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FROM DUNLAP'S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER.

IN the course of human events, nothing can be more grateful to the philanthropist, to the friends of the rights of man, than the progressive increase of liberty in the world. To see the gigantic image of despotism prostrate itself before the genius of freedom; to know that twenty-four millions of men have escaped from the hated Bastille of Slavery, and broken the chains with which they were bound—that they have asserted, with glorious effect, their inherent and unalienable rights; that they are restored to themselves, to their country, to their rights and to their liberty;—are circumstances which must pour an overflowing tide of joy upon the hearts of all the friends of human nature. The emancipation of so great a number of our fellow creatures, is a suitable, and it is a dignified subject of congratulation—the late glorious revolution in France presents this grand subject of joy to the feelings of humanity. The regeneration of so great and powerful a kingdom—the renovation of its rights, and the exaltation of its slaves to the high and dignified character of citizens, are events so analogous to the experience of these United States, that true Americans cannot hear of them without taking a deep interest in their benefits, and bestowing the benevolent wish of “*Ergo perpetua*” to the newly risen glory of France, and the newly acquired liberty of their citizens!—This revolution is on many accounts unexpected and astonishing; but its leading reasons may be found among the causes of all revolutions. For it is not the Prince alone, supreme as he is, that forms the genius of an empire, it is the gradual change of opinion and evolution of sentiment in the people; which, though slow in its progress, is generally irresistible and permanent in its duration. And it is this change of opinion and this evolution of sentiment in the people of France, that has produced a regeneration of their government. It is not, however, a matter of wonder that the progress of civil and political liberty should find enemies in the friends of aristocracy—nor that the principles of any system of freedom whatever should meet with enemies in the courts of kings, and the friends of monarchical government and hereditary succession. But it is more truly astonishing, and yet more unaccountable, that the unquestionable Rights of Man, and the principles of liberty and free government should find an enemy in the list of those who have ranked high as American Patriots.

The late revolution in France has given rise to much political diffention in Europe. Mr. Burke, formerly the friend of liberty, but now the metamorphosed flatterer of kings, has led the way. With all the furious zeal of aristocratical fanaticism, he has pleaded the cause of the king of Great-Britain. Mr. Paine, the author of *Common Sense*, has, in the bold stile of a Freeman, advocated the cause of the people of England, and of the world—the rights of men, and fully answered Mr. Burke.

It is worthy of remark, that the three principal points for which Mr. Burke contends, are—that the nation of England have no right

- 1st. To chuse their own governors.
- 2d. To cashier them for misconduct.
- 3d. To frame a government for themselves.

And he asserts with confidence, that they utterly disclaim those rights, and that they will resist the practical assertion of them with their lives and fortunes.—Mr. Paine has particularly replied to and refuted this spurious and heretical doctrine.

Pained at the prostration of Mr. Burke's argument, solicitous for the progress of British principles in America, and with heartfelt anxiety regarding the tottering reputation of hereditary succession, Publicola, from the town of Boston, has blown the trumpet of aristocracy, and is now echoing the sentiments of Mr. Burke in America.

The object of Publicola is by no means doubtful. I have fought for his polar principle, and I think I have not fought in vain. Could he effect a change of sentiment in the people of these States in favor of monarchy and hereditary succession, his purpose would be answered. He knows that this change, if ever made, must be gradually made; and he also knows, that the continual diffusion of his aristocratical principles are the only means of effectuating this purpose. Americans then ought to read Publicola with a jealous caution.

Publicola, previous to entering into a consideration of Mr. Paine's arguments, has given us a short character of the performance, which he has thought proper to oppose. It may not be amiss for me, in like manner, before I notice any of the arguments of Publicola, to give a brief description of his work to the fourth number inclusive, for these are all I have seen. As he has stiled Mr. Paine's work, so may his, with equal propriety, be stiled, “*historical, political, miscellaneous, satirical and panegyrical.*”

It is an encomium upon the English government, it is an historical and political commentary on that government, inferring questionable deductions from questionable principles; in this respect too, it is miscellaneous, and it is satirical in the enquiry “*whether a constitution, like a deed, must be written on paper or parchment, or whether it has a larger latitude and may be engraved on stone, or carved on wood.*”

However questionable any of the deductions of Mr. Paine may be, Publicola acknowledges the principles from which he infers those deductions to be unquestionable. If his principles be true, and they are admitted to be so, why does Publicola contest those very principles under the assumed veil of opposing the inferences deduced from them, and which only he considers questionable? And yet, however unaccountable it is, Publicola is in this very predicament.

Mr. Paine, in treating of the Rights of a Nation

To chuse their own governors.

