[No. XLIII.]
T H~E TABLE T.—No. XLIII.
" The pafions and prejudices of men often ?najk
ihtntfelves under the names of virtuous qualities."
MY lail number exhibited to the view of
the reader two characters, who, with
ut any bad intentions, were instrumental in
keeping alive a spirit of jealousy and uneasiness
among the people,relative to the affairs of govern
ment 0 I ftiall now introduce some more of my
acquaintance, whose motives perhaps are not
quite so unexceptionable.
The roify Fumosus is more troublesome, if
not more dangerous, than either of the cha
racters just mentioned. His paflions are so
tumultuous that he can never examine any cir
cumstance with candor, and deliberation. He
carries every thing to extremes. Whether he is
; n or out of office, he creates many enemies
atrainft the government,by his rashness andindif
cretion. If he or some of his particular friends
should happen to have a leading influence, he
funs into a vehemence of applaufeon public men
and measures. Should the reverse be the cafe,
the whole fury of his paflions takes a different
course. He joins the discontented and seditious,
and reprobates public proceedings with acrimo
ny and revenge. Though he enters into no sys
tems to overthrow the government, and though
bis paflions will vary or subside, yet he is a
peat fomenter of jealousy and uneasiness
among the people. His petulance does not,
like that of Infelix, waste itfelf in indefinite
clamor, but he points his arrows at particular ob
jects, and hunts after them with eagerness and
sage. Different passions and feelings at times are
uppermost. By turns he lhews jealousy, envy,
rei'entment, antipathy, and attachment ; and
which ever of them prevails,it does not flop short
of the highefl degree of excess. When disap
pointed, he raves at the administration ; when
fuccefsful, he idolizes it, and threatens perdition
to its enemies. Upon the w hole, Fumosus,
though he is not a man of knavery and intrigue,
is still a dangerous character. The impetuosity
of his conduct is calculated to excite undue pre
judices against the government, and frighten ma
ny well-meaning people with falfe alarms.
My acquaintance Profundus puzzles many
people exceedingly. 'No person can penetrate
more readily into the view of another.—He is
cool, designing and mysterious. His favorite
theories must not be called in question ; and he
approves or disapproves of any public tranfavtion,
according as it will promote or fruftrate his pe
culiar fy'ftem of politics. Such characters as
Phofundus are not common. It requires re
feirches so elaborate, and an attention to objects
so minute and persevering to form abflract sys
tems, that afinall proportion of mankind will e
wrnake the attempt. Few men have patience
aid application,and fewer still have the abilities
andaddrefsto proceed systematically Suchfpe
culative men often lead others astray ; because
their plans, when compared with practice and
experiment, are fallacious. I entertain a good
opinion of the talents of Pro fun dus, and I have
noreafonto scruple his integrity. But he is so
dark and incomprehensible, that when he hap
pens to take a wrong way of thinking, he draws
others into the fame error, by starting difficul
ties, with which common minds are perplexed
and alarmed. I would recommend it to the ho
"tfl: part of my readers, who love tranquility,
to have little to do with men, whom they cannot
understand. Plain,practical politicians, who are
more noted for good actions than for loud or fair
»ords, are the lafeft guide and counsel.
The vanity and ostentation of Opinus is ve
-7 disgusting. His dislike to public measures pro
ceeds lrom an affected Angularity of opinion. It
ishishigheft aim to recommend himfelf to the
world as a person of more than ordinary discern-
n 'ent. This easily accounts for the spirit of op
position which is so predominating a part of his
character. If he should acquiesce in any mea
'ue,which he did not originally propofe,it would
prevent the pride and triumph of oppofmg the
current opinion of mankind, and making his own
•J-gacity more conspicuous. The only conclusion
that can be drawn from his disapprobation of
'"yroeafure, is, that he did not introduce it
it it is no argument that the thing is wrong.
have I delineated foine of the motives
J. Salifications of a few individuals, for whose
I have a great value. Their conver
sion, however, sometimes makes unfavorable
'"'P'ellions ; and I find that some of their aflo
j la!es ca tch their foibles. The peevishness of
, I^ tL,x 'ours the temper of some people agninft
npV' CVe - rnnient: . T' le incapacity of Bene volus,
Kiin" un 4 ua lifi c d to give Inch advice, as the
11 -"els of his disposition tempts his acquaint-
WEDNESDAY, September 9, 1789.
ance to aflc of him. The turbulence of Fumo •
sus, frightens his companions into a dread oi
imaginary evils. The mystery of Profundus
entangles many an honelVman t in doubts The va
nity andpompof Opinus allures theHi allow and
fickle-minded into error and instability.
