poses all that which is requisite to the acquifnion of the object oT
the power. It has been contended on one iide,but is not conceded
on the other; that the power of is not veiled in
the Senate. I hat the Piefident is to nominate and appoint is
evident.—Treaties are to be made by the President, by and with
t.ic advice and confcntof the Senate—Dots the Senate make trea
ties ? But not to recapitulate arguments, it was upon another idea
(M. . Sedgwick observed that) he rose.
i. he institution of the office to be eltabliflied by this bill origi
nates in the idea of the incompetency of man. All the powers
neceiarily devolve upon the President which this officer is to b,
appointed to execut —hence the realon and propriety of the ab
solute dependence on, and responsibility of this oijicer to the Pre
iident. The executive department is extensive, and naturally d.-
videsitfelf into a variety of d fferent branches—.ll these branchc;
«'ie, or ought to be amenable to the chief magistrate, hence his
rc is greatly increased, provided the officers cf these
ieveral branches aie made dependent upon him—but can this re
sponsibility b • reasonably or justly expected of him, while the
persons executing the duties of these departments are independ
ent of him : The truth is, all these executive officers are as so
many auxiliaries-os the supreme executive, and therefore their
r-iponfibility is naturally resolved into that of the President as
cunflituent parts ol it : And without an entire depcndance upon
him the idea of responsibility in him is weakened and deilroyed.
In cases of incapacity and difqualification, which perhaps can be
known only by long acquantance and the frequent recurring of
evidence, what is to be done ? rrtuft the President before he
thall he relieved from the burden of such an officer,or the pub
lic ftrvicc placed in an eligible situation by difplaeing unsuitable
and introducing proper churaftcrs—l fay mult the Preiijentappeai
before a court of impeachment ? mud he be one party and the
aecufed another ? Let gentlemen consider whatmuft be then-full
of such a ,'r nation of things.
'1 he responsibility of the Senate is loft in contemplating the dif
ficulty of impeaching the members of a colleftive'body. It has
been said, that the judges are the only suitable persons to deter
mine this qiteftion ; but troin thc rcafoning ot others this point
is by no means clear : An appeal to the judiciary mull be conced
ed as foreign, and can not engage the serious attention of the
committee at the present moment.
Mr. I.ee replied to the various objeflions of Mr. White : He
then proceeded to state the merits of the qucftion, and observed,
1 .'iat it is a max : m in government, that the legislative, executive'
and judicial powers, should be kept fcparate anddiftintt as possible'
In the formation of the Constitution of the feveral'States, parti
cular attention has been paid to this essential point.
1 he Constitution under which this House is now fitting, is framed
upon the fame principle ; and it lays with this body to'kecp those
powers in that state of separation : It is of consequence that ihc
people ftiould form just ideas of these diftinft powers, and know
where they are severally dpofited, so that by this m -ans, the pub.
Jie jealousy may at all times reccivc a proper dire&ion : On this
the liberties of rhe people depend—that die bi anch
es which ir.vcfts them with the powers peculiar to their original
oeiign, is theonly way to create that responsibility, without which
the government never can be watched and guarded. Tins lefpon
-lhinty muftofneccffity reft principally with the executive branch;
Jt is in vain.to look for it in the other branches :It is that branch
yhich is naturally refprted to as the centre of this responsibility ■
" is congenial to the ideas which we connett with the inrtituti»n'
"t the office of Chief Magistrate ; it is implied in the very expref
lion : Now if theminifters of those departments which are created
to carry into crt'eft the great executive objeas of government, are
independent of he President, or are rendered accountable to the
joint control oi the Senate and the President, it is evident that the
idea of responsibility is dissipated, and in a great measure loft—
will tin be agreeable to the withes of the people? Uponthe whole
1 cannot fee the danger which gentlemen appear to apprehend from
tnat conftruftion of the Constitution which this clause is calculated
to give : On the-other hand it appear, to me perfectly consonant
to its (pint and design ; and it is the duty of the Houfs to uive a
denfive opinion on the cafe.
