Gazette of the United-States. (New-York [N.Y.]) 1789-1793, March 12, 1791, Page 778, Image 2

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    CONGRESS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
FRIDAY, Feb. 4.
The BANK BILL under conjideration,
MR. JACKSON
SAID, that having been theperfon who brought
forward the constitutional objection against
the bill, he thought himfelf bound to notice the
answers which had been offered to that objection.
Klewfpaper authorities, said he, have been allu
ded to, and their silence on the fubjecfl, consider
ed as indicating the approbation of the people—
lie would meet the gentlemen on that ground—
and tho he did not consider newspapers as an
authority to be depended on,yet if opinions thro'
that channel were to be regarded, lie would re
fer gentlemen to those of this city—the expedi
ency and constitutionality of the bill, has been
called in question by the newspapers of this city
The latitude contended for in construing the
constitution on this occasion, he reprobated very
fully : If the sweeping clause, as it is called,
extends to veiling Congress with such powers,
and necessary and proper means are an indispensa
ble implication in the ienfe advanced by the ad
vocates of the bill, we /hall soon be in polleflion
of all polfible powers, and the charter, under
which we set, will be nothing but a name.
This bill will eflentially interfere with the
rights of the separate Stales, for it is not denied,
that they poflefs the power of instituting hanks ;
but the proposed corporation will eclipse the
bank of North America, and contravene the in
terests of the individuals concerned in it.
He then noticed the several arguments drawn
from the doiftrine of implication ; the right to
incorporate a national bank has been deduced
from the power to'raife armies—but he presumed,
it would not be contended that this is a bill to
provide for the national defence. Nor could
such a power in his .opinion be derived from the
right to borrow money. It has been alked, what
the United States could do -with the surplus of
their revenue, without the convenience of a
bank, in which to depolit it with advantage >
For his part, though he wiftied to anticipate pleas
ing occurrences, he did not look forward to the
time when the general government would have
this superabundance at its disposal.
The right of Congress to purchase and hold
lands, has been urged to prove that they can
transfer this power—but the genei al government
is expressly reftritfted in the exercif'e of this pow
er ; the consent of the particular State to the
purchase for particular purposes only, is requi
lite ; these purposes are designated, such as
building light houses, eredling arsenals, &c.
It has been said that banks may exist without a
charter, but that this incorporation is neceflary
in order that it may have a hold on the govern
ment : Mr. Jackson strongly reprobated this
idea—he was, he said, aftonilhed to hear such a
declaration, and hoped that such ideas would pre
vent a majority of the house from passing a bill that
■would thus eliablifli a perpetual monopoly ; we
have (said he) 1 believe, a perpetual debt I
hope we lhall not make a perpetual corporation.
What was it drove our forefathers to this coun
try ? Was it not the ecclesiastical corporations,
and perpetual monopolies of England and Scot
land ? Shall we fufler the fame evils to exist in
this country, instead of taking every pofiible me
thod to encourage the encreafe of emigrants to
fettle among us ? For if we establish the pi ece
dent now before us, there is no faying where
it (hall flop.
The power to regulate trade is said to involve
this, as a necefl'ary means, but the powers con
sequent on this express power, are fpecified—
such as regulating light-lioufes, (hips, harbors,
&c. It has been said that Congress has borrowed
money ; this {hews that there is no neceifiry of
instituting any new bank, those already establish
ed having been found fufficient for the purpose.
He denied the right of Congress to eftablilh banks
at the permanent feat of government, or on those
sand heaps mentioned yesterday ; for if they
ihould, they could not force the circulation of
their paper one inch beyond the limits of those
places. But it is said, if Congress can eftabli/h
banks in those situations, the question becomes a
queflion of place and not of principle,—fro:u
hence it is inferred that the power may be exer
cised in any other part of the United States ; —
this appeared to him to involve a very danger
ous conftrutfion of the powers verted in the ge
neral government.
Adverting to the powers of Congress in refpeft
to the finances of the union, he obfcrved that
those powers did not warrant the adoption of
whatever measures they thought jjroper: the
constitution has reftrkled the exercise of thole
fifcal powers,—CongrMs cannot lay a poll tax,
nor impose duties on exports, —yet these un
doubtedly relate to the finances.
