Gazette of the United-States. (New-York [N.Y.]) 1789-1793, July 01, 1789, Image 1
iL-' Xttt f cbAp fci ffe [No. XXIII.] the TABLE T. No. XXIII. « J course of rigorous felf-denia! in youth may prove mimical to the happiness of old age." 1 N an excellent discourse which I heard a few Sundays ago, the preacher exhibited, in a ltrik ; n o- point of light, the propensity of mankind to facrifice their piofpetfis of future happiness to the love of present gratification. As I Seldom wish to call in question the propriety of religious ad monitions ; and as, on this occasion, the illustra tions were peculiarly pointed and forcible,l might have proceeded to the end of life, under the full conviction that such sentiments were just and rea sonable, had not foine doubts been excited by the following letter, I lately received from a friend. The reader must be informed, that this acquaint ance of mine retired a few years ago into the coun try, with a view of foftening the asperities of life by relaxation and indulgence. He had long been engaged in bulinefs, with much care and allidui ty, that he might put himfelfin circumltances to enjoy leisure and amufeinent. But it happened that his ardour to acquire property had produced such habits of diligence and activity, that he is utterly at a loss, how to occupy his mind, in the tranquil scenes of so calm a retreat. Removed from the anxiety and exercise of vigorous pur suits, he cannot change his feelings with his situa tion. In the early periods of life, he had solaced himfelf with the expectations of finding exquisite delight, in devoting his declining years to retire ment, which might be alternately employed in contemplation or diversions. But unfortunately he did not confulttlie principles ofhuman nature. No man can suddenly relinquish a course o(old habits, without Subjecting liiinfelf to a tedious interval, before he can for in new ones. By de laying his accustomed sources of happiness, bad as they may be, lie cannot readily adopt others that are not worse. The letter, to which 1 allude, thus describes the Situation of my correspondent. " > May 10, 1780. " D£ar Sir, "Your congratulations are pleafmg, as they de monstrate your good will and friend/hip ; but they are painful, in convincing me that .you can wilh my happiness more easily than I can realize it. If any felicity can be derived from being happy in your imagination, while in my own I am ferable, you congratulate me with propriety. " Yon will ask, and with great realbn, why I am not happy ; and you will even wonder to hear me complain, when at the fame time, I allure you that 1 have not a wish ungratified. Still however lam as unhappy a being as exilts. It is not dis appointed ambition ; it is not an unfatisfied tem per of avarice ; it is not perverse or disgraceful condutft in my family ; it is not pain or infirmity of body ; it is nota reluctance to leave this world, orthe dread of appearing in another, that disturbs my tranquility. No! None of thefecaufes oper ate in my disquietude. My infelicity only relults from disappointed hopes. I have formed expec tations of happiness which I Shall never realize. My anticipations were vain and fallacious, because ilieyamufed me with profpedls that ware contrary to the natural disposition of things. The mind that has accustomed itfelf to reject present grad uation, tor the fake of enjoying that which is future, loses by this means the relish for any en joyment at all. I am in poflellionof every ingre dient to gratify my wilhes, that I ever hoped or anticipated. They are far however from pro ducing the effeJl I intended. In short, my past habits are at variance with pi ei'ent plans and profpeifls. We arefomuch t e (laves of custom, that whatever mode of life u .\ c ' on g pui sued, cannot be suddenly alter s' " u ''°ut ft iking a dangerous blow upon our AappineSs. In vain had I flattered mvfelf, that e ! e S ant retreat would be a delightful fublli ute oi the bustle and watchfulnefs of an anxious , m P n ) mei it. Ihe disagreeable incidents of my \vTi occu P at 'ons, have all efcapedmy memory ; 1 e the pleasing circumilances are heightened tnc contrast oi my present Situation. I would it\ ' • w^ latno 'l" e of tumult I could hear, if vou d serve to wear away my tedious, vacant 'i", "'fiptd place of solitude. Every K ' l: "' figured to inyfelf from this retire awil' . las ' from my imagination. When I am ~e 111 , ® morning, I cannot form Schemes to lam t'!' C . t ' lrou gh the day ; and before night, ' hevl em ' Itec ' t0 believe that nature has changed thei| l VS ' an 1 t ' lat :^e P lanet s do not move with mvh™ "'I Verity- Thus, my friend, have ferSnn l " > a "i" defeated ;as those of every other me-v ' nU w ' lo expects that liberal enjoy contentment, after a long and '■ww woih' " - 0 ' kufi'icfi and. parfiinony. The tie na'-!r,/' 110 ' oouer change its laws than [ " ''' ''- cr to be concluded in our next number.] WEDNESDAY, July I, 1789. SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS. In the House (/REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES [Friday, June ig. Continuation of the debate on the qudlion, Whether the Secre tary of the department offoreign afoirs, shall be removable by the I're- Ilicit? ' Mr. Jackson : I am well aware Sir, how irksome it must be to have another member rife upon this question ; but when I con ttdei that the liberties of this country may be suspended upon the decision, I feel it my duty to trespass once more on the patience >f the committee: I (hall make but a few remarks.