("Thursday, June 25, 17&7. tUhate upon the Billfor ejlablipiingthe Treasury Department. Mr. Pace moved that these words '* Who frail digejl and report flans jor the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the Jupport of public credit" should be (truck out of the fecund clauf oi the bill : He added some observations to (hew the impro priety of any man's being impowercd to digest plans of revenue or any other for the House : it was true, he said, that some fuc officer as this did originate such plans and digests in other coun tries, but then it mtift be remembered, that in England particu larly, the minifterwas always a member of that House, wher money bills originated ; and that from thence he derived the righ to interfere with, and bring forward his proportions upon the fubjc&ot revenue; but he hoped this House would never perm: the head of any department to carve out work for them, and in troduce an undue influence in the representative body. Mr. Benson observed, that except this clause is retained in the bill, we (hall have no plans at all; the person who is to fill tin office, whoever he may be, has no power by the clause, to carry any thing intoeffett* he caw only propose. The concurrence of thr House, the Senate and the President, are neceflary to give efficacy to his plans: Should this clause be ftruckout, it efte&ually defeats the design of the bill. Mr. Goodhue : This motion, Sir, I think is carrying jcalou fy to a very extraordinary length indeed ; that we (hould be afrau to receive information from any person who is not a member of this House: this is as much as to fay, that we will not receive any light from without these doors upon the fubjett of finance : Ttu Secretary of thetreafory, is the only person from whom we can receive that information in all its extent, which this House will 1 peculiarly want. , Mr. Page replied, It is the duty of the membersof this Houfr. to inform themselves upon this, and every other fubjeft; a com mittee of finance may be appointed, who can report the necefla ry plans, and then the business will originate where it ought. I would ask, whether it it not evident, that an officer of this description, will have an undue influence and bias upon the mindi of the members, by having the power to introduce measures mt< the House? Let the Secretary form his plans, and let them be in troduced by a member; but I never will agree that an officei. who is not a member, (hall be admitted into this House with his proportions, to advocate, urge and enforce them upon us: I will be found at last, that the House has but the name of le^iflation, and the power of originating money bills will be transferred to the Secretary, and like the parliaments of France, we (hall bi called together to exercise only the power of regiftenng edi&s; this may be called jealousy, but 1 conceive it is the true language of the constitution. I wish for an energetic government; but 1 "wish for a permanent one; and I will never consent to measures in the infancy of the government, which will weaken that effici ency byalarming my conftitucnts, by giving up any constitu tional powers. Mr. Ames: The gentleman last speaking, appears to be ap prehenfive ofan infrattion of the formsof the House: This consideration ; but this is not the question immediately before us. I conceive there are two principles which present themselves to guide the committee : The one, that the powers of this officer be ufeful and efficient; and the other, that they fliould be fafe. The firft enquiry then is, Whether this power will tend to general utility. If the Secretary is to be presumed to have the best knowledge of the finances of the country ; and if this House is de firousof a&ing upon the best information, itfeems to follow lo gically, that he is to be consulted; and the best mode will be, to derive the information from him personally. It will not be de nied, that it will come within his province to have more accurate ideas upon this fubjett, than others who have no particular con cern in it. From the nature of his employment, he mud be supposed to have a full and compreheniive knowledge of the ftateof the funds of the United States—the demands that will be made upon th; and the best mode of condudting tnem: bt acquire this Ul 7' miance are ot iuch a nature, that they never can havejuftice done them by public afiemMies : This is a misfortune, which appears indefeafibly attached to their very formation. The interests of finance are so intricate, so complicated, and so diHi cult toarrange, and the opinions of members so various and oppo site, that ofie man may gain more knowledge by one hour's re search, than a popular aflembly by an inveftigarion for years. The knowledge of a financier will be ve.y desirable: Our fi nances, compared with those of all other countries, are in a cha otic state : I wish to let in a little sunshine upon them; and I cannot but flatter myf If, that such an office will be eftabliflied, as will put them in such a situation, as that we shall not be asha med of them. With refpett to the danger apprehended, I cannot conceive from whence it is to arise: It is laid, that his opinion will have an undue influence; but can he make that to be true, which is not true? Can he report untruths, which the House cannot di to£l? Truth may come in