Gazette of the United-States. (New-York [N.Y.]) 1789-1793, November 25, 1791, Page 238, Image 2

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    under despotic governments, whose foil in irfelf
is the most fertile imaginable, that scarcely pro
duce subsistence for the inhabitants, and jntirely
owing to the badness of the governments —Where
there is no security for property, none are am
bitious of acqoiring it ; the accumulation there
of, is but an inducement to their tyrants to de
prive them even of their lives, in order to pofl'efs
their property —Under ihefe circumstances men
are desirous of procuring only so much as ftiall
be barely fufficient for their sustenance—The
consequence is plain, the agricultural interelt
fuffers, the ground not half tilled, and the coun
try wearing a miserable appearance—On the con
trary, where the citizen enjoys liberty and secu
rity for his property, he is desirous of increasing
it, and makes the belt use of his lands ; the coun
try puts on " a gay, pleasant and prosperous ap
pearance," and that in gradation from a tyran
nical government to a free one, in pr oportion to
the goodness of the constitution. These effeds
of our excellent constitution are visible to every
obftTvtr, and acknowledged by every friend to
the government —All who acknowledge a divine
Providence, inuft own to be the prime source
of both profperltyand adverlity ; and sometimes,
for wife purposes, it is exercised in adverse dis
pensations ; thus we fee partial evil in the midst
of general good, without destroying the univer
sal influence of second causes—Such may have
been the cafe during the lall fuinmer—ln the
course of Providence a drought prevailed infome
places, yet notwithstanding, there was a general
appearance of fertility in the country —though
graft failed in lome places, yet was there a plen
tiful harvest ; nor did that partial evil militate
againfi the benign influence of our government,
in its happy effeds upon the country at large,
nor lead to a conclusion that the government is
defective. lam at the fame riine sorry to find
our Refpondcnt casting reflecftions upon a state,
which however amiflaken policy may for a while,
have made backward in fubferibing to theconlti
tution, yet now is a sister in union with us.
New- Jersey, November 10, 1791
CONGRESS.
PHILADELPHIA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
MONDAY, November 14,1791.
IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.
Debate on the Ratio oj Reprefentntivn.
TVT 1 *- UNDLEY declared himfelf to be in fa
vor of one representative for every 30,000
persons,
The opinion of the people, he said, should be
the guide of the committee : that opinion, he
conceived to be in favor of the ratio he had men
tioned.
The representation ought as nearly as possible
to ex pre Is not only the will, but to participate
111 the Tvifhes and interests of the people—A large
representation embraces these interests more ful
ly, and is more competent to gi v "ing and receiv
ing information. The objects of legiflatioii are
fach as come home to the doors, to the feelings
ol every man ; the government ought therefore
to secure the confidence of the people by a larcre
representation. The expence he considered "s
trifling compared to the benefits—and the people
expec't and are willing to pay for being well go
veined, and having their liberties secured. An
encreafed representation, he considered as an
additional security against corruption. As to
delays occasioned by a numerous body—he ob
served. that the representatives were chosen to
deliberate, and to mature every fubjeiTt before
oecilion He inllauced the advantages derived
trom the numerous representations in France and
in Ireland The former had fraoied aconftituti
on in two years for twenty-fix millions of citi
zens, and provided for securing the liberties of
Jvp nui ;y—and the latter had proved a fuc
ce s, u L.airier against the encroachments of the
arbKrary power of England. He concluded, by
a ertnig that the voice of the people was in fa
vor of the amendment proposed to the conftitu
-10.., Viiich would give une representative to eve-
T y 3°>ooo persons.
Mr. Giles -This fubjeft, said he, has struck
me in two points of view—Whether Congress
are not preceded from exercising any discretion
on the fubjeA • and whether, if they are not. it
is expedient for them to exercise this discretion
at this time. The ratio of representation is a
conltitutxonal, and not a legifiaiive adt. He re-
A°n l u* C ° ,,(V " mion ' in Nvllich is said that
L/l n °r re P re, " entat ive to every state,
and secondly, that until the enumeration, the
AN OPPONENT
nnmber flionld be as therein appointed to each
(late—after the enumeration the numbqr is men
tioned, below which it (hall not be placed—but
there is a negative power to increase the ratio—
and from this negative power, a positive discreti
onary power is inferred. But, he observed, than
"Congref* had precluded itfelf from a right to
exercise this discretionary power, by fending out
to the several date legislatures, an amendment
on this very fubjecl—this amendment lie consi
dered in a ferions point of view ; and had this
idea been attended 10 at the commencement of
the discussion, he conceived that it would have
prevented the opinioYi from being brought for
ward, whether it was expedient that any change
in the ratio of the representation (hould take
place—The idea of one to 30,000, he tonfidered
as fully fetijed in the minds of the people ; and
a change 011 the part of the government, would
indicate a changeable disposition, and a 111 utabiii
ty of counsels, which is but another name for
weakness.
