liis office—That it is made his duty by law, is a Sufficient apology for him in undertaking and discharging it, but not for the House in transfer iug it to linn ; I deny that the Honfe can be bound by a law with refpedi to its powers and duties—This House is as free to originate money bills as the lalt House was, and any future House will be as free as this—The coiiftirution is the only law whereby the powers and duties of this House can be governed, nor can we either de cline a duty or transfer a trull which has been specially bound on us by it.—Nor will I agree with the gentlemen, that if it is an evil it arilcs from necelfity—certainly if we are capable of al tering, amending, or changing the principles of the Secretary's reports altogether, as is granted, we must be capable with due industry and atten tion to originate them ourselves. But we are further told in defence of refering to the Secretary, iliat if we do not do itonrfelves, the comuiitte&employed, or some ofthe members, will have reconi fe to the Secretary foraffiftance, and that in this way his principles and argu ments will be introduced with equal influence fecretJy—and that it is better to face it openly, and for all the members to have equal advantag es from it. This argument is plausible indeed, but will not bear examination—So far is the method con tended for from preventing private influence, ihat it produces it in a much greater degree— From the nature of the cafe we may conclude, that a minister will not digest a revenue system without adapting it to the views and interests of a number of influential members, who will assist him in preparing and influencing others to sup port it when introduced—indeed it gives the greatest poflible ftiinulus to private influence ; for it not only combines an influential private interest to support it, but the minister's charac ter and the character of his friends, are much higher pledged for its success, than if the influ ence was private—Thus, I apprehend this me thod is not only objevfiionable on account of the ministerial fyltems and arguments which the members receive in this House, and peruse in their closets ; but also, on the account of the greater inducement it must give to a more dan gerous private influence, and in time to corrup tion. But the gentleman from North-Carolina, (Mr. Steele) observes that we may upon the fame grounds objert to the President's address, recom mending business to the legillature ; thatmyfelf and others who oppose the reference in question, very lately advocated a report of tlie Secretary of War, which he opposed ; that by carrying the substance of that report into a law, we have saddled the government with a debt for which we are now about to provide—and he suggests the impropriety of those, for whose immediate defence the debt is incurred, objecting to the usual method of providing for its discharge. 1 have observed already that the Prelident has a right, created by the constitution, to recom mend bnfinefs to the legislature, as well as to give information of the (late of the Union; in cor.feqnence of this trust he, by a report of his Secretary, gave us information of the state and misfortunes of the Indian war, and his opinion of the force and expence that he judged necert'a ry to enable him to bring it to a happy and fpetdy conclusion ; this information was consti tutional and neceflary—well knowing that an ina dequate force and the short inliftments, rendered the two lad campaigns difgraceful, and increased the strength and irritation of the enemy.—l vot ed (or the encreafe of the army, and for longer enlillments ; but 1 voted for higher wages than was reported, and we will yet re<*ret that this was not agreed to—and I think in doing so I was promoting the bed interests of the country, and countenancing no unconstitutional influence Surely if the gentleman would reflect for a mo ment, he would not quote this as a precedent to jullify this House in voting a transfer of the pe culiar and exclusive constitutional privilege and unalienable trull ol this House, to originate or digest the principles of revenue, fyflems, to an executive officer, not known in the constitution, nor appointed by or dependant on this House. I will further beg leave to inform the gentle man, that the people of the frontiers do not claim protection as a favor, they demand it as a light - T hey know that protection and allegiance are inseparable—that if they are not protected, their connection with the government is diflolved ; it is their lot and their misfortune to be exposed as a constant picquet guard to the interior inha bitants—too frequently has their habitations been rendered desolate, and they have had their dearest: relations butchered —When the ntlan tic Jliores were the object of invaflon, the incle mency of the season, nor the dangerous situation of their families at home did not prevent them from giving assistance—They have had little weight in the councils which have, by affording; inadequate means of protection, increased their d lit re Is ; they think it ungenerous to be aided with a too fpanng hand, and at the fame time mlulred with unmerited reproach. The gentleman fays he lias heard me -cften moving to refer petitions to one or other of the Secretaries myfelf-—I acknowjedge it—When the petitions are for personal claims, being of a judicial nature and connected with the docu ments in the Secreiary's office, I think it proper to refer them there for information with refpetft to faifts—Wlien I moved for a reference of the excise petitions which came in by me, 1 did it in obedience to the customs of the House, but with an express declaration that I thought the custom then wrong—this 1 have no doubt the members will recolletft. The genrlenian has also observed, that there is independence and good feni*e enough in this House to examine, to alter or rejetft a report of the Secretary, notwithstanding his arguments which accompany it—and that we have done so in various instances. This 1 freely grant —nay I advocate more than this, I believe there isgood sense and independence enough in this House, to digest and originate revenue systems without the Secretary's doing it for us. But what does this argument amount to ? Why it amounts to giving the peculiar trust of originating to the Secretary, and reserving that power to ourselves which theconllitution vests in the other branch —:the Senate cannot prepare a money-bill, but they may alter, a'mend or reject such as we pre pare and transmit to thein ; and they have done fo—ls not this giving the power and influence in a great degree ro the Secretary, which the constitution gives to us !—ls it not in fadt giving up (he point ?—The Sen'ate is not permitted lo digell their arguments and transmit them to us in support of business which they prepare, neither are we permited to do so with them — Nay it is unparliamentary to mention what we think would be agreeable to the Senate or the President, in our arguments on the floor, left it (hould have the appearance of influencing the measure—The one branch cannot call upon the other officially to originate business—how unrea sonable then is it, to refer the mofi important business to the Secretary to digest and prepare ; and also to digest arguments for us, which we or der to be printed and put into every member's hand. liut this method is highly objectionable on a nother ground —it is putting the power of the business out of our hands with refpe