iL-' Xttt f cbAp fci ffe
[No. XXIII.]
the TABLE T. No. XXIII.
« J course of rigorous felf-denia! in youth may prove
mimical to the happiness of old age."
1 N an excellent discourse which I heard a few
Sundays ago, the preacher exhibited, in a ltrik
; n o- point of light, the propensity of mankind to
facrifice their piofpetfis of future happiness to the
love of present gratification. As I Seldom wish
to call in question the propriety of religious ad
monitions ; and as, on this occasion, the illustra
tions were peculiarly pointed and forcible,l might
have proceeded to the end of life, under the full
conviction that such sentiments were just and rea
sonable, had not foine doubts been excited by the
following letter, I lately received from a friend.
The reader must be informed, that this acquaint
ance of mine retired a few years ago into the coun
try, with a view of foftening the asperities of life
by relaxation and indulgence. He had long been
engaged in bulinefs, with much care and allidui
ty, that he might put himfelfin circumltances to
enjoy leisure and amufeinent. But it happened
that his ardour to acquire property had produced
such habits of diligence and activity, that he is
utterly at a loss, how to occupy his mind, in the
tranquil scenes of so calm a retreat. Removed
from the anxiety and exercise of vigorous pur
suits, he cannot change his feelings with his situa
tion. In the early periods of life, he had solaced
himfelf with the expectations of finding exquisite
delight, in devoting his declining years to retire
ment, which might be alternately employed in
contemplation or diversions. But unfortunately
he did not confulttlie principles ofhuman nature.
No man can suddenly relinquish a course o(old
habits, without Subjecting liiinfelf to a tedious
interval, before he can for in new ones. By de
laying his accustomed sources of happiness, bad
as they may be, lie cannot readily adopt others
that are not worse. The letter, to which 1 allude,
thus describes the Situation of my correspondent.
" > May 10, 1780.
" D£ar Sir,
"Your congratulations are pleafmg, as they de
monstrate your good will and friend/hip ; but they
are painful, in convincing me that .you can wilh
my happiness more easily than I can realize it.
If any felicity can be derived from being happy
in your imagination, while in my own I am
ferable, you congratulate me with propriety.
" Yon will ask, and with great realbn, why I
am not happy ; and you will even wonder to hear
me complain, when at the fame time, I allure you
that 1 have not a wish ungratified. Still however
lam as unhappy a being as exilts. It is not dis
appointed ambition ; it is not an unfatisfied tem
per of avarice ; it is not perverse or disgraceful
condutft in my family ; it is not pain or infirmity
of body ; it is nota reluctance to leave this world,
orthe dread of appearing in another, that disturbs
my tranquility. No! None of thefecaufes oper
ate in my disquietude. My infelicity only relults
from disappointed hopes. I have formed expec
tations of happiness which I Shall never realize.
My anticipations were vain and fallacious, because
ilieyamufed me with profpedls that ware contrary
to the natural disposition of things. The mind
that has accustomed itfelf to reject present grad
uation, tor the fake of enjoying that which is
future, loses by this means the relish for any en
joyment at all. I am in poflellionof every ingre
dient to gratify my wilhes, that I ever hoped or
anticipated. They are far however from pro
ducing the effeJl I intended.
In short, my past habits are at variance with
pi ei'ent plans and profpeifls. We arefomuch
t e (laves of custom, that whatever mode of life
u .\ c ' on g pui sued, cannot be suddenly alter
s' " u ''°ut ft iking a dangerous blow upon our
AappineSs. In vain had I flattered mvfelf, that
e ! e S ant retreat would be a delightful fublli
ute oi the bustle and watchfulnefs of an anxious
, m P n ) mei it. Ihe disagreeable incidents of my
\vTi occu P at 'ons, have all efcapedmy memory ;
1 e the pleasing circumilances are heightened
tnc contrast oi my present Situation. I would
it\ ' • w^ latno 'l" e of tumult I could hear, if
vou d serve to wear away my tedious, vacant
'i", "'fiptd place of solitude. Every
K ' l: "' figured to inyfelf from this retire
awil' . las ' from my imagination. When I
am ~e 111 , ® morning, I cannot form Schemes to
lam t'!' C . t ' lrou gh the day ; and before night,
' hevl em ' Itec ' t0 believe that nature has changed
thei| l VS ' an 1 t ' lat :^e P lanet s do not move with
mvh™ "'I Verity- Thus, my friend, have
ferSnn l " > a "i" defeated ;as those of every other
me-v ' nU w ' lo expects that liberal enjoy
contentment, after a long and
'■ww woih' " - 0 ' kufi'icfi and. parfiinony. The
tie na'-!r,/' 110 ' oouer change its laws than
[ " ''' ''- cr to be concluded in our next number.]