—Mr. Jackson then adveited to the arguments which had beenfo strenuously ur ged to prove the division, and diftinflion of the powers of the se veral branches, and added, I deny Sir, that there ever was a go vernment in which the powers were not blended in a greater or less degree.— Shall we find it in Rome, or in any oi the ancient governments ? Let us turn our eyes to Britain, or the other powers of Europe—there we find that the will of the exe cutive gives law to the legislature—Let us look into our constituti on, there we fee the executive has a qualified legislative power— his signature is required to complete the acts of government—he may adjourn the House from time to time—Will gentlemen ftili contend that the executive power is diftinft ? Wifl they explain away these truths ? I call upon gentlemen to shew the ncceffity of delegating this power; it cannot be maintained upon any prin ciple, but that of rendering the President completely independent of all controul by the legislature. Gentlemen have come forward with their fpe&res.— The western territory was one, and molallts was another of those frightful images; but now there is nothing to alarm our apprehensions—all is perfectly fafe—l wilhthat gen tlemen were more confident with themselves—Let us again revert to ancient history—Carthage loft her liberties by taking power from one branch to confer it upon another, and the accumulation of power in one particular branch has swallowed up the liberties of most of the ancient republics.—lt has never yet been proved, that the power which appoints, is not the power to remove.—l think the constitution has fettled this question. The President has already the Iword ; there will be a time when America will have an army—l do not confine my remarks to the present period—Let us look forward, when a different character from that which now presides, may be in the chair—The purse ftringswillbe in his hands, and these with an army at his command, will enable him to lay prostrate the liberties of America—this is no fpeftre ; experience of past ages confirms the obfervation,that a wile people, will never let their liberties lye at the meer will and pleasure of any man. Some gentlemen fay there is no danger, as the President ischofen from the mass of the people—others de ny this—how (hall we reconcile these opposing opinions? I call upon gentlemen to shew that there is no check upon the Piefide nt provided in the ronftitution. The celebrated Mr. Wilson, is of opinion, that the Senate is de fined as this check. This sentiment is confirmed by other wri ters of reputation : Sir, I ihall add nothing iurther, but mv as sent to the motion for flriking out the claulc. Mr. Baldwin : I have felt, Sir, an unusual anxiety during the debate upon this question, as I consider a proper dtcilion upon it, OTcflinuil 111 XIITTvv -furtP.qri' i.er frT+TV •-rrr«*rnCTU. The main obje&ion totheclaufe is, that wi lliall violate the Con stitution, by giving this power to the President—we have been re minded of our oaths, and with great solemnity warned against this violation ; but in my opinion, gentlemen should alter their mode of exprcflion, and fay, that their conJlruCljons of the Constitution will be violated. The principle ground of opposition to the Constitution, as I am authorised from the best information to fay, was the aflociation of the President with the Senate : ihall we not do away this objec tion, by drawing a line of separation as far as lies in our power ? It has repeatedly been said, that the power that appoints lhould be the only power to remove ; but I deny the consequence; it docs not follow ; the judges only are to be removed by the Senate ; the power of removal docs not, and ought not to exist in the power that appoints. This principle is not pursued by the Senate itfelf in the Judi ciary Bill ; there the power that appoints the inferior officers of the Federal Courts has not the power of displacing those officers. If this had been the sense of the Convention who framed the Constitution, the clause, " to be removed in like manner," would have been added. The maxim among the wisest legislators is, that the reCpe&ive branches should not be blended any further, than is necessary to carry their fepurate powers into more complete operation. If experience lhould point outthe neceflity of uniting these pow ers, it may be done ; but what is the consequence apprehended from the exercise of this power ? Why, gentlemen are afraid that the President may turn out a worthy man ! It is his life, fays the gentleman from New-Hampftiire. But the President cannot keep in an unworthy officer ; he may be impeached by this House : This is an effectual