The RIGHT CONSTITUTION of a COMMON WEALTH EXAMINED, (IN CONTINUATION.) LET us now coiifider what would have been the face of yEmilius, if Rome had been governed at tliis time by Nedham's succession of the peo ple's representatives, unchecked by a senate. It is plain lie mult have given into the common practice offlattering, caressing, soothing, bribing, and cajoling the people, omeverhave been coil ful, never commanded armies, never triumphed. An example more deftructiveof our author's fyf tein can scarcely be fbund, and yet he has the inadvertence at least to adduce it in support of his Right Conllitution of a Commonwealth. It has been necessary to quote these anecdotes at some length, that we may not be deceived by a specious lliovv, which is destitute of substance, truth, and fact, to support it- But how come all these examples lo be patri cians and senators, and not one inltance to be found of a plebeian commander who did nut make a different use of his power ? 1 here is a strange confulion or perversion in what follows : " Rome never thrived until it was " fettled in a freedom of the people." Rome never was fettled in a freedom of the people ; meaning in a free Hate, according to our author's definition of it, a fucceflion of the supreme au thority in the people's representatives. Such an idea never-existed in the Roman commonwealth, not even when or before the people made Caesar perpetual dictator. Rome never greatly pros pered until the people obtained a finall mixture of authority, a (light check upon the senate, by their tribunes. This therefore, is proof in favor of the mixture, and against the system of our author. " Freedom was best preserved, and interest " best advanced, when all places of honor and " trust were exposed to men of merit, without " diftin«tion." True, but this never happened till the mixture took place. " This happiness could never beobtained, until " the people were inflated in a capacity of pre " fering whom they thought worthy, by a free " dom of electing men fucceflively into their fa " preme offices and aileinblies." What is meant here by supreme offices ? There were none in Rome but the dictators, and they were appointed by the senate, at least until Marius annihilated the senate, by making the tribes omnipotent. Consuls could not be called supreme officersin any sense. What is meant by supreme aHemblies ? There were none but the senate. The Roman people never had the power of electing a repre sentative aflembly.—" So long as this custom con " tinucd, and merit took place, the people made " ihifttokeepandincreafe their liberties." This custom never took place, and, strictly speaking, the Roman people never enjoyed liberty. The senate was sovereign till the people set up a per petual dictator. " When this custom lay neglected, and the " stream of preferment began to run along with " the favor anclpleafure of particular powerful " men, then vice and compliance making way " for advancement, the people could keep their " liberties no longer ; but both their liberties " and theinfelves were made the price of every " man's ambition and luxury." But when was this ! Precisely when the people began, and in proportion as they approached to, an equality of power with the s enate, and to that state of things which our author contends for ; so that the whole force of his reasoning and examples, when they come to bs analyzed, conclude against him. The eighth reason, why the people in their as semblies are the best keepers of their liberty, is, " because it is they only that are concerned in " the point of liberty."—lt is agreed that the people in their aflemblies, tempered by another coequal aflembly, and an executive coequal with either, are the best keepers of their liberties. But it is denied that in one aflembly, collective or re presentative, they are the best keepers : it may be reasonably questioned, whether they are not the worst ; because they are as sure to throw away their liberties, as a monarch or a senate untem peredare to take them ; with this additional evil, that they throw away their morals at the fame time ; whereas monarclis and senates femetimes by severity preserve them in some degree. In a simple democracy, the firft citizen, and the better fort of citizens, are part of the people, and are equally " concerned" with any others " in the " point of liberty." But is it clear that in other forms of government " the main interest and " concernment, both of kings and grandees, lies " either in keeping the people in utter ignorance " what liberty is, or eli'e in allowing and pleasing " them only with the name and shadow of liberty " instead of the substance ?" It is very true that knowlege is very apt to make people uneasy wnder an arbitrary and oppressive government : but a simple monarch or a sovereign senate, which is not arbitrary and oppressive rho absolute, if such cases can exist, would be interested to pro mote the knowlege of the nation. It must, however, be admitted, that simple governments will rarely if ever favor the dispersion or know lege among the middle and lower ranks of peo ple. But this is equally true of simple demo cracy : the people themselves, if uncontrouled, will never long tolerate a freedom of inquiry, debate, or