opportunely; it may destroy a favorite hypoihtfis-—this truth we may want: What means of public in fluence can he poflefs over the member:,? I can conceive of none; and it is impofliblc that in a public communication, he can have to improper an influence, as he may derive from out door in trigue, and private conversation : It is therefore more fafe to re ceive his communications publicly, than to give them to indivi dual members : It will establish a legislative controul over this officer, to call upon him to bring the details of his duty upon the floor of the House : It is a most effectual way of making him res ponsible; and will operate as a powerful check; and this is the reason, why the prime minister of Britain is obliged to appear on the floor of the House of Commons. In adduion to this, the people are hereby with the state of their money concerns. Mr. Amea concluded, by faying, that he hoped that gentlemen would review their reaf'ons for ftrikingout the words, and not let Tin unreasonable jealousy defeat the most salutary regulations. Mr. Liver more : Mr. Chairman, I am for ftrikingout the words in the clause : I suppose that no person has a right to make propositions to the representative body, who is not a member of this House : This would introduce a dangerous influence ; this will make the members careless and indifferent about anattention tothis neceflary and important part of their duty : The power to originate money bills is a sacred deposit, that ought not to be alie nated or violated : Giving the Secreta y this right will make him the source from whence all systems of Finance and plans of Reve nue will proceed. The Congrcfs, I remember, under the old Confederation, had an Ordinance similar to this bill, and it was then proper, as they had the power of removal ; but we shall not have this power, accordingto what has passed, and therefore I give my aflent to the motion for striking out those worcs. Mr. Sf.dgwick : Sir, it does appear to mc f that if we intend to realize the object of this bill, these words must not be struck out : A consideration of the different plans of revenue in the several 1 States, renders it highly neceflTary to have an officer of this kind : The methods that will be used to defeat the Revenue, renders it neceflary that there fliould be an officer vcfted with fuflicicnt pow ers to guard it : I cannot but think that the jealousy which anti cipates an undue influence, is not well founded : The indepen dence of this House will always be superior to an undue controul of the Executive : If the plans which may be proposed, were al ways of neceflity to be adopted, there would be some weight in the obje&ion ; but when the plans are introduced into this House. our various ideas will cause much time to be expended, before a current will be farmed, in which the general opinion will set. I do think it next to an impossibility, that a popular affemblv, composed of so many different members from different States, can be competent to form a good system of Revenue. It is a fuh- 1 which requires the closest application, the longest ftuay. and the view of things, to render a person proper ly adequate to it. We ftiatl always find amazing delay in wait ing to collect the opinion of individuals, upon so various afubjeft. I hope, therefore, the words will compose part of the bill. Mr. Boudi not : Jealousy, Sir, is valuable under a proper di -eftion; but there is danger of carrying it too far : Let us consider whether to realize the object before us, the power of the Secretary ought not to extend thus far : We are referred to individuals so nformation—this is, I conceive, giving up the point. One of the rand principles of the Conflitution is the responsibility of officers low if secret intelligence is obtained from this officer, and intro duced here, it will destroy that responsibility, Mid will be perni ious and dangerous to the liberties of the United States : Wehav eenthe incompetency of plans upon these principle in the indi vidual States. This secret information opens the doors to th ;reateft impositions and abuses. It is therefore ivc Ifary that w ould have anofficer, on whom we may officially call for this m oTmatioir. It has been faid,that the Committee of the whole is the propt ourceof enquiry : This, Sir, I can by no means accede to. Th Vlembers when they come together, are under the controul of I il prejudices, and must be naturally ignorant of many things n' effary to be known, in order to form a wife decision. Enormoi xpence is continually accruing while this knowledge is acquir i ig. It will require lome person to be continually employed • this business ; his time, his attention, and talents, must all be di voted : The fubjetl wili be a science, and his knowledge will b tbfolutely necessary : I hope, Sir, the amendment will not tak place. Mr. Hartley was in favor of the motion for striking out thr words : The do&rine of the gentleman lafl speaking, proved to-, nuch : That one person (hould have more knowledge of the F - nances than all others, goes to fupercede the neceflitv of legislation. The clause in the bill appears to me tooftrong. lam willingthat the House (hould draw information from this officer ; but that n hould have a right to obtrude his sentiments here at pleasure, is i neafure productive of a