The RIGHT CONSTITUTION of a COMMON
WEALTH EXAMINED.
[Continued from our
AN ariitocracy, like tlie Roman senate, be
tween the abolition of royalty and the inltitution
of the tribunate, is of itfelf a faction, a private
partial intereit. Yet it waslefs fotlian an aliem
bly annually chosen by the people, and vested
with all authority, would be ; for l'uch an aflem
bly runs falter and easier into an oligarchy than
an hereditary ariltocratical aflembly. The lead
ing members having, as has been before shewn in
detail, the appointment of judges, and the nomi
nation to all lucrative and honorable offices, they
have thus the power to bend the whole executive
and judicial authority to their own private in
tereit, and by tliefe means to increase their own
reputations, wealth, and influence, and those of
their party, at every new election : whereas, in
a simple hereditary ariltocracy, it is the intereit
of the members in general to preserve an equality
among themselves as long as they can ; and as
they are smaller in number, and have more know
ledge, they can moreealily unite for that purpose,
and there is no opportunity for any one to in
crease his power by any annual elections. An
aspiring arillocratic therefore mult take more
time, and use more address, to augment his in
fluence : yet we find in experience, that even
hereditary ariltocracies have never been able to
prevent oligarchies riling up among them, but by
the most rigorous, severe and tyrannical regula
tions, l'uch as the institution of inquilitions, &c.
It may found oddly to lay that the majority is
a fadtion ; but it is, neverthelels, literally just.
If the majority are partial in their own favour, if
they refufe or deny a perfect equality to every
member of the minority, they area faction : and
as a popular aflembly, collective or reprei'entative,
cannot aCt, or will, but by a vote, the firlt (tep
tuey take, if they are not unanimous, occasions a
divilion into majority and minority, that is, intd
two parties, and the moment the former is unjult
itisa faJtion. The Roman decemvirs themselves
were let up by the people, not by the senate :
much longer time would have been required for
an oligarchy to have grown up among the patri
cians and in the senate, if the people had not
interposed and demanded a body of laws, that is, a
conltitution. The senate oppoled the requilition
as long as they could but at last appointed the
decemvirs, much againll their own inclinations,
and merely in compliance with the urgent cla
mours of the people. Nedham thinks, that "as
" the firlt founders of the Roman liberty did well
<£ in driving out their kings; 10, on the other
" fide, they did very ill in fettling a standing
" authority within themselves." It is really very
injudicious, and very ridiculous, to call those Ro
man nobles who expelled their kings, founders of
the Roman liberty : noteing was farther from
their heads or their hearts than national liberty ;
it was merely a Itruggle for power between a
king and a body of haughty envious nobles ; the
intereit of the people and of liberty had no Ihare
in it. The Romans might do well in driving out
their king : he might be a bad and incorrigible
character ; and in such a cafe any people may do
well in expelling or depoling a king. But they
did not well in dcmolifhing the lingle executive
magiltracy : they should have then demanded a
body of laws, a definite constitution, and an in
tegral lhare in thelegillature for the people, with
a prccife delineation of the power of the firlt ma
giltiate'and senate. In this cafe they would have
been entitled to the praise of founders of Roman
liberty : but as it was, they only substituted one
fyltein of tyranny for another, and the new one
was worse than the old. They certainly " did
" very ill in fettling a Itandingfovereigu l'upreine
" authority within themselves." Thus far our
author is perfectly in the right, andtlie reason he
gives for this opinion is very well founded : it is
the fame that was given thousands of years before
him, by Plato Socrates, and others, and has been
conltantly given by all succeeding writers in fa
vour of mixed governments, and againlt simple
ones, " because, lying open to the temptations of
" honor and profit," or, in other words, haying
their ambitijn and vanity, avaiiceand lust, hatred
and resentment, malice and revenge, in jfliort
their felt-love, and all their paifions (" which are
" fails too big for any human bulk") unrestrain
ed by any controuling power, they were at once
transported by them ; made use of their public
power not for the good of the commonwealth, but
tor the gratification of their private pallions,
whereby tliey'put the commonwealth into frequent
flames of discontent and fediiion. Thus far is
very well : but when our author goes 011, " which
" might all have been prevented, could they
" have fettled the ltate free, indeed, by placing
" an orderly fuccedion of supreme authority in
" the hands of th<; people," he can be followed
by 110 one who knows what is in man, and in
society—because that supreme authority falls out
of the whole body into a majority at the firft vote.