writing ; their idols mull not be reflec ted 011, nor their ichemes and actions fc?miied, upon pain of popular vengeance, which isnotlefs terrible than that of despots or lovereign iena tors. An ESSAY on FREE TRADE and FINANCES. Written by a citizcn of Philadelphia in 1783. (Continued from No. XL.) TO escape the ruinous effwfts of this mode of supply, I think every exertion fliould be made to obtain our supplies at home ; it is certainly very plain our country is not exhaufled, it is full of every kind of supply which we need, and nothing further can be neceflary, than to find tliofe avenues from the sources of wealth in the hands of individuals, which lead into the public treasury, tliofe ways and proportions that are moftjufl, inoft equal, and moil easy to the peo ple. This is the firft great art of finance, that of economy in expenditures, is the next. Any body may receive money and pay it out; borrow money and draw bills ; but to raise and manage the internal revenue, so as to make the wealth of the country balance the public expenditures, is not so easy a talk, but yet I think noc so hard as to be impracticable ; unless this can be done, the greatefl conceivable abilities mull labor in vain, for it is naturally impoflible that any ellate which can not pay its expenditures, fliould con tinue long without embarraflinent and diminu tion, the load of debtmuft continually increase, and the interell will make a continual addition to that debt, and render the eflate more and more unable every year to clear itfelf ; bur if the estate can pay its expenditures, it is the heighth of n\adnefsnot to do it. If revenues can be l'pared fufficient to discharge the interefl of the debt, so as to flop its increase, the estate may be saved, and a future increase of revenue may in time wipe off the principal ; but 110 hope is left, if interefl upon interefl may continue to accumulate. And as the interefl of every indi vidual is infeperably conneCled with the public credit or state of the finances, it follows that this affair becomes a matter of the utmofl concern and very important moment to every person in the community, and therefore ought to be at tended to as a matter of the liigliefl national concern ; and no burden ought to be accounted too heavy, which is fufficient to remedy so great a mifchief. It may be objected to all this,°that the duties I propose are so extremely high, that firft, They will hurt our trade : And Tecond, Can have no chance of obtaining a general consent. To the firft I answer—As far as this tax tends to les sen the importation of hurtful luxuries and use less consumptions, it is the very object I have in view ; and it is so very light on all other arti cles, that the burden will be almofl insensible. But as to the second objection—it is in vain to trifle with a matter of such weight and importance, or weary our people with small plans and remi dies utterly inadequate to the purpose. In weighty matters, weak half allured attempts will appear to every one to be labor loft, and a ridi culous disproportion of the means to the end ; it is better in itfelf, as well as more likely to succeed with the people, to take flrong hold, and, with a bold firm aflurance, propose some thing, which when done, will be an adequate and effectual remedy.—Our national debt, inclu ding the supplies for theprefent year, I am told, by the Financier's estimate delivered to Congress, amounts to about thirty-five millions of dollars' the annual interefl of which will be some what above two millions of dollars, which, I think, may be railed by thetax I propose ; tho it is im poflible to tell with much precision, what the proceeds of a tax will be which has not been tri ed, it is very plain that the proceeds will be large, and so calculated as to be almofl wholly a clear f'a\ ing, not to fay a benefit to the country ; and if there should be deficiencies, a small additional tax may be laid in the usual way to supply them. Our annual expenditures, on the peace eftabliffi ment, may, I think, be reduced to a quarter or third of a million dollars, and perhaps, if our national debt was liquidated as it ought to be, a great saving might be made both of principal and interefl ; but the detail of tliefe matters is in every ones power who hasleifure and proper doc cuinents to make the calculations Without de fending to minutiae, I only mean to examine the great principles of resource and mode of supply which is within our power, and give my reasons as clear a.-» I can tor adopting a practical trial Such a practice would doubtless discover many things which noforefight can reach, and experi ence only can elucidate.