check. If the Constitution had niovidcdfor every contingency, instead of being contained in a fheetof paper, it would have swelled to a folio volume. But the President may turn out so many, that the Senate will find it difficult to procure officers. It (hould be remembered, that if a misunderstanding should arise between the President, and the head of a department, it is ne celfary that he should be removed ; but every thing we hold dear is to be profti ated by the power of the President! He is however to be eletted every four yeais, and the jealousy of this people is ever alive to catch at every defect, and we always have the pov/er of impeachment in our hands ; but as it is a doubt ful clause, as observed by the gentleman from Connecticut, we ought not to meddle with it : This is a bad sentiment in its oper ation i The great division of the Committee proves it is a doubt ful question ! We then are the disinterested branch : The President and Senate are the parties: It rests with us to decide : The Senate will receive with pleasure our decision on this question : We art fellow laborers : We are all trying to raise a noble ftrufture upon the lame foundation. Ido not wifti we should leave this question. I wish this Eill may go up with our full determination—the Senate will receive it with candour. The Judiciary is the constitutional ]udge of our laws, and they will decide upon this, and I think they will consider themselves obliged by our decision. It would be a criminal pufillahiinity to retreat from this decision. Mr. Sylvester : In yesterday's debate, Sir, t we had the fub linie, the marvellous and the pathetic-^—monfters with heads, and inonfters without heads. It has been said, that we have no right to give a conftruftion of the constitution ; if to decide this questi on is contrary to the constitution, and can be made to appear so, I shall be against it; but if it is doubtful, it is our duty to give an opinion : If there is nothing contrary to the c-onftitution, the question is, how we shall decide ? By virtue of the constitution, the executive power is vested in the President—the constitution is explicit as to *ppoinments, and by that the power of the President is eclipsed—We have a right to create such officers by the conftitution—lf we have this right, we eei tainly have a right to modify the laws for their removal; and I have aright consequently to delegate that power; and where can \_Publifhed on H eduefday and Saturday.] it be deposited with greater security ? But it is said that the Senate mull concur in the removal—this is matter of opinion as to the expediency of the power residing in the President; it is to be con sidered, that this is an high officer; it may benecefiary for an imme diate discharge, but in order to an impeachment, the vote of this House must be obtained; this would require time, and if officers are not to be removed but my impeachment, they have an inhe ritance in their office. The present is the timefor us to decide this important question; we are free and unbiafled; any errors may be rectified by the judges'; that the President should have the power to appoint, ?.*l not to displace, would in my opinion, defeat his power to carry the con stitution, so far as lays with him, into operation. Mr. Stone : I consider, Sir, that the decision of this question will give a leading feature to the administration of the government The people, Sir, have adopted this constitution because they thought that it would more eifeftually secure their liberties all the amendments Which have been proposed, go to a more perfect eftablilhment of their rights. Our object should be to carry the constitution into execution upon its true principles, without whether there is too much power here, or too little there. It is not an indifferent thing (as has been asserted) that because there is a certain quantum of power to be cxercifed, how that power is appropriated. I cannot think that the alTociated powers of the President and the Senate, is so monstrous as fotne gentlemen have supposed; the af fociAion constantly takes place : In cases of treaty, this aflociati on is requisite—what injury is apprehended ? If there is that dan-i ger predicted by gentlemen, we are in a hazardous situation? The constitution has designated a balance, the President is to appoint- the Senate to approve; it remains to carry this balance throughout. This proposed delegation of power destroys the ba lance, for the President may defeat by removals these joint ap pointments. As I refpeft the constitution, I would distribute the powers as nearly aspoflibleas the constitution has done. The separation of the powers maintained by some; is not a prin ciple in the constitution—it is contended by writers on govern ment, that the powers in general lhould be Separated, and pro perly; but in the present cafe, there is an exception, and we ought to follow that exception, step by step. Go through the constitution, and you do not find, that the Pre sident has a Angle power to appoint—The convention may have done wrong; but they did not think it fafe to trust even the