To exped: fell-denial from men, when they have
a majority in their favour, and consequently
power to gratify themselves, is to diibelieve all
history and universal experience ; it is to tiiibelieve
Revelation and the Word of God, which informs
us, the heart is deceitful above all things, and
desperately wicked. There have been examples
of (elf-denial,and will be again; but l'uch exalted
virtue never yet exilted in any large body of men
and lalted long : and our author's argument re
quires it to be proved, not only that individuals,
but that nations and majorities of nations, are ca
pable not only of a iingle aift, or a few aifts of
disinterested justice and exalted felf-denial, but
of a course of l'uch heroic virtue for ages and ge
nerations ; and not only that they are capable of
this, but that it is probable they will pra<flife it.
There is 110 man lo blind as not to lee, that to
talk of founding a government upon a fuppofiti
-011 that nations and great bodies of men, left to
themselves will practiie a course of felf-denial,
is either to babble like a new-born infant, or to
deceive like an unprincipled impoltor. Nedham
hasliimfelf acknowledged, in leveral parts of this
•work, the depravity of men in very ftrongterms.
In this fifth reafonhe avers " temptations of 11011-
" our and profit to be fails too big for any human
" bulk." Why then does he build a system on
a foundation which he owns to be f'o unliable ?
If his mind had been at liberty to follow his own
ideas and principles, he must have seen that a
fuccelfion of supreme authority in the hands of
the people, by their house of representatives, is
at firlt ail ariltocracy asdefpotical as a Reman se
nate, and becomes an oligarchy even sooner than
thatallembly fell into the decimvirate. There is
this infallible disadvantage infucha government,
even in companion with an hereditary ariltocra
cy, that it lets in vice, profligacy and corruption,
like a torrent, with tyranny ; whereas the latter
often guards the morals of the people with the
utmost leverity : even the despotism of arilto
cracy prelerves the morals of the people.
(To be continued.J
An ESSAY on FREE TRADE and. FINANCES.
[Continued from No. XXVI.J
I come now to the confide ration of the prac
ticability of the mode of taxation which I propo
lied, ami which 1 do conceive is a matter of ca
pital weight in this di scullion, for which I do re
ly on these two grand propositions. ilt. That
whatever is the real, great interest of the peo
ple, they may, by proper measures, be made to
believe and adopt: And, 2d. That whatever is
admitted to be a matter of common and important
interest, in the general opinion of the people,
may be easily put in practice, by wisdom, pru
dence, and due management of the affairs. I do
contend, that when this tax is fairly proposed to
the public, with a proper elucidation of the evils
it avoids, and the advantages which result from
it, it will not be looked on as a burden of opprel
fion, aniinpolition of power, but as the purchase
of our molt precious blelfings, as a measure abso
lutely neceilary to our molt cliential and impor
tant interelts ; therefore any attempt to avoid this
tax, by smuggling or any other way, will be
deemed by general consent, anatft of meanness ;
an avoidance of a due share of the public burden;
si ultrating the neceilary plans of public fafety,
and rendering ineffectual the public measures
adopted by general conlent, for the public secu
rity, tranquility and liappinefs. isucli an action
implies in it gieat meanness of character in the
agent, and a high crime against the State, and
the detection of it will be conlidered as a very
material service to the commonwealth. Where
any actions are deemed crimes, scandals and nui
sances by the general voice of the people, detec
tions and informations against them are reputa
ble ; they cease to be infamous—the infamy of an
informer does not take place in such instances.
The reasons of governmental measures ought
always to attend their publication lb far as to af
ford good means of conviction to the people at
large, that their objeCt and tendency is the public
good. This greatly facilitates their execution
and success. 'Tis hard governing people against
their interests, their persuasions, and even againlt
their prejudices. 'Tis better to court tlicir un
derltaiuhngs lirlt withreafon, candor and sinceri
ty, and we may be almolt lure all their pailions
will follow loon. I abhor a mysterious govern
ment. I think an adminiltration, like a private
man, which affeifts to have a great many iecrets
that must not be explained, has generally agreat
many faults which will not bear telling ; or a great
deal of corruption, which will not bear exami
ning. Government, like private persons, may
indeed have l'ecrets, which ought to be kept so ;
but in that cafe, caution lhoulii be used against
any intimations or hints getting abroad, even
that there are such l'ecrets, or any lecrets:
for this would produce an anxious enquiry and
folicitousinfpeCtion, which mightmake the keep
ing thefecret more difficult, and besides bring on
many other inconveniencies arising from imm
berlefs apprehensions, which such acircumftance
would give birth to. An oltentatious given out
that there are mighty l'ecrets in the cabinet, or
many myitcries in the State that must not be pry.