WEDNESDAY, July I, 1789.
SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.
In the House (/REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES
[Friday, June ig.
Continuation of the debate on the qudlion, Whether the Secre
tary of the department offoreign afoirs, shall be removable by the I're-
Ilicit? '
Mr. Jackson : I am well aware Sir, how irksome it must be
to have another member rife upon this question ; but when I con
ttdei that the liberties of this country may be suspended upon the
decision, I feel it my duty to trespass once more on the patience
>f the committee: I (hall make but a few remarks.—Mr. Jackson
then adveited to the arguments which had beenfo strenuously ur
ged to prove the division, and diftinflion of the powers of the se
veral branches, and added, I deny Sir, that there ever was a go
vernment in which the powers were not blended in a greater or
less degree.— Shall we find it in Rome, or in any oi
the ancient governments ? Let us turn our eyes to Britain, or the
other powers of Europe—there we find that the will of the exe
cutive gives law to the legislature—Let us look into our constituti
on, there we fee the executive has a qualified legislative power—
his signature is required to complete the acts of government—he
may adjourn the House from time to time—Will gentlemen ftili
contend that the executive power is diftinft ? Wifl they explain
away these truths ? I call upon gentlemen to shew the ncceffity
of delegating this power; it cannot be maintained upon any prin
ciple, but that of rendering the President completely independent
of all controul by the legislature. Gentlemen have come forward
with their fpe&res.— The western territory was one, and molallts
was another of those frightful images; but now there is nothing
to alarm our apprehensions—all is perfectly fafe—l wilhthat gen
tlemen were more confident with themselves—Let us again revert
to ancient history—Carthage loft her liberties by taking power
from one branch to confer it upon another, and the accumulation
of power in one particular branch has swallowed up the liberties
of most of the ancient republics.—lt has never yet been proved,
that the power which appoints, is not the power to remove.—l
think the constitution has fettled this question.
The President has already the Iword ; there will be a time when
America will have an army—l do not confine my remarks to the
present period—Let us look forward, when a different character
from that which now presides, may be in the chair—The purse
ftringswillbe in his hands, and these with an army at his command,
will enable him to lay prostrate the liberties of America—this is
no fpeftre ; experience of past ages confirms the obfervation,that
a wile people, will never let their liberties lye at the meer will
and pleasure of any man. Some gentlemen fay there is no danger,
as the President ischofen from the mass of the people—others de
ny this—how (hall we reconcile these opposing opinions?
I call upon gentlemen to shew that there is no check upon the
Piefide nt provided in the ronftitution.
The celebrated Mr. Wilson, is of opinion, that the Senate is de
fined as this check. This sentiment is confirmed by other wri
ters of reputation : Sir, I ihall add nothing iurther, but mv as
sent to the motion for flriking out the claulc.
Mr. Baldwin : I have felt, Sir, an unusual anxiety during the
debate upon this question, as I consider a proper dtcilion upon it,
OTcflinuil 111 XIITTvv -furtP.qri' i.er frT+TV •-rrr«*rnCTU.
The main obje&ion totheclaufe is, that wi lliall violate the Con
stitution, by giving this power to the President—we have been re
minded of our oaths, and with great solemnity warned against this
violation ; but in my opinion, gentlemen should alter their mode
of exprcflion, and fay, that their conJlruCljons of the Constitution
will be violated.
The principle ground of opposition to the Constitution, as I am
authorised from the best information to fay, was the aflociation of
the President with the Senate : ihall we not do away this objec
tion, by drawing a line of separation as far as lies in our power ?
It has repeatedly been said, that the power that appoints lhould
be the only power to remove ; but I deny the consequence; it docs
not follow ; the judges only are to be removed by the Senate ; the
power of removal docs not, and ought not to exist in the power
that appoints.
This principle is not pursued by the Senate itfelf in the Judi
ciary Bill ; there the power that appoints the inferior officers of
the Federal Courts has not the power of displacing those officers.
If this had been the sense of the Convention who framed the
Constitution, the clause, " to be removed in like manner," would
have been added.
The maxim among the wisest legislators is, that the reCpe&ive
branches should not be blended any further, than is necessary to
carry their fepurate powers into more complete operation.