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To frame a government for themselves lays down this proposition with respect to that right, “*That which a whole nation chooses to do, it has a right to do.*” But Publicola, uncandidly abstracting this position from the reasoning with which it stands connected in Mr. Paine's book, says “*that it cannot, in any sense whatever, be admitted as true.*” Were I to contemplate the same position in the same abstracted point of view, I would decide on it by affirming, “*that the eternal and immutable laws of justice and of morality are paramount to all human legislation,*” and that though “*the violation of those laws is certainly in the power, yet it is not among the Rights of Nations.*” But the statement which Publicola has made of this principle is by no means ingenious. Does not Mr. Paine qualify this principle by a confined relation to the subject of which he is treating? He does—Was he writing a treatise on metaphysics, or on the abstract principles of morality, or was it a treatise on the Rights of Man? What is the amount of his argument? He brings into view, plain, simple, incontrovertible principles, which Publicola himself acknowledges—proving unquestionably and exclusively, that when a whole nation

chooses to have a particular form of government, it has a right to have it.

This is undoubtedly his meaning—and the abstracted ground upon which Publicola has thought proper to consider this proposition, proves incontestably his want of candor, and a perversion of meaning intentionally designed to destroy the whole force of Mr. Paine's reasoning.

Having, I think, sufficiently shewn, that the manner of the statement of this principle, by Publicola, is uncandid and ungenerous, and that he has given it a construction which it does not bear, it will be obvious that the long train of inferences which he draws from such his own mis-stated, and therefore, false premises, will, with the reasoning from which he has deduced them, fall to the ground.

I therefore shall take no notice of them, but proceed briefly to consider a few of his arguments to prove the existence of a British constitution. It will, however, be proper here to premise, that it is now of no importance to free and independent America, whether Great-Britain has or has not a constitution—or, if they have one, whether it be a constitution of principles or a constitution of articles, or whether it be composed of the common law, or of the great body of the statute law, or, in short, whether it be an usurpation itself. In all these concerns we stand wholly independent of them. It is sufficient for us to know that they have a government competent to the execution of their treaties, without enquiring what the essence of that government is, or whether it has arisen out of the people or over the people. But since Publicola, like Mr. Burke, contends against the rights of the people of England to chuse their own governors, to cashier them for misconduct, and to frame a government for themselves, and as the arguments which he uses for this purpose have a correspondent force against the like rights of the citizens of America, it will be proper to make a few remarks upon them.

Publicola asserts, “*that the common law of England is the constitution of Great-Britain, and that the constitution of a country is not the paper or parchment upon which the compact is written, that it is the system of fundamental rules by which the people have consented to be governed, which is always supposed to be impressed upon the mind of every individual, and of which the written or printed copies are nothing more than the evidence.*” “*That in this sense the British nation have a constitution.*” Again—“*It is composed of a venerable system of unwritten or customary laws, handed down from time immemorial, and sanctioned by the accumulated experience of ages, and of a body of statutes enacted by an authority lawfully competent to that purpose.*” And again—“*The constitution of Great-Britain is a constitution of principles, not of articles.*”

Why will not Publicola, on this subject, go to the source of things? Does he mean by this definition that a constitution is a compact antecedent to all government, and from which free government results? Or does he mean that it is a system of jurisprudence, ordained by a government after its institution? This is a point necessary to be settled, for there is a striking difference between the act of constituting a government, and the acts of a government after it is constituted. If he means that the latter is the constitution of Great-Britain, he will find no opposition to the sentiment, but if the former, I deny its existence. In this sense the people of England have no constitution—and with this meaning I defy Publicola to produce the evidence that they have one. How then will his reasoning, on the subject of a social compact, which he pretends now exists, apply to destroy the inherent rights of the people of England. As it has never yet been made appear that the government of England originated in the people, they yet have these rights inherent in themselves in their original character—If therefore, they have not these rights at this day, they never had them—but the uncontrollable rights of sovereignty residing in the people antecedent to government, they therefore have these rights. The right of a people to form a government, and the power of a government after it is formed, are two distinct things—but Publicola has artfully confounded them together, so as to obscure the generous principles of freedom. Why not, in this respect, preserve the distinction between rights and power? Liberty is a bold principle, it is an irresistible principle—it invites enquiry, nor does it seek the subtleties of sophistry for protection. It avows itself to the world, and it declares, that all lawful, all just authority, both legislative and executive, originates from the people. That the power and sovereignty of the people are like light in the sun, original and inherent, and unlimited by any thing human. That in those who are governors, it is the reflected rays of that light, borrowed, delegated and limited by the sovereign power of the people.

In the sense in which I admit that Great-Britain has a constitution, it is certainly a constitution of principles; and on the same ground, every country under Heaven, has a constitution of principles. But what are these principles? not the principles of a government arising out of the people, but of a government arising over the people. Consequently, it is the arbitrary will of government, and such, unquestionably, is the government of Great-Britain. Americans know that it is the omnipotence of Parliament. Why, therefore, in the name of Common Sense, *I should have said Aristocracy*, did not the federal convention of 1787 adopt such a glorious “*Constitution of Principles,*” instead of a constitution of written articles? And why did not Publicola then step forward, and like the honest Norman mentioned by Mr. Paine, represent, that “*as the Americans had dismissed or sent away their King, they would want another,*” and generously offer to be their sovereign Lord and Master.