ap pointment of inferior officers but by law—lt is said that the pow er of removal is in the President, and we cannot take it from him —this must be by implication; I never was fond of implications. Here Mr. Stone dilated upon the absurdity and dang r of impli cations, and then proceeded : In all the departments, there are officers to be appointed, there is the army, the navy, the mint; who is to have the power of making all these appointments ? It is said, that the President is the executive, and may discharge all these officers by himfe f, what follows? In absolute govei nments there is no doubt about implications; they always suppose that the monarch is unreftiained. The executive contended for must be defined, and then there will be no difficulty about implications. I think there are good reasons to be given why the Senate fliould in appointments and removals—in some views the watrhftrri*?" ~ j rc the President—the Senate are the ° f tlie constitution the defter.^ of the Preli-. How far above the level of the people do tnfy i 'i *nH l fiw' ll i^ii- — dent, who think it derogatory to h s dignity, to institute an en quiry into the conduct of an officer below him. We seem to for get the confidence we ought to have in the constitution—Do you place more confidence in the President thai? in the heads of de pal tments, and the Senate together? We have expended our time, blood and treasure to very little purpose, if we do not think that liberty and iafety constitute the real dignity of human nature. I think there is more real dignity r>f foul in a common peasant of America, than in a prime mmifter of Europe. Air. Stone added ftveral other observations, and con cluded with approbating the motion for fti iking out the clause. Mr. Vininc : I join with every gentleman in the idea of tlie very great importance of this fubjeft, as it refpeftsthe constitution and the future operations of the government. It has been fufficiently demonstrated by gentlemen, that the ixecutive and legislative powers should be separated : But it has been asked, where does the government exist, whose powers are not blended ? To answer this question fully would lead us into too extensive a field—but granting that in moll countries this divi sion of power is but faintly defined, yet in Great-Britain, where the fciencc has been carried to the greatest perfection, hitherto known, and where the idea of checJts is a leading feature in the system, there the powers are no farther blended than is ne cefTary. * I am pleased with the great concern which gentlemen discover for liberty—upon the fame principle 1 .contend for the neceflity of the clause. What has been theconfequence of encroachments upon the executive in other countries ? Anarchy, confufion, and the lofsof that liberty which is now said to be at stake. The shortness of the time for which the President is eleftcd is a fuffi cient preventative from abuse of power 5 but will you in order to prevent him fr< m doing harm, deprive him of the power to do %ood ? No instances can be adduced from history to prove the in tringemcnts of the executive—but on the contrary the weakening of the executive by taking away such powers as are requisite, has constantly been followed by anarchy and despotism. It has been said, that it is cruel, to take away an office without an impeachment, a trial, &c. but the delays of impeachments will render removals almost impracticable : Beides let us reflect upon the train of disagreeable, and perhaps fatal consequences to the government, which may arise from an adherence to this mode. Suppose there should be parties in the Senate ; and they will ex ist : How easy will it be to support an unworthy officer in his place, through the agency of fucl\ a party in the Senate; where decisions will be made by ballot, and where every man's vote will be a secret : What cabals and undue influence will be the consequence ! In what a situation will this place our chief magi strate ? Will this be agreeable to the spirit of the constitution ? I think not. Let us remember that thisgovernment, like He r c u l es, rose brawling from the cradle—let us avail ourselves of the prac tice, the wiidom and experience of former ages, and of other countries, and bring itto maturity. The Senators—the representatives of the sovereignties of the States, are not chosen by men specially appointed for that pur pose ; but the President is chosen by electors who are chosen im mediately by the people for that express design—hence the Senate is an improper body to interfere with the executive. The powers of the Legislature ought to be commensurate to the objects of legislation : It is conceded that this ast is a proper le g'Hative ast; but except it can be carried into compleat opera tion upon the principles of the couftitution, it is a nullity.] [The Debate upon this fubjeft was extended to a greater length than any which preceded it—some observations were atlded to those which we have given, by several other gentlemen, when the question was determined, as mentioned in fkelches of the proceed ings of 19th inft. in No. 20. of our paper.]