- it is anuntrodden path which 1 recommend, and tho it can not be per fectly known yet it seems to have such an appear ance of advantage as deserves a trial. The ex pence and difficulty of collection will be no o-reat! er on the high tax I propose, than it wouldTje on a trifling one, which would produce less than a tenth part of thefupply which this would e niih, and therefore, if it ihould be j u dp- e d dent to make the trial, I think it most nlf/"' 1>«:,o wk* it up on such , Urgt M. it fufficiently productive, to become an I t worthy of strong effort and persevering dilligeu f in order to give it full effect. s^ce, ( To be continued.) CONGRESS ov the UNITED STATES~~ Begun and held at the City of Ncw-York, on Wednefd™ r' , ot March, t)ne Thousand Seven Hundred a;ia Ei g kv_\f n ™ An ACT for eitablilhing the SALARIES us the executive OFFICERSof GO VERNMENT their ASSISTANTS and CLERKS. c , f'' b "* Senate and Hafe cj ReprefmUtiuts tftkt V, -id Statu ofAmcrua m Longrefi That there (ball be allc j to the officer* hereafter mention,), the following payable quarterly at the Treasury of Ihe United Stales ■ n «f Secretary of the Treasury thr«* thousand five hundred Secretary in the department of State, three thousand live hundred dollars; to the Secretary in the departmeut of war, three thou, (and dollars ; to the Comptroller of the Treasury, two thoulai.d dollars ; to the Auflitor, fifteen hundred dollars; tonhe Treasurer two thouf„i.d dollars; to the Rafter, twelve hundred and fiftJ dollars; to the Governor of the Welter. Territory, for his I'alarv as such, and for discharging the duties of Superintendent of U dian affairs in the northern department, two thousand dollars to the three Judges of the Werfem Territory, each c , g ht hundred dollars; to the Afliftant ot the Secretary of the Treasury, fifteen hundred dollars ■ to the Chief Ckrk. in the department of State C'gln hundred dollars ; to the Chief Clerk in the department of war, fix hundred dollars . To the Secretary of the Wetter.! Ter ntory seven hundred and fifty dollars ; to the principal Cl-ik ot the Comptroller, eight hundred dollars; to theprincipalClerk ot the Audffor, iix hundred dollars; to the principal ClerS of,|» rrcafurcr fix hundred dollars. And be it further enafled, That the heads of the three depart mcnts firft above mentioned, lhall appoint such Clerks therein refpettively as thevfliafl find necefl'ary, and the salary of fjid Clerks refpeflively lhall not exceed the rate offive hundred dollars per an nuii). FREDERICK AUGUSTUS MUHLENBERG, Speaker of the House aj fieprefmtattm. JOHN ADAMS, Ficc-PrtJuiuit of the I'mti Stiui, and Prefiicnf of fa Smite. approved, sirTiMßtk the nth, 1789. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefdevt of the United Stilti. THE NATIONAL MONITOR No. XX. Be steady patriots to your public trust, A ficklc Lut jew will recti nize their individual duty to support and defend the inflitution. As it originated in necefpty, so 'its exig ence appears to be perpetuated more from that (auft than from the rcafon and fitnefs of things. To ■ahut else cat: be imputed the uniform conduCi ofthetivlliii} world with refpeCl to this momentous concern. Mm grow difgufled with old eflablijhments, and clavior for new ones : They anticipate every bleffmg from change : But under the wife J} inflitutions, the voict of discontent and sedition is heard. They give Mr fll ffrages for their bejl men, and immediately find fat/It with the work of their own hands—the agents of their own choice. This is not an exaggeration; expe rience ha< teflified to its truth. To what Jhall we at tribute this propensity, which militates so efentiall) with human happiness ? It is owing to the serf utility of human nature; a quality which requires all the wisdom, fortitude and address which can result from the bejl principles, and bejl experience, to counting its baneful effeCis. While the New Conf)itutiln was in its ratifying progress, this querulous temper discovered itfelf; for altho the whole continent was groaning under the pressure of those evils which flowed from the inadequa cy and weakness of the old confederation : Andtbt the universal voice called for an alteration, yet as soon as the deliberations of that enlightened bod) if men, the chosen, confidential, tried patriots of America who formed the Continental Convention, were known, and the Constitution they hadformed, was propofii to the people, the produCt of their labors was ajfailed,mif conftruedand ridiculed; their motives were impeached; their characters traduced; their abilities depreciated-, and their whole conduCi in convention vilified. Which is the charatter among the whole, that escaped the venom of fiander, and the poisoned arrows of defamation ? IVhile mankind continue what tbey are, a 'series of ftnultr conduld may be expeCled.—There are manyperfons in every society who hold opinions hojlile to all good govern ment ; there are others who are offo captious anduneafj a disposition, that itfeems as if they had fix or r. eternal enmity to candor and peace : There are others, whoft evil dispositions delight in disorder and coufufion. These classes, united to a numerous body of difappo'tnted expeClants, form the phalanx of opposition to " the Powers that be." From such beings, the wises! and best inflitution that ever existed, will meet with ajfaulti —andfrom, attacking the form of the Government, the transfer of their evil offices is to the adminifl ration of it- It will therefore be of great consequence to the pedc?, freedom and security of the Union, that particular at tention' Jhould be paid to the sources, from whence originate the insinuations, the flanders and clamfs again ft public characters. This subjeCt Jhall fa P ur ' filed in a future number. Published by JOHN FENNO, No. 9, Maiden'* Lane, near the New-York.— pr.M'J