M.. Boudikot : I have, Sir, attended with the grcateft care to
the arguments which have been offered upon both fides of the sub.
vT rr C the committee, and from the wholeam convinced, that
thee.hcacy of th<*government depends on a just decision of this
question : I (hall always turo my attention to the Constitution
from v r 0n y dl ; tft ° r y ; 1 " nnot a S rer with thc CC"'lcman
Iron, \ irginia, that this Congress cannot with propriety explain
and modi,y the principles of thc Constitution ; for il this'is a fact
■wi h.v.-no bufmefs here : Congress lias a right to exefcife all the
so*' hl| t are rleducible from the Constitution :We are not to
be ins.ii, need by ratifications, or by the fcceding States: I contend
that th.s power is inverted in the President, and that it is the duty
this House to declare it: The powers of thcrefpeaive branches
_ught to be defined and separated : One great objettion to the
Constitution is, that the powers ar not properly separated.
Mr.. Boud.not then repeated the arguments upon .appropriating
e relpefl'^power;, and observed, that officers Were appoint- d
and corrnmffioncd by the President, and not by the Senate : The
ot icer at the head of the department of Foreign Affairs is to obey
leo ders of the President, and confcquently must be dependent
upon him, or else hu obedience cannot be commanded : If we
C to declare that the power of removal is
n the President, thaii we not leave our great executive departments
in confufion, and low the fccdsqlj.-aloufyanddiffatisfjflion among
a fuhftir™. r C "° f government ? Gentlemen have proposed as
fubfli.nte the power offufpenfion ; butthispowcr will be found
as e.xeep iiWable as the other, and liable to greatabufes. Thc Pre
retnf! .fill ca " t,ous , of unncceffHry removals ; the Senate may
refute to fill the vacancies ; what will be the consequence ? It is
painful to refit cf upon the fubjea in this point ofview : The pow
cr must then reft with the President ; it will be impossible for him
to perform thedutn s of his department without it.
fbU l rif ACKS i ON That the decision upon the clause in
this 1 ill involves the fate ot the other two, the War and Treafurv
n P ki' ! n !C k tS : ' lnd , u 1S evidrm) y the object of thc Bill to
eftablifhthc principle in the present instance, before thc department
of the Treafnry is brought forward. 1 tmLnt
I contend Sir, that the several branches of the Legislature are
plainly pointed out in the constitution ; and those of the P.efident
are particularly enumerated: The heads also of the several de
partmcnts ar. enumerated and designated as fcparate ; and the Pre"
lident is not confiderea as the head of the whole :Heis to receive
then atv ice and require their opinions in writing—this is the ex
orlnn "h""' 0 r' " £onft,t "' ion : If "'ey are then meerly parts
or appendages of the executive, this provision in the Constitution
will be nugatory. I l, C g leave to differ from gentlemen in re
gard to conftrua.ons-I consider then, as dangerous : The Con"
ftitution has pointed out these departments—Congress may arran
them; but this is different from confirm,,- ,he fvflem • Tf "
prefumc to define and conftruc the Constitution, there is no limus
o the bu.niefs; if one is made, we may go on from alpha to omc ~
The various branches cannot in the nature of thin-s be (a i- na ,£j
and independent as some gentlemen pretend : r ver t'o ,
excelb nt w, r Publms :He has proved that the Senate are arm
edl Wit" executive power; and on the other hand the IV. fident has
tended fe '? "■ Gentlemen have said, that thc power con
tended lor IS necellary to prevent a misapplication of the public
raonev .but I contend Sir, if we give this power to the Prefid.-nt
he Will have the l,be,ti ;s of the people,,, his hands ; for if the o-'
f.ccs lliould oppose his measures, however bad, he may difola',
them at.pleafuie—and whole hands will the Tneafury then fail in
to The pin It and ;he sword are paramount to all other confid i
ations : Give a man an upcontrolable dominion over these and
POt ' h ' m Wh " e wiU be V o '"
1 U h 'li bt l n fj ' d ' that , thc P^ wcr l'c!ngvefted in the Senate woul.l
be equally dangerous ; but lafk, where is the greater danger from
power, in the one, or the many ? The Senate is con.inually revert
ing to,the mafsot t lie people; the ilatt legislatures will be a check
ipon then?. The Pre/idem has already got the iworti—give him t lie
H-urfe with the army and navy, and what is ther left ? What can
■ no: do ? With the command of the public eheii, he would
• 1 ways be able to iecure his eledlion, and thus perpetuate li s
political exillence. Let us look round us this very moment, and
•e what strides we are making towards venality and corruption.