dangerous influence, and will be introdu cing an officer intothe government, unknown to the Constitution. Mr. Gerry observed, that if the do£lrinr which he had heard was eftablilhed, [refering to the Secretary] it ought to be extend ed to all the other officers, and that th<*y ought to be by a ribbon, or some other badge, which none of the members o r he House should have a right to wear. He said that the powei ontended for by some gentlemen, neceftanly included the ideaoi originating money bills : What is this officer to do ? Why, he is to digest and report plans for the improvement of the Revenue : \' >w f this does not comprize the power of originating mone) Hills v I do not know what does : This will be inverting the Pre udent with a moll alarming power. Gentlemen have dwelt mud »n refponfibiltty ; but what is the relponfibility of this officer i Does it mean that he should be r fponfible for a deficiency in th< R venue ? Could he be responsible for the effetts of a meafur< which he had only prop.ifrd ? Is he to be impeached for an error n judgment ? This would be unprecedented : For what thei 'hould wegive him such an enormous p >wer ? By some doctrine which have been advanced, it (hould seem as if »g«. ntleman woulc ofe his reputation by opposing this omnipotent officer ; for thef aine arguments being used, whieh are now brought forward, whei i plan of Revenue (hall be brought in by the Secretary, ihe mem bcrs will be told, that they are not competrnt to judge of finances that they came together with local views, and without any genera knowledge ; that the system proposed by the Secretary is the reful of gre»t study and observation, and it is not proper to oppose it This will preclude examination, and give an undue influence, anc from being told that it is his duty officially to bring m bills, will be told it is his duty officially to pass them : The do£lrin< omes tothis point, That it is impossible there (hould be any res ponfibility in a collective body, and is to be found only in an in dividual : Authorise this officer to originate money bills, anc what becomes of that mofteffential claufcof the Constitution whici \xrfix th: C 1.. , :.u 1A -..1.1 U- -1-. %-t|. :umftance, and would raise a clamor among the people. Mr. Gerry added a few more observations, and concluded b) a y in g> he hoped the power would not bevelled in any manwhat :ver, to palm his plans upon the representative body. Mr. Laurance : When this fubjeft was under confideratior before, there was nor difficulty Sir, about giving the power; al! he difficulty then rose from the impossibility of finding-a compe ent chai after to exercise the power : It was then contended with £reat zeal, that boards ought to have the preference : Since then, t seems that a wonderful discovery has been made, and every member of the House is found to posT fs this knowledge ; and wc ire all competent to forming systems of finance and revenue. I rejoice at this discovery! but it gentlemen are competent to form systems ot revenue, they certainly will be capable of judging ol thein ; they will be able to detest the fallacy of a sentiment, and will pofTefs fufficient sagacity to discover the impolicy of mea sures that may be proposed : From whence then is the dangerous Influence of this officer toanfe, when all are competent to detett ing his machinations? Gentlemen appear to confound terms. To propose, is not to decide : He is not to decide for us: This in formation is to be under the controul of the legislature: Will gi ving a power to recommend, be giving a power to determine? 1 hey are certainly diftinfl, and have no connection, and yet, gentlemen talk of delegating a power to originate money bills. I can conceive of no danger: When we have made it the business of a man to acquire this knowledge, it will be valuable. Is it probable that we can ever derive the necessary information from the members, who are not stationary, who are continually com ing and goine? It has been a misfortune to the United States, that an individual has not been entruftcd with this power 5 Many of the States, feperately, have fuffered from the fame cause; and '•t is owing tothis, that the finances of the country are now in such a Hate of derangement. Take away this power, and all the reft is mechanical; genius, abilities and judgment, are entirelv outofthequeftion. 1 Every member of this House, has a right to propose a bill ; but it cannot be said with propriety, that a bill is originated, till it has been matured and made a fubjea of difcuflion, by the aflent ot the House. Mr, Gerry observed, that if there was a person in the United States, competent tothis duty, he had not heard of him : the House (said he) has however determined that they will have such an officer: Sir, I would alh whether the information of this Houte would not be superior to that of any individual whatever? It such powers are mentioned now, as ar? proposed to be given this officer, what may wc not expett after he is established ? I would a(k , is a power to digest plans, meerly giving information? this is a wonderful discovery indeed! No Sir, an influence will fol low, and if we give any person a power to influence the determi nations of this House, do we not so far depart from the consti tution? He then adverted to what Mr. lanrance said refm-ftine