It would be well for people to obtain a fatis
factory iolution to this question ; whether there
are not more causes that induce public men to
seek the public prosperity, than probably influ
ence either of the chara<slers marked out in this
speculation.
NEW-YORK, September 9, 1789.
SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.
In the HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES of the
UNITED STATES,
MONDAY, AUGUST 31.
In committee of the whole oil the Judicial Bill.
THIRD SECTION UNDER CONSIDERATION.
MR. LivermorE : I think this law will en
tirely change the form of government of
the United States.
Several obfcrvations have heen made on the
clause : It is said to be the hinge on which the
whole turns : Some of the objections which I have
thrown out, have been attempted to be answered
—among others the great ex pence—by expence I
do not mean the salaries of Judges—this will how
ever be greater than the whole expence of the
Judiciary throughout the United States ; but I
refer to thr general expenccs, which mull be
borne by the people at large, for jails, court
houses, &c.—the expences of jurors and witnesses,
and other incidental charges,will be another great
burthen : This is atprefent borne without repin
ing, as the people receive compensation in person
al security and public justice ; but if all tliefe are
to be doubled throughout, it will be justly consi
dered as intolerable. Another burthen is the ra
pidity of thecourfe of prolecution in tliefe courts,
by which debtors will be obliged very suddenly
to pay their debts at a great disadvantage : Some
thing like this, occasioned the insurrection in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts : In other States
similar modes of rapidity in the collection of
debts have produced conventions : This has been
the cafe to the Northward, and as I have been in
formed, has also to the Southward.
This new fangled system will eventually swal
low up the State Courts, as those who are in fa
vor of this rapid mode of getting debts will have
recourse to them. He then adverted to the claffi
ingcircumftances which must arifein the admini
stration of justice, by these independent courts
having fitnilar powers. . Gentlemen, said he, may
be facetious refpecfiing dividing the liorfe—but
these are serious difficulties—the inltances men
tioned by the gentleman from South Carolina, do
not apply—the officer here is the fame—the fame
Sheriff has the precepts committed to him—and
the execution does not claffi—the fame goal ans
wers for both, &c.
I do not think that the difficulties have been
answered by any of the examples brought for the
purpose :
As to the instance of the trial for piracy in the
State of South Carolina, that was a particular cafc,
which could not otherwise be provided for ; but
these so rarely happen, that no precedent can be
drawn from them, to render it neceflary to estab
lish these perpetual courts.
He then refered to the observation which had
been made refpedting those who are opposed to
theclaufe,offeringafubftitute,andfaid,he thought
upon the whole that the motion made by an Hon.
Gentleman from South-Carolina, (Mr. Burke,)
that there ffiould be no diftridt courts, is better
than any substitute.
It may be proper here to refer to the Constitu
tion : He then read the clause upon this fubjedt—
The Supreme Federal Court is to have original
jurifdidtion only in certain fpecified cases—in all
other,it is to have only appellate jurifdidtion : It
is argued from this, that there are to be Inferior
Federal Courts, from which these appeals are to
be made : If the fconftitution had taken from the
State Courts all cognizance of federal causes,
something might be said ; but this is not the cafe.
The State Courts are allowed jurifdidtion in these
cases.
It has been objedted that bonds taken by the
Judges of the Supreme Court, cannot be sued in
the State Courts : I do not fee why this cannot be
done : Similar procelles have been usual among
us in times past, and there has been no difficulty.