Ve already hearthehigh founding titlcsof His Highnefs,aad Molt
1 ionorable, whicu ttn years ago would have exalted a man to a lta
iou as hign os Hanun'i : These titles have been echoed
n the newfpapcis oi B >ftjn, a town which fifteen years since
would acknowledge lio King but the Lord of Holts.
Mr. Jackson further oblerved, that the principle lie had repuatcd
y advanced, refpethng the great departments being pointed out
inthc eonftitution fpecifically, and not as neceiTanly connected
with the Pre/ident, had not been attended to ; he called upon gen
' ' cm jn to ihew the fallacy of this pi incip e: It was clearly in his
mind, that it went to ihew the unconllitutionalily of delegating
tins power to the President; and he hop.d the clause would not
oe adopted by the committee.
Mr. Scott : I have listened with great attention to the debates
upon this question, and putting the arguments of famegentlemen
together, they amount to just this ; the raifmg a great number of
nghl ul pictures, which at lirll fight appeal very terrific indeed ;
but when minutely examined, turn out to be the harmless proge
ny of a disordered imagination : Let us extm ne < n or iwo of
t £fe pictures as a sample of the whole groupe ; that we may
P f!i whet ' ier t,lere IS such danger in giving this power to the
re idcnt; and that security which some gentlemen pretend m
ltrikmg out the clause in the bill.
One ot thofc pictures represents the Piefident grasping the mo
ney ( licit, after having arbitrarily removed theofficer whole du
-11 "'he treasury: Then, Sir, in the back ground, wc
e -he Pre.,dent with the army the navy and the money ehelt en
iiga<:«nftthe liberties of America and reducing tbe people to
a jUt ilavery ; so ludden is the alarm, and so terrible the onset,
a we are hardly allowed time to fay Farewell to Libei ty : And
J , "V. s confluence of the Present's having a power to remove
tnc officer ot thetreafury.
I»ut. Sir, the fa£t is, that our money may be in the treafurv
> millwns, and wiilu at Ip,, .oI appropriation l.vtlie K-ifutuu'.
Nt ir ier the Prefidcnt not this officer can touch a farthm -of it
-lefst : This bein, the cafe, I fee as little to
, , y the ot this officer, as dano,, to it,
from his dependence oil the President.
Prefidcnt may come with his army at his back, and
ei. the money chest : 1„ this cafe I fee but little advanta -e in the
J "' ' ! ,! ' ouldftand ln 'he Prefidenfs
>, I think he will be very apt to take him, and the money too.
I 11 ■A A 1 • matter, it appears that gentlemen have
neen ar<;u,ng from prcmifcs that do not ex.ft. , n order that they
iVma.. W " C I 0 " C ; aGo ",! " om '"•<•>• have b,, „ drawl
kimcki r ond k ' to batter thcm d ° wn wit| > thtir
oflherel r ,° f a " fc !" ghlful P ' ftur " is ra,ftd out of a comparison
of therelat.onffiip between the President and the people, with
to th 7' " '" r f"T a " d thc P^P 1 ' - a "d her ewe have run deep
nuo the f Ll e„ee of ealculat,,, ; kindred, and it f,ems to be eonelu
"cd hythefnpportersofthis motion, that the Senate area much
EC r the'P °CA P co P le „ than I he Prd ' d^nt ; therefore this ftran-
Hce'r bfr' T' r"'" bl ' ' ntruft d with 'he removal of of.
