

knew that the wages were not a sufficient encouragement to procure fit men, they knew it bore no reasonable proportion to the price of labor, at least where the men were expected; they knew that the time was too short for enlisting the men with such scanty encouragement, and for carrying on so distant and precarious an expedition, even if no accidents or mismanagement were to take place; but certainly accidents and mismanagement ought to be provided for in undertakings of this nature; they know or might have known that trifling with such a war would naturally excite the flame, and not quench it.

It cannot be pretended that resources were wanting. Congress received the public purse with the government, and they very properly soon rendered it productive. At an early period revenues were found; not only to provide for the debts of the Union, for the discharge of which they were bound by contract, but also made provision for the debts of the individual States, to do which they were bound by no contract; and which are not yet liquidated, nor their amount known. I cannot suppose this neglect was altogether owing to inattention, for committees were frequently held on the state of the Union, and surely the defence of the union was the first subject which could present itself to their thoughts. As no sufficient reason for this neglect has ever occurred to me, I continue to view it with surprize, perhaps others can better account for it.

However, last session we were sufficiently convinced of our error, the object was fully before us, as well as the plan proposed to be pursued, and however we regretted the expense, and evils still more to be dreaded, from a standing army, we from conviction, provided adequate means, and now after much of the expense is incurred, and the end not accomplished, there is an attempt to withdraw the means: surely gentlemen have not taken a full view of the subject.

Arguments have been drawn in favor of the resolution from the slow progress of the recruiting service, and the inactivity of the army last summer. On this subject, I have a very different opinion. Let gentlemen for a moment reflect upon the difficulties the recruiting service had to encounter. The levies after a scene of arduous fatigue, enduring hunger and nakedness, many of them were left rotting on the desolate sod in the wilderness, and those who survived the horrid carnage, returned with infinite hardships to their homes, they with difficulty procured the pittance allowed them by law; their mouths were filled with complaints, nor did they alone complain; and though the wages were raised a dollar a month, yet even so, it was not a sufficient encouragement where the greatest number, and the best men were sought for; but this house are not to blame for this, for we had agreed once, and again to make the wages higher, but were overruled by the other legislative branch. When gentlemen maturely reflect on those considerations, and also that the spring was far advanced, before the recruiting service could commence, they will with me rather be surprized that it has succeeded so well; it is indeed beyond my most sanguine expectations, and the men are not generally of the most inferior kind, as has been suggested.

With respect to the inactivity of the army, the observations may have in some degree arose from something expressed by me some days ago, I think on another subject.

I then said that the army which rendezvoused at Pittsburgh had not undertaken the defence of the frontier, and prevented the necessity of militia service. That some of the counties had been more distressed by the savages last summer, and the militia service more burthenome than at any time since the peace with Britain—that even the county where they lay had to employ militia; and this is certainly true; of the reasons for this I have not been informed, nor am I accountable for it.—However, it is but reasonable that I should offer such reasons as suggest themselves to me. It is well known in this house that General Butler's having, according to orders, sent such of the levies as arrived early, to the frontiers, and therefore afforded necessary protection in time of harvest, was much complained of, and assigned as a cause of defeat, not only by delay, but want of discipline, though I do not think it had that effect; yet probably to prevent complaints of this nature, the introducing discipline and military habits among the new raised troops may have been judged preferable to the defence of the frontier; prevailing desertions might have had its weight; but though this might be complained of with respect to those oppressed with savage depredations and militia service, yet certainly the army may be more fit for the great object of an expedition, etc. From my own observations I know that unremitting industry has been used to promote discipline among the troops.

But an argument of another nature, and which seems to have the greatest weight with the gentlemen, has been often urged, I mean the expense, and the danger of new taxes. Is it possible that we have not revenues sufficient for the defence of the union? Surely every other claim must give way to this.—Let it not be said that a tax for our own defence could not be levied; the people would cheerfully pay taxes for this purpose, though they might think themselves oppressed by other demands that are more amply provided for. But a new tax is not necessary for that purpose; a surplus of existing revenues are at our disposal, besides the estimates of the war. It is true we designed to have availed ourselves of it to begin the extinguishment of our debt, though we have been since told that it is necessary to be applied otherwise, and we are called upon to raise a new tax for that purpose, not for the purpose of procuring peace. However anxiously I desire to pay off

the debt, yet I am certain it would be an unwarrantable policy to subject the country to destruction for that purpose; besides, I believe the alternative proposed would eventually increase the expense.