The power exercised in respect to the Western
Territory, he observed, had reference to pro
perty already belonging to the United Stares;
it does not refer to property to be purchased,
nor does it authorise the purchase of any addi
tional property, —besides, the powers are express
and definite, and the exercise of them in making
needful rules and regulations in the government
of that territory, does not interfere with the
rights of any of the refpetftive States.
Mr. Jackson then denied the neceflity of the
propoled institution, —and, noticing the observa
tion of Mr. Ames, that it was dangerous on mat
ters of importance not to give an opinion, ob
served, that he could conceive of no danger that
would result from poftoning that conftrutftion of
the constitution now contended for, to lome fu
ture Congress, who, when the neceflity of a hank
institution fliall be apparent, will be as eompe
tent to the decifionas the present house. Allud
ing to the frequent representations of the flou
rilhing situation of the country, he inferred that
this ihews that the neceflity of the proposed insti
tution does not exist at the present time; why
then should we be anticipating for future gene
rations ? State banl<s he considered preferable to
a national bank, as counterfeits can be deteifted
in the States, —but if you eftablilh a national
bank, the checks wi/1 be found only in the city
of 1 hiladelphia or Oonnogochegue. He palled
an eulogiuni on the bank of Pennsylvania: the
stockholders, said le, are not speculators; they
have the solid coin iepofited in their vaults.
He adverted to the preamble and context of
the condirmion, and aflerted that this context is
to be interpreted the general powers contain
ed in the instrument; noticing the advantages
which it had been said would accrue to the Uni
ted States from the bank. He alked, is the Uni
ted States going to commence stockjobbers ? —
The " general welfare," are the two words that
ate to involve and juftify the afl'umption of every
power. But what is this general welfare ?—it is
the welfare of Philadelphia, New York and Bos
ton ; for as to the States of Georgia and New-
Hampshire, they may as well be out of the union
for any advantages ihey will receive from the
institution. He reprobated the idea of the Uni
ted States deriving any emolument from the bank,
and more especially, he reprobated the influence
which it was defigued the government should
enjoy by it. He said the banks of Venice and
Amsterdam were founded on different principles.
In the famous bank of Venice, tho' government
holds no shares, yet it has at command 5,000,000
ducats ; but the United States were to be imme
diately concerned in rheirs, and become stock
jobbers. The bank of Anifterdam was under the
entire direction of the Burgoniafters, who alone
had the power of making bye-laws for its regula
tion : this power by the bill was given tip by
government, very improperly, he thought, anil
was to be exercil'ed by the ftock-holdei s. The
French bank, he added, wasfirft eftabliffied upon
proper principles, and flouriffied ; but afterwards
became a royal bank, —much paper was intro
duced, which destroyed the establishment, and
was near oversetting the government.
Tlie facility of borrowing, he deprecated, it
will, said he, involve the union in irretrievable
debts: the facility of borrowing, is but another
name for anticipation, which will in its effecls
deprive the government of the power to controul
it* revenues,—they will be mortgaged to the cre
ditors of the government: let lis beware of fol
lowing the example of Great-Britain, in this re
fpecft. He said, undue advantages had been ta
ken'in precipitating the measure, and the rea
sonable proportion refpe(fting the State debts, is
not admitted, —this I consider as partial and un
just. A gentleman from Virginia has well ob
served, that we appear to be divided by a geo
graphical line, —not a gentleman scarcely to the
eastward of a certain line, is opposed to the
bank, and where is the geiitleman to the south
ward that is for it. This ideal line will have a
tendency to ellablirti a real 'difference. He added
a few more observations, and concluded by urtr
inj> a postponement, if any regard was to be had
to the tranquility of the union.
HARTFORD, February 2?
The inhabitants of France are said to be 25
millions, and their national debt about 200 milli
ons sterling. This sum if divided equally a
mongft them, will amount to 81 a head. Tliofe
of Great Britain are computed at 8 millions of
inhabitants—their national debt to 300 millions
sterling : this equally divided among them, a
mounvs to 371. sterling a head.—And those of the
United States, to about 1 million and a half of
inhabitants—the national debt (including state
debts) about 18 millions sterling. The fum,equal
ly divided, aniouuts to about s]. fterlin« a' head
778
In the Houp if of tl: United Stat's
Thursday, March 3, 1791
ON motion of Mr. Lawrance, Resolved, That
the consideration of the amendment to the con
st i; ution proposed to be made, refpecfting the ju
diciary, be deferred till the next feflion of Con
gress, and that one hundred copies thereof be
printed for the use of the members of bo h
Houses.
