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Whether the winner laughs or not, the loser will complain.

THE sources of clamor and disquietude in any society multiply in proportion as it becomes opulent and civilized. Nothing is more evident than that competition is a very forcible spring of action; and unless there are more men than business, more candidates than offices, private as well as public affairs will be managed with languor and inattention. The competitors are of course engaged in a kind of warfare with each other; and are only restrained from violent hostilities by those sentiments of politeness and propriety, which are inspired by good-breeding and a knowledge of the world. It is easy however to distinguish the different sides in which men range themselves, and the different objects they are pursuing. Those who are rivals may carry external marks of good-will and confidence, but the disguise is easily penetrated. As those who are disappointed and discontented form a more numerous class, than those who are satisfied and successful, it must be expected that complaints and reproaches will give the predominating tone to conversation. In whatever company one falls it must not therefore agitate him to find a strong propensity to complain.

In creating the various branches of the executive department of government, it is natural to expect the number of candidates will far exceed the places that are to be filled. This opens a great scene of competition. The inevitable result of such a situation is, that many persons must be disappointed, and some will be disgusted. It would be paying too great a compliment to human nature to imagine that, in the great number whose expectations are frustrated, there will be none who secretly wish, and even openly demonstrate their wishes, to impede the success, and blur the reputation of our national government. There is however a circumstance that will much, though perhaps not totally restrain a disposition to censure and oppose the administration.

It is so universally believed that our chief magistrate, in all his measures and appointments is actuated by just and impartial motives, that few of the disappointed will think it worth while to raise clamors. The public ear will be shut against the insinuations of the artful, and the reproaches of the petulant. As restless and discontented men are more active and vigilant, than those who enjoy a satisfaction of mind, either from fortunate affairs, or from a natural calmness of spirits, there will of course be more people to vex and disturb the government, than to applaud and vindicate its proceedings. From this view of the matter, honest and moderate men, who have the public prosperity at heart, should guard themselves against improper impressions from those, who will be apt to grumble through envy and disappointment. There are unavoidably a great proportion of persons in every society, who may be denominated unfortunate. Whether their ill luck is the effect of imprudence, or merely adverse fortune it may have the same influence on their temper, and judging by their own feelings, they may seriously imagine every thing is going wrong. In every community such men are capable of doing great mischief. The people of the United States are too well experienced in political transactions to be easily deceived, and drawn into tumult and dissensions. But still there is in human nature a strong propensity to take part with the unfortunate, and to believe their complaints have some foundation. (To be continued.)

We are happy to have it in our power to enrich the Miscellany of the Gazette, by the following speculation on the interesting subjects of

REPRESENTATION and COMPENSATION.

I RECOLLECT but one good reason for a numerous representation of the people—that is, the greater certainty of having their interests and sentiments understood in the representative assembly. The objects of the national government are not the local, but the general concerns. Of course, a moderate number is sufficient. Responsibility decreases as the body increases. In a small assembly a member has more to do, and more to answer for. He is more in public view, and feels his industry, and his generous passions excited by a stronger stimulus. In a numerous assembly he feels his personal weight and influence diminished. The members will act less as individuals, and more by combinations and parties. If a man has not great talents, singly, he can do little. If he has, he gains an ascendancy, and attaches many to his views. Their association is cemented by the sympathy of acting together—by the fear of losing a favorite point—by the anger on having it disputed—by the joy of gaining it, or the chagrin of a disappointment. By degrees the two

sides are divided, strongly marked and agitated by the spirit of their body (l'esprit de corps, as the French term it.) In fact, all great assemblies have been led astray by the spirit of party. Perhaps all parties are nearly equally vindictive, violent and blind. The true check upon them is the interposition of the public sentiment. A free press, and an enlightened people will form a controul over all parties; and oblige them to seek the means of superiority and power by the promotion of the public good. Party spirit is an evil; but it is the inevitable consequence of a numerous assembly. It is not, however, impossible to draw good from evil. These are the consequences which result from the principles; but it is obviously preferable to exclude the evil, if possible. Though parties may promote the public good, they often do infinite mischief. They disturb the tranquility, impair the happiness, and endanger the safety of society.

Whether it is possible so to constitute a small assembly as wholly to banish, or in a considerable degree to restrain this spirit, is a problem of some nicety. Its solution is highly important to mankind, and especially to the United States. A government strong by the means of a rich treasury, by troops, and by the habits of a people broken to subjection may be disturbed, but will not be endangered by party disputes. But in America, government rests on public opinion, and we should carefully avoid those causes which are powerful enough to subvert its foundations.

In forming a legislative assembly, we should counteract as much as possible the gregarious disposition of the members, which is the ailment of faction. It will be necessary to analyze the human character, and to lay open the motives which lead public men to combine together, and to act in parties. It is true that a public life calls forth the strongest passions of the heart. But it is also true that these passions are not continually in action. On great and rare occasions, they are roused to act with violence. But ordinarily they are held suspended by motives of less strength, but of a more uniform and permanent influence. These motives are the sense of weakness, the love of ease, and the love of power.