We have a particular plan in view in order to accomplish peace, is that plan executed? Is that object obtained? No.

I believe gentlemen know we cannot explain fully on this subject, as it involves confidential communications, and plans not submitted to public view; but they say that two regiments are sufficient to garrison the existing forts. Surely they know that Fort Hamilton, Fort Knox, &c. are not the objects contemplated; nor would these I presume be kept for their own sakes, they cannot defend our territory, nor make it the interest of the Indians to be at peace. If we expect to exist as a nation we must defend the territory which we have purchased, which we have sold to others, and which unfortunately for them we have encouraged others to settle upon. In this I presume the committee are agreed, at least I hope so; but it will be said the difference is about the means. We are told that the militia are more fit for this kind of war than an army; let the army keep the forts, and the militia defend the frontiers where they reside, and carry on expeditions against the Indians. Comparing the militia and standing army is to little purpose; I have known both the one and the other on some occasions behave so as to deserve great commendation, & at other times behave very ill; this depends greatly on circumstances, each have their particular advantages, and each may find too much employ; there are situations and circumstances in which the militia are undoubtedly best, and there are other situations in which a standing army have the advantage. But when I speak of militia I do not mean such as are called in classes from their families, and composed of many that have never been accustomed to the woods, nor arms, and go out with reluctance, leaving all that is dear to them behind, and considering the service as a grievous oppression. I know and feel these things. I have been oftener than once outwith the militia. I mean a selection of the militia willing to go, and experienced in the woods, and in most of the frontiers such men, or suitable arms do not now abound; but surely for services of a more permanent nature an enlisted army is more suitable.

But do gentlemen consider the consequences of throwing all internal defence, and distant expeditions, upon the militia? Is it not enough that they already stand as a picket guard to their brethren who live at ease; that they eat their bread in the fear of their lives, and are frequently embittered with the view of mournful incidents; but that we must lay a deliberate plan for increasing the number of their fatherless children, and childless parents?

I recollect, it has been said oftener than once on this floor on former occasions, and is still owned by members, that the states who have frontiers ought to provide for their own protection, and that the government of the union ought to assist only in the last resort; in short that protection ought not to be a common cause. Such highly antifederal sentiments I confess I heard with surprize.

There are some members, however, more generous and promise to vote for a sufficient sum of money to pay the expense. I believe these members are sincere; but do gentlemen contemplate to what issue the principles would lead? Do they not observe that the fate of the government is deeply involved in the decision?—Perhaps I may be asked, did not the states depend chiefly upon their own exertions for the defence of the frontiers under the old Congress? Yes, they did, and were better protected than since that period. But let it be recollected that at that time the states had the command of their own resources, and the laying and executing their own plans: that the Indians were not so formidably combined; but that since, the states had not the power of retaliating, nor the means of gratifying with presents, since the Indians have been solemnly told to look away from the little fires of the states, to the great fire of the union: they have looked upon us a more formidable and dangerous foe, and made their arrangements accordingly, and European nations and emissaries among them have improved upon the circumstance, and excited and aided them in their union and exertions.

If the militia are to be so much oppressed, it must be under their state laws; the operation of our militia law has not been tried, and the militia will naturally have more confidence in the laws of the state, and be better paid by them. If the people must undergo all the risk of life and all the hardships of war, in carrying on a war which they did not commence, nor have power to terminate, will they not naturally look from the government of the union, to that of their own states? and will the state governments conduct a war with their hands tied? Will they not take their own way of conducting the war and of procuring peace? Surely they will, and the general government ought only to hope for obedience and respect as long as it gives general protection, which was the reason of its institution. But if gentlemen were willing thus to surrender the principles of the government, they ought first to put the frontier states in as good a situation as the new Congress found them; when the Indians were not united, and when they did not know that they could so easily and completely defeat us.

Supposing that we appropriate a sufficient sum of money to pay the frontier militia for conducting the war of the union; I ask who are these militia? is it those unfortunate few whom we induced to settle at Marietta that are to protect our extensive western territory, against the united exertions of all the western Indians? or is it the few scattered inha-

bitants of the South-western Territory, who are to undertake our defence against the numerous and warlike tribes around them, aided by our southern European neighbours? Or is it the scattered settlements of Georgia who from known causes are weak within themselves, that are to defend us against the most powerful and numerous tribes of Indians on the one side, and white people perhaps little less inimical on the other?—Impossible! This cannot on cool reflection be the serious intention of even the members who have expressed themselves so.