The sense of the people have been retorted to
by gentlemen on both fides ofthequeftion—this,
if it can be ascertained, is undoubtedly the belt
guide ; and he thought thole in favor of one to
30,000 had with great propriety referred to the
conventions, and to the adls of Congress itfelf.
But the amendments are said to have been a
matter of compromise, and were insincerely ac
ceded to by the majority—but even 011 this ground
he conceived, that the sense of the people was
equally at well declared.—He however differed
from gentlemen in refpeift to the motives wlych
produced ihofe amendments—in the ftate'he came
from, both federalifts and anti-federalifts were
fully of opinion that.further fecurhy as to the
representation, wasrequifite.
The numerous representations of the states,
whatever inconveniences may attend them, plain
ly shew the sense of the people on the fubjeA.
He then took a view of the objccls of Icgifla
tion to the state afterablies, and of those of the
general government —in the former, he said, a
bove ioooperfons are employed, though their
attention is confined to their internal police—
Those of the general government on the other
band, are on the great objects of the whole fi
nance of the Union, a sum of more than eighty
millions of dollars, &c. &c.
It is said that we shall want abilities—but, said
he, I fhonld be sorry if a reprefenration of ten
times the present number of this House, fliould
comprize the abilities of a single state.
He afligned different causes from numbers, for
the corruption in*tlie British House of" Commons
—among these wtfre the frequent mortgages of
the funds, and the iiijmenie appropriations at
the difftofal of the executive—the mode of their
elections, &c. A large number, he observed, is
not so easily corrupted as a small body.
An inequality of circumstances, he then observ
ed, produces revolutions in government, from
democracy to aristocracy and monarchy. Great
wealth produces a desire ofdiftintftions, rank and
titles—The revolutions in property in this coun
try, have created a prodigious inequality of cir
cuniftances—Government has contributed to this
inequality—the Bank of the United States is a
most important machine in promoting the objects
of this monied imereft—this bank will be the
most powerful engine to corrupt this House—
some of the members are direiftors of this inflitu
tion—and it will only be by increafingthe repre
sentation that an adequate barrier can be oppos
ed to this monied interert. He next adverted to
certain ideas -Which he said had been difl'eminated
through the United States ; and here he took
occasion to observe, that the legislature ought to
express some public disapprobation of these opi
nions—The strong executive ef this government
ought to be balanced by a full reprefentatioH in
this House. He hoped the motion to strike out
30,00# would not obtain.
Mr. Boudin»t closed the debate of this day, by
a few remarks, reinforcing his former obfervaci
ons in favor of an increased ratio.
TUESDAY, November 15
Mr. Page.—l can 110 longer refrain from ex
pressing my sentiments refpecling the queltion
before the committee ; not only because \ wifhif
paifibie to remove the error which I think seve
ral members, tor whom I have the highest respect,
have fallen into, but because I feel Inyfelf more
interested in the question than 1 ever was in any
one I have had to decide on.
Sir, it gave me pain to find those worthy mem
bers calculating and coldly applying the rules of
arithmetic to a lubjedt beyond the power of num
bers to express the degree of its importance to
their fellow-citizens. I was distressed, fir, to find
that in their honelt zeal for securing order, dis
patch of btifinefs, and dignity in refpetftability of
members in the general legislature, they ufed'ar
guments which have been applied in other coun
tries to the eftablifoment of insolent aristocracies
—in some, tyrannical despotisms- and in others,
Kings ; thole countries which were :noll on their
guard with the semblance of a free government
238
Sir,the errors I wifli to correct are these ■T !