Suppose a member of common ability in an assembly of fifty. He has a fiftieth part of the duty, as well as of the weight of the body. Increase the assembly to two hundred members. His voice will lose three fourths of its influence. He will lose more of his responsibility—be further removed from public view—and as party influence will be more active, he will probably lose nine tenths of his personal weight, and his vote will become proportionably of less consequence to his constituents, and to the public. Suppose him a weak but well intentioned man, his sense of weakness and sense of duty will combine to subject him to the influence of some leading member. Knowing that his voice will not govern the vote of any other, and doubting how to give his own, he will relieve his suspense by following the guide in whom he places most confidence.

The love of ease is a more powerful agent than is generally supposed. It is the greatest impediment to eminence. Rest is the reward of labor, and the hope of this reward is probably one of the springs of action, even with those men who seem to abhor repose. We compare action with rest. We calculate the value of the object proposed to be attained by our exertions, and the price of those exertions. A member conscious of being able to effect little, singly, will not make the attempt. He will be obliged to add his strength to a party. There is something unaccountable in the sympathy of many minds. Probably a large assembly of the wisest men would not be wholly exempt from that distrust of their own understandings, and that complacency towards the errors and wishes of one another which has been found totally to banish reason, and even humanity, from mobs and riotous meetings.

That the administration of a government should correspond with its principles, and be secured from faction and commotion, it seems to be important that the legislative powers should be lodged in as few hands as may be necessary for procuring information of the state of the society, and that they should be carefully selected from the best informed and best disposed citizens—men, who understand, and are able to manage business, and who, in a body of fifty, are individually important, will act more according to the dictates of their own understandings, and be less influenced by party passions than the assembly of two hundred. The great question of the Constitution had divided the community. It was natural to expect the new Congress would be tinged with the hue of the rival parties. It is not owing to any miracle, suspending the human passions, that the national legislature has been so remarkably

distinguished by the spirit of candor and moderation. Nothing like faction or cabal and intrigue has been charged upon that body—and the public are disposed to think favorably of their patriotism and independency of sentiment. Two events may be contemplated, either of which would wholly change the character and conduct of the assembly; increasing the number of the members would expose the government to faction—it would diminish the agency of the understanding, and augment that of the passions. Improper persons would more easily get elected. For the number of suitable persons is not great in any country—of these, many will be indisposed to the duty. Probably, this country is as little deficient in this respect as any whatever. If however more representatives are to be elected than a due proportion of those who are willing and qualified to serve, the probability of inferior candidates being elected will rise. Learned men have disputed whether so large a territory could remain united under one government, even if the administration should be entrusted to men of consummate wisdom and incorruptible virtue. The chance would be made considerably more unfavorable by the appointment of men of a different character.

To make the people happy, and the government permanent, two principles must be regarded. That the members of the legislature be few, and that provision should be made for drawing forth the best qualified citizens to serve.

In a republic, it is not necessary, perhaps not safe, that a citizen should be allowed, and surely he should not be obliged to lay the public under obligations of gratitude to him by serving at a loss. Pay for services is as republican as it is equitable. Adequate compensation may be understood very variously in its application to particular cases. It must always mean such compensation as will secure to the public the performance of the services in question. If the pay of the members of the Legislature is established at an higher rate than is necessary to secure the attendance of men best qualified to serve, it is improper. The interest of the people requires the adoption of the principle insisted upon. Many will dispute the application of the doctrine to the case, though none will deny the doctrine itself. The dispute, if any should arise, will be of the less consequence, because as it is a question of fact only, no inference unfavorable to the intentions of the house could be drawn from the tenor of the bill which has passed the house of representatives. Those who may happen to be violent on the subject, will be sorry to find any reasons to vindicate what has been done, because it will disappoint their passions of an expected gratification. But candid men will consider the principles which have been discussed in this speculation, and they will not overlook the rate of compensation which has been allowed to members of the former Congress by the respective States—the average of which is said to be equal to the sum proposed by the bill. They will also note that that body being in session the whole year was better paid than the new Congress, which, probably, after the first year will not sit more than one fourth of the time, and that the recesses, and the diminished business of eighteen hundred members of the State Legislatures will make a saving by the national government. Perhaps, however, it would have been advisable to have reduced the pay, as it is not an object which the members will deem a balance for any subtraction of the approbation and confidence of the people.

Another circumstance is worthy of being mentioned. The difficulty of preserving a government over a great tract of country is principally in proportion to the inconvenience of assembling the members from the extreme parts to the seat of government. Very low pay would render this inconvenience speedily intolerable, and produce a general desire for a division of the Union. The distant members submit to a kind of banishment, and cannot regulate their private concerns. This furnishes no reason for profusion and extravagance—but it is hereby a caution against extreme parsimony. There is a just medium which is to be preferred—it will extend the principle of Union to the extremities, and bring the outside of the circle nearer to the centre. The people will consider, therefore, whether the Union is not more valuable than any other object, and whether they would desire to have any small savings of money, which, in any future period, should endanger that blessing. These observations are submitted to the candid public. If upon an impartial examination, they should be found to have less weight than the writer has given them, the voice of the public will unquestionably reach the walls of the Legislature. For in this country, the general sentiment of the wise and worthy is law.