From the very inadequate pay which the militia have already received and the difficulty of obtaining it, however well disposed the members who propose it may be, there is little ground to confide in the provision being ample, especially when it is considered that the expense has been the argument most dwelt upon by all the gentlemen.

Arguments however of another and more important nature have been suggested in favor of lessening the army. I mean the peaceable disposition of our citizens and the principles of our government; in this I am heartily agreed, and were the argument upon original ground, and the measure optional, I would doubtless oppose an army; but the question is not, whether we shall begin a war, or whether we shall have a standing army to aid the government in time of peace; if that were the case I would certainly be on the other side; but with us it is a question of necessity, not of choice, it is to procure a peace, and not to procure a war; it is to protect, and not to oppress or aid in governing our citizens; I know that standing armies have always been sources of oppression and aids of tyranny; our people may long be governed without such aids, their situation will not admit of abuses from standing armies, nor would the citizens submit thereto.

However when I observe the difficulty of procuring money for the support of even a necessary force, and the jealousy of armies so prevalent among the members; whatever difficulties it may now produce, yet this disposition augurs well towards the security of our liberties; when I also consider how anxious the people of the United States and the members of Congress are for peace, and what extraordinary exertions the executive has made to preserve it; and when I also reflect, that the next Congress will be a more full and equal representation of the people's interests and sentiments than we are, I am confident the army will be discharged as soon as our affairs will admit of it.

The prospects we have of peace are not very flattering, they by no means arise from the good dispositions of the Indians towards us, nor from the love of peace, but from the dread of the power and permanency of our force; take away those impressions and all our prospects of peace vanish; it may be recollected that the Six Nation Indians were our inveterate foes, and would never listen to the voice of peace until they felt our power, and we have sufficient proofs, that their continuing peaceable does not arise from their dispositions towards us, but from their being so much in reach of our power. Admitting that the militia were in every respect the best for fighting Indians, and that we could in justice throw the burthen and risk of fighting wholly on them; yet this method would certainly lengthen the war; we have, and always had the militia; but they are not a visible force, the strokes they make distress and irritate the Indians, and when the expedition is over the force disappears, and the Indians meditate and too often obtain revenge; the apprehension of an army strikes them with apprehensions of a permanent design, and convinces them that it is their interest to have peace; the late murders of those who bore the ensigns of peace are an undoubted proof that the prospects of peace do not arise from any other motives than the dread of our force.

When I reflect on our having so lately been convinced of the indispensable necessity of raising an army, and before it was possible to accomplish the object intended, that a motion is made for lessening that force, I am truly surprized at the inconsistency to which it would lead; surely there is not such an instance to be found in the history of nations, nor in the acts of public bodies, and if it should succeed it would mark our councils in an extraordinary point of view. However, so averse am I to armies and so sensible of the evils they have occasioned, that I gave a serious ear to the motion, and maturely examined the circumstances in which the case was involved. I wished for reasons to justify my supporting thereof, but examination produced conviction of its impropriety.

The gentlemen doubtless have determined from the first impression of the subject; more minute investigation will convince themselves of the bad policy of such an unreasonable change of measures. I with great reluctance was convinced of the necessity of so great a force last session, but even if I had been finally against it last session, I would nevertheless have been for supporting that force in the present important crisis; better by far we had never made the law for raising the army than to repeal it now.

The present Indian war is essentially different from any former one. When Britain and France divided North America betwixt them, if the emissaries of both excited the Indians to war, the power of both afforded protection. When Britain became possessed of the Western posts, and many tribes of Indians commenced a war, the British government conducted the war, carried it into the Indian country, and by the dread of their arms procured a peace; but the Indians were not then supported by other powers. But in the present war, the Indians who at that time knew nothing of us, have combined to make it a common cause; and no superior power interest themselves in our favor, no, they

conceive our interests to be inimical to theirs. But if they did not receive encouragement, protection, and supplies from our European neighbors a peace would soon be procured, the gentlemen who support this resolution know well how that matter stands, and they know explanations here are not convenient.