If experience lhould point outthe neceflity of uniting these pow
ers, it may be done ; but what is the consequence apprehended
from the exercise of this power ? Why, gentlemen are afraid that
the President may turn out a worthy man ! It is his life, fays the
gentleman from New-Hampftiire.
But the President cannot keep in an unworthy officer ; he may
be impeached by this House : This is an effectual check.
If the Constitution had niovidcdfor every contingency, instead
of being contained in a fheetof paper, it would have swelled to a
folio volume.
But the President may turn out so many, that the Senate will find
it difficult to procure officers.
It (hould be remembered, that if a misunderstanding should
arise between the President, and the head of a department, it is ne
celfary that he should be removed ; but every thing we hold dear
is to be profti ated by the power of the President!
He is however to be eletted every four yeais, and the jealousy
of this people is ever alive to catch at every defect, and we always
have the pov/er of impeachment in our hands ; but as it is a doubt
ful clause, as observed by the gentleman from Connecticut, we
ought not to meddle with it : This is a bad sentiment in its oper
ation i The great division of the Committee proves it is a doubt
ful question ! We then are the disinterested branch : The President
and Senate are the parties: It rests with us to decide : The Senate
will receive with pleasure our decision on this question : We art
fellow laborers : We are all trying to raise a noble ftrufture upon
the lame foundation. Ido not wifti we should leave this question.
I wish this Eill may go up with our full determination—the Senate
will receive it with candour. The Judiciary is the constitutional
]udge of our laws, and they will decide upon this, and I think
they will consider themselves obliged by our decision. It would
be a criminal pufillahiinity to retreat from this decision.
Mr. Sylvester : In yesterday's debate, Sir, t we had the fub
linie, the marvellous and the pathetic-^—monfters with heads, and
inonfters without heads. It has been said, that we have no right
to give a conftruftion of the constitution ; if to decide this questi
on is contrary to the constitution, and can be made to appear so,
I shall be against it; but if it is doubtful, it is our duty to give an
opinion : If there is nothing contrary to the c-onftitution, the
question is, how we shall decide ?
By virtue of the constitution, the executive power is vested in
the President—the constitution is explicit as to *ppoinments, and
by that the power of the President is eclipsed—We have a right to
create such officers by the conftitution—lf we have this right, we
eei tainly have a right to modify the laws for their removal; and
I have aright consequently to delegate that power; and where can
\_Publifhed on H eduefday and Saturday.]
it be deposited with greater security ? But it is said that the Senate
mull concur in the removal—this is matter of opinion as to the
expediency of the power residing in the President; it is to be con
sidered, that this is an high officer; it may benecefiary for an imme
diate discharge, but in order to an impeachment, the vote of this
House must be obtained; this would require time, and if officers
are not to be removed but my impeachment, they have an inhe
ritance in their office.
The present is the timefor us to decide this important question;
we are free and unbiafled; any errors may be rectified by the judges';
that the President should have the power to appoint, ?.*l not to
displace, would in my opinion, defeat his power to carry the con
stitution, so far as lays with him, into operation.
Mr. Stone : I consider, Sir, that the decision of this question
will give a leading feature to the administration of the government
The people, Sir, have adopted this constitution because they
thought that it would more eifeftually secure their liberties all
the amendments Which have been proposed, go to a more perfect
eftablilhment of their rights.
Our object should be to carry the constitution into execution
upon its true principles, without whether there is too
much power here, or too little there. It is not an indifferent
thing (as has been asserted) that because there is a certain quantum
of power to be cxercifed, how that power is appropriated. I
cannot think that the alTociated powers of the President and the
Senate, is so monstrous as fotne gentlemen have supposed; the af
fociAion constantly takes place : In cases of treaty, this aflociati
on is requisite—what injury is apprehended ? If there is that dan-i
ger predicted by gentlemen, we are in a hazardous situation?
The constitution has designated a balance, the President is to
appoint- the Senate to approve; it remains to carry this balance
throughout. This proposed delegation of power destroys the ba
lance, for the President may defeat by removals these joint ap
pointments.
As I refpeft the constitution, I would distribute the powers as
nearly aspoflibleas the constitution has done.
The separation of the powers maintained by some; is not a prin
ciple in the constitution—it is contended by writers on govern
ment, that the powers in general lhould be Separated, and pro
perly; but in the present cafe, there is an exception, and we
ought to follow that exception, step by step.