Mr. Paine observes, “*that a government on the principles on which constitutional government, arising out of society, are established, cannot have the right of altering itself; for if it had, it would be arbitrary.*” But this, says Publicola, is not sufficient. I think it is. But why is it not? Why, truly, replies Publicola, “*because a nation in forming a social compact, may delegate the whole of their collective powers to ordinary legislators in perpetual succession.*” In reply to this I contend, that a nation has no right to form a compact to obligate any but the parties contracting, it must therefore cease on an infraction of the terms by either party, and must be void as to all future generations, unless they revive it for themselves. In compacts we determine and promise for ourselves only—and not for posterity. The *JURA SUMMI IMPERII*, or the rights of sovereignty reside in every generation of men in their original character; and Mr. Paine well observes, that every generation is equal in rights to the one that preceded it.—How, then, has a nation a right to delegate in perpetual succession? There is a cruel principle of injustice in the doctrine of perpetual succession; it is an enslaving principle; it is a black aristocratical doctrine, that absorbs every ray of the sun of freedom, and swallows up all the rights of the people to the end of time. This is the inevitable consequence of the doctrine

of perpetual succession; it is unjust in theory; it is tyrannical in practice; it is a subversion of the “*eternal and immutable laws of justice and morality;*” because it is founded on the principle of A's willing to B. the property of C.—and this I deny that any nation has a right to do.—For although a whole nation should be mad enough to adopt such a form of government, yet as they could have no property in posterity, a future generation would have an undoubted right not merely to alter, but entirely to abolish it; and for the very reason because “*the consent of that posterity would be necessary before they could be bound by those laws;*” and I maintain further, that the same people who constitute a government, have a right to change or totally annihilate it, whenever they choose so to do, even if it should have answered all the purposes for which it was originally instituted. This is a principle inseparable from the rights of sovereignty, originally resident in the people, and from all authority emanating from them. Government is nothing else but power, and the power of a free government is nothing but the delegation of a trust. It is a mere authority of agency, which the constituents may resume at pleasure. But the resumption of this right is one thing, and the expediency of it another: and it is hardly to be supposed that a nation will dissolve the bands of the social compact, unless they find it expedient so to do. Publicola however, confounds the right and expediency together, and from this sophistical jumble of ideas, he bewilders the subject he attempts to explain, and clearly evinces that the pursuit of truth is not his only object, or the way to truth must lie through the mazy labyrinths of sophistry.

I have heard of a man (perhaps Publicola knows him) who possessed the esteem and confidence of a free, generous, patriotic people; who partook liberally of their bounty, and was raised by their general voice, to an office of high dignity and trust in their government; whose pride it ought to have been, and whose duty it was to have supported the principles, and to have contributed to the welfare of that government to the utmost of his abilities, or to have rejected the office. The latter, however, he did not do; but under a fictitious name, employed his whole force of art, of genius and erudition in collecting and pouring forth floods of heretical, aristocratical doctrines in direct opposition to the free and equal principle of the very government which he administered.—Strange inconsistency!

Let those who sigh for monarchy and pant after aristocracy, court the munificence of princes and prop the tottering thrones of Kings. Let them weep over the dying image of royalty—but let the independent sons of America blow the trumpet of freedom, and proclaim to the world their liberty and happiness. The unshaken faith of these, is, that all power is originally inherent in the people, and that whatever governments are not founded on their authority alone, and instituted by them for their peace, safety and happiness, are not free but usurped, and that they therefore have and in ‘contempt’ of Kings, Princes, and the whole group of Aristocrats, will, exercise the right of establishing and of altering, reforming or abolishing government in such manner or form as they may think proper for securing the blessings of freedom.

A G R I C O L A.

Philadelphia, July 1, 1791.

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 19.

ASANTON (a kind of religious Mussulman) was lately impaled here for having the audacity to prophecy that the capital of the Ottoman empire would ere long change its master.

The imprudence of the crew of a Venetian ship had lately nearly caused the death of their Captain. In firing the usual salute, on passing the walls of the Seraglio, the crew forgot that the guns were loaded with balls, which not only alarmed those within the walls, but also damaged some of the buildings. The Sultan was so exasperated, that he demanded the head of the Captain, and, but for the interposition of the Dragoman, who is a great friend to the Venetian Ambassador, the Captain would have been beheaded. However the matter having been explained, he was pardoned; but on condition of remaining under an arrest for some time in the Ambassador's hotel.

B E R L I N, April 15.

The *Commandeur* Great Cross of the Order of the Sword, Sir Sidney Smith, an officer of the Royal Navy of England, arrived at Potsdam last week, and was immediately admitted to a private conference with the King, to which he was introduced by the British Minister.

P A R I S, April 28.

M. de la Fayette has at length yielded to the reiterated solicitations of his fellow-citizens, and resumed his former station of commander in chief of the National Guards.

On Monday morning all the battalions appeared under arms, and waited on their General to testify their joy and their gratitude; these sentiments were manifested in a particular manner, when M. de la Fayette appeared at the Place de Greve, clothed in his uniform, and surrounded by a guard. Men, women, children, old men, all the croud surrounded him, seemed eager to embrace, and actually clasped him in their arms!

At half past one o'clock on the same day, a grand deputation of the national guards, without any distinction of rank or military regulation as to companies, marched six a-breast to wait on his Majesty. Being arrived at the Thuilleries, they