nccrs , but our near kinsmen the Senate.
liut thefadfis, that the President, above all the officers of ro
ties'oThls b ° th ' rom,hc " at " r col' his appointment and the L
oTth, P ' nia y J J ftly and truly be denominated The Man
of 11" f OPU ' Whereas the Senate are thc mere repr.Tentative!
wh rW""■ ' St"t " S ° f ,he rcvcral Stal s compoAng the Un on
Td ' S "n eS are tI,C ° n ' y cffcflual bar lhat CJ " he raif.
ham , y execution of lh c federal government, and per
apsavery efficunt chcck to keep the federal government wnh.n
It'tufonal bounds, and which reprefe.natives have
, 'ucially j intle or nothing to do With the people or then in'.erelts
e, I tn, ; C t| Uap r r> tl: '" a,th ""- h '' lls picture is note; ute to 1...J
JT G„o°' ' u w ''i ,,all y phantom, and fool the,, il
Mr. Goodhl e obfenv d, that the great obi ct of t! - nref , i
l ° prOV ' d< ; tlK "" e w-h,ch we lYrel U
Vhi ?I Wam 0t ' " uder Ille " ld confederation :It is clearly
P'iwers wl„"h' """ " - dd ' S:1 ° f thc ' «>•« all thoh
.1, J' " K "" '"'any thc g-v.Tnmuit into ( \ C eu.
, lh u.d be v< iU d in the several branches ; of this defer lot u,.,
Prehdem W and V 'l', l h h thls l "" Jcdar " 11 vdl,d ln ll "
fi-er v«' f | ' llh " a & th,s P owe ' cables him to remove an ol-
President e T" ' m P"chment .efiding in the Senate, th,
eonfent ho continue 3n officer in his place, without the,,
c »nlent, however great a favorite he may be.
* * ," hfc , rvcd "P' jn ' h <- dan and impropriety of tin
Itrue 're v, 'u" "akin ;to expound the eonftitution, or'to con
awr " c , dai,fr ,n bui i-»«iuu x
co-.ftitutinn fc "fe of the committee on thc meamn,, of ,]„
ri-Vator aft' I' 1 "",' U «° b " denominated a de
x :r ~enJcd ihjt Congrta ~ad -
Mi. Sherman : The more I hear the question difculTed th.
power is vested in C th U P "l" k 1U ' S fau! ' that ""
ihn ,1 I r in the President by the eonftitution ; ,f so why
me fwo'uld t C '° yS° 10 tdl "J 1 ' P ' cf,drllt of ? " appears to
' , it would be more proper to leave the matter to his dcterm,
to do " COrdl "S 10 th " eonftitution : The President is author,f< d
do every thing ncceffary to d,fchar,e the duties of the exm
' C • but " '» eontadered, that by reft, iking him from the now ,
lilwllrTk C r vlng Officers at his will and pleat,ire, ,l„
S" ,iSP n" i ' 1 ' /i^hts"anci
adv ee a . S r th ' SenalC a ' l ' c "»' ld » d -a councilo,
merely'an K "f " 0t confldcrcd 'he conftitut.on a :
5 an advifoiy body ; tlieir consent is also nectff.ry in ao
ouentlT Th 'Th 0h 0 / h ° Uld r aVe ' he poWrr ° f d,lm '«i», confe.