Admiralty Courts ffiould have cognizance of all
maritime matters, and cases of seizures ffiould al
so be committed to their decision. I hope there
fore that the clause will be disagreed to, orftruck
out, and that the bill may be rejedted, that a ffiort
concise system may be adopted.
r Published on h
Mr. Vining : I conceive that the inftitutiou
of general and independent tribunals, are eilential
to the fair and impartial administration of the
laws of the United States—That the power of
making laws, of executing laws, and a judicial
administration of such laws, is in its nature, inse
parable andindivifible,if not " JuJlice might be said
to b: lame as visll as blind among us." The only
plausible argument which has been urged againlt
this clause, is the expence : It is true, that ex
pence mull in some degree be neceflarily incurred,
but it will chiefly consist and end with the organ
ization of your courts, and the erecftion of such
buildings as may be eflential—filch as Court-
Houses, Jails, and Offices, as the gentleman has
mentioned—and what, at all events, do such ex
pences amount to—they are the price which is
paid for the fair and equal administration of
your laws : From your amazingly encreafing sys
tem of government, causes must neceflarily multi
ply in a proportionately extensive ratio : These
causes must be tried some where, and whether it
is in a State Court, or a Federal Judicature, can,
in the article of expence, make but little differ
ence to the parties : It is only (for the fake of
more impartial justice) transfering the bufinel';s
from one tribunal to another.
The gentleman has told us, that the people do
not like courts—that they have been opposed and
prevented by violence—nay, by an
in Maflachufetts : Surely'this operates as a pow
erful reason to prove that there should be a gener
al, independent, and energetic judicature—other
wise, if either the State Judges should be so incli
ned, or a few lons of facftion choose to aflcmble,
they could ever fruftrate the objects of Juftice —
and besides, from the different periods fixed by
the Constitution of the United States, and the
different Constitutions of the several States, with
refpeclto the continuance of the Judges in office,
it is equally impolfible and inconliftent, to make
a general uniform establishment, so as to accom
modate them to your government.
I wi(h to fee Justice so equally distributed as
that every citizen of the United States should be
fairly dealt by, and so impartially administered,
that every fubjetft or citizen of tlie World, whe
ther foreigner or alien, friend or foe, ftiotild be
alike fatisfied: By this means you would expand
the doors of justice, encourage emigration from
all countries into your own, and in Ihort, would
make the United States of America, not only an
Asylum of Liberty, but a Sanctuary of Justice :
The faith of treaties would be preserved in-vio
lately—your extensive funding system would have
its intended operation—and your revenue, your
navigation, and your impost laws would be exe
cuted foas to receive their many advantages—and
in effetft establish the public and private credit of
the Union.
Mr. Stone : I have given the arguments all
the attention which their weight demands, consi
dering the refpediability of the characters which
have spoken upon the fubjeifl.
It has been said that the clause in the Constitu
tion is imperative—if this is the cafe, let us fee
where it will carry us : It is conceded on all hands
that the establishment of these Courts is immuta
ble ; but the Constitution fays, that Congress shall
constitute such inferior Courts from time to time.
The Constitution gives you a right to extend the
judiciary power to all tliofe cases fpecified ; bur
it does not fay that these powers shall be exercised
over all these cases.
He then extended this idea to theLegiflative Pow
er,which it cannot be pretended(faid he)isincom
plete, because it is not extended to all possible
cases : Do yoti divest yourfelf of the power by noC
exercising it ? Certainly not. This idea involves
the principle mentioned by the gentleman from
New-York, (Mr. Benfon,) that the establishment
of these inferior tribunals or diftridt courts, will
draw the whole judiciary power along with them ;
fothat the clause which rellricfts their cognizance
to a certain sum, is a nullity.
State Judges may be considered in two refpedls,
as men, and as Judges : As men, they are to sub
mit to the modification of the Constitution, as it
respects them as citizens : As Judges, they are to
consider their relation as such to the Constitution,
and are to administer justice agreeable to that
Constitution, or they may resign. I can hardly
bring myfelf to consider the fubjedt in a reverse
point of view : If it is admitted that the Judges
of the several States cannot take cognizance of a
law of the United States, because they are laws
de novo, you annihilate their judicial capacity at
a blow.
It appears tome that there is nothing that the
State Courts are not competent to, but certain ca
ses which are specially designated.
He then went on to fhewthat there was no spe
cies of treason which could be committed against
ir.e/Jay ami Saturd