Go through the constitution, and you do not find, that the Pre
sident has a Angle power to appoint—The convention may have
done wrong; but they did not think it fafe to trust even the ap
pointment of inferior officers but by law—lt is said that the pow
er of removal is in the President, and we cannot take it from him
—this must be by implication; I never was fond of implications.
Here Mr. Stone dilated upon the absurdity and dang r of impli
cations, and then proceeded : In all the departments, there are
officers to be appointed, there is the army, the navy, the mint;
who is to have the power of making all these appointments ? It is
said, that the President is the executive, and may discharge all
these officers by himfe f, what follows? In absolute govei nments
there is no doubt about implications; they always suppose that
the monarch is unreftiained. The executive contended for must
be defined, and then there will be no difficulty about implications.
I think there are good reasons to be given why the Senate fliould
in appointments and removals—in some views the
watrhftrri*?" ~ j rc the President—the Senate are the
° f tlie constitution the defter.^ of the Preli-.
How far above the level of the people do tnfy i 'i *nH l fiw' ll i^ii- —
dent, who think it derogatory to h s dignity, to institute an en
quiry into the conduct of an officer below him. We seem to for
get the confidence we ought to have in the constitution—Do you
place more confidence in the President thai? in the heads of de
pal tments, and the Senate together?
We have expended our time, blood and treasure to very little
purpose, if we do not think that liberty and iafety constitute the
real dignity of human nature. I think there is more real dignity
r>f foul in a common peasant of America, than in a prime mmifter
of Europe. Air. Stone added ftveral other observations, and con
cluded with approbating the motion for fti iking out the clause.
Mr. Vininc : I join with every gentleman in the idea of tlie
very great importance of this fubjeft, as it refpeftsthe constitution
and the future operations of the government.
It has been fufficiently demonstrated by gentlemen, that the
ixecutive and legislative powers should be separated : But it has
been asked, where does the government exist, whose powers are
not blended ? To answer this question fully would lead us into
too extensive a field—but granting that in moll countries this divi
sion of power is but faintly defined, yet in Great-Britain, where
the fciencc has been carried to the greatest perfection, hitherto
known, and where the idea of checJts is a leading feature in the
system, there the powers are no farther blended than is ne
cefTary. *
I am pleased with the great concern which gentlemen discover
for liberty—upon the fame principle 1 .contend for the neceflity
of the clause. What has been theconfequence of encroachments
upon the executive in other countries ? Anarchy, confufion, and
the lofsof that liberty which is now said to be at stake. The
shortness of the time for which the President is eleftcd is a fuffi
cient preventative from abuse of power 5 but will you in order
to prevent him fr< m doing harm, deprive him of the power to do
%ood ? No instances can be adduced from history to prove the in
tringemcnts of the executive—but on the contrary the weakening
of the executive by taking away such powers as are requisite, has
constantly been followed by anarchy and despotism.
It has been said, that it is cruel, to take away an office without
an impeachment, a trial, &c. but the delays of impeachments
will render removals almost impracticable : Beides let us reflect
upon the train of disagreeable, and perhaps fatal consequences to
the government, which may arise from an adherence to this mode.
Suppose there should be parties in the Senate ; and they will ex
ist : How easy will it be to support an unworthy officer in his
place, through the agency of fucl\ a party in the Senate; where
decisions will be made by ballot, and where every man's vote
will be a secret : What cabals and undue influence will be the
consequence ! In what a situation will this place our chief magi
strate ? Will this be agreeable to the spirit of the constitution ? I
think not. Let us remember that thisgovernment, like He r c u l es,
rose brawling from the cradle—let us avail ourselves of the prac
tice, the wiidom and experience of former ages, and of other
countries, and bring itto maturity.
The Senators—the representatives of the sovereignties of the
States, are not chosen by men specially appointed for that pur
pose ; but the President is chosen by electors who are chosen im
mediately by the people for that express design—hence the Senate
is an improper body to interfere with the executive.
The powers of the Legislature ought to be commensurate to the
objects of legislation : It is conceded that this ast is a proper le
g'Hative ast; but except it can be carried into compleat opera
tion upon the principles of the couftitution, it is a nullity.]
[The Debate upon this fubjeft was extended to a greater length
than any which preceded it—some observations were atlded to
those which we have given, by several other gentlemen, when the
question was determined, as mentioned in fkelches of the proceed
ings of 19th inft. in No. 20. of our paper.]