,-ommitte whe!',l «!•= „
s mnehT y Wl '°" S: bllt we are l ""'" d to decide We a,
not disingenuous to fay, it is too oerDleved r '
tive. The Senate's power of advice is an excewion f ,
rh.s exception mull be conllrued ftnfllv to J, | m tt,c rul
tution with itlelf- Fur without the power in cue ft, th l Co ""'-
icc t! J at thc '* ws are executed, as he is required i Q ft"'? ca »
control over officers. Take that out of h.siiands a„d h
ped of t.ie power of his offi.e. He is no 1, n-r.r V i' c lsl W
null be made to aniwer for what he cannot V' ht
not only advise secretly, but as then own diftretior, "
They are not answerable. The bl.medividcd „ m ' fo 2 d '" f,;
tail upon none. 8 man ywuj
We are 'crvants, it is true; but wb are w,,,u
Ihould be unfaithful in both characters, if we ihould'fo ad"'" 11
advamag"' "
This power seems, therefore, to fall within thr l„ -
the President, to be nccelfary to controul oiHcers -. ; j
to thc executive his indepe nd nee. ' ' S " d t0 P ref «v=
If gentlemen on the other fide ftiould not be fatiried „,
conflru£tion,a condulion almoftas ftronirrefuits iron • ! ■ ! !l "
as from their assent: For they must br?„, more proif'f
nates power of advifmg, oradn.it thc power to be In fhio/ S "
alone; unlets they prefer renting b'oth
dilpofe of the power as :t may be expedient. Inii,., "''"J 3
dreadful array of obiefclionsdrawn from the Conftitut," lil!
nothing The Constitution has nbt impoildanv dtuy uLT',!.™?' 1
nate, which this conftruaion In favor ol the Prtfid< nt Jill"
being done ; nor is there a (ingle letter or clause whllT""™
lair or unfair conftpiftion, is oopofed to it. The ar eumf JJ
from the Cotiftitution, rests solely upon this princiole wh xh '
to be found m it, but is f.iid to be reasonable that hTi
removal from office is incident to the power of apDoinrin''^^
r C Th t ' S,S i an , if denied, cannot
tc. Certainly it is often not true. But if true Hum P ",
to their doflrine ; for the President has cxpr'cfsiy the nou'r r
norni"it.ng and appoint!,,though he must obtain thecal
s "Wtc He 15 the agent. They may prevent action •!
n °n Ai Xt ,S n 'V afy l ° illuftratc 1 lis point by examples whit
Will exaaiv correspond. But suppose that a man devises to £
ecutor land, to be fold (with the advice of a certain pcrf,m)on»
tain conditions : The executor fells with the consent, and u po „ ft,,"
cond.t.onsrequ.red in the will: The conditions are broken Sy
the executor re-enter for the breach of them ; or has the Jrf
whom he was obliged to advise with in the idle, any powerm
tram him ?1 he executor may remove the wrongful p„,f ir,, rfto '
the land though perhaps by the will he may hold "t in rfZ
feme other person's benefit. In this man,.e'l ,he President mt
advice'of Sena"®"' W '' C " hecann °'si» » withom
M'e arc told that it is dangerous to adopt conftruftions, and that
what 1S not expreWy g.vrn, is retained. Surely it is as improper
in this way to confer power upon the Senate, as upon the PrL „•
he result is, that if the power is not in the President fo.Vy u
clearly not 111 thc President and Senate. For thc very a-™
mens which make the former doubtful, make the latter abfux
oecaufe thequeltion wnsnot fr-efrom doubt, he wasfafein votiii
for the words question. If the Senate ha. not the power whictt
ST n,! r J bO,M ' dtl prOVe with alm o!tequal force,t'henthe
rielirient is veiled with it, or it is luthedifpofalof the Lc-ilkurt
Certainly we lha!l not, of choice, confer it 011 the Smite. fat
the doubt whether the President is not already entitled to t ism
argument against placing it 111 any other hands. H- I,d, s the Senile
is not always fitting-,s not responsible. I. is out of the.rlineof
auty as legislators : They are to try ; not accuse offenders: They
arc not to give orders, but oil complaint to judge of the breach of
We are warned against betraying liberty: We are told that all
power tends to abuse. And yet we cannot avoid truftins it out
of our hands. What is intended by this ?To the p.ople'it is of
no importance as it refpefls their power. Thtv cannot remove