Amendment to the Consti t i't i on of the Unites
Stat/.s, laid on the Clerk's table by J\lr. Ben!o:i
to b' fropoftd by Congress to the Legiflaturcs of
the fsvet at States.
THAT the Congress (hall, either by declaring
the superior or supreme common law-court
of the state to be the cotirr, or by creating a new
court for the purpose, eftabli/h a General Judicial
Court in each state, the judges whereof shall hold
their commissions during good behaviour and
without any other limitation whatsoever, and
shall be appoinred and commiflioned by theflate
and shall receive their compensations from the
United States only ; and the compensations shall
not be diminished during their continuance in
office.
The number of judges of the general judicial
court in a state, nnlefs the fame should be altered
by the consent of the Congress and the legifla
tureof the state, /hall be in the proportion ofone
judge for every persons in the state, accord
ing to the enumeration for apportioning the re
presentatives among the several states ; but there
fliall always be at least three judges in each
state.
The general judicial court lhall, in all cases to
which the judicial power of the United States
doth extend, have original jurifditSion, ei:her
exclusively or concurrently with other courts in
the refpec r tive ftatcs, and otherwise reo-ulated a?
the Congress shall prescribe ; and, in cases where
the judicial power is reserved tothefeveral flutes,
as the legislature of each f'cate shall prescribe ;
■but shall have, and exclusively, immediate appel
late jurifdidtion, in all cases, from every other
court within the state, under such limitations,
exceptions and regulations, however, as fnall be
made with the consent of the Congress, and the
legislature of the state : there may, notwithfland
ing, be in each slate a court of appeals or errors
in the lad resort, nnder the authority of the
state, from the general judicial court, in cases
and on questions only, where the supreme court
of the United States hath not appellate jurisdic
tion from the general judicial court.
T he Congress may provide that the judges of
the general judicial court shall hold circuit courts
within the state ; and the legislature of the state
may, in addition to the times and places to be
afligned by the Congress, for holding the gene
ral judicial court or the circuit courts, assign other
times and places.
J he Congress may determine the number of
judges which shall be a quorum to hold a gene
ral judicial court, or a circuit court, in each re
fpetiive state.
The Congress may, in the cases to which the
judicial power of the United States doth extend,
and the legislature of the state may, in the other
cases, regulate the fees and proceedings in the
several courts, the jurifditftion of the circuit
courts, within the state.
The ministerial officers of the general judicial
court shall be appointed and commissioned iii such
manner as the legislature of the state shall pre
scribe.
All writs, ifiuiug out of the general judicial
court, ilia 1 1 be in the name of the judges thereof.
The judges of the general*judicial court may
be impeached, by the house of Repi efentatives of
the United States, andalfo bythe most numerous
branch of the slate legislature.
The impeachment shall not be tried by the Se
nate of the United States, or by any judicature
undet the authority of the state, but the Congress
shall, by law, establish a court to be held in each
slate, for the trial of such impeachments, to con
sist only of Senators of the United States, judges
of the supreme court of the United States, and
judges of general judicial courts —The trial shall
be in the state where the person impeached shall
reside, and every law, designating the judges of
a court for the trial of impeachments, shall be
palled previous to the impeachment, and the (!e
---fignation shall be, not by naming the persons.but
by describing the offices, the perfous in which
offices for the time being, and elected or appoint
ed previous to the impeachment, shall be the
judges ; and no person lhall be convicted without
the concurrence of two thirds of the judges pre
sent.
Judgments by the courts so robe ellabliflied
for the trial of impeachments, fliall not extend
further than is provided by the conftitutioll of
the United Spates, in cases of impeachments, and
the party, nevertheless. to be liable and f'ub jefft
to indictment, trial, judgment and puniflinient
according to law.
In every state where theCongrefs shall declare
the superior or supreme common law court,to be
the general judicial court, the judges fhalJ, by
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