the disposition of the United' States" have also given a handle to cavil. • It has been a Iked how could the Presi dent undertake to declare che disposition of the United States. The people for aught he knew may have been in a very differenc sentiment . Thus* a conformity with republican propriety and modesty is turned into a topic of accusation. Had the President announced his own dispo sition, he would have been chargeable with egot ism if not presumption The constitutional or gan of ihte*ct>urfe between the United Stktes and foreign nations whenever he (peaks to them, it is in that capacity ; it is in the name and on behalf of the United States, it mull therefore be with greater propriety, that he (peaks of their disposition than o( his own. It is easy to imagine, that occasions frequent ly occur in the communications to foreign go vernments and foreign agents, which render it necessary to speak of the friendihip or friendly disposition of the United States,of their difpofit'wn to cultivate harmony and good undemanding, - 481- to reciprocate neighbourly offices, ice. &c. It i= usual for example when public mini iters are for . i.wry erpreffio»» t« be interchanged. It is presumable, that the late toception of the French miniftcr did not pas», tvithovt some afiurance on the part of the Prefi ' dent of the friendly disposition of the United StaUs towards France. Admitting it to have happened, would it be deemed a* improper ar rogation ? if not, why was it more so, to declare the difpefition of the United States to observe a neutrality in theexilling war ? In all such cases nothing more is to he under ilood than an official expreflion of the political djfpotiftnof the nation inferred front rt* politi cal relations, obligations and intetefts. It is never to be supposed that the expreflion is meant' to convey the precifit ilate of the individual fen* timents or opinions of the great mafc of the peo ple. Kings and Princes speak of their own dispo sitions. The ma giftratct. ef republics of the dis positions of their nations. The Prefldent there fore has evidently used the style adapted to his thecriticifm upon it if plainly a ca vil. PACIFICUS, V ■$*?¥ Tfit wigimdti timiim' • Mr. Russell, THE qucftion whether a date is fuablc vereignty nf States as. far at filing affects it i But although the words ap pear reciprocally to affect the S«ate here and a foreign State, and put them on the fame $o [Whole No. 445.] fioting as f.ir'as may bp, yet inftrnu tv may fay—that the State l en-may U- but ca illicit be sued—but that rfce foreign KfMc n u !-c foed but cknftwt (ue. We snaf touch foreiun foveieijjnties but not our own: Uiit i c'in teive the re»fu\i of the thingj as \v.-il *s the word? of the constitution, tend to (hew, rhat the federal judicial powef i-xfench to a To't brought by a f"teij;n state any one K' the Uoited State?. Ooe of the perietal government W3s for managing the af fairs of peace and war, ai d the general'de fence, which were impofiible to be conduftt d, with fafety, by the States [tpnrctzh. Inci dent to thef'e power?, and for preventing con troversies between foreign powers or citizens from rising to extremities and to an appell t» the sword. a national tribunal was r.eceflavy, amicably to decide tliem, and thus ward off such fata!, public calamity. Thus, slates at home and their citizens, and foreign itates and their citizens aie put together wifhout diftinClion upou the fame footii g, as far as may Ik-, as to contrm e.riies between them. So also with r Tpeft to cuntrnverfie * be tween a ft.ite and citizens of another (lata (at hoiijC l comparing all tie clauses togetler, the remedy is reciprocal—tJic t!d>m to jofiiie equal.' As controversies between flare and (late, and between a (late and citizens < t' ano ther ftjte, might tend gradually to i rive dates in war and bloodflied, a d!flnter(;fteii ci vil tribunal was intended to lie trftifo. i cf.to decide Inch controvei fie;, and preserve peace and fricndfhipv Further ; if a (late is.entitled to judice in the federal court against a citizen ofanother State, why not I'ucß citizen the I'ate, when the fajne iangu:.ge equally comprehends both ! The rights of individuals, and the jus tice due to them are as dear and precious as tbo.fe of States—lndeed the latter ai.'e found ed upon til - former ; and the great ri d and ohjeft of them mutt be to fecu'eaud support the rights ot ,ii)di\iduals, or elie van is go vernment- But still :t may be insisted, that this will redoce Hates to mere corporations, and take away al! rovereign'tj. As to corpoiatTons, all states whatever are corporations or bodies pit. litic. The onjy qucftioti is—What a:e their powers ! As to individual States and the United Starts, theronfhtntion marks the bovntlary ot powers. Whatever power is depofitea with the Union by the people for their own nepeffary security, is so far a curtailirg of tbfl power and prerogatives,of (lutes. This :s, as it were, a felf evident proposi tion ; at Jer.ft it clnnot be contested. Thus the powers of declaring war—.making peace —railing and ("upporting aim es for public de fence—laying duties, excises and taxes, if npceUaiy, with many other powersare lodged in Conjtref**-and are a nioft essential abridge ment of State sovereignty. A»ain, the reftr'tftons upon states, ftr)te (h ill enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, coin money, emit bills of cre dit, make any thing but gold and Jilver a ten der in payments of debts, pals any law impair ing the obligation of contracts; thef'e, with a number of others, are imporrant reft ftiors of the power of Hates, and were thought ne celfary to preserve the Union—and to eflab lifh foine fundamental", uniform principles of public juftce throughout the whole Union. So that I fliini, tie argument of force can be taken from the foveveignty of ft a ten— Where it has been abridged, it was thought neceflary for the g-eater, indispensable good of t ie whole. If the coiiftitution is fonnd inconvenient in practice in this or any other particular, it U well that a regular mode is pointed cut for amendment. But while it remains, all officers legislative, executive and judicial, both of the ft;,tes, and of" the Union, are bound by oath to support it. One other objection has been fDggefted,that if a state may be sued by a citizen of another (late, then the United States may be sued by a citizen of any of the' slates, or in other words, by any of their own citizens. If this be a necetfary consequence, it must be so. I doubt the consequence, from the different wording of the different clauses, connected with other reasons. When speaking of the United States, the confiitution fays, " Controversies to which the United States dial! be s party"— not cor. troverlies between the United States and any of their citizens. When (peaking of states, it fays—" Contro verts between two or more states; between ;i state and citizens of another state." As to reasons for citizens suing a differ ent state, which do not hold equally good for fumj: the' United States; one good one may be, that as controversies between a state and citizens and citizens of another state, might have a tendency to involve both states In a -coDteft, and perhaps in war, a common um pire to decide such controversies, mav havff a tendency to prevent the mifchief that aa ohjeft of this kind was had in view by th« lVamers of the corflitntion, I Jiave no doubt, when I confaler the ctafhing interfering laws which were made in the neighboring ftatet