Dart officers : They can neither gain nor lose pow'ei by it. Forthe
queltion is only which of their fcrvauts shall have the power al
rej y granted. Wife and worthy as the Senators are, thc power
in their bands will not only tend to abuse, but cannot tend to an/
thing tlfe. Many free governments have been fufcverted. The
world has profited by their expciienee, and agreed upon certain
I? 3 n' S 1 a " P owcr 'S a trust ; that to pr, vent abuse it mud
• e c, inhuted into tlircc branches, who mult be made indepen
dent, i.nd to watch and check one another. If all power is givei
' f °ft 5 c xecut ' vc » ' s a dcfpotifm. It the senatorial branch is in-
V J, ? 1 . t ! >c exec utive autho:i:y, it is an aristocracy, which of
ll rj nnies is the wnrft. As one usurps thc powers of the other,
°i ajthem conferred upon it, the government will vibrate towards
one o ihelc points. The fe arc to watch one another, and thepco-
P~ rc to watch them all—and liberty may long be fafe. Nrg-
C - n j n' c 'P^ in K these maxims, the ancient commonwealths
u ere ckftroyed. A voice ifTues from the earth which hides their
ru ' ns » an d proclaims to mankind the facredncfs of thofc truths
w icn are at this moment in controverly. It is laid that the con
• tution has in fact blended thc legifldtive and executive powers,
is has been an objettion against the constitution. If is true,
w*c Ihould restrain, not extend the evil But perhaps with the
■> e power of removal in tl>c President, thc check of the Senate in
appointments is proper : Ii is merely a check : It affords the molt
I a, '«wer to the objection. Tncre is much less objedion
1 t *e advisory power in appointments than iu removals from of-
J ||,- f, n p revent a nian » s coming into office ; but the
• ittci lOids him in office. Thc fir(t is thc tranfaftion ot an instant:
•' a^ [ er, a permanent thing It i rcates a continued connexion.
• t is obvious how this will nurse tatlion : How much it will pro
motc mtngue to procure protc£lors, and to shelter tools, It is
u liijr poison into the Constitution. It is an impure, unchaste
f-onneftion : There is rain in it : It is tempting the integrity of
e ena te with forbidden fruit. It Ihonld not be poflible for a
)r,lnc , l tne legillature to hope for a ftiare of the executive pow
1, \\ inch they are bound to watch : For tjhey may be tempted tp
ncrc«. tne executive power, by thc hope of partaking in the cx
rci People are seldom jealous of their own power, and if
cy may become partners with the executive, will they be iuitable
watchmen ? ;
Instead of being champions for liberty, they will become con
pi rators against it. The executive should be so far independ nt,
as to defeat any attempts by eith< r of the legislative branchesro
ILI, P ' u^P rer ogatives. lueverv pofTible event, his power should
>e exclusive of their partnership. But the proposed
mtioul of the Senate is setting that body above the Prtfidmt.
t tends to eftablifli an aristocracy by law ; and at the moment
> endangering the principles of our free and excellent Govern
ment, the people are to be amused with the found of liberty : For
in this lies the danger to liberty : It infufes a principle of mor
a uy mto a government, which the lovers of mankind havewilh
mi3ht hft to the end of the world. With a mixture of execu
tive an (giflative powers, no government can long remain ficc
• itn a corrupt executive, liberty may long be prefervrd. But
•vith a corrupt legislative, it is impoflible. A government lo
formed, would be the most formidable curse that could hefal this
•Probably an enlightened people would forfteanda
mend the error in fcafon. But if time was allowed for fu:ha com
pound to produce its natural effects, it would cither banifli liberty,
1)1 t .e p.ople would be driven to exercise the primary rights 0
nature, ana to deflroy a mnnftcr wbi> h would destroy their..-'
He admired the free principles of the Constitution, and lho"M
vote tor tne clause on account of its conformity to those principles.
[J , j ~, , t . { j , ' v '.' ' i' . V,- 'j ; ■