I once thought of moving a resolution for limiting the time of enlisting to some day in March or April next, knowing that the intermediate winter months are the best season for recruiting, and apprehending the best opportunities of disciplining would then be probably over; but upon second thought, I apprehend this was not necessary, that most probably the army by that time would be so nearly compleat, that all the saving of money it would make, would be no object, and reflecting that the President was already authorized either to stop recruiting, or to discharge the new regiments when circumstances would admit of such a measure. From the observations I have made the committee will be convinced that I design to vote against the resolution. (Debate to be continued.)

TUESDAY, January 8.

Mr. Greenup laid the following motion on the table yesterday:—That a committee be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill, for placing on the pension list, all such officers and privates of the militia, who have been, or shall be wounded, or disabled in the service of the United States, and not provided for by law.

A petition was presented by Mr. Muhlenberg, from William Wirtz, praying compensation for services during the late war. Read and referred to the Secretary of the Treasury.

The House took into consideration, the bill making appropriations for the year 1793, as reported by the committee of the whole yesterday. Some debate ensued on the item of contingencies for the War Department; the sum reported in the estimate is 50,000 dollars. The House at length filled the blank with 30,000.—All the blanks being filled, it was ordered that the bill be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.

A message was received from the Senate by Mr. Secretary Otis, informing the House that the Senate have passed a bill in addition to the act for establishing the Judicial Courts of the United States; and desire the concurrence of the House.

Another message from the Senate informed the House, that they have passed a bill, which originated in the House, for allowing interest on a sum due to the persons therein mentioned, pursuant to a resolution of the late Congress.

On motion of Mr. Steele, the yeas and noes were taken this day on the proposed amendment to his resolution, for reducing the military establishment of the United States—viz.

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill for reducing the military establishment of the United States to

regiments, consisting of the non-commissioned officers and privates now in service, or which may be recruited before the day of next; with such proportion of commissioned officers as the President of the United States may think proper.

A Y E S.

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| Mess. Ashe, | Mess. Madison, |
| Clark, | Moore, |
| Giles, | Niles, |
| Gilman, | Orr, |
| Gerry, | Parker, |
| Goodhue, | J. Smith, |
| Grove, | Steele, |
| Greenup, | Sumpter, |
| Lee, | Treadwell, |
| Leonard, | Tucker, |
| Livermore, | Venable, |
| Macon, | Ward, |
| Mercer | Williamson. 26. |

N O E S.

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| Mess. Ames, | Mess. Kittera, |
| Benson, | Lawrance, |
| Barnwell, | Milledge, |
| Baldwin, | Muhlenberg, |
| S. Bourne, | Murray, |
| B. Bourn, | Sedgwick, |
| Boudinot, | Schoonmaker, |
| Dayton, | W. Smith, |
| Findley, | Is. Smith, |
| Fitzsimons, | Sterrett, |
| Gregg, | Sturges, |
| Hartley, | Sylvester, |
| Heister, | Thatcher, |
| Hillhouse, | Wadsworth, |
| Huger, | White, |
| Kitchell, | Willis. 32. |

The yeas and noes on the original motion, were then called:

A Y E S.

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| Mess. Ashe, | Mess. Mercer, |
| Clark, | Niles, |
| Giles, | Orr, |
| Gilman, | Parker, |
| Goodhue, | Lee, |
| Greenup, | Steele, |
| Grove, | Sumpter, |
| Leonard, | Treadwell, |
| Livermore, | Venable. |
| Macon, | Ward. 20. |

N O E S.

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|-------------|-----------------|
| Mess. Ames, | Mess. Milledge, |
| Barnwell, | Moore, |
| Baldwin, | Muhlenberg, |
| Benson, | Murray, |
| Boudinot, | Schoonmaker, |
| S. Bourne, | Sedgwick, |
| Dayton, | J. Smith, |
| Findley, | Is. Smith, |
| Fitzsimons, | W. Smith, |
| Gerry, | Sterrett, |
| Gordon, | Sturges, |
| Gregg, | Sylvester, |
| Hartley, | Thatcher, |
| Hillhouse, | Tucker, |
| Huger, | Wadsworth, |
| Kitchell, | White, |
| Kittera, | Williamson, |
| Lawrance, | Willis. 31. |