originating bills, which if he understood the gentleman (he said) was faying that a bill could be originated, and not origina ted, at the fame moment. Mr. Vi n 1 ng observed, that this officer would be an auxiliary to the executive, when he reportshis plans : they will be before 'he f lou ' c jor their rejeflion or approbation :h; could fee no dif nculty in the business whatever. Mr. Jackson was in favor of the motion, for striking out the words: He said, the other parts of the bill are fufficiem : This ■fficcr cannot be a check upon the President, as the President .as the power of removal. lam willing this officer should have power to digest plans, but never to report them, unless called Mr. Fitzsimons moved, that the word report, should be | struck out, and the word prepare inserted. Mr. Madison said, he could not conceive where the dancer ay that some gentlemen apprehended: The words objedtcd to are fimila. to thole used in an ordinance passed by Congrcfs, in I 1782", in a subsequent ordinance to establish a treasury board- tf lff fame persons are annexed to that board, as belonging to the ofl sice of finance, To that this power nowexifts in the treasury board" so far as that has an existence. There is a possibility that the powl ei may carry some influence, but let us compare this with the danger that will accrue from the want of this power. In my opinion, there is more danger of a bad administration, from the want of this power, than can refiflt from all the influence which the Secretary can crcate; more has resulted from the want of this ►fficer, than from all other causes. The gentleman (Mr. Gerry) aflcs what is meant by refponftbility? I anlwer, we fhalleftabhih a refponfibihty? There will be a refponfibily in point of reputa, tion: a refponfibihty to the public opinion. Men of talents and dill n&ion, pay a greatregard to public opinion and the >f pufb)ic duties, for which their reputation is pledged: they vill take care to perform well : This officer upon this principle vill cake a great interest m all laws that may pass refpe&ing the evenue, and the duties of his department. The communications from the President will always be accom panied with alufions to revenue, if the doctrine is true that t» nake propositions s to originate : the President may be said to iriginate money bills : It the principle of the gentlemen is ad nittcd, the House will be abridged of the right. Mr, Page said, as to the argument derived from the proceed ings of the late Congress—it is well known, they had no power aid th. States accordingly reje&ed their doings. The President he observed, is a representative, and therefore may claim the •ght of making proportions : With refpe&to the clause, a plan to be well digested, must be vrell supported : This will bring this ificer into the House, and thus an influence will be created which will finally destroy both House and Senate too. Mr. Tucker supposed, that the amendment of Mr. Fitzfrmons, amount to the fame thing as the other ; as to prepare wolild 'oe nugatory, w thout report was made in consequence : He was therefore against it. 1 would ask, Sir, (said he) whythis princi ple, should not be inserted in the other two bills-for xecutive departments ? Why ihould not the Secretary for foreign' affairs be called upon by the branches to which he is particularly attached, to digest plans for carrying the bufinefsof the depart ment into execution? It would be attrontive to them, and foof he war department : Why then- is this House to be considered as not qualified rodo theirduty ? but must have plans digested and ' ported for us ! If we are not competent to our duty, why do we lit here ? If this principle is to be adopted, we shall divest our selves of all power and authority whatever : We shall eventually place ourselves under a master : We fhsill become more and more rarelefs and inattentive to the business of revenue : We (hall more and more confide in the judgment of the officer, supposing his s ystems are uniform, till we become intirely ignorant of the state of our finances. Mr. Sherman : It appears to me, that this clause is one of the molt important in the bill: What is the duty her.* enjoined ? It is pdevife methods for the belt arrangement of the revenue: This requires great thought, reflection, and calculation. —Let us refer to France: They had a financier who was displaced ; but their af fairs got plunged into such difficulties, that they have been obli ged to recal and restore him. This department is pointed outia the constitution, and the President may require the advice of the officer. And though it lays with the legislature to form laws for theraifing of the revenue ; yet they will want the information, that the fecretarv may lav it before them, and it will lay with the House whether to adopt it or not. There will be no other obliga tion than whatarifes from the reason and nature of things: The more light and information there is, the better will the legislature be enabled to do their duty: What is every body's bufinef, is nobody's business. The gentleman (Mr. Gerry), fays there is no person qualified : I agree with him : And there never will be, except this office is eitablifhed. We have men,whom experience will make equal to any in the world. Mr. Madison said, lam of opinion Chat the duty should be