think that because it is propoftd, by a 1
mendmenc to the Constitution, to authorise th
to interfere in the business of afcertainine
fixing the ratio of reprefesmation to the po PU |' ■
tion of the States, that Congress ought, with o '
any hefuation, to enter on that bufnief»_butl
humbly conceive, that Coogreft, as this is a deli
cate quellion in which their own weight and
portane'e must nnire wjth the weight aiid fab'u"'
£ ial intereil or their coulhtucnts, ought to
to the suggestions of delicacy, and feave its jjf
cuffion to a difintereffed convention of the States"
I fay it appears to me no firrall error to q jip tl ,®*
plain path of legislation, marked out for us bv
the Coiiil itution, needlessly io wander into the
field of political '(peculation, its
poled defects. 3 *
Let nie therefore advise to leave the reftrk<ii on
of the numbers of members of tbn house to the
people, or to some future Cou'grefs, which carr
fee more plainly than can now be descried the
evils of a too numerous reprefenration.''
to doing, we (hall avoid, if not an inipropermea-
Cure, ar lead a rafli step—at least we (hall Hand
clear of a charge of indelicacy, and deprive our
enemies of the triumph they expected in the com
pletion of their predictions, thatCongrefs would
never propose any amendments to the Constitu
tion but such as would be subservient to their own
views and aggrandizement. Let us not give the
enemies of our new government cause to exult
and its friends to sigh and mourn. Let us not
give our friends occasion to repeat what many
have said, that so many of our citizens have been
led away by theoretical writers on government
as to render it problematical whether the Ame
rican States are not at this time as much indebted
to the Na'tionnl Aflembly for its remains of re
publican principles, as France was to Cotigrefsin
t 776, for their firfl. ideas of that liberty which
they now enjoy. Let us not, in this moment of
general exultation of the friends to the rights of
man, take a step which may damp their joy, and
lead them to fear that Americans who were fore
molt in the glorious career of liberty, have Hoo
ped (hort.
But, fir, granting that ws were now fitting in
full toDventiou, convened for the sole pii'rpofe of
.altering that article of theConlhtation which re :
fpeefts die number of representatives, woulditi.oc
become us :o consider rather what was the sense
of the members who framed that Conflitution,
and what was and is the sense of their constituents
and our own respecting ir, than what may be the
r'efult of our enquiries concerning the speculative
opinions of writers on the fubjedt of government,
or even the real consequences of the mot' piauli
ble theories reduced to pradtice in other eoutries
Hut not to take up the precious time of this
house with relations of faifts to' show what was
and is the opinion of our fellow-citizens 011 this
interelting fubjecft, 1 will only state a few
arguments which have weight with me as be
ing in themfeives evident truths, viz. Our
Conftiturion being framed by the people, and
introduced to us in their name, and Congress
being the creatures of their will, fpoker. into ex
igence by the word of theirpower for Congress,
to lefl'en their weight, to diminilh their import
ance, and to exclude them from as full a/hareiu
their own government, as can be confident with
the nature of it, and indeed from that fliare which
they claim, inujt be impolitic and dangerous.
But granting that the people wished not a
greater fliare in the general government than is
proposed by the amendment, as it is impolfible,
a country like the United States, tliar one mail
can be fufficiently informed of the opinions,
wishes and'real interests of thirty-five thoufandof
his fellow-citizens, and therefore laws might be
enaifted contrary to the opinions, wishes and in
terests of the people, in which they might never
theless acquiesce, facrincing their interests for
the fake of peace and quiet, to the wills of their
reprefjntatives, one thirty-five thousandth part
of their own number—What friend to his coun
try would wish to fee such a dangerous influence
on the one hand, and such a blind fubmiflion on
the otlier ? How long could an enlightened peo
ple remain in such a state of infenfibifity and
torpor ! and what might not be the consequence
of their awaking from their lethargy ? If not an
expensive revolution, an expensive repeal of laws.
And here I will remark, that the fm3lleft number
of legiflators,and they too, well feleJted for their
wisdom and respectability, if unacquainted with
their conftittients, might pass well framed laws,
founded on the wifdow»f other countries, and
yet find them disagreeable to their constituents,
and be under a necessity of repealing them —but
this could not be the cafe if the people had in
that legislature a fufficient number of represen
tatives, on whose fidelity, attachment and difiii
tereftednefs, they could rely. This, fir, is a truth
worthy of our attention—an ignorance of which
or inattention thereto, 1 fufpeit has been the oc
cafion of much political evil in the world. Hap
pily for France, the people had such a number ot
repi efentatives in the National A Hem bly, as could