Ed too clofcly into, is the very contrary of all this,
and generally is a sign of a weak adminiltration,
and not seldom of a corrupt one; Lut of n
lie measures, which require explanations'r/f"
people, that of taxes, which touches their
ney, which is always a very sensible pa a tto '
Hand as chief; and to make these <r 0 ' R:; - v
thing well, 'tis always neceilkry to tore-id ,
verlal conviction, ill. That the money
in taxes is neceflary for the public , ,
2 dly, 1 hat it will certainly be fX) >' ® 1
only on the objects for which 'tis a Iked aucUivl,
and if these two things are really °.i '
will rarely be much difficulty in making iw" 6
be believed through the moll sensible part oftl!"
commonwealth ; but of these two things e J
are not really true, or not really and geneJk
beheved, I dont know that a 11 anding army v, u( ,|d
be fufhcient to collect the taxes. I ain 0 f 0 • •
on their force, authority and influence Hketh
conquelb of the British army, would last „ 0 lT
germ any place than they staid to fupporti-
When ever they ilrall go away, I i mag f„ e the L ;
will find that they have left behind themi:ifi n i tt :
ly more abhorrence than obedience amon® the
people. Though lam clearly of opinion°that
there mult exilt an ultimate force or power of
compulsion in every effective and good govern
ment, yet 'tis plain to me, that such force is ne
ver to be put in a<ftion against the general convic
tion or opinion of the people ; nor indeed do 1
believe it es er can be so exercifed,with fuccefsand
final efl'eifl, for every attempt of this kind tends to
convulsions and death. Such an ultimate force in
deed ought to fall upon and correct tliofe whofia
against the peace, interest and security of the
public, but this can be done with fafety and ad
vantage only in cases where the crime pumfhed
is against the opinions, the sentiments and moral
or political principles, which generally prevail
in the people ; for if the moll violent declaimer
and mover of feditioh in a government, fliould
happen to be received by the people as a patriot,
and his harangues fliould be eagerly adopted a?
the doctrines of their liberties and rights, anyat
tempt topunilh him would be in vain or ufeleft;
foreitherthe people would interpose and refcije
him, or if he was puniihed, they would consider
hnn as the martyr of their cause, and thereby the
public uneasiness, tumult and uproar would be
augmented.
(To be continued.J
THE NATIONAL MONITOR. No. XIV.
" Self-love but fcrves the virtuous mind to wake.
As the lmall pebble stirs the peaceful lake ;
The centre mov'd, a circle straight succeeds.
Another still, and still another spreads;
Friend, parent, neighbour, fii ft it will embrace,
Its country next; and next all human race ;
Wide and more wide, th' overflowings of the mind
Takes ev'ry creaturc in of, ev'rv kind ;
Earth imiies aiound with boundlcfs bounty blest,
And Heav'n beholds its image in its brcaft."
THE words local attachment, an J partial pr?->
judices,have hadfuch a peat rung upon them, that the)
now jornt the mojt uncertain and confufed found ima
ginable : But so far at they are understood with
any precifton, they convey an idea that is almtfi itn'i
verfally reprobated—with how much reason will a(-
pear, when it is considered that very jew of the hw
man race are without those attachments and preju
dices ; and if they generally were, the condition of
humanity would be altered infinitely for the worse.
The truth is, those attachments are interwoven lit
the very texture of our natures by the Author of Ex
ijtence, and subserve the mo ft valuable and important
purposes ; to these we are indebted for the noblejl ex
ertions of the human mind, and they prove the fpritl
of the fine ft enjoyments of life.
There are but few minds so capaciously formed, is
to embrace the interests of a large community, in such
manner as to enter into all their enjoyments and dif
trejfes, with those lively sensations which fyvipathy ex
cites for a friend, a family, or a neighbourhood. It"
generally true, that in proportion to the txpanfion if
what is called the philanthropic principle, in the fane
proportion it is faint and inoperative—and a perfo"
totally dejlitute of local and partial attachments, viill
want the amor patria in the bejl sense of the words.
It is not intended by these remarks to advocate a eon
trafted and felfifh principle—they are not dejigned
to fanftion that local policy, which shuts up the oejt af
fections of the heart, and confines every benevolent
wish to the spot where we were bom, or to the par
ticular circle with which we happen to be more particu
larly connelled.—They are dejigned to abate that
ardour of spirit which proscribes all partialities and
predilections,however jnftjfiable ; for we deceive our-
J'eves byf'ppofing that : heje attachments can be anni
hilated, or that it wouldJerve any valuable pnrpofe
life if they could.
As in the genera! administration of human affairs,
the be ft interejt of society is promoted by every indivi
dual's purfutng with steadiness, andperjeveranc ' their
own particular advantage in conformity to the laws---
so the great objects of patriotism are mojt essential'/
advanced, by the attachments which are difcovere ty
every person to the state, the country, the town,
neighbourhood, the family, &c. with which they are
more immediately connefied—this is nature,reafon/' 1
common sense.
PubliJhed by JOHN FENNO, No. 9, MA / ID p EN '
Lane, near tlic Ofwcgo-Markct, NeWtYork.—'[3«*